v&mms^Mi 


YALE 
HISTORICAL  STUDIES 


published  under  the  direction  of  the 

Department  of  History 

from  the  income  of 

THE  FREDERICK  J.  KINGSBURY 
MEMORIAL  FUND 


COLBERT'S  WEST  INDIA 
POLICY 


By 


STEWART  L.   MIMS 

Assistant  Professor  of  History 
in  Yale  College 


,' '  »  •  > »  »  > 


New  Haven:  Yale  University  Peess 

London  :    Henry   Frowde 

Oxford  University  Press 

MCMXII 


Copyright,  1912,  bt 
Yale  University  Press 


Printed  from  type,  600  copies,  July,  1912 

3S- 


rt.nl  ^ 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF 

EDWARD   GAYLORD  BOURNE 

WHOSE  PROFOUND  LEARNING  AND  MANLY  QUALITIES 

INSPIRED  HIS  PUPILS  TO  TRY  TO  FOLLOW 

IN  HIS  FOOTSTEPS 


271035 


PREFACE 

Some  five  or  six  years  ago  in  a  course  offered  to  grad- 
uate students  of  Yale  University  by  the  late  Professor 
Edward  Gaylord  Bourne,  I  became  much  interested  in  the 
so-called  economic  causes  of  the  American  Revolution.  I 
found  then,  and  have  continued  to  find,  much  inspiration 
in  the  work  of  Mr.  George  L.  Beer.  All  of  that  author's 
work  shows  a  thorough  and  comprehensive  grasp  of  the 
forces  and  ideas  which  directed  and  gave  shape  to  the 
commercial-colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain.  Study  con- 
vinced me,  however,  that  neither  Mr.  Beer  nor  any  other 
writer  had  worked  out  or  clearly  presented  a  most  striking 
economic  fact  which  was  of  considerable  importance  in 
the  commercial  history  of  the  British  North  American 
colonies,  namely,  the  rapid  growth  and  expansion  during 
the  eighteenth  century  of  the  French  West  Indies,  the 
most  important  of  which  were  Martinique,  Guadeloupe, 
and  the  western  half  of  St.  Domingo. 

Mr.  Beer  and  some  of  his  predecessors  have  pointed 
out  the  fact  that  New  England  traders  obtained  from 
these  islands  their  most  important  supply  of  molasses  for 
their  rum  distilleries,  which  became  of  great  importance 
to  their  economic  and  commercial  life,  and  that  they  also 
found  in  these  same  islands  a  profitable  market  for  large 
quantities  of  lumber,  of  "West  India"  cod  and  other  salt 
fish,  of  live  stock  and  food-stuffs.  It  is,  in  fact,  writ  large 
in  the  Molasses  Act  of  1733  and  again  in  the  Sugar  Act 
of  1764  that  the  trade  between  these  two  groups  of  colo- 
nies had  become  of  such  great  importance  as  to  arouse 
the  opposition  of  the  British  West  India  planters  and  to 
cause  the  British  government  to  take  steps  to  interrupt. 


PREFACE 

or  at  least  to  discourage,  this  trade  so  seriously  as  to 
render  it  unprofitable.  Many  students  are  already  famil- 
iar with  the  violent  protests  of  Massachusetts  and  of 
Rhode  Island  against  George  Grenville's  policy,  and  have 
seen  in  them  an  indication  of  the  importance  of  the  trade. 

The  French  West  Indies,  however,  have  remained  but 
a  name.  Students  have  watched  New  England  ships  sail 
with  their  cargoes  of  fish,  lumber,  live  stock  and  food- 
stuffs and  have  let  them,  so  to  speak,  disappear  into  the 
unknown,  whence  they  saw  them  reappear  with  cargoes 
of  sugar  and  molasses.  None  has  seen  fit  to  follow  them 
to  Martinique  or  to  Guadeloupe  or  to  St.  Domingo  to  catch 
a  glimpse  of  the  great  prosperity  of  these  islands  and  to 
learn  the  secret  of  their  extraordinary  development  which 
enabled  the  French  to  drive  the  English  from  the  sugar 
markets  of  Europe  and  made  of  them  the  most  profitable 
market  which  New  England  traders  could  find. 

It  was  in  quest  of  this  secret  that  I  set  out  some  three 
years  ago  for  France  to  find,  if  possible,  buried  away  in 
unprinted  manuscripts  the  story  of  the  economic  and 
commercial  development  of  the  French  W*est  Indies  which 
no  one  had  ever  tried  to  tell,  but  which  I  believed  was, 
nevertheless,  one  of  both  interest  and  importance. 

M}^  immediate  interest  in  the  story  lay  rather  in  that 
part  of  it  which  had  to  do  with  the  eighteenth  century, 
when  these  islands  first  became  of  any  considerable  impor- 
tance, and  to  that  I  first  turned  my  attention.  But  even 
at  the  beginning  of  my  work,  I  found  it  quite  impossible 
to  deal  intelligently  with  many  questions  of  the  eighteenth 
century  without  knowing  something  more  accurate  than 
was  to  be  found  in  any  printed  work  of  the  commercial 
policy  which  had  directed  and  shaped  the  growth  of  the 
islands  during  the  preceding  century.  The  result  was  that 
I  decided  to  make  a  thorough  study  of  the  early  period 
for  myself  as  a  foundation  for  my  later  work. 

viii 


PREFACE 

It  was  in  this  way  that  I  came  to  write  the  present 
study  for  the  ministry  of  Colbert  and  will  offer  shortly 
another  of  similar  character  for  the  period  1683-1715. 
I  hope  that  these  two  studies  will  make  it  possible  to 
present  more  intelligently  a  later  study  for  the  reign  of 
Louis  XV,  in  which  I  shall  deal  with  the  story  of  the  trade 
between  the  New  England  colonies  and  the  French  West 
Indies. 

It  was  with  much  hesitation  that  I  decided  to  make  the 
bold  venture  of  writing  a  volume  which  dealt  with  any 
phase  of  the  ministry  of  Colbert.  His  name  and  his  work 
have  attracted  so  many  scholars  of  great  ability  that  I 
naturally  felt  some  misgiving  in  exposing  myself  to  such 
a  body  of  critics.  A  more  serious  objection  was  the  fact 
that  I  had  never  made  any  thorough  study  of  Colbert  and 
had  collected  material  on  his  ministry  merely  to  aid  me  in 
writing  an  introduction  to  a  volume  on  the  later  period 
which  I  had  in  mind.  But  as  I  found  at  the  end  of  my 
researches  that  I  had  amassed  enough  notes  from  unpub- 
lished, and  in  some  cases,  unexplored  material  which  would 
permit  me  to  state  the  problem  confronting  the  great  min- 
ister in  the  reorganization  of  the  French  West  India  colo- 
nies and  to  give  an  account  of  the  measures  he  took  to 
solve  it,  I  was  subjected  to  the  temptation  of  expanding 
my  introduction  into  a  volume.  The  temptation  grew 
stronger  when  I  realized  that  no  serious  student  had  ever 
tried  to  study  in  detail  any  single  problem  which  Colbert 
encountered  in  his  efforts  to  build  up  colonial  commerce. 
I  yielded  to  the  temptation. 

An  attempt  has  been  made,  therefore,  in  the  present 
volume  to  present  the  results  of  my  study  and  to  offer 
them  for  what  value  they  may  have  for  special  students 
of  Colbert  and  for  those  interested  in  the  history  of  the 
West  Indies.  I  have  tried  to  present  the  essential  lines 
of  Colbert's  commercial  policy  toward  the  French  West 

ix 


PREFACE 

Indies,  as  they  are  traced  in  the  legislation  and  corre- 
spondence of  the  period.  For  the  most  part,  I  have  done 
so  without  comment  or  criticism,  permitting  the  documents 
in  many  cases  to  tell  their  own  story.  I  have  left  to  more 
competent  hands  the  task  of  stating  the  larger  principles 
of  economy  which  guided  Colbert  in  framing  his  more 
comprehensive  plan  for  the  upbuilding  of  French  indus- 
tries and  French  commerce.  That  task  can  not  well  be 
performed  until  more  detailed  studies  have  been  made  on 
many  subjects  which  are  related  to  the  history  of  his  com- 
mercial and  industrial  policy.  I  shall  feel  amply  rewarded 
for  my  work,  if  the  contents  of  this  volume  prove  of  value 
to  him  who  undertakes  this  larger  and  more  important 
task.  I  regret  very  much  that  I  have  not  been  able  to 
treat  many  questions  which  would  prove  both  interesting 
and  profitable  to  students  of  the  West  Indies.  Thus,  such 
questions  as  the  cost  of  production  of  sugar,  the  fluctua- 
tion of  its  price,  the  methods  employed  in  its  cultivation, 
the  great  social  transformation  wrought  by  its  introduc- 
tion as  a  staple  product  in  the  islands,  or  others,  such  as 
the  cost  of  slave  labour,  the  system  of  land  grants,  colo- 
nial currency,  the  sources  of  capital  invested  in  the  islands, 
as  well  as  all  questions  of  administration  and  kindred 
questions  have  been  either  entirely  omitted  or  touched 
upon  only  superficially.  This  has  been  done,  partly 
because  the  material  found  proved  inadequate  for  a  satis- 
factory treatment  of  these  questions,  and  partly  because 
I  have  attempted  to  present  here  primarily  a  study  in 
imperial  policy  and  not  a  study  in  West  India  history. 
The  history  of  the  French  West  Indies  did  not,  in  fact, 
become  important  until  the  eighteenth  century.  Their 
production  and  their  commerce  during  the  seventeenth 
century  were  small  and  a  detailed  history  of  either  would 
be  of  minor  interest.  The  policy  which  was  pursued  by 
Colbert,   however,   to  stimulate   their   production   and   to 


PREFACE 

increase  their  commerce  with  the  mother  country  proved 
of  permanent  value,  because  it  laid  the  base  for  the  marvel- 
lous development  of  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  and  espe- 
cially St.  Domingo,  in  the  eighteenth  century.  This  is 
the  justification  offered  for  placing  the  emphasis  upon 
questions  of  imperial  policy  and  upon  conditions  within 
the  islands  only  as  they  affected  or  were  affected  by  that 
policy. 

I  have  yielded,  perhaps  unwisely,  to  the  temptation  of 
devoting  too  much  space  to  the  history  of  the  West  India 
Company.  New  material  found  in  the  Archives  Coloniales 
at  Paris  made  it  possible  to  state  more  accurately  many 
old  facts  and  to  add  many  new  ones  concerning  its  history. 
An  examination  of  the  bibliography  and  footnotes  will 
reveal  the  sources  from  which  my  study  has  been  drawn. 

I  am  under  obligations  to  many  who  have  aided  me  in 
my  work.  I  shall  always  recall  with  much  pleasure  the 
kindness  shown  me  by  many  librarians  and  archivists  in 
Paris  and  in  the  various  ports  of  France  where  my  work 
called  me.  To  M.  Nicolas  and  M.  Wirth  of  the  Archives 
Coloniales ;  to  M.  Stein  and  M.  Bourgin  of  the  Archives 
Nationales ;  to  M.  Charles  de  La  Ronciere,  the  sympathetic 
and  obliging  conservateur  of  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale, 
at  Paris ;  to  M.  Leon  Maitre,  late  archivist  of  the  Archives 
Departementales  de  la  Loire  Inferieure,  whose  patience  and 
wilHngness  to  aid  me  in  unraveUing  the  tangles  in  the  ad- 
miralty records  of  Nantes  were  inexhaustible;  to  M.  Cul- 
tru,  charge  de  cours  at  the  Sorbonne,  who  proved  an 
inspiration  to  me  many  times  during  my  stay  at  Paris ;  to 
H.  P.  Biggar  and  his  assistant,  M.  Beauchesne,  both  of 
whom  were  ever  ready  to  communicate  any  information, 
relating  to  my  subject,  which  they  found  in  the  Canadian 
correspondence ;  to  one  and  all  I  wish  to  express  my  grati- 
tude. Of  my  own  countrymen,  I  am  indebted  to  Mr. 
Waldo    G.    Leland    of    the    Carnegie    Institution,    whose 

xi 


PREFACE 

sojourn  at  Paris  coincided  with  my  own  and  who  was 
ever  willing  to  aid  me;  to  my  colleague,  Professor  Emer- 
son D.  Fite  of  the  faculty  of  Yale  College,  for  sug- 
gestions; to  Mr.  Andrew  Keogh  of  the  Yale  University 
Library,  for  suggestions  and  aid  in  the  arrangement  of 
the  bibliography.  I  am  under  special  obligations  to  Pro- 
fessor George  Burton  Adams  for  making  possible  the  pub- 
lication of  this  volume  in  its  present  form.  I  am  most 
indebted  to  Professors  Wilbur  C.  Abbott  and  Max  Far- 
rand  for  their  kindness  in  reading  my  manuscript,  going 
over  it  patiently  with  me  and  offering  many  invaluable 
criticisms.  I  am  grateful  to  Mr.  E.  Byrne  Hackett  of  the 
Yale  University  Press  for  his  patience  and  kindness  in 
aiding  me  in  the  many  problems  which  arose  in  the  trans- 
formation of  my  work  from  manuscript  to  its  present 
form.  Finally  I  should  not  fail  to  express  here  my  ever- 
lasting gratitude  to  him  to  whose  memory  this  study  is 
dedicated.  It  was  he  who  first  inspired  me  to  begin  my 
work.  I  only  wish  that  I  could  offer  something  worthy 
of  the  inspiration  which  he  imparted  while  still  among  us 
and  of  the  hallowed  memory  which  he  has  left  to  us  his 
former  pupils. 


CONTENTS* 

Page 
Preface  ........        vii 

Introduction    .  .  .  ....  .  .  1 

Chapter  I 

The  Establishment  of  the  French  in  the  West  Indies 

and  the  Commencement  of  Trade,  1626-1 660  .        14 

Chapter  II 
The  Awakening  and  the  Period  of  Preparation     .  .        52 

Chapter  III 

The  Establishment  of  the  West   India  Company.     Its 

Concessions,  Privileges  and  Composition       .  .        68 

Chapter  IV 
The  West  India  Company,  1664-1665  ...       83 

Chapter  V 
The  West  India  Company,  1666-1667  .  .  -123 

Chapter  VI 
The  West  India  Company,  1668-1670  .  .  .150 

Chapter  VII  ^ 

The  West   India  Company,   1670-1674.     Its   Trade  in 

Slaves,  Salt  Beef,  Live  Stock.     Its  Downfall  .      165 


*  For  detailed  reference  see  Index. 

xiii 


CONTENTS 


Chapter  VIII  p^ge 

The  Exclusion  of  Foreign  Traders     .  .  .  .182 


Chapter  IX 
The  Fight  Against  the  Dutch 195 

Chapter  X 
Freedom  of  Trade  and  the  Rise  of  the  Private  Trader     225 

Chapter  XI 
Colonial  Exports — Tobacco        .  .  .  .  .      249 

y^  Chapter  XII 

Colonial  Exports — Sugar  .....      260 

Chapter  XIII 
Colonial  Imports — Indentured  Servants  and  Slaves         .      281 

Chapter  XIV 
Colonial  Imports — Food-Stuffs  .  .  .  .310 

Chapter  XV 

Colonial  Imports — Live  Stock,   Lumber,  Manufactured 

Goods 326 

Chapter  XVI 
Conclusion       ........      332 

Bibliography  .  .  .  .  .  .  .341 

Index ^^^ 


XIV 


COLBERT'S  WEST  INDIA  POLICY 


INTRODUCTION 

*'    A  iS'  /  cast  my  glance  throughout  the  length  and  hreadth\ 
Am.   of  France  to  find  out  what  is  the  condition  of  its  com-    j 
merce,  I  am  dumfounded  to  see  into  what  a  low  state  it  has  sunk,  j 
I  am  seized  with  a  feeling  of  disgrace  and  of  sorrow,  when  I  seei 
the  greater  part   of  our  merchants   idle,  our  sailors   without 
employment,    our    harbours    without  •  vessels,    and    our    ships 
wrecked  and  stranded  upon  the  beach.    .    .    .   Like  Diogenes 
I  might  carry  a  lantern  at  noontide  in  our  cities  and  our  ports 
in  search  of  a  French  merchant."^ 

Thus  wrote  Jean  Eon,  a  Carmelite,  at  Nantes,  in  1646. 
It  is  only  one  of  many  striking  passages  in  his  interesting 
book,  Le  Commerce  honorable,  which  describes  in  mourn- 
ful numbers  the  state  of  France  of  his  day.  The  pessi- 
mism which  is  breathed  into  his  book  was  only  too  well 
justified  by  the  deplorable  condition  into  which  the  indus- 
trial and  commercial  life  of  France  had  sunk  at  the  eve 
of  Colbert's  ministry.  The  industries,  established  under 
the  stimulating  economic  policy  of  Sully  and  fostered  by 
Richelieu,  were  in  a  state  of  decadence.  The  woollen 
industry  had  almost  ceased  to  exist  in  Languedoc,  which 
had  been  its  most  thriving  center.  The  Dutch  and 
Enghsh,  the  latter  of  whom  had  formerly  brought  their 
wool  to  France  to  be  manufactured,  had  established  manu- 
factories of  their  own  and  had  largely  supplanted  the 
French  as  furnishers  of  woollens  to  the  markets  of  Europe. 
The  silk  mills  of  Tours  and  Lyons  were  decHning.  The 
foundries,  the  forges,  the  factories  of  steel,  and  the  tan- 
neries had  been  almost  abandoned.^  "So  that  instead  of 
gaining  large  sums  as  they  did  in  former  times,  the  French 

'^  Le  Commerce  honorable,  Nantes,  1646,  p.  20. 
2  G.  Martin,  La  grande  industrie  en  France  sous  le  r^gne  de  Louis 
XIV,  Paris,  1899,  Chap.  I. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

gain  nothing,  for  much  specie  is  leaving  the  kingdom  and 
none  enters."^ 

The  navy  and  merchant  marine,  too,  were  in  a  most 
deplorable  condition.  "The  power  of  the  king  by  land  is 
superior  to  that  of  all  others  in  Europe,  by  sea  it  is  infe- 
rior. .  .  .  France  has  not  at  the  present  hour  200  ves- 
sels in  good  condition  in  her  ports."*  The  number  of 
vessels  even  for  coasting  trade  was  certainly  small.^  The 
inquest  ordered  to  be  made  in  1664  by  the  conseil  des 
finances  at  the  suggestion  of  Colbert,  to  find  out  "the 
number  and  quality  of  vessels  which  were  in  the  ports  of 
the  realm,"  showed  that  in  all  the  ports  of  France  there 
was  a  total  of  only  2368  vessels,  representing  an  aggregate 
tonnage  of  129,605  tons.^  There  were  only  329  vessels 
of  more  than  100  tons.  Some  of  these  even  were  to9  old 
or  disabled  for  service.^  So  that  Colbert  probably  knew 
whereof  he  spoke,  when  he  remarked  that  France  had  not 
at  that  time  200  vessels  in  good  condition  in  her  ports. 

The  Dutch  were  at  the  height  of  their  maritime  suprem- 

3  P.  Clement,  Lettres,  instructions  et  m4moires,  II,  1,  cclxvii,  Dis- 
cours  sur  les  manufactures  du  Roy,  a  memoir  by  Colbert  in  1664. 

4  Clement,  II,  1,  cclxxl,  Colbert,  M6moire  sur  le  Commerce, 

5  "That  is  a  fact  which  is  very  easy  to  prove  by  visiting  our  coasts 
and  our  harbours,  where  one  sees  so  many  foreign  ships  that  the  small 
number  of  French  ships  is  lost  from  sight.  Thus  for  ten  or  twelve  of 
our  ships  one  may  count  fifty  or  sixty  belonging  to  foreigners."  Le 
Commerce  honorable,  p.  20. 

6  There  were:  1063  of  10  to  30  tons;  345  of  30  to  40  tons;  320  of 
40  to  60  tons ;  178  of  60  to  80  tons ;  133  of  80  to  100  tons ;  102  of  100 
to  120  tons;  72  of  120  to  150  tons;  70  of  150  to  200  tons;  39  of  200 
to  250  tons;  27  of  250  to  300  tons;  19  of  300  to  400  tons.  Bib.  Nat. 
MSS.,  500  Colbert,  199,  contains  the  results  of  this  most  interesting 
inquest.  Detailed  information  is  given  in  the  reports  made  from  the 
diflFerent  ports.  It  is  a  mine  of  information  which  has  not  been  thor- 
oughly exploited. 

7  Thus  it  is  recorded  in  the  inquest  made  at  Nantes  that  La  PeU 
lagye,  a  vessel  of  140  tons,  built  at  Croisic  in  1648,  "was  fit  for  nothing 
except  to  be  torn  to  pieces." 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

acy.  Colbert  estimated  that  out  of  a  total  of  20,000  ves- 
sels in  the  merchant  marine  of  Europe,  16,000  belonged 
to  them.  They  had  become  the  great  carriers  of  Europe. 
Their  cities  had  become  the  great  entrepots  of  interna- 
tional trade.  Their  ships  were  upon  every  sea  and  in  every 
harbour  to  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  profit 
by  trade  and  transport.  The  ports  of  France  were  no- 
exception  to  the  rule.  They,  too,  were  frequented  by  great 
numbers  of  Dutch  traders.  For  the  item  of  transport 
alone  in  the  coastwise  and  foreign  trade,  the  French  paid, 
according  to  Colbert's  estimate,  an  annual  tribute  of 
4,000,000  livres.  Commerce  also  was  almost  entirely  in 
their  hands. 

"It  is  certain,"  remarked  Colbert,  "that  with  the  exception 
of  a  certain  number  of  vessels  which  go  from  Marseilles  to 
trade  in  the  Levant,  no  commerce  exists  in  the  kingdom.  This 
is  true  even  to  the  point  that  in  the  islands  of  America, 
occupied  by  the  French,  there  are  150  Dutch  ships  annually 
which  carry  on  trade  with  them,  importing  food-stufFs  pro- 
duced in  Germany  and  goods  manufactured  in  Holland,  and 
exporting  sugar,  tobacco  and  dye-woods.  They  carry  these 
latter  commodities  to  Holland,  which,  after  manufacturing  and 
paying  an  import  and  export  duty  upon,  they  bring  to  France 
to  sell."^ 

Jean  Eon  estimated,  in  1646,  that  the  "balance  of 
trade"  was  against  France  in  her  dealings  with  all  the 
principal  nations  of  Europe.  He  justified  this  statement 
by  the  following  statistics: 

Holland :« 

Imports  from  ....      21,445,520  livres. 

Exports  to      .  .  .  .  .      16,701,466  livres. 

8  Clement,  II,  1,  cclxxi. 

^Le  Commerce  honorable,  pp.  28  flF.  The  details  of  the  imports 
from  and  exports  to  Holland  were  as  follows: 

3 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 


Great  Britain  and  Ireland: 

Imports  from 

Exports  to 
Portugal : 

Imports  from 

Exports  to 
Italy: 

Imports  from 

Exports  to 


15,372,000  livres. 
12,904,100  livres. 

4,992,500  livres. 
5,851,950  livres. 

4,124,500  livres. 
3,020,000  livres. 


Holland,  Imports  from: 
Pepper,  cinnamon,  nutmeg,  mace,  ginger,  etc 

Sugar      .         

Medicine,  drugs,  etc.         .... 
Precious  stones,  cottons,  woollens,  ebony,  plumes. 

etc 

Indigo,  Brazil  wood,  camphor,  gums 

Swedish  copper,  Polish  lead,  tin,  ironware,  etc, 

Cannon,  powder,  firearms 

Russian  leather,  furs,  etc. 

Linen,  flax,  tar,  Norwegian  timber  . 

Herring,  salt  salmon,  whale  oil 

Butter,  cheese,  tallow,  etc. 


3,193,130  livres. 

1,885,150  livres. 

842,080  livres. 


1,835,200 

1,035,220 

1,500,000 

1,235,000 

675,300 

1,700,170 

454,300 

200,000 


livres. 
livres. 
livres. 
livres. 
livres. 
livres. 
livres. 
livres. 


Total 21,445,520  livres. 

Exports  to: 

Wine,  cognac,  brandy 6,192,632  livres. 

Wheat,  other  grains 3,450,450  livres. 

Salt 2,488,750  livres. 

Cloth,  linen  from  Normandy  and  Brittany  and 

Guienne 1,583,432  livres. 

Olive  oil,  olives,  from  Marseilles  and  Provence  715,177  livres. 

Laces,  paper,  glass,  thread     ....  915,525  livres. 

Honey,  preserved  fruits,  etc 355,500  livres. 

Total 16,701,466  livres. 

The  author  states  that  these  statistics  were  compiled  from  memoirs 
in  the  principal  ports  of  France  and  represent  the  average  for  five 
years  and  states  that  "they  have  been  carefully  compiled  by  reliable 
persons  who  understood  the  theory  and  practice  of  trade." 

4 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

An  explanation  of  the  inferiority  of  the  French  in  trade 
was  suggested  by  the  same  writer : 

y^  'The  French  have  long  sihce  entertained  a  very  disparaging 
opinion  of  commerce,  which  they  consider  suited  only  to  I 
debased  souls.  .  .  .  Every  one  aspires  to  gain  honour  and 
leisure  and  believes  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is  to  be  i 
enjoyed  in  the  pursuit  of  commerce.  This  is  the  opinion  which] 
rihe  majority  of  Frenchmen  hold  and  especially  those  of  the! 
/  tiers  etat,  who  have  means  and  desire  to  elevate  their  children  i 
1  to  tlje  most  honourable  stations.  They  cultivate  in  them  no  love 
'  for  trade  or  give  them  no  instruction  in  matters  of  commerce, 
but  send  them  to  colleges  where  they  pass  many  years  in  the 
study  of  the  sciences.  To  be  sure  instruction  is  very  good  and 
necessary  in  the  moulding  of  a  virtuous  life  and  in  rendering 
one  of  service  to  God,  the  king  and  the  state.  Nevertheless, 
the  energy  of  our  young  men  is  wasted  in  these  colleges  and 
they  are  fitted  only  for  a  life  of  elegance,  of  idleness,  and  of 
no  service  to  the  state.  For  as  soon  as  they  leave  college, 
some  give  themselves  over  to  the  pursuits  of  love,  which  Diog^ 
enes  calls  the  affair  of  those  who  have  nothing  to  do.  .  .  . 
Others  spend  their  time  playing  at  jeu-de-paumes  to  sweat  at 
their  pleasure  and  thereby  gain  an  appetite  to  eat  up  in  a 
*  short  time  all  their  patrimony.  Others  take  to  cards  and  dice, 
and  thus  pass  their  days  and  nights  in  foolishly  dissipating 
the  fortunes  which  their  fathers  have  acquired  by  hard  work. 
Still  others  pass  their  time  in  drink-shops.  .  .  .  Our  young 
are  thus  reared  to  lead  an  idle  and  spendthrift  life.  .  .  .  The 
indifference  of  the  French  to  commerce  comes  not  only  from 
the  small  esteem  and  the  little  inclination  which  they  have  for 
it,  but  also  from  the  fact  that  they  are  strongly  diverted  by 
ambition.  .  .  .  They  have  ambition  to  acquire  the  offices  of 
justice  which  the  state  in  its  need  has  created  in  great  numbers, 
so  that  the  majority  of  those  who  are  rich  and  have  means 
to  carry  on  commerce  abandon  it,  in  order  to  acquire  such  posi- 
tions for  their  children.  .  .  .  It  is  for  this  reason  that  for 
the  maintenance  of  trade  there  remain  only  those  of  low  estate, 
who,  by  reason  of  their  moderate  means,  are  unable  to  buy 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

offices  from  the  state,  and  who  for  the  same  reason  are  incap- 
able of  carrying  on  an  extensive  trade  and  are  forced  to  confine 
themselves  to  retail  trade,  or  at  best,  to  the  coasting  trade,  both 
of  which  are  of  small  value  to  the  nation  in  comparison  with 
foreign  commerce  which  brings  us  gold  and  silver  and  many 
other  things  necessary  and  useful  for  our  life.  Whenever, 
from  that  small  number  of  Frenchmen  who  are  engaged  in 
foreign  commerce,  some  one  amasses  a  fortune,  which  is  the 
very  moment  when  he  is  the  most  capable  of  pursuing  foreign 
trade,  he  abandons  it  in  order  to  place  his  children  in  some 
office  of  state/'^J/^ 

From  this  picture  the  author  turns  his  eyes  toward  the 
life  of  other  nations : 

"From  the  age  of  fifteen  and  twenty,  they  [the  Dutch]  are 
to  be  seen  upon  the  quais  loading  and  unloading  cargoes,  or 
in  the  stock-exchanges  engaged  in  business,  or  in  the  market- 
places choosing  and  buying  the  best  products.  .  .  .  Thus 
from  their  youth  they  form  habits  of  trade,  become  endowed 
with  skill  which  insures  their  success.  .  .  .  They  learn  for- 
eign languages  and,  like  the  ancients,  acquire  by  conversation 
a  knowledge  of  those  things  which  are  the  most  beautiful  and 
the  most  necessary  for  the  enjoyment  of  life  and  its  spiritual 
welfare." 

There  is  to  be  found  in  these  two  passages  an  explana- 
tion of  the  decadence  of  commerce  in  France,  which  gives 
a  profound  insight  into  the  very  difficult  problem  that 
confronted  Colbert  in  his  determination  to  build  up 
national  industries  and  national  trade.  (The  life  of  the 
nation  was  centered  in  the  court,  in  the  attainment  of 
rank  and  places  as  high  as  possible  in  the  ereat  social  and 
political  hierarchy  of  the  ancien  regime./  A  man's  worth 
seemed  measured  by  the  amount  of  success  which  he  had 
met  with  in  this  pursuit.  Commerce  was  considered  an 
occupation  below  the  dignity  of  the  well-bred.     A  mer- 

w  Ibid.,  44  fF. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

chant  who  met  with  success  forsook  his  calhng  to  become 
another  sateUite  in  the  mad  whirl  of  office-seekers,  cour- 
tiers and  dilettantes.  Ministers,  warriors,  artists,  littera- 
teurs, officials,  noblemen,  the  clergy,  were  all  received  with 
favour  at  the  court  and  throughout  the  kingdom,  but  the 
merchant  was  regarded  with  disfavour  or  indifference. 

The  importance  of  this  fact  did  not  escape  Colbert.  In 
his  memoir  on  commerce,  read  in  the  first  session  of  the 
conseil  de  commerce  presided  over  by  the  king  on  August 
3,  1664,  he  exposed  the  poor  state  of  commerce  in  the 
realm  and  then  proposed  the  remedies.  It  was  not  by  mere 
chance  that  the  following  recommendations  came  first  to 
the  great  minister's  mind : 

"Receive  with  special  marks  of  favour  and  protection  all 
merchants  who  come  to  the  court. 

"Aid  them  in  everything  which  concerns  their  commerce. 
Permit  them  to  present  their  cause  in  person  before  the  council 
of  His  Majesty^  when  they  are  involved  in  cases  of  impor- 
tance. 

"Let  there  be  always  some  merchants  in  the  suite  of  His 
Majesty."^ 

These  recommendations  are  ample  proof  that  commerce 
was  not  an  honourable  calling  in  France,  and  that  the 
conditions  described  by  Jean  Eon  persisted.  The  fact 
offers  at  least  a  partial  explanation  of  the  deplorable 
state  of  commerce  in  the  realm.  But  wherever  one  may 
search  for  the  causes  and  whatever  explanation  one  may 
offer,  it  is  certain  that  Mazarin  willed  to  Colbert  a  France 
in  a  state  of  industrial  and  commercial  decadence. 

At  Mazarin's  death  Colbert  was  at  first  made  intendant 
of  finance  (March  16,  1661).  He  rapidly  rose  in  the 
king's  favour.  In  January,  1664,  he  was  made  surinten- 
dant  des  bdtiments  et  manufactures,  in  1665,  controUer- 

11  Clement,  II,  1,  cclxxi. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

general,  and  finally,  in  1669,  minister  of  the  marine,  thus 
uniting  in  his  hands  all  the  important  branches  of  admin- 
istration except  that  of  war.  But  from  the  first  he  exerted 
a  large  influence  upon  the  direction  of  affairs.  For  the 
first  three  years  of  his  service  to  the  king  his  time  was 
largely  absorbed  by  the  prosecution  of  the  "affair  Fou- 
quet"  and  by  the  reorganization  of  the  finances  of  the 
kingdom.  It  was  not  until  1664  that  he  had  worked  out 
a  large  plan  for  the  upbuilding  of  industry  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  commerce.  In  that  year  he  showed  character- 
istic energy.  He  organized  the  conseil  de  commerce;  he 
framed  the  high  protective  tariff  of  1664 ;  he  developed  a 
comprehensive  plan  to  restore  industry  and  create  manu- 
factures, to  build  up  a  strong  navy  and  merchant  marine ; 
and  he  organized  the  East  and  West  India  Companies. 
Most  of  the  details  of  this  plan  have  been  made  so  familiar 
by  the  studies  of  Joubleau,  Clement,  Neymarck  and  others, 
as  to  make  it  unnecessary  to  restate  them  here.  It  will 
be  permitted  to  recall,  however,  that  the  development  of 
over-sea  commerce  occupied  the  most  important  place  in 
the  great  minister's  plan  for  the  regeneration  of  France : 

"The  happiness  of  a  people  consists  not  only  in  a  consider- 
able diminution  of  taxes,  such  as  has  been  made  within  the 
last  few  years,  but  even  more  in  the  maintenance  of  commerce 
which  alone  can  bring  into  the  kingdom  an  abundance  that  will 
serve  not  as  a  means  of  luxury  to  the  few,  but  as  a  blessing  to 
the  many.  Commerce  stimulates  manufactures,  by  opening 
markets  for  their  products  and  gives  employment  to  a  large 
number  of  people  of  almost  every  age  and  sex.  It  is  thus  an 
agent  which  harmonizes  an  abundance  of  temporal  things  with 
the  spiritual  welfare  of  a  people,  for  idleness  begets  wrong- 
doing, while  hard  work  fortifies  one  against  it.  After  a  care- 
ful examination  of  all  the  means  to  bring  happiness  to  our 
subjects  and  after  much  reflection  over  a  subject  of  such  impor- 
tance, we  have  been  more  and  more  convinced  that  over-sea 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

commerce  is  the  means.  It  is  certain,  both  from  sound  reason 
and  from  the  experience  of  our  neighbours,  that  the  profit 
gained  much  outweighs  the  toil  and  pain  expended  therein."^ 

These  words  may  or  may  not  have  been  written  by  Col- 
bert, but  they  may  be  taken  as  representing  his  ideas,  for 
he  remarked  later,  in  speaking  of  the  East  India  Company, 
that  it  was  the  most  difficult  enterprise  which  the  king  had 
undertaken  since  he  began  to  rule,  and  the  success  of  which 
would  prove  the  most  glorious  and  the  most  advantageous 
for  the  welfare  of  the  realm.^^  Again  in  the  preamble  of 
the  tariff  of  1664  it  is  remarked  that  although  measures 
had  been  taken  to  build  up  commerce  within  the  realm,  yet 
most  attention  had  been  paid  to  the  upbuilding  of  naviga- 
tion and  foreign  commerce  which  was  "the  only  means  of 
making  the  kingdom  prosperous."^*  It  is  quite  certain 
from  the  constant  attention  which  Colbert  paid  to  the 
establishment  of  such  a  commerce  that  these  ideas  were  his 
own  and  that  upon  them  this  policy  was  founded. 

The  success  of  the  Dutch  with  their  wealth  and  power 
upon  the  sea  exerted  a  large  influence  upon  his  mind.  He 
attributed  their  success  to  trade,  asserting  that  the  Dutch 
East  India  Company  had  assets  amounting  to  no  less  than 
800,000,000  livres ;  that  Holland  had  become  the  entrepot 
in  Europe  for  the  rich  trade  with  the  Indies ;  and  further- 
more that  the  Dutch  had  made  themselves  masters  of  the 
trade  with  the  ports  of  the  Baltic,  with  the  French  West 
Indies,  and  of  the  carrying  trade  of  Europe. 

Colbert  decided  to  organize  two  large  companies  which 
would  at  least  dispute  with  them  the  trade  with  the  two 
Indies.  There  is  something  stupendous  in  the  way  in  which 
he  projected  the  East  and  West  India  Companies.  To 
the  one  he  assigned,  as  the  field  for  its  activity,  the  vast 

12  The  preamble  of  the  letters-patent  of  the  East  India  Company. 

13  C16ment,  III,  2,  Ixv. 

14  Ibid.,  II,  2,  p.  789. 

9 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

expanse  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  eastward  even  to  the 
straits  of  Magellan,  including  all  the  East  Indies,  China, 
Japan,  and  all  the  oriental  seas ;  to  the  other,  he  granted 
immense  territories  in  the  three  continents  of  North  Amer- 
ica, South  America  and  Africa,  and  many  prosperous 
islands  in  the  West  Indies.  Is  it  not  in  a  sense  a  new 
demarcation  line  by  which  the  world  is  split  in  twain  and 
a  half  given  to  each  company  for  its  exploitation? 

Of  the  two  companies,  Colbert  considered  the  East 
India  Company  of  greater  importance.  Its  organiza- 
tion became  a  matter  of  great  moment.  Charpentier,  ar 
member  of  the  Academy,  was  called  into  service  to  paint 
in  glowing  colours  the  paradise  at  Madagascar  which 
offered  its  hospitable  shores  to  serve  the  company  as  a  base 
for  trade  with  the  rich  Orient .^^  The  king,  the  queen,  the 
queen-mother,  the  princes  of  royal  blood,  noblemen,  offi- 
cials of  high  rank,  subscribed  for  varying  sums.  A  verit- 
able campaign  was  pursued  by  Colbert  to  persuade  or 
force  judges,  revenue- farmers,  intendants  and  merchants 
throughout  the  kingdom  to  subscribe  to  the  funds  of  the 
company.  Everything  was  done  to  make  the  enterprise 
appear  attractive  as  an  investment.  National  pride  was 
appealed  to  by  pointing  out  the  success  and  superiority 
of  the  Dutch  in  the  oriental  trade.  Special  rights  were 
offered  to  subscribers  of  10,000  and  20,000  livres.  In 
short,  the  organization  of  the  company  was  made  an  affair 
of  state. 

The  organization  of  the  West  India  Company  was  not 
regarded  as  a  matter  of  such  importance.  It  had  no  Char- 
pentier to  describe  its  brilliant  prospects,  no  queen  or 
queen-mothers,  no  princes  and  very  few  noblemen  to 
appear  as  its  sponsors  and  supporters.  This  point  is  of 
some  importance,  because  it  shows  clearly  that  Colbert 
expended  much  more  effort   in   the   organization   of   the 

15  Charpentier,  Le  Discours  d'un  fiddle  sujet,  Paris,  1664. 

10 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

former  company  and  expected  much  larger  results  from 
it.  In  this  he  was  destined  to  be  disappointed,  for  the 
West  India  Company  yielded  much  larger  results  and  in 
the  light  of  these  results  deserved  much  more  attention 
and  much  more  financial  support  than  it  at  first  received 
at  the  hands  of  the  minister. 

The  problems  of  the  two  companies  were  quite  different. 
That  of  the  East  India  Company  consisted  in  the  creation 
of  trade  with  the  far-distant  Orient.  The  attempts  which 
had  been  made  already  in  1604,  1611,  1615  and  1642  had 
proved  practically  fruitless,  so  that  at  the  commencement 
of  Louis  XIV's  personal  reign  all  the  products  of  the 
Orient  came  by  the  way  of  Holland  or  of  England.  There 
were  thus  no  precedents  to  guide  the  new  company  except 
those  of  failure  and  of  ill-omen.  The  seriousness  of  this 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  company  spent  the  first  four 
years  of  its  existence  battling  with  the  problem  of  estab- 
lishing an  entrepoi  at  Madagascar  as  a  base  of  its  opera- 
tions to  build  up  trade  with  the  Orient.  All  of  its  pre- 
liminary expeditions,  representing  a  large  expenditure  of 
money,  got  no  farther  than  Madagascar,  and  it  was  not 
until  1669  that  one  of  its  vessels  returned  directly  from 
the  Indies  to  France.^^       / 

The  problem  of  the  West  India  Company  was  also  to 
prove  exceedingly  difficult.  The  long  list  of  companies, 
organized  since  the  sixteenth  century  for  the  exploitation 
of  different  parts  of  the  territory  of  the  new  company, 
was  a  long  list  of  failures  and  augured  ill  for  the  success 
of  the  enterprise.  But  the  task  before  it  was  not  so  con- 
structive in  character  as  that  of  the  other  company.  The 
route  to  Canada  was  well  known,  for  many  hardy  sailors 
of  the  ports  of  France  were  engaged  in  the  fisheries  of 
Newfoundland,  and  Canada  was  a  French  colony.     The 

16  P.  Kaeppelin,  La  Compagnie  des  Indes  Orientales  et  Frangois 
Martin,  Paris,  1908,  Chap.  I. 

11 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

French  Antilles  contained  in  many  cases  prosperous  colo- 
nies and  a  good  trade  already  existed.  A  French  settle- 
ment had  been  recently  made  at  Cayenne.  On  the  west 
coast  of  Africa,  French  trading-posts  were  already  estab- 
lished. So  that  the  new  company  fell  heir  to  many  valu- 
able assets  and  had  as  its  problem,  rather,  the  union  of 
those  separate  colonies  in  its  hands  and  development  of 
their  resources.  This  difference  may  account,  in  a  meas- 
ure, for  the  greater  stress  which  Colbert  laid  upon  the 
organization  of  the  East  India  Company,  but  the  princi- 
pal reason  remains  that  he  regarded  that  company  as  of 
much  greater  importance. 

In  addition  to  these  two  companies,  Colbert,  during  the 
course  of  his  ministry,  organized  for  various  purposes  five 
other  commercial  companies,  namely,  the  Company  of  the 
North,  the  Company  of  the  Levant,  the  Company  of  the 
Pyrenees,  the  first  and  second  companies  of  Senegal. 

The  Company  of  the  North  was  organized  in  1669  with 
the  purpose  of  building  up  a  trade  with  the  ports  of 
Northern  Europe,  especially  with  those  of  the  Baltic,  and 
thus  of  making  France  independent  of  the  Dutch  trader.  It 
was  granted  a  monopoly  of  trade  with  Holland,  the  coasts 
of  Germany,  Sweden,  Norway,  Muscovy,  and  other  coun- 
tries of  the  North.  De  Lagny,  who  was  later  to  become 
director  of  commerce,  and  Colbert  de  Terron,  intendant 
at  Brouage,  were  especially  charged  with  the  direction  of 
the  enterprise.  Premiums  were  offered  for  the  exportation 
and  importation  of  cargoes  to  and  from  the  North.  The 
king  agreed  to  take  on  liberal  terms,  masts,  lumber,  tar, 
and  other  articles  necessary  for  his  navy. 

It  was  in  this  same  year  that  Colbert  formed  the  plan 
of  organizing  a  new  company  to  re-establish  commerce 
with  the  Levant.  An  idea  of  the  importance  which  he 
attached  to  this  enterprise  may  be  gained  from  a  letter 
which  he  wrote  to  one  of  its  prospective  directors : 

13 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

"I  beseech  you  to  consider  the  affair  as  one  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  the  interests  of  the  nation  and  one  in  which,  con- 
sequently, I  feel  the  greatest  concern.  I  feel  sure  that  you 
will  apply  yourself  with  the  utmost  diligence  in  order  that  the 
enterprise  may  succeed  in  accordance  with  my  wishes."^^ 

Letters-patent  were  issued  to  the  Company  of  the  Levant 
in  July,  1670.  Its  capital  was  fixed  at  3,000,000  livres 
and  the  king  agreed  to  furnish  one-fourth  of  it.^^ 

The  Company  of  the  Pyrenees  was  organized  in  1671, 
in  preparation  for  the  war  with  the  Dutch,  in  order  that 
the  royal  marine  might  not  lack  masts  and  lumber,  sup- 
plied ordinarily  by  trade  with  the  North,  which  might  be 
interrupted  during  the  war. 

Finally,  in  1673,  a  company  was  organized  for  the  ex- 
ploitation of  Senegal  and  another  for  the  same  purpose 
in  1679  and  1681.     Their  history  is  recorded  below. 

All  of  these  companies  received  the  attention  of  Colbert 
and  were  organized  to  do  a  very  definite  work  in  the  ful- 
fillment of  his  larger  plans.  Their  history  is  interesting, 
not  so  much  for  what  they  actually  accomplished,  as  for 
the  insight  which  they  give  into  what  he  wished  to  accom- 
plish and  attempted  to  do.  It  reveals  the  vast  importance  >, 
which  Colbert  attached  to  foreign  and  colonial  commerce. 

17  Clement,  II,  2,  p.  507.    Letter  to  Sir  Dallier,  January  9,  1670. 

18  Bonassieux,  Les  Grandes  Compagnies  de  Commerce,  p.  179. 


13 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Establishment  of  the  French  in  the 

West  Indies  and  the  Commencement 

OF  Trade,  1626-1660 

T  N  the  year  1625  there  set  sail  from  Dieppe  a  small  brig- 
•■•  antine,  armed  with  four  cannon  and  equipped  with  a 
crew  of  thirty  or  forty  men,  "all  of  whom  were  good  sol- 
diers, well  seasoned  and  well  discipHned."  It  was  com- 
manded by  Pierre  d'Esnambuc  and  his  companion  of  for- 
tune, Urbain  de  Roissey.  The  latter  was  known  among 
the  English  as  the  "pirate  of  Dieppe"  and  records  exist 
of  some  of  his  piratical  exploits.^  It  may  be  that  the  two 
captains  sailed  as  pirates,  bent  upon  finding  some  prey 
on  the  high  seas  and  that  their  sojourn  shortly  afterwards 
at  St.  Christopher  was  only  an  incident  in  their  voyage. 
Thus  the  beginning  of  colonization  by  the  French  in  the 
West  Indies,  which  resulted  from  this  sojourn,  would  seem, 
as  de  La  Ronciere  affirms  it  to  be,  the  result  of  an  adven- 
ture. It  may  be,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  two  captains 
sailed  with  definite  intentions,  for  it  was  affirmed  in  the 
permission  granted  them  the  following  year  to  establish  a 
colony  that  these  two  captains  had  been  in  search  for  some 
fifteen  years  "of  some  fertile  lands  in  good  clime  which 
could  be  colonized  by  the  French."  As  pirates  or  as 
founders  of  colonies,  they  set  sail  to  the  westward.  Near 
Jamaica  they  encountered  a  large  Spanish  galleon  from 
which,  after  three  hours  of  fighting,  they  escaped.  They 
sought   refuge   with   their  badly   damaged   vessel   at   St. 

iSee  Du  Tertre,  Histoire  g4n6rale  des  Antilles  franqaises,  I,  3fP.; 
de  La  Ronciere,  Histoire  de  la  marine  franqaise,  IV,  649  fF. ;  Br^ard, 
Documents  relatifs  h  la  marine  normande,  pp.  179,  212,  213;  Pierre 
Margry,  Pierre  d'Esnambuc. 

14 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Christopher,  where  they  arrived  probably  in  the  summer  / 
of  16^5. 

Much  to  their  surprise,  certainly  much  to  their  joy, 
they  found  a  small  band  of  Frenchmen  already  established 
there  and  living  in  peace  with  the  savages.  It  was  a  band 
composed  of  those  who  from  time  to  time  had  sought  refuge 
in  the  island.  Thus  in  their  number  was  Chantail,  a 
refugee  from  an  unsuccessful  expedition  to  Cayenne. 
D'Esnambuc  was  hailed  with  joy  as  "an  angel  from 
heaven"  and  during  his  sojourn  in  the  island  he  came  to 
be  "loved  as  a  father,  honoured  as  a  chief  and  obeyed  as  a* 
master."^  The  island  proved  particularly  attractive  to 
him.  Its  situation  impressed  him  as  excellent,  its  soil  as 
fertile  and  well  adapted  to  the  cultivation  of  tobacco. 
The  members  of  the  little  colony  were  favourably  disposed 
toward  the  plan  of  remaining  in  the  island  to  form  a  per-  • 
manent  settlement.  D'Esnambuc  promised  them  that  he 
would  return  to  France,  seek  additional  funds  and  come 
back  to  live  with  them.  He  straightway  loaded  his  vessel 
with  excellent  tobacco  and  some  articles  obtained  in  trade 
from  the  Indians  and  set  sail  for  France.  He  arrived  at  ! 
Dieppe  probably  in  the  summer  of  1626. 

After  selling  his  cargo  at  good  profit,  d'Esnambuc 
turned  his  face  toward  Paris  to  plead  his  cause.  He 
appeared  clad  in  such  excellent  attire  and  gave  such  a 
good  account  of  his  voyage  that  all  with  whom  he  t^ilked 
were  convinced  of  the  excellence  of  the  island  and  of  the 
profit  to  be  gained  by  its  settlement.  Thanks  to  the  iiAi- 
ence  of  some  friends,  he  obtained  an  interview  with  Ricne- 
heu.  The  great  cardinal  was  so  favourably  impressed  that 
he  decided  to  aid  d'Esnambuc  to  carry  out  his  plans. 

The  act  of  association  for  the  organization  of  the  Com-   \ 
pany   of   St.    Christopher  was   drawn  up   and   signed  on 
October  31,   1626.      It  bore  the  signature  of  Richeheu, 


2  Du  Tertre,  I,  4. 


15 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

for  the  sum  of  10,000  livres,  of  which  8000  livres  were  to 
be  paid  by  the  gift  of  a  vessel ;  of  Ruse  d'Effiat,  intendant 
general  of  the  marine,  for  2000  livres ;  of  de  Flecelles  and 
Bardin-Royer,  presidents  des  comptes,  each  for  2000 
livres ;  and  of  four  others  for  a  total  of  7000  livres.  The 
initial  subscriptions  amounted  to  only  22,000  livres,  but 
the  associates  pledged  their  credit  to  the  amount  of  45,000 
livres.  It  was  proposed  to  expend  the  capital  of  the  com- 
pany for  the  purchase  and  equipment  of  three  vessels. 
The  purpose  was  declared  to  be  the  settlement  of  "the 
islands  of  St.  Christopher,  Barbuda,  and  the  others  at 
the  entrance  of  Peru,"  situated  between  the  11th  and  18th 
degrees  north  latitude  and  not  already  occupied  by  Euro- 
peans. The  establishment  of  trade  and  the  conversion  of 
the  natives  to  the  Holy  Catholic  faith  were  the  declared 
motives.  A  monopoly  of  trade  for  forty  years  was 
granted  to  the  company.^ 

On  the  same  day,  October  31,  1626,  a  formal  permit 
was  issued  to  the  two  captains  to  return  to  St.  Christo- 
pher. They  straightway  left  Paris,  d'Esnambuc  going 
into  Normandy  and  de  Roissey  into  Brittany,  in  order  to 
enlist  settlers.  The  former  succeeded  in  enlisting  322 
men,  whom  he  embarked  in  La  Catholique,  a  vessel  of  2qp> 
tons  belonging  to  the  company,  and  the  latter,  210  men, 
whom  he  embarked  in  La  Cardinale  and  La  Victoire. 
D'Esnambuc  set  sail  from  Havre  near  the  end  of  January 
and  rejoined  de  Roissey  in  Brittany,  whence  "this  little 

'The  text  of  the  act  of  association  is  to  be  found  in  Du  Tertre, 
op.  cit.,  I,  8-11,  and  in  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  Loix  et  Constitutions, 
I,  18-19.  The  clause  of  the  document  defining  the  concessions  of  the 
company  reads  as  follows:  "Pour  faire  habiter  et  peupler  les  isles  de 
St.  Christophe  et  la  Barbade  et  autres  situ^es  a  I'entr^e  du  P^rou.'* 
The  Antilles  were  very  frequently  referred  to  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury as  the  "isles  du  P6rou."  See  Br6ard,  op.  cit.,  145.  As  to  the 
term  "la  Barbade,"  it  is  used  somewhat  loosely  to  refer  either  to  Bar- 
buda q|^to  Barbadoes. 

16 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

fleet,  composed  for  the  most  part  of  poor  people  gathered 
here  and  there  and  very  little  accustomed  to  the  fatigues 
of  the  sea,  set  sail  on  February  24,  1627."* 

They  had  not  gone  200  leagues  upon  the  sea,  before 
provisions  began  to  fail.  Limited  rations  of  water  and 
food  were  meted  out.  Sickness  set  in  and  death  began 
to  claim  many  victims.  After  more  than  two  months  the 
three  vessels  anchored  at  Sandy  Point,  at  the  western  end 
of  St.  Christopher.  Of  the  seventy  embarked  in  La  Cardi- 
nale,  only  sixteen  had  survived  the  voyage.  More  than 
half  of  those  embarked  in  the  other  vessels  had  died  during 
the  passage.  Those  who  remained  were  more  dead  than 
alive.  Thus  the  fleet  which  had  been  awaited  by  the  little 
band  at  St.  Christopher  and  which,  according  to  their 
hopes,  was  to  bring  them  not  only  strong  companions  to 
aid  them,  but  also  an  abundant  supply  of  food  and  of 
other  things  necessary  for  their  comfort,  arrived  at  last 
in  a  deplorable  state  of  poverty.  The  great  joy  which 
they  had  felt  at  the  appearance  of  the  ships  was  changed 
into  bitter  disappointment,  and  then  bitter  disappoint- 
ment into  pity,  as  they  saw  the  poor  wretches  totter  upon 
their  feeble  limbs,  as  they  were  set  ashore. 

D'Esnambuc  and  de  Roissey  divided  the  colony  between 
them,  the  former  going  to  the  western  end  of  the  island, 
and  the  latter  to  the  eastern.  Between  the  two  settle- 
ments were  the  English  under  the  command  of  Thomas 
Warner,  who  had  come  to  the  island  almost  simultaneously 
with  the  French.  Four  hundred  of  them  had  lately  landed 
fresh  and  strong  from  England.  A  treaty  was  made 
which  fixed  the  boundaries  and  assured  peace  between  the 
two  nations. 

De  Roissey  was  straightway  sent  back  to  France  with 
La  Cardinale  to  implore  aid  from  the  company.  He 
arrived  at  Roscou  in  Brittany  toward  the  last  of  Septem- 

4  Du  Tertre,  I,  15. 

17 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ber,  1627.  Instead,  however,  of  hastening  his  prepara- 
tions to  return  and  carry  aid  to  the  distressed  colony,  he 
allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded  by  de  Razilly  to  take 
part  in  a  secret  expedition  into  the  Irish  Sea.  De  Razilly 
assured  him  that  a  vessel  had  already  been  sent  to  carry 
aid  to  the  colony.^  In  fact,  a  vessel  had  been  sent,  but 
unfortunately  its  cargo  of  provisions  was  so  badly  dam- 
aged during  the  voyage,  that  the  coldny  received  very 
small  benefit  therefrom.  It  was  not  until  the  following 
spring  that  de  Roissey  returned  to  St,  Christopher  in 
command  of  La  Cardinale  and  another  small  vessel,  both 
of  which  had  been-  equipped  at  the  cost  of  35()p_  livres 
furnished  by  the  company.  Of  the  150  new  settlers  carried 
by  the  two  vessels,  majiy_died^  duijiig_theji!;oyage  and  the 
colony  again  j*eceived  but^mall--aidi.  Shortly  afterwards 
another  vessel  was  sent  out  by  the  company,  this  time  with 
120  new  settlers.  Again  the  few  survivors  were  more  of 
a  tax  than  an  aid  to  the  colony__ai>  their  arriyal. 

^  There  was'such  need  that  d'Esnambuc  decided  to  go  to 
France  himself  to  plead  the  cause  of  the  colony.  Richelieu 
seems  to  have  been  touched  by  "the  account  which  he  gave 
of  the  colony's  suffering  and  of  the  danger  which  it  ran  of 
being  crushed  by  the  English.  In  addition,  he  was 
aroused  by  the  report  which  reached  him  that  the  Spanish 
king  was  planning  to  send  the  powerful  fleet  under  the 
command  of  Fadrique  of  Toledo  by  way  of  St.  Christopher 
on  its  way  to  Brazil  and  that  orders  should  be  given  to 
crush  the  new  French  settlement.  He  therefore  commanded 
a  strong  fleet  to  be  equipped  and  sent  to  the  defense  of  the 
king's  subjects. 

.  On  June  25,  1629,  a  squadron  of  ten  vessels  under  the 
command  of  Cahuzac  sailed  from  Havre  for-St^-Ghristo- 
pher.^    Three  hundred  new  settlers  were  sent  out  with  the 

5De  La  Rondure,  op.  cit.,  IV,  Q5<i-66^',  Du  Tertre,  I,  21. 
6De  La  Rondure,  op.  cit.,  IV,  653-654. 

18 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

fleet  at  the  expense  of  the  company.  The  fleet  arrived  in 
the  island  at  the  end  of  August.  Cahuzac  quickly  forced 
the  English  to  respect  the  treaty  which  they  had  made 
with  d'Esnambuc,  and  relieved  the  colony  from  the  con- 
stant fear  of  being  crushed  by  a  stronger  neighbour. 
Unfortunately,  however,  he  grew  impatient  at  waiting 
for  the  Spanish  fleet  and  set  sail  to  seek  his  fortune  in  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  This  proved  disastrous,  for  the  Spanish 
fleet  appeared  at  the  end  of  October,,  composed  of  35  large  j 
galleons  and  14  merchant  vessels  armed  for  war,  and  \ 
attacked  the  settlement  at  the  eastern  end  of  the  island.  ^ 
In  spite  of  the  courage  shown  by  some,  such  as  the  young 
du  Parquet,  the  cowardice  of  de  Roissey  rendered  the  task 
of  the  Spaniards  easy.  The  French  fled  in  wild  disorder 
to  gain  the  western  end  of  the  island.  At  their  arrival 
they  declared  that  all  was  lost,  that  the  Spaniards  were 
in  pursuit  and  that  all  must  flee  for  their  lives.  De  Rois-  _ 
sey  demanded  an  immediate  convocation  of  the  council  of 
war  and  threatened  to  have  d'Esnambuc  stabbed,  if  he 
opposed  the  plan  of  flight.  In  spite  of  d'Esnambuc's 
opposition,  the  whole  colony  embarked  in  two  vessels 
which  were  at  Sandy  Point  and  sailed  for  Antigua.  Un- 
favourable winds  and  tides  drove  them  to  St.  Martin. 
Thence  de  Roissey,  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  d'Esnambuc, 
set  sail  with  one  of  the  vessels  for  France.  He  was 
imprisoned  in  the  Bastille  by  the  orders  of  Richelieu.  As 
for  d'Esi\ambuc  and  those  who  remained  faithful  to  him,  « 
after  a  brief  sojourn  at  St.  Martin  and  after  vain  eff'orts 
to  settle  in  the  islands  of  Antigua  and  Montserrat,  they  I 
decided  to  return  to  their  former  settlement.  This  proved 
easy  from  the  fact  that  the  Spaniards  had  left  no  troops 
to  maintain  their  possession  of  the  island  and  from  the 
fact  that  d'Esnambuc  had  the  good  fortune  to  find  at 
Antigua  a  French  vessel  under  the  command  of  Giron, 
who  had  deserted  the  fleet  commanded  by  Cahuzac  during 

19 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

its  sojourn  at  St.  Christopher.  By  aid  of  this  vessel  the 
little  colony  was  re-established  in  its  old  quarters.' 

Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  1630,  the  French  were  re- 
commencing the  colonization  of  St.  Christopher.  Of  the 
1100  or  1200  settlers  who  had  been  sent  out,  only  350 
remained  after  four  years  of  toil  and  struggle.  The 
expenditures  had  been  great,  the  returns  small,  the  results 
discouraging.  Henceforth,  the  company  made  but  few 
efforts  to  send  aid  and  the  settlement  was  largely  left  to 
its  fate.  In  spite  of  the  heroic  efforts  of  the  brave  leader, 
it  would  probably  not  have  survived,  had  aid  not  come 
from  another  quarter. 

In  1628,  even  while  d'Esnambuc  was  on  his  way  to 
France  to  seek  aid,  there  arrived  at  the  coast  of  St.  Chris- 
topher, so  Du  Tertre  relates,  a  ship  from  Zeeland : 

"The  Dutch  captain,  finding  the  tobacco  most  excellent, 
traded  with  the  French,  even  letting  them  have  some  merchan- 
dise on  credit.  He  encouraged  them  to  work,  consoled  them  in 
their  misery  and  urged  them  to  prepare  a  quantity  of  tobacco 
for  him,  promising  them  that  he  would  come  back  in  six  months 
with  a  supply  of  food-stuffs  and  of  everything  of  which  they 
had  need.  Our  Frenchmen,  seeing  themselves  thus  succoured 
by  foreigners  in  the  midst  of  their  necessity,  regained  their 
courage  and  began  straightway  to  clear  their  lands,  to  plant 
crops  which  would  furnish  them  food,  to  cultivate  tobacco  and 
to  build  houses."* 

It  is  thus  that  the  historian  records  the  appearance  of 
the  first  Dutch  merchant  to  trade  with  the  French  settled 
in  the  West  Indies.  One  naturally  pauses  before  the  fact, 
for  it  is  the  beginning  of  a  trade  which  increased  rapidly 
and  became  the  chief  artery  of  the  economic  life  of  the 
French  West  Indies  for  nearly  half  a  century.  It  was  no 
mere  chance  that  the  vessel  was  Dutch.     How  many  times 

7  This  account  has  been  taken  from  Du  Tertre,  I,  28-31. 

8  Du  Tertre,  I,  23. 

20 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

in  the  colonial  history  of  the  seventeenth  century  one  finds 
the  Dutch  merchant  arriving  to  bring  help  and  comfort 
to  a  colony^  all  but  abandoned  by  the  mother  country. 
He  seems  ubiquitous.  He  is  in  the  distant  Orient,  on  the 
coasts  of  Africa,  in  South  America,  in  Mexico,  in  North 
America,  everywhere  in  the  islands,  sometimes  trading  at 
ports  which  he  himself  has  established,  sometimes  and  very 
often  with  colonies  which  other  nations  have  founded.  He 
seems  omniscient.  He  knows  the  way  to  everywhere  and 
is  acquainted  with  the  needs  of  all.  The  French,  the  Span- 
ish and  the  Portuguese  were  much  superior  as  explorers, 
the  English  as  permanent  colonizers,  but  the  Dutch  were' 
the  traders  par  excellence  of  the  seventeenth  century.  As 
such,  they  rendered  just  as  valuable  services  to  the  perma- 
nent conquest  of  the  New  World  as  did  the  others  as 
explorers  and  colonizers^  They  nursed  many  a  colony 
through  its  years  of  infancy  and  nourished  many  another 
through  a  stage  of  weakness,  until  its  life  was  assured. 

Following  the  re-establishment  of  the  colony  at  St. 
Christopher  in  1630,  d'Esnambuc  became  thoroughly  dis- 
couraged at  the  failure  of  the  company  to  send  aid.  The 
resolution  was  taken  to  abandon  the  island.  Accordingly 
only  a  very  small  amount  of  food-stuffs  was  planted  in 
order  that  the  harvest  of  tobacco  might  be  as  large  as  pos- 
sible. Six  months  later,  however,  the  plan  of  returning  was 
abandoned  and  naturally  enough,  the  food  supply  began 
to  fail.  Famine  set  in.  All  were  suffering  and  "would 
have  perished,  had  not  divine  Providence  sent  back  the 
Dutch  captain  who  had  traded  with  them  the  year  before. 
He  brought  them  flour,  wine,  meat,  shirts,  cloth,  and  in 
general,  a  supply  of  all  things  of  which  they  had  need  and 
he  gave  it  to  them  at  six  months'  credit,  contenting  him- 
self with  the  amount  of  tobacco  which  they  had  on  hand."^ 
The  merchant  sold  this  tobacco  so  advantageously  at  his 

9  Du  Tertre,  I,  36. 

21 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

return  to  Holland  that  some  merchants  of  Flushing  and 
of  other  Dutch  ports  decided  to  establish  a  regular  trade 
with  St.  Cliristoplicr.  Henceforth  they  sent  so  many  ships 
there  that  all  the  needs  of  the  colony  were  satisfied.  "It 
is  true  to  say,"  Du  Tertre  remarks,  "that  without  the 
aid  of  the  Dutch  our  colonies  would  never  have  survived."^" 

The  influence  of  this  upon  the  colonists  at  St.  Chris- 
topher was  quickly  felt.  Thoughts  of  leaving  their  plan- 
tations were  abandoned.  The  attention  of  all  was  con- 
centrated upon  the  cultivation  of  tobacco,  "they  thought 
of  nothing  else  than  to  produce  good  merchandise  in  order 
to  attract  the  Dutch.  They  no  longer  took  the  trouble 
to  send  anything  to  France."^^ 

The  directors  of  the  Company  of  St.  Christopher  com- 
plained  bij;t_erly  of  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  were  absorbing 
all  the  trade,  saying  that  they  had  made  considerable 
advances  for  the  establishment  of  the  colony  and  that  it 
was  not  fair  that  foreigners  reap  the  benefit  therefrom. 
The  planters  replied  that  if  they  were  forced  to  respect 
all  the  regulations  and  obligations  which  the  company 
wished  to  impose  upon  them,  and  to  rely  upon  it  to  fur- 
nish them  with  necessary  provisions,  they  would  not  have 
a  shirt  upon  their  backs ;  and  that  it  was  necessary  to 
trade  with  the  Dutch.  In  order  to  silence  these  com- 
plaints, the  company  decided  to  equip  La  Cardinale,  and 
sent  it  to  the  relief  of  the  colony.  It  arrived  at  St.  Chris- 
topher with  a  cargo  of  food-stuffs  in  1631,  but  "in  such 
small  quantities  that  the  planters  thought  that  the  com- 
pany was  making  fun  of  them."^  They  were  more  firmly 
resolved  than  ever  to  trade  with  all  who  brought  them  aid. 

To  protect  the  companj  both  against  the  Dutch  and 
the  private  French  trader,  a  royal  declaration  was  issued 


10  Du  Tertre,  I,  37. 

11  Ibid. 

12  Ibid.,  I,  40. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

on  November  25,  16^4,  which  forbade  trade  in  the  islands 
except  with  a  written  permit  from  the  directors.  The 
declaration  apparently  had  no  effect.  Less  than  three 
months  later  the  directors  confessed  that  the  company 
was  bankrupt  and  unable  to  continue  its  commerce.  The 
company  was  entirely  too  small  and  the  field  of  its  activ- 
ity too  limited  to  command  the  attention  of  the  stockhold- 
ers and  none  of  them  took  any  interest  in  its  affairs.  A 
petition  was  made  to  the  king  to  permit  the  formation  of 
a  new  company  with  increased  capital  and  larger  con- 
cessions. It  was  thus  that  the  Company  of  St.  Christo- 
pher came  to  an  end.  On  the  whole,  itwas^aTdistinct  fail- 
ure, but  it  must  be  recorded  that  with  its  capital  and 
under  its  nominal  administration,  at  least,  a  permanent 
^settlement  had  been  made  by  the  French  in  the  West 
Indies,  from  which,  in  the  following  period,  other  settle- 
ments developed  and  the  power  of  the  French  was  definitely 
established  in  the  Antilles.  So  far  as  commerce  was 
concerned,  the  company  proved  itself  unable  to  satisfy 
the  needs  of  the  planters  and  after  the  first  three  or  four 
years  of  its  existence,  left  the  field  entirely  free  to  the 
Dutch. 

The  Company  of  St.  Christopher  was  reorganized  at 
the  beginning  of  1635  under  the  name  of  the  Company 
of  the  Isles  of  America.  The  most  notable  additions  to 
its  personnel  were  Berruyer  and  Nicholas  Fouquet.  The 
former  was  "captain  of"  the  sea-ports  of  Veulette  and 
petite  Dalle-en-Caux."  The  latter,  a  "conseiller  du  roy," 
became  one  of  the  directors,  not  only  in  his  own  name  but 
also  as  representative  of  the  interests  of  Richelieu.  During 
the  first  five  years  the  meetings  of  the  directors  were  held 
at  his  apartments.^^  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  impor- 
tance of  the  role  which  he  henceforth  played  in  the  coloni- 
zation of  the  West  Indies. 

13  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  passim. 

23 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

The  contract  for  the  organization  of  the  company  was 
signed  at  the  hotel  of  Richeheu,  rue  St.  Honore,  on  Feb- 
ruary 12,  1635,  and  was  confirmed  by  letters-patent  of 
March  8.  Permission  was  granted  to  continue  the  coloni- 
zation of  St.  Christopher  and  to  settle  any  other  islands 
not  occupied  by  European  powers  between  the  10th  and 
30th  parallels  north  latitude.  The  company  assumed  the 
obligation  to  trf^nspori,  or  have  transported,  to  the  islands 
of  its  concession,  during  the  course  of  twenty  years,  at 
least  4000  persons.  For  the  satisfaction  of  this  obliga- 
tion the  number  already  at  St.  Christopher  was  to  be 
counted.  Article  10  of  the  letters-patent  accorded  a 
monopoly  of  trade  for  twenty  years.^* 

It  is  impossible  to  state  with  precision  the  amount 
of  work  which  the  company  accomplished,  but  it  is  certain 
that  a  notable  advance  was  made  during  its  existence 
in  the  occupation  of  new  islands  and  in  the  increase  of 
the  power  of  the  French  in  the  West  Indies.  The  narra- 
tives of  Mathias  du  Puis,  of  Bouton,  and  especially  of 
Du  Tertre,  enable  one  to  say  that  the  company  showed 
considerable  activity  in  the  importation  of  new  settlers 
and  indentured  servants.  From  the  register,  containing 
the  minutes  of  the  meetings  of  the  directors  from  January 
31,  1635,  to  September  4,  1648,  some  idea  may  be  gained 
of  the  efforts  which  it  made  to  promote  plantation  and 
to  establish  regular  trade.^^ 

Even  before  the  formation  of  the  new  company,  de 
I'Olive,  the  lieutenant  of  d'Esnambuc  at  St.  Christopher, 
formed  the  plan  of  establishing  a  new  settlement  in  one 

14  "During  the  space  of  twenty  years  no  subject  of  His  Majesty 
other  than  the  said  associates  shall  trade  in  the  ports,  harbours  and 
rivers  of  the  said  islands  except  by  the  permission  of  the  directors, 
under  penalty  of  confiscation  of  vessel  and  cargo  to  the  profit  of  the 
company."  The  text  of  the  letters-patent  is  to  be  found  in  Moreau 
de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  29-36;  and  in  Du  Tertre,  I,  46-55. 

15  The  register  is  to  be  found  in  Arch.  Col.,  F^,  19. 

24 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

of  the  three  islands  of  Guadeloupe,  Martinique  or  Domi- 
nica.    During  the  course  of  the  year  1634,  he  sent  the 

""  trusted  Guillaume  d'Orange^^  to  make  explorations  in  the 
three  islands.  Satisfied  by  the  information  thus  gained, 
he  set  sail  for  France  and  arrived  at  Dieppe  at  the  close 
of  that  year.  Shortly  after  his  arrival,  he  made  the 
acquaintance  of  du  Plessis,  who  h^d  made  the  voyage  to 
the  West  Indies  with  Cahuzac  in  1629,  and  who  had 
recently  formed  the  plan  to  return*  to  St.  Christopher  at 
the  head  of  a  band  of  new  settlers.  Du  Plessis  was  easily 
persuaded  to  join  de  TOlive  in  his  larger  scheme.  They 
went  to  Paris  together  in  order  to  gain  the  permission  of 
Richelieu  and  of  the  new  company. 

^  A  contract  was  signed  with  the  company  on  February 

14,  1635,  whereby  de  I'Olive  and  du  Plessis  were  bound,  to 
transport,  within  three  months,  to  the  one  of  ^he  three 
islands  chosen,  200  men,  to  construct  dwellings  and  store- 
houses, to  build  one  fort  the  first  year,  and  another  the 
following.  After  the  first  year  and  for  the  five  succeeding 
years,  100  men  were  to  be  sent  out  annually  and  fifty  for 
the  four  years  thereafter.  The  company  reserved  the 
right  to  send  on  its  own  account  whatever  number  of 
settlers  it  chose,  and  stipulated  that  the  two  contractors 
should  grant  lands  to  such  settlers  and  furnish  them  food 
during  the  first  year  of  their  residence  in  the  islands. 
Only  Frenchmen  of  the  Catholic  faith  were  to  be  trans- 
ported to  the  proposed  colony.  During  the  first  six 
years  every  male  inhabitant  was  to  pay  to  the  company  a 
tax  of  sixty  pounds  of  tobacco  or  forty  pounds  of  cotton, 
according  as  the  one  or  the  other  was  planted  in  a  given 
year.  For  the  four  succeeding  years,  the  tax  was  to  be 
100  pounds  of  tobacco  and  fifty  pounds  of  cotton.     An 

16  See  an  interesting  study  recently  made  of  him  by  le  Vicomte  du 
Motey,  Guillaume  d'Orange  et  Us  Origines  des  Antilles  Franqaises, 
Paris,  1908. 

25 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

additional  tax  of  one-tenth  was  to  be  paid  on  all  other 
products.  After  the  first  six  years  the  cultivation  of 
tobacco  was  to  be  permitted  only  on  alternate  years  and 
the  maximum  production  for  a  planter  in  any  one  year  was 
not  to  exceed  900  pounds.  Commerce  with  foreigners  was 
to  be  strictly  forbidden.  During  the  space  of  ten  years  de 
I'Olive  and  du  Plessis  were  to  enjoy  the  command  of  the 
colony,  conjointly,  if  only  one  island  was  occupied,  sepa- 
rately, if  two  were  occupied.^^ 

A  sub-contract  was  let  by  de  I'Ohve  and  du  Plessis, 
whereby  some  merchants  of  Dieppe  agreed  to  transport 
to  Guadeloupe,  in  the  space  of  ten  years,  2500  men,  all 
of  whom  were  to  be  French  Catholics.  In  return  the  mer- 
chants were  to  enjoy,  during  six  years,  the  right  to  levy 
a  tax  of  twenty  pounds  of  tobacco  on  all  those  whom  they 
transported.  They  were  also  to  enjoy  a  monopoly  of 
trade.^« 

DeJ'Olive  and  du  Plessis  set  sail  from  Dieppe  on  May 
25,  1635,  in  command  of  two  vessels  with  550  men  on 
board.  After  an  unusually  good  voyage  of  one  month 
and  three  days  they  arrived  at  Guadeloupe  and  decided 
to  establish  the  colony  in  that  island.  From  the  first,  suf- 
fering was  most  acute.  Famine  set  in  and  many  died 
from  hunger.  It  was  the  same  old  story  of  lack  of  prep- 
aration. The  merchants  of  Dieppe  had  not  supplied  the 
vessels  with  adequate  provisions.  Even  those  furnished 
were  of  poor  quality,  for  the  meat  and  salt  fish  were  in  a 
state  of  putrification.  No  store  of  beans  or  peas  or  cas- 
sava plant  to  serve  for  planting  had  been  provided.  For 
no  less  than  five  years  most  deplorable  conditions  reigned 
at  Guadeloupe.  The  famine  became  so  great  at  times, 
according  to  Du  Tertre,^^  that  some  ate  their  own  excre- 

17  Du  Tertre,  I,  66-69. 

18  Ibid.,  I,  70-71. 

19  Ibid.,  I,  80. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

merits  and  it  was  reported  that  one  poor  wretch  was  found 
gnawing  the  arm  of  a  dead  comrade.  To  add  to  these 
miseries,  the  colony  was  often  attacked  by  the  savages. 
No  aid  came  from  France.  The  merchants  of  Dieppe 
became  frightened  at  the  prospects  of  loss  and  refused 
to  carry  out  their  contract.  The  young  colony  was  con- 
sequently left  to  suffer  from  want  of  supplies.  It  fell  a 
victim  also  to  misrule  and  rebellion,  so  that  Mathias  du 
Puis  remarked  that  during  the  six  years  of  his  residence 
he  saw  more  rebellions,  persecution,  oppression  of  the 
innocent  in  Guadeloupe  than  in  the  whole  of  a  great 
empire.^^ 

In  spite,  however,  of  these  trying  years,  the  settlement 
at  Guadeloupe  proved  permanent.  By  1642,  emigration 
from  the  ports  of  France  to  the  island  was  noticeable.^^ 
The  development  of  the  colony  was  very  satisfactory  in 
the  following  period. 

The  establishment  of  a  French  settlement  at  Martinique 
d§,tej  from  this  same  year,  1635.  D'Esnambuc,  having 
decided  to  take  possession  of  that  island,  chose  about  one 
hundred  of  the  most  experienced  planters  of  his  colony, 
men  who  were  thoroughly  acclimated  to  the  tropics  and 
hardened  to  the  labour  of  clearing  lands  and  tilling  the 
soil.  He  equipped  them  with  good  firearms  and  ammuni- 
tion and  with  all  sorts  of  farming  utensils.  Sprouts  of 
the  cassava  plant  and  potatoes,  as  well  as  a  supply  of 
peas,  beans  and  other  grains  for  planting,  were  given  them. 
The  little  colony  set  sail  from  St.  Christopher  at  the 
beginning  of  July  and  arrived  at  Martinique  about  a  week 
later.  A  tort  was  built  and  du  Pont  was  placed  in  com- 
mand. Du  Pont  was  captured  a  short  time  afterwards 
by  the  Spaniards  and  was  succeeded  by  du  Parquet,  one 

20  Mathias  du  Puis,  Relation  de  VUahlissement  d'une  Colonic 
frangaise. 

21  Du  Tertre,  I,  208. 

37 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

of  d'Esnambuc's  nephews.  He  was,  according  to  a  con- 
temporary, "a  brave  gentleman  well  endowed  with  all  the 
qualities  necessary  for  the  situation,"  and  lived  in  such 
good  fellowship  with  the  savages  that  they  called  him  the 
great  captain  and  their  "compere."^ 

With  the  administration  of  du  Parquet  there  began  an 
era  of  steady  development  of  the  new  colony.  The  com- 
pany in  France  was  so  contented  with  what  he  accom- 
plished that  it  appointed  him,  at  the  close  of  1637,  lieuten- 
ant-general of  Martinique.  De  Poincy,  the  successor  of 
d'Esnarabuc  and  governor-general  of  the  islands,  wrote 
Fouquet  in  1639  that  there  were  700  men  at  Martinique 
capable  of  bearing  arms.^  Bouton  stated  in  1640  that 
there  were  about  1000  Frenchmen  in  the  island.^^  The 
history  of  the  early  years  of  this  colony  furnishes  a  con- 
trast to  that  of  Guadeloupe.  It  was  a  striking  proof  of 
the  immense  advantage  of  founding  new  settlements  with 
men  who  had  already  been  acclimated  to  work  in  the 
tropics. 

Following  this  successful  establishment  of  a  colony  at 
Martinique,  an  expedition  was  sent  out  from  St.  Chris- 
topher to  take  possession  of  the  island  of  Tortuga,  or  la 
Tortue,  an  island  off  the  northern  coast  of  St.  Domingo. 
The  English  had  already  made  a  settlement  there  as  early 
as  1631,  but  were  surprised  by  the  Spaniards  in  1635  and 
driven  out  in  1638.  They  returned,  however,  shortly 
afterwards,  together  with  some  of  the  French  from  St. 
Domingo.  In  ,1639  there  appeared  at  St.  Christopher  a 
Frenchman  from  Tortuga  to  inform  de  Poincy  that  the 
French  were  being  maltreated  by  the  English  and  implored 
aid.     He  gave  the  assurance  that  the  island  could  be  very 

22  J.  Bouton,  Relation  dje  VEtablissement  des  Franqais  depuis  Van 
1635  en  Vlsle  de  la  Martinique,  39;  also  Du  Tertre,  I,  104. 

23  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  Letter  from  de  Poincy  to  Fouquet,  August 
16,  1639. 

24  Bouton,  op.  cit.,  41. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

easily  captured  and  made  a  French  possession.  De  Poincy 
promptly  seized  the  opportunity  of  getting  rid  of  the 
Protestants  at  St.  Christopher,  and  at  the  same  time 
received  favourably  the  idea  of  establishing  a  new  colony. 
He  proposed  the  affair  to  Levasseur,  the  chief  of  the 
Protestants,  and  offered  to  bear  half  of  the  expenses  of 
the  enterprise.  His  proposal  was  accepted.  A  small  bark 
was  fitted  out  and  forty  or  fifty  Huguenots,  under  the  , 
command  of  Levasseur,  sailed  for  Tortuga.  They  made 
a  landing  in  that  island  near  the  end  of  August,  1640.—^ 
The  English  were  easily  driven  out  and  the  French  took 
possession.  From  the  first  Levasseur  ruled  with  an  iron  — 
hand  and  evidently  tried  to  make  his  government  entirely 
independent  both  of  de  Poincy  and  of  the  company,  for 
the  directors  in  their  meeting  of  March  2,  1644,  voted  that 
de  Poincy  be  instructed  "to  surprise  Levasseur  in  the 
island  of  Tortuga. "^^  Levasseur  seems,  however,  to  have 
remained  in  control  of  the  colony  until  his  assassination 
in  1652.  "^^^^ 

Some  of  the  Fxench  who  had  been  chased  from  St.  Chris-/ 
topher  in  1629  by  the  Spaniards  settled  on  the  northern    / 
coast  of  St*  Domingo,  but  not  until  the  ministry  of  Col- 
bert did  their  settlement  develop  into  anything  more  than 
a  small  colony  of  freebooters  and  buccaneers  which  main- 
tained a  small  trade  in  hides  with  the  Dutch. 

A  very  considerable  emigration  from  the  ports^of  N"r- 
mandy  and  Brittany  made  this  expansion  and  development 
of  new  colonies  possible.  From  the  port  of  Honfleur  alone 
more  than  600  indentured  servants  went  out  to  the  West 
Indies  between  January,   1637,   and  June,   1639.^     The 

25  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fol.  466. 

26  Charlevoix,  op.  cit.,  II,  6. 

27  Br6ard,  op.  cit.,  187  ff.  Some  contracts  by  which  servants  bound 
themselves  to  captains  of  ships  and  to  the  Company  of  the  Isles  of 
America  have  been  published  by  Br^ard,  and  by  du  Motey,  Ouillaume 
d'Orange  et  les  Origines  des  Antilles  Frangaises. 

29 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

total  population  of  the  French  Wfest  Indies  was  estimated 
in  1642  to  be  more  than  7000.^  This  increase  in  territory 
and  population  was  accompanied  by  a  corresponding 
increase  in  production  and  commerce. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  most  important  pron-^ 
duction  at  St.  Christopher  was  tobacco.  Its  cultivation 
was  also  begun  in  the  other  colonies  at  their  occupation 
and,  as  in  that  island,  it  became  the  chief  production.  The 
increase  in  production  was  so  great  that  the  price  of 
tobacco  fell.  The  company  tried  to  prevent  this  by  limit^ 
ijig  the  maximum  .production  by  any  individual  planter 
to  900  pounds  annually  and  by  forbidding  its  cultivation 
on  alternate  years.^  De  Poincy  made  an  agreement  in 
1639  with  the  English  governor  that  no  tobacco  should 
be  planted  by  the  planters  of  either  nation  during  the 
period  of  one  and  a  half  years,  and  he  issued  an  ordinance 
on  May  26,  ordering  that  all  tobacco  actually  planted 
be  uprooted.^  Another  solution  attempted  was  to  diver- 
sify the  crops.  Thus,  instructions  were  sent  to  Sieur 
Gentilly,  general  agent  at  St.  Christopher,  "to  force  all 
the  planters  in  St.  Christopher  as  well  as  at  Martinique, 
to  plant  a  large  quantity  of  cotton."^^  Similar  instruc- 
tions were  sent  to  the  agent  at  Martinique  in  the  following 
year.^  When  the  orders  were  given  in  1638  to  limit  the 
plantation  of  tobacco  to  alternate  years,  instructions  were 
sent  to  the  islands  that  cotton,  roucou,  or  other  things 

28  It  was  so  stated  in  the  preamble  of  the  letters-patent  which 
renewed  the  privileges  in  1642.    Du  Tertre,  I,  209. 

29  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fols.  335,  339. 

30  Du  Tertre,  I,  143-144.  This  order  and  agreement  were  also  sent 
to  Guadeloupe,  but  de  I'Olive  refused  to  obey  it  and  he  was  sustained 
by  the  directors  on  the  ground  that  an  enforcement  of  it  in  that 
island  would  be  a  violation  of  the  contract  with  the  merchants  of 
Dieppe. 

31  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fol.  109,  September  3,  1636. 

32  Ibid.,  fol.  119. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

be  planted.^^     A  proposal  to  cultivate  indigo  was  favour- 
ably received  by  the  company  in  1643.^ 

But  it  was  in  the  cultivation  of  si^^ar^cane  that  theX^ 
future  prosperity  of  the  islands  lay  and  it  was  to  this  \ 
that  the  directors  devoted  much  attention  about  1640. 
In  their  session  of  October  6,  1638,  they  discussed  the  pro- 
posal made  by  a  Sieur  Turque  to  undertake  the  produc- 
tion of  sugar  and  other  merchandise.  The  directors 
offered  free  passage  for  him,  his  wife  and  six  men,  with 
exemption  from  ordinary  taxes  in  the  island,  provided 
that  he  plant  no  tobacco,  but  only  sugar-cane  and  other 
products,  and  provided  that  he  depart  during  the  course 
of  the  current  year.^  No  record  has  been  found  that 
Sieur  Turque  ever  went  to  Guadeloupe  to  carry  out  any 
such  plan.  But  in  April,  1639,  the  company  accepted 
the  proposal  of  Trezel.  a,  Dutckjnerchant  of  Rouen,  to 
carxY  out  a  somewhat  similar  plan  fer  Martinique.^ 

33  Ibid.,  fol.  339. 

34  Ibid.,  fol.  464. 

35  Ibid.,  fol.  341. 

36  The  entry  in  the  register  of  the  company  is  as  follows:  "After 
having  taken  note  of  the  proposal  made  by  Sieur  Trezel  of  Rouen  for 
the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  and  for  the  establishment  of  mills  for 
the  manufacture  of  sugar  in  the  island  of  Martinique,  and  after 
having  heard  the  aforesaid  Sieur  Trezel  regarding  his  plans  therefor, 
it  was  ordered  that  Mess.  Martin  and  Chanut  draw  up  a  con- 
tract with  him  with  the  following  stipulations:  2400  arpents  of  land 
to  be  granted  by  the  company  for  the  establishment  of  necessary 
building  and  the  plantation  of  sugar-cane;  a  monopoly  of  the  culti- 
vation of  sugar-cane  in  the  aforesaid  island  of  Martinique  for  the 
remainder  of  the  current  year  and  for  six  years  following;  the  monop- 
oly to  be  protected  by  the  imposition  of  the  penalty  of  confiscation 
and  fines  on  all  those  who  attempt  to  violate  it;  .  .  .the  said  six 
years  to  be  prolonged  in  case  of  war;  ...  the  privilege  of  estab- 
lishing one  or  two  plantations  of  sugar-cane  in  the  island  of  Guade- 
loupe without,  however,  a  monopoly  of  its  production  in  that 
island;  ...  a  premium  of  one-tenth  of  all  sugar  and  other  pro- 
ducts to  be  paid  directly  to  the  company  and  one-fortieth  to  some 
person  designated  by  the  company;  the  sugar  produced  to  be  trans- 

31 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Trezel  sailed  almost  immediately  to  carry  out  his  plans.^ 
He  evidently  found  the  task  before  him  much  more  difficult 
than  he  had  anticipated,  for  he  demanded  more  liberal 
terms  before  he  was  willing  to  carry  out  his  contract.  The 
company  made  several  concessions,  the  most  important  of 
which  were:  That  the  double  tax  of  one-tenth  and  one- 
fortieth  was  not  to  be  paid  during  the  first  six  years ;  and 
that  at  the  expiration  of  the  six  years,  the  planters  of 
Martinique  who  cultivated  sugar-cane  were  to  pay  a  tax 
of  one-tenth  to  Trezel  from  1645  to  1651 ;  that  he  was 
permitted  to  employ  fifteen  of  his  men  in  the  plantation  of 
tobacco;  and  that  he  was  allowed  to  trade  with  foreigners 
in  sugar,  tobacco  and  other  products  in  exchange  for  food- 
stuffs for  the  nourishment  of  his  men.^  In  the  following 
year  (1641),  the  company  granted  him  free  passage  on 
one  of  its  ships  for  three  men  and  four  tons  of  merchan- 
dise "in  consideration  of  the  great  expense  to  which  Sieur 
Trezel  has  been  forced  and  of  the  promise  which  he  gives 
of  setting  up  a  sugar-mill  in  the  island  of  Martinique."^ 
In  1642  Trezel  complained  of  bad  treatment,  stating  that 
"all  his  utensils  had  been  scattered  and  that  under  pre- 

ported  only  to  France  and  its  sale  to  foreigners  to  be  strictly  for- 
bidden; no  cultivation  of  tobacco  to  be  permitted;  at  the  expiration 
of  the  aforesaid  six  years  only  the  tax  of  one-tenth  to  be  imposed  by 
the  company  and  the  monopoly  to  cease  and  all  the  planters  of  the 
said  island  of  Martinique  thereafter  to  enjoy  the  liberty  to  plant 
sugar-cane  at  their  pleasure."  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fol.  354,  April  6, 
1639.     See  also  fols.  35  ff. 

37  His  presence  and  the  manner  of  his  reception  are  indicated  in  a 
letter  written  by  du  Parquet  under  the  date  of  August  17.  "I  was 
delighted  at  the  arrival  of  Sieur  Trezel.  I  hope  that  by  the  aid  of 
God  he  will  succeed  in  the  production  of  sugar.  As  to  the  orders 
which  you  have  sent  that  no  one  else  is  to  be  permitted  to  cultivate 
sugar-cane,  it  is  not  necessary  to  give  them  as  there  is  no  one  here 
rich  enough  to  do  so.  If,  however,  some  one  makes  an  attempt,  I 
shall  at  once  forbid  him  to  continue."    Du  Tertre,  I,  109. 

38  Arch.   Col.,  F2,   19,  fol.  388. 

39  Ibid.,  fol.  416. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

text  of  certain  debts,  his  plantation  had  been  sold,"  that  ■ 
thus  all  the  expenditures  which  he  had  made  for  the  manu- 
facture of  50,000  pounds  of  sugar  were  lost.  The  direct- 
ors instructed  the  company's  agent  at  Martinique  to  inves- 
tigate the  statements  of  Trezel  and  at  the  same  time  to 
consider  the  advisability  of  re-establishing  the  enterprise  on 
the  basis  of  one-third  being  owned  by  the  company,  one- 
third  by  du  Parquet,  and  one-third  by  Trezel:*"  This  plan 
did  not  materialize,  for  only  a  few  months  later  the  follow- 
ing entry  was  made  in  the  minutes  of  the  company: 

"As  the  contract  made  with  Sieur  Trezel  has  not  had  the 
success  hoped  for^  owing  to  the  weakness  and  bad  faith  of  the 
contractor^  the  company,  being  unwilling  that  a  matter  of 
such  great  importance  be  postponed  longer,  is  hereby  resolved 
to  furnish  the  funds  for  the  establishment  of  the  enterprise/'*^ 

In  accordance  with  this  resolution  it  was  decided  to 
-purchase  sixty  negroes,  and  to  obtain  forty  or  fifty  work- 
men of  aB^^ortTfor  the  construction  of  necessary  buildings 
and  for  the  other  work  necessary  for  the  cultivation  of 
sugar.  Guadeloupe  wa8-<;heseiL3a-Jthe-46land  best  suited^ 
to  the  enterprise.  It  was  further  resolved  to  find  "some 
person  of  distinction"  to  whom  the  management  of  the 
work  could  be  confided.*^  The  choice  fell  upon  Charles 
Houel,  one  of  the  stockholders  of  the  company.*^  He  had 
recently  returned  from  a  voyage  to  the  West  Indies,  made 
under  the  orders  of  the  company  "in  order  to  gain  a  per- 
fect knowledge  of  all  which  was  going  on  in  the  islands  and 
to  render  the  company  a  faithful  account  thereof,  and 
particularly  in  order  to  find  some  island  where  he  might 

40  Ibid.,  fol.  178. 

41  Ibid.,  fol.  472.  , 

42  Ibid.,  fol.  439. 

43  Du  Motey,  Guillaume  d'Orange,  153.  "Charles  Houel,  6cuyer, 
sieur  de  Petit-Pr6  .  .  .  fils  d'un  riche  financier  Louis  Houel,  sieur 
de  Petit-Pr6,  conseiUer  du  Roi,  contr61eur  g6n6ral  des  salines  du 
Brouage  et  traites  de  Saintonge." 

33 


n 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

establish  himself."^  Houel  was  made  governor  pLLiittAde- 
Ipy^g,  and  entrusted  with  the  entire  management  of  the 
enteirprise.  All  the  clerks,  workmen  and  slaves  of  the  com- 
pany were  placed  under  his  orders.  He  was  granted  one- 
teiitL-iif-'ati-4he~sug:ar  to  be  produced  in  the  island.^^ 

A  contract  was  made  with  Rozer,  a  merchant  of  Rouen, 
to  deliver  sixty  negroes  at  Guadeloupe  at  the  rate  of  200 
livres  apiece,  one-third  of  the  entire  sum  to  be  paid  imme- 
diately and  the  other  two-thirds  after  their  delivery.  In 
October  following,  Rozer  demanded  the  payment  of  the 
8000  livres  and  the  payment  for  two  additional  slaves 
which  had  been  sold  to  de  Leumont,  the  company's  agent 
^  at  St.  Christopher.^ 

The  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  was  definitely  begun  at 
Guadeloupe  in  accordance  with  these  plans.^'^  J^x>  monop- 
cjy__wa^   asseiied  by  the  com  for  all  the  planters 

were  encouraged  to  begin  the  plantation,  af  sugar-cane 

44  Du  Tertre,  I,  207. 

45  Arch.  CoL,  Fg,  19,  fol.  449. 

46  Prompt  payment  was  demanded  on  the  ground  that  the  negroes 
"had  cost  more  than  was  expected  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the 
Dutch  were  making  large  demands  for  them  at  the  coast  of  Guinea." 
Ibid.,  fol,  462.  Houel  claimed,  in  1648,  that  he  had  furnished  the 
funds  for  the  purchase  of  these  slaves  and  demanded  the  cession  of 
Marie  Galante,  where  he  might  take  the  "sixty  negroes  which  the 
company  seemed  unwilling  to  pay  for"  and  establish  himself  as 
proprietor.     Du  Tertre,  I,  441. 

47  A  contemporary  traveller  observed  that  "Mess,  of  the  Com- 
pany of  the  Isles  of  America  possessed  at  Guadeloupe  a  large  plan- 
tation of  sugar-cane  which  I  saw.  They  have  also  a  good  mill  which 
was  being  prepared  when  I  was  there  and  which  has  since  been  com- 
pleted according  to  information  which  I  have  received.  Eighty 
negroes  have  been  sent  there  in  addition  to  the  100  which  I  saw 
myself  and  more  land  has  been  acquired,  so  that  M.  Houel  told  me 
that  he  hoped  to  manufacture  150,000  pounds  of  sugar  annually." 
Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Fran?.,  18593,  fols.  367-368.  The  relation  cited  at  this 
reference  was  probably  written  about  1647,  see  Jacques  de  Dampierre, 
Essai  sur  les  sources  de  I'histoire  des  Antilles  frangaises,  1492-1664, 
Paris,  1904. 

84 


K' 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

by  the  offer  of  exemption  from  the  tax  of  sixty  pounds  of 
tobacco  during  the  first  year.^ 

It  seems  probable  that  Trezel  re-established  his  planta- 
tion and  sugar-mill  at  Martinique,  for  on  June  3,  1644,  he 
was  granted  free  permission  to  send  vessels  to  the  islands 
during  the  space  of  six  years,  free  passage  for  six  tons  of 
merchandise  on  a  ship  then  being  equipped  by  the  com- 
pany at  Dieppe,  and  finally  he  was  granted  an  exemption 
from  all  taxes  on  sugar  produced  by  him  during  the  year 
1647/' 

Plans  to  begin  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  at  St.  ^  -4 
Christopher  were  cojotemp^raneous.  In  1639,  de  Poincy 
proposed  such  a  plan  and  it  was  promptly  accepted  by 
the  directors  in  their  meeting  of  June  1.^  De  Poincy, 
however,  met  with_obstj,cles.  Thus  he  wrote  to  the  direct- 
ors in  the  following  year: 

"We  haven't^^nough  land  to  produce  roucou  and  cotton. 
They  are  pjciidncts- which  t>ccupy  too  much  space.  I  admit 
that  the  soil  is  suited  to  tibg^pjroductiqn  of  both.  .  .  .  The 
planters  do  not  know  or  wish  to  know  anything  except  how 
to  produce  tobacco^  unless  some  one  first  shows  them  the  way. 
What  I  say  about  the  cultivation  of  roucou  and  cotton  is  also 
true  of  sugar-cane.  In  regard  to  that  there  is  another  diffi- 
culty. It  is  the  lack  of  water  which  is  absolutely  necessary 
and  of  which  we  have  no  supply  except  that  from  a  small 
brook.  .  .  ,  This  lack  could  of  course  be  supplied,  so  far  as 
power  to  turn  the  mills  is  concerned,  by  the  employment  of 
horses  or  of  oxen,  but  it  would  still  be  necessary  to  have  a 
supply  of  water. "^^ 

48  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fol.  452. 

49  Ibid.,  fol.  472. 

50  Ibid.,  fol.  357.  Two  months  later  the  exclusive  privilege  of 
manufacturing  brandy  in  the  islands  of  Martinique  and  St.  Chris- 
topher was  granted  to  a  M.  Fagues.  It  is  possible  and  even  almost 
certain  that  it  is  there  a  question  of  the  manufacture  of  brandy  from 
sugar-cane.     See  fol.  362. 

51  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  letter  from  de  Poincy,  November  15,  1640. 

35 


J 


J 


il 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

This  difficulty  proved  only  temporary,  for  only  a  few  years 
later  both  Pelleprat  and  de  Rochefort  make  special  men- 
tion of  the  production  of  sugar  at  St.  Christopher.^^  De 
Rochefort  remarked  that  de  Poincy  had  three  mills  for 
crushing  cane  on  his  principal  plantation,  and  three  more 
on  another  in  the  quarter  of  Cayonne,  and  that  all  six  of 
these  mills  were  turned  by  oxen  or  horses,  except  one  which 
was  turned  by  water.  He  added  that  all  the  principal 
planters  had  followed  the  example  of  their  governor  by 
planting  sugar-cane.^ 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  for  a  moment  that  the  planta- 
tion of  sugar-cane  had  become  general  as  yet,  in  any  of  the 
islands.  Maurile  de  St.  Michel,  who  was  in  Guadeloupe 
in  1647,  remarked  that  Houel,  the  governor,  raised  sugar- 
cane, but  that  the  average  planter  raised  tobacco.^  But 
the  fact  that  the  plantation  of  sugar-cane  had  been  begun 
in  aUthe  islands  was  most-significant  and  was  the  most 
important  single  fact  connected  with  the  administration 
of  the  Company  of  the  Isles  of  America.  The  broad  road 
to  the  future  had  been  opened  and  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  islands- was  assured.  It  remains  to  trace  the 
development  of  commerce  which  accompanied  the  increase 
in  population  and  production. 

In  the  beginning,  the  new  company  seems  to  have 
intended  to  assert  its  monopoly  and  undertake  to  carry  on 
the  commerce  with  the  islands  in  its  own  ships.  It  estab- 
lished agents  at  Nantes,  St.  Malo,  Dieppe,  Havre  and  La 
Rochelle,  and  in  the  islands  at  St.  Christopher,  Guade- 

52  Le  P^re  Pierre  Pelleprat,  Relation  des  missions  des  PP.  de  la 
Comyagnie  de  Jhus  dans  les  Isles  et  dans  la  Terre  Ferme  de  l'Am4r- 
ique,  Paris,  1665,  pp.  8-9. 

53  Cesar  de  Rochefort,  Histoire  naturelle  et  morale  des  Antilles  de 
VAmMque,  p.  312. 

54  F.  Maurile  de  St.  Michel,  Voyage  des  Isles  Camercanes  en 
VAmirique  et  une  relation  diversifi^e,  p.  41. 

36 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

loupe  and  Martinique.^^  The  directors  gave  instructions 
that  the  planters  be  prevented Jrom  huying^gny tiling  from 
the  Enpflish  except  liYeL_sluidL_QlLCQi±9n,  and  from  selling 
their  t(jhMX£i_t(lJh£m,  and  in  general  fxQiSLtradiiig^ j^jth 
f oceigiiers^  so  far  as  it  was  possible,  and  finally  from 
returning  ±0.  Europe  in  Dutch  and  E  vessels  or  from 

sending  their  merchandise  thither„,by  such  vessels.*  Pri- 
vate French.traders  were  forbidden  to  trade  in  the  islands 
except  by  first_ob.taining  a  passport  from  the  company. 
Passports  were  granted  on  condition  of  returning  directly 
to  Dieppe,  or  Ha vre^^and  of  providing  on  the  outward  voy- 
age free  passage  for  three  servants  belonging  to  the  com- 
pany and  free  transport  for  "a  certain  number  of  tons  of 
merchandise,"  and  on  the  return  voyage  free  transport  for 
ten  tons  of  merchandise  for  every  100  tons  of  the  vessel's 
tonnage.^ 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  company   attempted  to    • 
assert  its  monopoly,  the  question  is  naturally  asked  what 
it  did  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  planters  through  its  own 
efforts.      "I  have  not  been   able  to   find  out,"  says  Du 
Tertre,^^  "the  details  of  the  succour  which  this  company 
sent  out  to  St.  Christopher,  but  there  is  every  appearance 
that   it   was    considerable   and   that   many   settlers   were 
enlisted  at  Dieppe  and  Havre."     But  the  principal  aid  ^J 
which  the  company  sent  out  to jthejslanj^s  was  in  the  shape  / 
of  new  settlers,  for  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  com- 

55  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fols.  155,  257,  109,  119,  159,  167. 

56  Ibid.,  fols.  109,  119,  159,  167. 

57  Ibid.,  fol.  89.  These  conditions  were  not  always  enforced,  how- 
ever, for  there  are  several  cases  where  others  were  substituted.  Thus, 
a  permission  was  granted  to  a  captain  of  La  Rochelle  in  1637,  on 
condition  of  carrying  out  six  muskets  and  of  bringing  back  a  "certain 
quantity  of  tobacco  for  the  company."  Fols.  293-296.  The  company 
insisted  on  private  traders  having  passports.  It  ordered  prosecution 
of  a  captain  in  1635  and  another  in  1637  for  infractions  of  this  rule. 
Ibid.,  fol.  253. 

58  Du  Tertre,  I,  58. 

37 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

panj's_activit.jL Jn  matters __of  trade,  properly  speaking, 
was  not  important.  Although  mention  is  made  from  time 
to  time  of  vessels  belonging  to  the  company  going  out  to 
the  islands,^^  the  company  came  to  depend  more  and  .more 
upon  pijvatp  Fren^hand  foreign  traders  to  supply  the 
needs  ofjthe^slands-  Permits  to  trade  seem  to  have  been 
granted  freely.  Thus  they  were  given  to  merchants  at 
La  Rochelle  in  1637,  1638,  1642,  to  some  at  Nantes  in 
1637  (2),  1639  (2),  1643,  1644.'°  In  a  general  assembly, 
held  December  2,  1637,  the  company  decided  that  stock- 
holders could  send  vessels  to  the  islands  on  the  same  con- 
ditions as_other-individuals.®^    But  the  results  of  the  activ- 

59  Thus  it  is  noted  in  the  minutes  of  August  25,  1635,  that  one  of 
its  vessels  was  captured  on  its  way  from  St.  Christopher  with  a  cargo 
of  tobacco  (fol.  251).  Under  the  date  of  July  1,  1637,  mention 
is  made  of  the  arrival  of  a  vessel  at  Nantes  from  St.  Christopher  with 
a  cargo  of  tobacco  likewise  (fol.  296).  On  July  28,  1641,  free  trans- 
port of  four  tons  of  merchandise  and  three  men  on  a  vessel  being 
equipped  at  St.  Malo  or  Dieppe.  A  similar  thing  was  done  on  June 
3,  1644,  for  a  vessel  being  equipped  at  St.  Malo  (fols.  417  and  473). 
It  is  not  certain  but  very  probable  that  in  both  cases  it  was  a  question 
of  vessels  belonging  to  the  company.  On  May  14,  1640,  the  directors 
ordered  that  a  letter  be  written  to  de  Poincy  to  inform  him  that  the 
vessel  lately  sent  out  from  St.  Malo  had  been  captured.  Near  the 
close  of  1641  the  company  made  a  contract  with  Rozer,  a  merchant 
of  Rouen,  to  send  in  partnership  with  him  a  cargo  of  merchandise  to 
the  islands.  For  this  purpose  a  vessel  of  200  tons  was  chartered  at 
La  Rochelle.  In  the  following  year,  before  the  return  of  the  vessel, 
the  company  offered  to  pay  Rozer  36,000  livres  for  his  share,  which 
represented  only  an  original  investment  of  18,000.  The  vessel  was 
bringing  a  cargo  of  tobacco,  the  price  of  which  had  risen  recently 
(fol.  418).  Again,  at  the  close  of  1642,  the  directors  decided  to  equip 
a  vessel  of  100  tons  and  send  it  to  the  islands  (fol.  438).  Unless 
some  oversight  has  been  made,  these  are  all  the  indications  which  the 
minutes  contain  of  the  expedition  of  vessels  to  the  islands.  Of  course, 
one  cannot  be  certain  that  the  minutes  contain  a  complete  list  of  all 
the  vessels  which  were  sent  out.  But  it  is  probable  that  the  reason 
why  more  indications  are  not  given  is  that  the  company  sent  very 
few  vessels  to  trade  with  the  planters. 

60  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  19,  fols.  170,  293,  306,  352,  325,  444,  473. 

61  Fol.  315. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

ity  of  the  private  French  trader  were  not  great  and  the 
planters  relied  more  and  more  completely  upon  the  Dutch 
for  their  supplies. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  company  gave  instructions 
to  exclude  foreigners.  But  in  actual  practice,  it  either 
permitted  foreign  trade,  by  reason  of  its  inability  to  assert 
its  monopoly,  or  tolerated  it,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
it  was  unable  to  supplant  the  Dutch  in  the  satisfaction  of 
the  planters'  needs.  It  permitted  it  in  the  case  of  Trezel, , 
for  on  April  4,  1640,  the  directors  permitted  him  to  barter 
tobacco,  sugar,  or  other  products  for  food-stuffs  in  trade 
with  foreigners.  It  tolerated  it  in  the  case  of  trade  at  St. 
Christopher.  De  Poincy  made  a  contract  with  Mess, 
de  Ruberque,  merchants  of  Middleburg,  whereby  they 
agreed  to  furnish  all  things  of  which  the  island  had  need. 
"In  order  to  facilitate  this  trade  de  Poincy  permitted 
them  to  send  an  agent  and  construct  a  store  at  Sandy 
Point.  This  agent,  thanks  to  the  profit  which  he  assured 
to  de  Poincy,  was  permitted  to  monopolize  almost  the 
entire  trade  of  the  island."^^  The  minutes  of  the  company 
contain  a  very  interesting  item  of  evidence  which  shows 
that  the  foreigner  became  the  mainstay  of  the  planters. 
On  September  13,  1641,  the  directors  took  the  following 
action : 

."In  consideration  of  the  fact  that  according  to  the  memoirs 
of  M.  de  Poincy  and  the  letters  from  the  agents  in  the  islands, 
the  planters  are  entirely  without  supplies,  which  are  ordinarily 
brought  them  by  the  Dutch  and  English  traders,  who  have 
ceased  to  come  of  late,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  planta- 
tion of  tobacco  has  temporarily  ceased  [due  to  the  ordinance  of 
May,  1639],  and  that  the  lack  of  these  necessities  has  caused 
sickness,  it  is  hereby  resolved  to  send  relief  to  the  islands." 

This  is  a  most  categorical  statement  that  under  normal 
conditions  the  suppHes  of  the  planters  were  furnished  by 
62  Du  Tertre,  I,  165-167. 

89 


L 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

\  foreigners,  and  it  is  not  without  significance  that  the  com- 
pany took  the  resolution  to  send  a  vessel  to  the  islands 
more  for  the  sake  of  relieving  suffering  than  for  the  pur- 
pose of  carrying  on  commerce.  The  foreigner  was  not 
long  absent  and  the  company  again  subsided  into  inactiv- 
]  ity.  Near  the  close  of  the  period  of  the  conjpany's  rule 
in  the  islands,  which  came  to  an  end  in  IjSi^  the  Djitr.h  - 
seem  again  to  have  almost  completely  monopolized  trade.  ^ — 
They  had  built  up  a  lucrative  commerce  and  their  vessels 
were  going  to  the  islands  in  ever  increasing  numbers. 

In  spite  of  this  development  of  the  islands  the  Company 
i  of  the  Isles  of  America  proved  a  failure  and  was  bankrupt 
in  1648.     Du  Tertre  attributed  its  downfall  to  two  prin- 
cipal reasons,  namely,  civil  warfare  arid  the  trjumph  of 
the  persojiaJL.inter£ats^of_the.jnd^  at  the 

expense  of  those  of  the  company.     Both  of  these  causes 
require  a  moment's  explanation. 

At  the  death  of  d'Esnambuc  in  1634,  the  company 
appointed  Sieur  de  Longvillier  de  Poincy,  a  chevalier  in 
the  order  of  St.  John_of_ Jerusalem  and  chief  of  the  squad- 
ron of  the  king's  vessels  in  Brittany,  as  lieutenant^genexal  ^ 
of  all  the  French  islands  of  America.  He  arrived  at  St. 
Christopher  in  February,  IfiSSi,  and  seems  to  have  begun 
almost  immediately  an  administration  which  promoted  his 
own  personal  interests  rather  than  those  of  the  company. 
In  1640,  as  has  been  noted  already,  he  made  a  contract 
with  a  Dutch  firm  of  Middleburg  to  furnish  all  supplies 
necessary  at  St.  Christopher.  He  attempted,  according 
to  Du  Tertre,  to  monopolize  all  the  trade  of  the  island.— 
For  this  purpose  he  forbade  the  inhabitants  to  board  ves- 
sels which  came  to  St.  Christopher,  in  order  that  he  might 
buy  all  the  merchandise  imported  into  the  island  and  sell 
it  to  the  planters  at  a  profit.  He  employed  no  less  than 
seven  clerks  for  the  distribution  of  goods  thus  bought. 

40 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

In  addition  he  laid  heavy  taxes  upon  the  people  so  that 
"he  and  his  clerks  grew  very  rich  at  the  expense  of  the 
poor  planters  who  groaned  under  the  monopoly."^ 

The  company  decided  to  replace  him  in  1644  and  sent 
out  as  his  successor  Sieur  de  TJiQJsy.  From  the  moment 
of  de  Thoisy's  arrival  in  the  islands,  in  November,  16453^  ^ 
de  Poinjsy  refused  to  acknowledge  him  and  straightway 
prepared  to  defend  himself  by  force  of  arms.  A  civil  war 
broke  out,  which  spread  to  all  the  islands.  St.  Christo- 
pher, Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  suffered  most  from  the 
conflict.  De  Poincy  was  able  not  only  to  remain  in  control 
of  St.  Christopher,  but  forced  his  rival  to  embark  for 
France  in  January,  1647.  The  authority  of  the  com- 
pany was  thus  defied  and  it  was  too  weak  to  reply.  It 
was,  however,  not  merely  humiliation  that  the  company 
suff'ered,  but  in  addition  its  revenue  from  taxation  in  the 
islands  was  cut  off^.  No  revenue  came  from  St.  Christo- 
pher during  the  struggle,  for  de  Poincy  held  all  with  an 
iron  hand  in  that  island,  and  the  planters  of  the  other 
islands,  "profiting  from  the  state  of  affairs,  refused  to  pay 
taxes  to  the  company."^ 

As  to  the  selfish  rule  of  the  several  governors,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  de  Poincy  at  St.  Christopher,  Houel  at  Guade- 
loupe, du  Parquet  at  Martinique,  and  Levasseur  at  Tor- 
tuga  had  all  the  power  in  their  hands.  It  has  just  been 
seen  that  de  Poincy  was  strong  enough  to  defy  the  com- 
pany and  rule  his  island  in  accordance  with  his  own  wishes. 
It  has  also  been  noted  that  efforts  to  bring  Levasseur  into 
obedience  proved  fruitless.  He  apparently  maintained  no 
relations  with  the  company  whatever.  Houel's  voyage  to 
Guadeloupe  in  1646  was  made  as  much  in  his  own  interests 
as  in  those  of  the  company.  He  was  seeking  an  island 
where  he  might  make  his  fortune.     He  was  a  stockholder 

63  Du  Tertre,  I,  123,  166,  390. 

64  Ibid.,  I,  439. 

41 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

and  easily  succeeded  in  having  himself  appointed  governor 
of  the  island.  He  furnished  a  large  part  of  the  capital 
for  the  establishment  of  the  sugar  industry,  a  fact  which 
gave  him  an  upper  hand  in  his  relations  with  the  company. 
When  the  complaint  was  made  that  the  company  was 
receiving  no  revenue  from  Guadeloupe,  he  replied  that 
he  had  employed  his  own  capital  to  make  the  affairs  of 
the  company  succeed,  and  that  the  company  was  his 
debtor  and  not  he  the  company's.  When  it  became  a  ques- 
tion of  disposing  of  the  several  islands  in  1648,  Houel 
wrote  to  his  brother-in-law,  de  Boisseret,  instructing  him 
to  buy  the  island  of  Guadeloupe  in  partnership  with  him, 
*  assuring  him  that  for  the  year  1650  he  would  produce  at 
least  100,000  pounds  of  sugar  and  a  large  quantity  of 
tobacco.®^  This  statement  shows  very  conclusively  that  if 
the  company  was  receiving  no  revenue  from  Guadeloupe, 
it  was  due,  not  to  the  fact  that  the  island  was  not  pro- 
ductive, but  rather  to  the  fact  that  Houel  was  guarding 
the  proceeds  for  himself.  Du  Parquet,  at  Martinique, 
seems  to  have  been  the  only  one  of  the  governors  who 
administered  affairs  in  the  interest  of  the  company. 

The  downfall  of  the  company  was  undoubtedly  due  in 
V-      part,  and  perhaps  principally,  to  these  causes.     It  may 
have  been  due  also  to  the  fact  that  its  capital  was  too 
small  and  that  the  directors  paid  too  little  attention  to 
V<?  its  affairs.     But  whatever  may  have  been  the  causes,  it  is 

certain  that  the  company  was  in  a  bankrupt  state  in  1648. 
The  revenue  from  the  islands  had  become  small,  the  com- 
pany had  been  deeply  humiliated  from  the  defeat  admin- 
istered by  de  Poincy  and  creditors  had  become  very  press- 
ing. A  special  general  assembly  of  the  stockholders  was 
called  to  deliberate  over  the  crisis.  It  was  held  on  the 
first  Friday  of  June,  1648.  After  having  taken  into  con- 
sideration that  the  several  governors  had  become  masters 

65  Du  Tertre,  I,  443. 

42 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

of  the  islands,  that  the  officers  of  the  company  were  no 
longer  respected,  and  that  in  order  to  hft  it  out  of  its 
embarrassments  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  stockholders 
to  subscribe  4000  livres  for  each  share  held,  it  was  decided 
to  sell  the  several  islands. 

In  accordance  with  this  decision,  Guadeloupe,  together 
with  Marie  Galante,  Desirade  and  the  Saints,  was  sold  to 
Houel  and  de  Boisseret  (September  4,  1649)  for  60,000 
livres,  Martinique,  with  St.  Lucia,  Grenada  and  the  Grena- 
dines, to  du  Parquet  (September  27,  1650)  for  50,000 
livres,  and  St.  Christopher  to  the  Knights  of  Malta  (May 
24,  1651)  for  120,000  livres.'^  Thus  was  inaugurated  a 
period  of  proprietary  rule,  which  lasted  until  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  West  India  Company  in  1664.  It  is  not 
the  purpose  here  to  recount  the  history  of  the  islands 
under  this  regime  of  proprietary  rule,  but  merely  to  call 
attention  to  the  most  important  facts  which  bear  directly 
upon  the  development  of  trade  and  industry. 

The  expansion  which  has  been  noted  for  the  period 
1635-1648  continued  for  the  period  1648-1664.  In 
March,  1648,  de  Poincy,  on  learning  that  the  Spaniards 
had  abandoned  the  island  of  St.  M^y|,^;^  sent  his  nephew 
with  300  men  to  take  possession  of  it.  The  Dutch  sent  a 
similar  expedition  from  St.  Eustatius  about  the  same  time 
and  for  the  same  purpose.  By  a  treaty  of  March  23,  the 
two  nations  agreed  to  divide  the  island  between  them, 
about  two-thirds  going  to  the  French  and  one-third  to  ' 
the  Dutch.  The  island  of  St.  Bartholomew  was  occupied 
in  the  same  year  by  a  small  colony  of  fifty  or  sixty  men 
sent  out  fll^m  St.  Christopher.  It  was  abandoned  in 
1656,  after  a  furious  attack  by  the  savages,  but  reoccupied, . 
in  1659.  In  1650,  de  Poincy  placed  one  of  his  lieutenants, 
de  Vaughan,  in  command  of  some  160  of  the  bravest  men 
at  St.  Christopher  and  ordered  him_to_atlaiJ^ 

66  Du  Tertre,  I,  443  ff. 

48 


f. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

iaxds-at.  St.  Croix  and  take  possession  of  the  island.  De 
Vaughan  was  successful  and  in  the  following  year  300 
more  men  were  sent  out  to  establish  a  permanent  colony .^^ 

From  Guadeloupe  an  expedition  occupied,  in  October, 
1648,  the  groups  of  small  islands  lying  between  it  and 
Dominica,  known  as  the  SaintSj^  and  in  the  same  year 
ManfiLGalante  was  occupied.^ 

At  Martinique  du.  Parquet  was  not  idle,  but  also  took 
part  in  the  movement  of  expansion.  In  l&^tS,  a  small  col- 
ony was  sent  Jio  St.  Lucia,  but  the  island  was  occupied 
more  with  the  idea  of  preventing  it 3  occupation  by  another 
nation  than  with  that  of  founding  a  productive  colony. 
In  June,  1650,  du  Parquet  himself  set  sail  with  a  well- 
equipped  colony  of  200  men  to  take  possession  of  Grenada. 
After  a  successful  occupation  he  reinforced  the  colony 
in  the  following  year  by  sending  300  additional  settlers. 
The  island  was  sold  in  1656  to  de  Cerillac,  in  whose  hands 
it  remained  until  its  cession  to  the  West  India  Company  in 
1664.^' 

This.,. expansion  in  territory  was  accompanied  by  a 
growth  in  population.  The  population  of  the  French 
West  Indies  was  estimated  in  1642  to  be  more  than  TOOO,'^" 
and  in  1655,  Pelleprat,  a  Jesuit  missionary,  estimated  it 
to  be  15,000  or  16,000  Frenchmen  and  12,000  or  13,000 
slaves.^^ 

There  was  also  a  very  notable  increase  ijLiJiaproductiDn 
of  sugar.  Biet  stated  that,  according  to  reports  which 
he  had  received  from  the  islands,  there  were  planters  who 
produced  10,000  pounds  of  sugar  per  week  and  that  the 
poor  planters,  which  he  had  seen  in  1654,  had  become 

67  For  all  of  these  facts  concerning  the  colonies  founded  from  St. 
Christopher  see  Du  Tertre,  I,  409-413,  and  II,  32,  33,  37. 

68  Ibid.,  I,  425  flf.  and  II,  40-41. 

69  Ibid. 

70  Ibid.,  I,  209. 

71  Pelleprat,  op.  ciL,  3,  15,  54. 

44 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

"little  lords."^^  A  memorialist  of  1660  noted  that  a  large 
amount  of  sugar  was  being  produced  in  the  islands  and 
that  it  had  supplanted  tobacco  as  the  most  important 
product/^  De  Tracy  wrote  to  Colbert  in  1664)  that  so 
much  land  was  being  devoted  to  the  plantation  of  sugar 
that  the  islands  were  suffering  from  a  failure  to  plant 
food-stuffs  J*  Colbert  himself  stated  in  1664«  that  the 
Dutch  carried  away  with  them  from  the  French  West 
Indies  annually,  2,000,000  livres  worth  of  sugar  and 
1,000,000  livres  worth  of  tobacco,  cotton,  dye-woods, 
indigo,  etc/^  This  increase  in  production  had  been  made 
possible  by  a  large  importation  of  indentured  servants  and 
still  more  of  slaves.  "Traders  bring  many  ships  every 
year  laden  with  slaves.  Three  arrived  at  Martinique  last 
year  [1654]  which  disembarked  600  or  700.'"'  St.  Chris- 
topher and  Guadeloupe  were  perhaps  no  less  favoured, 
for  the 'same  writer  observes  that  de  Poincy  at  St.  Chris- 
topher had  no  less  than  600  or  700  slaves  on  his 
plantations.^ 

Trade  stea,dily  increased  under  proprietary  rule. 
French  traders  seem  to  have  profited  very  little  from  it, 
however.  A  few  vessels  went  out  from  Dieppe,  Havre,  St. 
Malo,  Nantes  and  La  Rochelle.^^    The  principal  trade  of 

72Antoine  Biet,  Voyage  de  la  France  Equinoxiale  en  Visle  de 
Cayenne  entrepris  par  les  Frangois  en  Vannee  MDCLIII,  Paris,  1664, 
314-315. 

73  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Relation  des  isles  de  I'Amdrique. 

74  Du  Tertre,  III,  98. 

75  Clement,  op.  cit.,  II,  1,  cclix,  Discours  sur  les  manufactures.     . 
76P^lleprat,  op.  cit.,  54-55. 

77  Ibid. 

78  Pelleprat  made  the  voyage  to  the  islands  in  1651  in  a  vessel  from 
La  Rochelle.  Op.  cit.,  p.  27.  Du  Tertre  notes  the  presence  of  a  ves- 
sel from  Nantes  at  St.  Domingo  in  1659.  Du  Tertre,  III,  131. 
L'Aurore  (200  tons),  from  Dieppe,  was  on  a  voyage  to  the  West 
Indies  in  1664.  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  500  Colbert,  199,  fols.  101-108.  In 
the  same  year,  Le  Phenix  (60  tons),  Le  Petit  Soleil  (50  tons),  and  Ire 
St.  Antoine  (140  tons),  all  from  St.  Malo,  were  in  the  islands.    Ibid., 

45 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

these  vessels,  especially  those  of  the  northern  ports,  was 
in  indentured  servants/^  Foreigners,  for  the  inosF  part 
Dutch*  controlled  almost  all  the  rest  of  the  trade. 

Pelleprat  remarked  that  foreigners  brought  wine,  beer, 
brandy,  oil,  butter,  salt-meat,  biscuit,  cloth  and  every- 
thing else  necessary  for  the  planters,  and  took  in  exchange 
tobacco,  sugar,  indigo,  ginger,  tortoise  shell,  and  other 
articles.^  Biet,  during  his  short  sojourn  in  the  islands 
in  1654,  remarked  that  the  ships  of  all  nations  were  trad- 
ing in  the  harbours  of  Guadeloupe.^^  Maurile  de  St. 
Michel,  in  a  chapter  on  the  establishment  of  the  Carme- 
lites at  Guadeloupe,  states  that  durfng  the  voyage  of 
Fathers  Cosme  and  Innocent  in  1648,  from  France,  no  less 
than  thirty  passengers  died,  and  during  that  of  Father 
Athanase,  in  1650,  forty-five  died.  He  stated  that  the 
deaths  in  each  case  were  due  to  the  "filth  and  infection  of 
our  vessels,"  and  added  that  the  safest  thing  to  do  was  to 
go  to  Holland  to  embark  in  a  Dutch  vessel,  because  the 
Dutch  cleaned  their  ships  often,  fed  passengers  well  and 
did  not  take  such  a  large  number  aboard.^^  Du  Tertre 
made  the  outward  voyage  in  1654  in  a  Dutch  ship  from 
Texel  and  returned  the  following  year  in  another  to  Flush- 
ing. Father  Feuillet  came  from  St.  Christopher  to  Flush- 
ing by  a  Dutch  vessel  in  1658.  Houel  returned  to 
France  by  another  in  1664.^ 

It  was  the  Dutch  who  saved  Martinique  from  disaster 
in  1654.  In  that  year  the  attacks  of  the  savages  were  so 
persistent  that  "the  island  was  on  the  point  of  succumbing 
to  the  ferocious  brutality  of  the  barbarians  and  the  rebel- 

fols.  237-260.  Three  vessels  from  Nantes,  one  of  140  tons,  another  of 
200,  another  of  250,  were  there  the  same  year.     Ibid.,  fols.  221-234. 

79  Du  Tertre,  II,  464. 

80  Pelleprat,  op.  ciL,  8. 

81  Biet,  op.  cit.,  315. 

82  De  St.  Michel,  op.  cit.,  328. 

83  Du  Tertre,  I,  508,  528,  and  III,  79.  %■ 

46 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

lion  of  the  slaves,  when  God  sent  four  large  Dutch  vessels 
armed  for  war  to  their  aid."  The  Dutph  landed  300 
soldiers,  drove  off_the  savages  and.  saved  the  colony  from 
calamity.^  A  memorialist  of  1660  remarked  that  the 
French  trader  was  subjected  to  such  heavy  duties  that  it 
was  no  longer  possible  for  him  to  compete  with  his  Dutch 
rival  in  the  trade  with  the  island.  He  stated  that  the 
Dutch  were  importing  all  sorts  of  merchandise  and  offered 
them  much  cheaper  than  the  French  and  that  they  offered 
much  lower  rates  for  the  transportation  of  freight  from 
the  islands  to  Europe.^^  Formont,  a  Parisian  banker,  who 
had  interests  in  the  islands  and  who  had  engaged  in  trade 
there,  remarked  in  a  memoir,  written  in  1662,  that  the 
trade  with  the  French  West  Indies  had  become  so  impor- 
tant that  they  sent  no  less  than  100  or  120  large  vessels 
there  annually:^  Colbert  himself  estimated  that  out  of  a 
total  of  150  vessels  which  traded  in  the  French  Antilles  in 
1662,  three  ^  or  four  at  most  sailed  from  the  ports  of 
France.^^ 

De  Rochefort  asserts  that  the  trade  with  St.  Christo- 
pher and  the  other  islands  had  led  to  the  establishment  of 
"rich  and  powerful  firms  at  Middleburg  and  Flushing," 
and  that  the  trade  of  these  islands  had  become,  for  the 
traders  of  these  towns,  what  the  mines  of  Peru  were  for 
the  Spaniards.  The  merchants  of  Flushing  called  the 
French  planters  "our  planters."^  The  relation  between 
them  became  intimate.  "The  planters  a  few  years  ago  hav- 
ing expressed  the  fear  that  in  case  of  rupture  between 
France  and  Holland  they  would  suffer  heavy  losses,  the 
Dutch  straightway  offered  them  the  right  of  bourgeois  and 

84  Du  Tertre,  I,  469. 

85  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Relation  des  isles  de  rAm6rique. 

86  Ibid.,  Memoire  du  Sieur  Formont  pour  montrer  rutilit6  du  com- 
merce des  isles  et  les  moyens  de  le  bien  dtablir. 

87Lavisse,  Histoire  de  France,  VII,  1,  235,  note  1. 
88  De  Rochefort,  op.  cit.,  311. 

47 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

granted  them  insurance  policies  in  firms  of  Amsterdam, 
Middleburg  and  Flushing."^^  The  most  important  plant- 
ers of  Martinique  accepted  the  offer,  and  by  paying  twelve 
livres  a  3^ear  received  insurance  for  all  of  their  property. 
In  1657,  when  a  rupture  between  the  two  nations  seemed 
imminent,  the  Dutch  sent  post  haste  a  frigate  to  the  islands 
to  assure  the  merchants  and  planters  that  no  matter  what 
happened,  their  property  would  be  as  safe  as  if  it  were  in 
Dutch  possessions. 

Du  Tertre  recounts  an  incident  which  occurred  in  1663 
at  St.  Christopher,  which  gives  a  very  good  idea  of  the 
immense  importance  of  Dutch  commerce  in  the  islands  at 
that  date: 

"In  the  year  1663  there  occurred  something  most  remarkable 
in  this  island  [St.  Christopher].  It  was  the  conflagration  of 
all  the  storehouses  belonging  to  the  Dutch  merchants.  More 
than  sixty  were  consumed  with  all  the  merchandise  which  they 
contained.  The  loss  was  estimated  at  more  than  2^000,000 
livres.  .  .  .  The  island  suffered  very  much  during  four  or 
five  months,  because  all  the  salt  beef  and  bacon,  wine,  oil, 
brandy,  flour,  cloth^  and  other  goods  were  entirely  burned, 
so  that  the  planters  were  deprived  of  all  these  things  in  a 
single  day  and  were  forced  to  await  aid  from  Holland,  which 
had  always  proved  their  refuge  in  time  of  necessity.  The 
Dutch  did  not  fail  them,  in  spite  of  their  own  losses,  for  they 
had  no  sooner  received  news  of  the  disaster  than  they  freighted 
a  large  number  of  vessels  with  all  sorts  of  merchandise.  .  .  . 
Such  a  large  quantity  of  supplies  was  imported  that  some  poor 
Dutch  merchants,  who  had  brought  a  quantity  of  meat,  wine 
and  brandy,  which  could  not  be  preserved  a  long  time,  were 
forced  to  sell  them  at  a  loss  of  one-third."^ 

Du  Tertre  does  not  fail  to  explain  the  superiority  of  the 
Dutch  and  the  reason  why  the  French  planters  regarded 

89  Du  Tertre,  II,  464. 

90  Ibid.,  I,  586. 

48 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

them  with  favour.  At  the  close  of  his  second  volume  he 
devotes  a  most  interesting  chapter  to  the  subject  of  trade. 
The  chapter  has  all  the  greater  significance,  when  it  is 
recalled  that  the  author  spent  some  years  of  his  life  as  a 
sailor  and  had  made  many  voyages  to  and  from  the  islands, 
a  fact  which  gave  him  ample  opportunity  to  observe  and 
to  know  whereof  he  spoke  in  discussing  matters  of  navi- 
gation and  trade.^^    A  passage  from  it  is  as  follows: 

"There  is  to  be  found  in  the  storehouse  of  the  islands  every- 
thing of  which  the  planters  have  need.  Merchants  take  pains 
to  have  such  an  assortment  of  merchandise  that  the  planter 
is  not  obliged  to  go  from  store  to  store  in  order  to  find  all 
that  he  desires.  Everything  is  much  dearer  than  in  France, 
for  a  pair  of  slippers  sometimes  costs  100  pounds  of  tobacco, 
that  is  to  say  fifteen  livres  in  money.  I  have  had  merchants  in 
France  tell  me  that  those  who  understand  well  the  needs  of 
the  planters  can  make  a  profit  of  100  per  cent  on  the  merchan- 
dise which  they  import  into  the  islands. 

"It  is  undoubtedly  for  that  reason  that  the  Dutch  offer  goods 
much  cheaper,  for  they  are  contented  with  much  less  profit  and 
offer  goods  brought  from  France  even  at  less  cost  than  the 
French  merchants.  Notwithstanding  the  great  losses  which 
they  have  suffered,  amounting  in  some  cases  to  the  shipwreck 
of  thirty  to  forty  ships  in  a  single  year,  they  have  never  per- 
mitted themselves  to  be  rebuffed,  but  have  always  furnished  the 
islands  abundantly  with  all  things  of  which  they  had  need. 
That  is  the  principal  reason  wherefore  our  planters  abandoned 
trade  with  the  ports  of  France  and  placed  all  of  their  affairs 
in  the  hands  of  the  Dutch.  To  this  reason  must  be  added  the 
excess  of  duties  which  must  be  paid  in  France  on  goods 
imported  from  and  exported  to  the  colonies.  In  some  cases 
such  duties  exceed  the  cost  of  the  goods.  ...  I  have  seen 
poor  planters  indebted  for  more  than  100  ecus  after  paying 
duties  on  shipments  to  France  on  which  they  had  hoped  to 
realize  a  profit  of  5,000  livres. 

91  See  Dampierre,  op.  cit.,  108,  for  a  very  interesting  sketch  of  his 
life. 

49 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

"Besides  all  of  these  reasons,  the  greater  part  of  all  the 
French  vessels  which  went  to  the  islands  before  the  formation 
of  the  West  India  Company,  were  in  such  a  bad  state  that  there 
was  no  security  for  their  cargoes.  The  Dutch,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  a  goodly  number  of  large,  beautiful  vessels  and  were 
often  satisfied  with  half  of  that  which  the  French  demanded 
for  the  transportation  of  freight.  There  is  no  occasion  for 
surprise,  therefore,  if  all  the  products  of  our  islands  were 
laden  in  their  ships. 

"So  that  if  we  consider  the  matter  closely,  we  will  under- 
stand that  not  only  our  planters  are  justified  in  placing  their 
affairs  in  the  hands  of  the  Dutch,  but  also  that  the  Dutch,  who 
are  the  best  informed  traders  in  the  world,  have  persistently 
sought  to  maintain  this  trade  by  reason  of  the  profit  which 
they  found  therein.  The  freedom  of  the  ports  of  Holland  has 
also  attracted  our  planters,  and  besides,  the  Dutch  merchants 
have  shown  such  affection  and  such  fidelity  in  their  relations 
with  our  planters  that  they  have  become  masters  of  all  the 
affairs  of  the  islands."^ 

Thus  at  the  eve  of  Colbert's  ministry,  the  French  were 
in  possession  of  no  less  than  fourteen  islands  in  the  W*est 
Indies,  the  most  important  of  which,  St.  Christopher, 
Guadeloupe,  and  Martinique,  were  already  well  cultivated 
and  productive,  and  another,  St.  Domingo,  was  capable 
of  wonderful  development  and  was  destined  to  become  the 
most  productive  colony  of  all.  The  importation  of  ser- 
vants from  France  and  of  slaves  from  the  coast  of  Africa 
had  made  possible  a  notable  development  in  the  productiv- 
ity of  the  colonies.  Sugar  had  become  an  important  pro- 
duct and  had  already  begun  to  serve  as  a  solid  base  for  the 
prosperity  of  the  islands.  The  poor  little  planter  of  the 
small  tobacco  patch,  with  his  few  servants  about  him,  had 
been  replaced  by  the  "little  lord"  of  the  large  plantations 
of  waving  sugar-cane  who  had  many  slaves  to  do  his 
bidding.      The    small   number    of   vessels    which   came   in 

92  Du  Tertre,  II,  460. 

60 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

former  times  only  at  the  tobacco  harvest,  came  now  in 
great  numbers  and  at  all  seasons. 

The  profit  of  all  this  development,  however,  had  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  Dutch.  Most  of  the  capital  which 
had  made  possible  the  development  of  the  sugar  industry 
had  been  furnished  by  them.  Dutch  ships  brought  slaves 
from  the  coast  of  Africa  in  abundance  and  thus  made  pos- 
sible increased  production.  Dutch  traders  and  Dutch  ships 
were  everywhere,  to  import  and  export  all  the  merchan- 
dise of  the  French  West  Indies.  For  a  whole  generation 
they  had  been  knitting,  one  by  one,  the  ties  which  bound 
the  planters  closer  and  closer  to  them.  Now  by  gratitude, 
now  by  affection,  now  by  personal  interest,  the  French 
planter  had  become  attached  to  Holland.  Politically  these  ( 
fourteen  islands  were  under  the  rule  of  French  proprietors  j 
and  were  theoretically  in  the  possession  of  the  French  king,  j 
but  industrially  and  commercially  they  were  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  Dutch. 

It  remained  for  Colbert  to  bring  them  under  the  verit-  j 
able  rule  of  the  French  king  and  lay  hold  of  their  riches  ■ 
for  the  profit  of  the  nation. 


51 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Awakening  and  the  Period  of 
Preparation 

THE  fact  that  the  commerce  of  the  French  Wfest  Indies 
had  become  relatively  important  and  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Dutch  did  not  fail  to  attract  attention  in 
France  before  the  beginning  of  Colbert's  ministry.  The 
important  part  which  I^^uquet  played  in  the  affairs  of 
Company  of  the  Isles  of  America  has  already  been  noted. 
It  was  at  his  apartment  that  the  meetings  of  the  directors 
of  the  company  were  most  frequently  held  and  it  was  to 
him  that  colonial  governors  addressed  their  correspond- 
ence. Thanks  to  the  favour  of  the  queen-mother,  he  re- 
ceived in  1652  the  very  important  appointment  of  surin- 
tendant  des  finances  and  came  to  play  a  capital  role  in 
the  affairs  of  the  kingdom.  His  interest  in  the  affairs  of 
the  West  Indies  continued,  for  he  maintained  a  plantation 
at  St.  Lucia  and  another  at  Martinique.  He  sent  two 
vessels  from  Belle  Isle  with  cargoes  of  workmen  and  sup- 
plies and  implements  for  the  cultivation  of  his  plantation^ 
in  the  latter  island  in  1661.^  At  the  moment  of  his  dis- 
grace, as  he  recounts  in  his  Defenses,  he  had  formed  a  large 
plan: 

"I  was  thinking  of  nothing  else  [he  is  speaking  of  his  estab- 
lishment at  Belle  Isle]  than  of  the  establishment  of  a  commer- 
cial company  and  of  building  up  the  colonies.  I  had  already 
talked  with  the  king  in  regard  to  my  plans.  I  had  orders  from 
the  late  Cardinal  Mazarin,  as  well  as  from  Cardinal  Richelieu, 
to  occupy  myself  with  the  matter  of  the  American  colonies. 

1  Gabriel  Marcel,  Le  Surintendant  Fouquet,  Vice-Boi  d'Amirique, 
p.  15. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

De  FeuquiereSj  d'Andilly,  Lavocat,  Clement,  Chanut,  some 
merchants  and  I  were  on  the  point  of  forming  a  company. 
That  is  why  I  lent  money  to  de  Feuquieres  for  the  office  of 

Viceroy  of  America I  hoped  to  render  a  great  service  to 

His  Majesty  by  taking  away  from  foreigners  the  commerce 
of  the  islands  which  they  had  usurped  and  at  the  same  time  to 
find  a  good  investment  for  the  revenue  derived  from  Belle 
Isle."2 

This  passage  shows  very  clearly  that  Fouquet  was  a  pred- 
ecessor of  Colbert  in  his  plans  to  drive  out  the  Dutch  and 
to  reserve  the  trade  of  the  islands  for  Frenchmen. 

Others  called  attention  to  the  importance  of  taking 
some  steps  to  accomplish  the  same  thing.  A  memorialist 
of  1660  presented  the  matter  as  follows: 

'As  for  that  which  regards  trade,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that 
the  heavy  duties  which  French  captains  and  merchants  are 
obliged  to  pay  to  the  king  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  con- 
tinue to  trade  with  the  Antilles,  because  the  Dutch  not  only 
import  there  all  sorts  of  merchandise  and  offer  them  for  sale 
at  much  lower  prices  than  the  French,  but  they  also  demand 
much  less  for  the  transportation  of  freight  from  the  islands 
to  Europe." 

The  remedy  suggested  by  the  writer  was  the  creation  of 
one  or  two  free  ports  in  France,  where  all  the  merchan- 
dise, either  exported  to  or  imported  from  the  islands,  might 
be  free  from  duties.^ 

Formont,  a  Parisian  banker,  wrote  a  memoir  in  1662 
which  is  of  unusual  interest  in  giving  the  point  of  view  of 
a  man  of  affairs : 

"The  commerce  of  the  islands  of  St.  Christopher,  Martin- 
ique, Guadeloupe  and  others  under  the  king's  dominion  is  so 
profitable  and  so  considerable  that  if  it  were  once  established 

2  Becueil  des  defenses  de  M.  Fouquet,  Amsterdam,  1665-1667,  tome 
III,  360. 

3  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Relation  des  Isles  de  l'Am6rique. 

53 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

in  France  and  carried  on  by  Frenchmen,  as  could  easily  be 
done,  the  king,  as  well  as  all  his  subjects,  would  derive 
great  profit  therefrom  not  only  by  gaining  a  market  for  a 
large  quantity  of  merchandise  produced  in  France,  but  also  by 
the  importation  of  colonial  products  which  would  serve  as  a 
means  of  exchange  with  the  ports  of  the  Baltic. 

"The  great  number  of  vessels  which  Dutch  merchants  con- 
stantly send  to  the  French  islands  is  proof  that  trade  with 
these  islands  is  very  profitable,  for  otherwise  they  would  not 

send  100  or  120  large  ships  there  every  year In  order 

that  the  French  may  profit  from  this  commerce  it  is  necessary 
to  exclude  all  foreigners  from  the  privileges  of  trade  there, 
as  the  Dutch,  Spanish  and  English  have  done  in  regard  to 

their  colonies In  this  way  the  French  could  enter  into 

the  possession  of  all  this  trade  and  the  other  nations  would 
have  no  right  to  mate  objections  because  they  were  excluded. 
....  Inasmuch,  however,  as  France  is  not  in  condition  to 
undertake  all  of  the  trade  of  the  islands  immediately,  it  seems 
wise  to  permit  the  Dutch  to  continue  to  trade  for  a  season. 
To  establish  this  trade  upon  a  solid  basis  in  France,  His 
Majesty,  if  it  so  pleases  him,  should  first  issue  a  declaration 
exempting  from  all  import  duties  all  products  brought  from 
the  islands  in  French  bottoms." 

Formont  explains  the  importance  of  this  latter  sugges- 
tion by  pointing  out  the  fact  that  the  import  duties  were 
most  unreasonable  and  prohibitive  of  trade.  Thus  sugar, 
which  sold  for  30  livres  the  cwt.,  paid  a  duty  of  almost  12 
livres;  tobacco,  selling  for  20  livres  the  cwt.,  paid  10 
livres,  and  ginger,  which  sold  for  5  livres,  paid  a  duty  of 
about  12  livres.  In  Holland,  on  the  other  hand,  these 
same  products  paid  only  a  uniform  duty  of  5  sous  the 
cwt.  This  was  why  the  Dutch  had  been  able  to  increase 
their  navigation,  to  establish  a  large  number  of  refineries 
where  they  refined  the  raw  sugar  imported  from  the 
French  West  Indies,  and  to  manufacture  the  tobacco 
from  the  same  islands,  and  to  re-export  this  tobacco  and 

54 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

this  sugar  into  the  ports  of  the  Baltic,  into  Flanders  and 
even,  in  great  quantities,  into  France.  Without  some 
such  measure  to  take  the  burden  off  the  French  trader 
and  thus  place  him  on  a  fairer  basis  of  competition  with 
his  Dutch  rival,  Formont  asserted  that  "it  was  impossible 
to  draw  the  trade  of  the  islands  to  France  and  to  take 
it  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Dutch,  who  had  become  abso- 
lute masters  of  it."  Formont  closed  his  memoir  with  a 
warning:  "If  one  continues  to  abandon  this  commerce 
to  the  Dutch,  these  colonies,  which  have  cost  the  lives  of 
so  many  Frenchmen  to  establish,  will,  to  the  disgrace  of 
the  nation,  be  lost  forever."* 

The  author  of  another  memoir,  bearing  the  date  of 
1663,  wished  to  accord  two  years  of  grace  for  the  Dutch 
to  settle  up  all  their  affairs  in  the  islands,  and  to  organize 
a  French  company,  composed  of  very  rich  persons,  to 
carry  on  this  trade.  He  proposed  that  this  company 
should  equip,  annually,  four  ships  at  Dieppe  with  cargoes 
of  cloth,  hats,  shoes,  stockings,  tinware,  etc.,  and  a  certain 
number  of  other  vessels  in  the  same  port  to  fetch  slaves 
from  the  coast  of  Angola  and  Guinea;  three  more  at 
Havre  and  one  at  Honfleur  with  the  same  cargoes  as  at 
Dieppe;  two  at  St.  Malo  with  cargoes  of  cloth,  bacon 
and  brandy ;  four  at  Nantes  with  wine,  brandy,  bacon 
and  cloth;  three  at  La  Rochelle  with  the  same  articles; 
and  finally  one  at  Bordeaux  or  Bayonne  with  wine,  dried 
fruit,  olive  oil  and  fuel  oil.  One  is  incidentally  impressed 
with  the  distinctly  national  character  which  the  writer 
wished  to  give  to  the  proposed  commerce.^ 

A  proposal  was  made  in  1663  by  Sir  Nacquart,  an 
admiralty  officer  at  Dunkerque,  "to  form  a  new  company 
for  trade  with  the  French  islands  of  America."     It  is  so 

4  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  M6moire  du  Sr.  Formont. 

5  Ibid.,  series  F  (Com.  des  Col.),  I,  Memoire  des  moyens  qu'il 
faudrait  tenir  pour  empescher  aux  estrangers  le  n^goce  des  Isles  de 
I'Am^rique  et  de  I'utilit^  a  la  France. 

55 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

out  of  harmony  with  what  Colbert  attempted  to  do,  when 
he  turned  his  attention  to  the  problem,  and  at  the  same 
time  throws  such  an  interesting  light  on  the  strong  hold 
that  the  Dutch  had  upon  the  trade  with  the  islands  that 
it  deserves  a  moment's  notice.  Nacquart  proposed  to  form 
a  company  which  would  equip  its  vessels  at  Amsterdam, 
"where  ships  and  cargoes  of  goods  suitable  for  the  trade 
are  to  be  had  much  better  and  much  cheaper  than  at  any 
port  in  France."  The  company  should  make  it  a  rule, 
while  its  vessels  were  being  loaded  at  Amsterdam,  to  post 
the  news  when  they  would  call  at  Havre,  "in  order  that 
those  who  are  accustomed  to  send  servants  to  the  islands 
may  have  them  in  readiness."  It  should  also  make  an 
agreement  with  the  Dutch  West  India  Company,  whereby 
permission  would  be  granted  to  send  its  vessels  tp  Cura9ao 
and  Bonaire  to  get  live  stock  for  the  planters.^  It  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  why  the  plan  was  not  seriously  con- 
sidered. 

All  of  the  memoirs  just  cited  may  have  been  written 
spontaneously  by  their  authors  as  an  attempt  to  awaken 
the  interest  of  the  government  in  establishing  trade  with 
the  richest  colonies  which  France  possessed,  and  to  arouse 
it  to  the  danger  of  losing  them  forever,  if  action  were  not 
taken  promptly  to  save  them.  They  may  have  been  writ- 
ten, on  the  other  hand,  in  response  to  requests  by  Colbert 
for  information  or  advice  which  he  desired  to  have  to  aid 
him  in  the  solution  of  the  difficult  problem  before  him. 
There  is  an  item  of  evidence  to  support  the  latter  view. 
A  memoir  entitled  "Memoire  instructif  de  Pestat  present 
du  gouvemement  de  la  Martinique,"  and  bearing  the  date 
of  1663  is  endorsed,  "En  response  a  une  demande  de  M. 
Colbert."^     It  was  written  by  Count  d'Estrades,  viceroy 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Proposition  au  Roy  d'une 
nouvelle  compagnie  h  establir  pour  le  commerce  des  isles  fran9aises 
de  I'Am^rique. 

7  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I. 

56 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

of  America,  in  response  to  a  letter  written  to  him  by 
Colbert  on  September  21,  1662.^  This  fact  certainly 
proves  that  Colbert  was  seeking  information  and  advice 
in  regard  to  the-  islands  at  least  as  early  as  the  date  of 
his  letter.  The  supposition  is  very  natural  that  the  other 
memoirs,  which  date  from  almost  the  same  time  and  are 
preserved  in  the  same  carton  as  the  d'Estrades  memoir, 
were  also  written  in  response  to  his  requests.  It  is  also 
possible  that  these  memoirs  represent  only  a  part  of  the 
total  number  written.  In  any  case  Colbert's  attention 
was  being  called  to  the  fact  that  France  was  in  posses- 
sion of  some  rich  colonies  from  which  she  was  deriving 
no  benefit  and  near  the  close  of  1662  he  began  to  make 
definite  plans  in  regard  to  the  islands. 

During  the  course  of  the  year  1662,  the  report  reached 
France  that  the  administration  of  Martinique  had  become 
corrupt,  that  the  island  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy,  and 
that  more  than  1000  planters  had  left  it.^  Colbert  wrote 
to  d'Estrades  for  definite  information  in  regard  to  the 
matter.  D'Estrades  confirmed  the  report  and  at  the  same 
time  took  occasion  to  recount  the  history  of  the  state  of 
the  island.  At  the  death  of  du  Parquet  in  1658  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  island  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  Sieur 
de  Vaudroque,  the  uncle  and  guardian  of  his  children. 
After  four  years  of  his  administration,  justice  had  become 
corrupted  by  his  constant  interference  in  order  to  protect 
his  own  personal  interests  and  those  of  his  friends ;  police 
regulations  were  no  longer  observed;  taxes  were  imposed 
arbitrarily  and  unequally. 

"All  of  these  disorders  not  only  prevent  the  growth  of  the 
island,  which  is  capable  of  a  development  ten  times  greater 
than  it  has  yet  received,  but  also  will  probably  work  its  total 
ruin  from  the  fact  that  it  will  so  weaken  it  as  to  subject  it 

8  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bg,  I,  fol.  109  verso. 

9  Ibid. 

57 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

to  foreign  attack^  or  to  cause  the  decrease  of  its  commerce, 
which  can  thrive  only  under  a  regime  that  guarantees  law  and 
order,  or  to  subject  it  to  rebellions  and  internal  strife." 

In  regard  to  the  cessation  of  trade,  d'Estrades  stated 
that  both  the  Dutch  and  French  traders  were  already 
abandoning  the  island  in  great  numbers,  "some  of  whom 
are  so  determined  under  the  present  conditions  to  leave 
that  they  have  withdrawn  their  affairs  with  losses  estimated 
at  eight,  ten  and  twelve  thousand  livres."^* 

The  matter  was  all  the  more  serious  in  Colbert's  mind, 
because  he  regarded  Martinique  by  reason  of  its  location, 
the  conveniency  of  its  harbours  and  the  fertility  of  its 
soil,  as  the  mogtjny ortsmt^f  Jhe  Fre^^  and  the 

one  which  could  best  be  u^tilized  as  the  military  base  from 
which  the  king's  power  could  be  maintained  and  as  the 
entrepoT'  for  trade  with  the  others.  Colbert  said  to 
d'Estrades  that  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  "to 
form  a  prompt  and  wise  plan  of  doing  something  which 
would  insure  the  authority  of  the  king  and  prevent  the 
deterioration  of  the  island. "^^ 

The  forming  of  the  plan,  or  at  least  its  execution,  was 
not  prompt  because  the  season  was  "too  far  advanced," 
when  Colbert  wrote  his  letter  to  d'Estrades  in  September, 
1662,  to  send  anyone  to  Martinique  before  the  following 
spring.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  more  than  a  year  elapsed 
before  anything  was  actually  done.  In  the  mean  time 
Colbert  had  formed  the  plan  of  sending  "a  man  of  ability 
and  of  authority"  to  visit  not  only  Martinique,  but  also 
all  the  other  French  possessions  in  America  in  order  to 
assert  that  king's  authority  and  to  bring  them  into  closer 
relations  with  the  realm .^ 

10  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I. 

11  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bg,  I,  fol.  109. 

12  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B2,  2,  fol.  132.  "Je  connois  bien  a  la  verity 
qu'il  seroit  du  service  du  Roy  d'apporter  un  remade  a  la  trop  grande 

58 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  logical  choice  of  such  a  man  would  have  fallen  upon 
Count  d'Estrades,  viceroy  of  all  the  French  possessions 
in  America,  but  he  had  recently  been  sent  as  ambassador 
to  Holland  and  was  not  available.  Alexandre  Prouville 
de  Tracy  was  chosen  in  his  place.  Dg  Tra^y  ^^s  at  this 
time  about  sixty  years  old,  having  been  promoted  in  1651 
to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-general,^^  and  had  "grown  grey 
in  the  most  glorious  campaigns  of  His  Majesty's  army."^* 
He  was  a  seasoned  soldier,  a  man  of  exceptional  character, 
of  a  most  remarkable  sense  of  honour  for  the  period,  a 
loyal  subject  and  a  most  conscientious  official.  Colbert 
never  made  throughout  his  career  a  more  happy  choice 
of  a  man  for  the  performance  of  an  important  task. 

De  Tracy's  commission  bore  the  date  of  November  19, 

1663.     He  was  made  "lieutenant-general  in  all  the  lands 

of  our  obedience  situated  in  North  and  South  America 

and  in  the  islands  of  America."     As  such,  he  was  given 

supreme  command  by  land  and  sea  of  all  the  forces  of 

His  Majesty  in  America,  as  well  as  supreme  judicial  power 

in  all  cases  whatsoever.     He  was  instructed  to  administer 

jthe.oath  of  allegiance  to  all  the  governors,  members  of 

the   conseils   souverains   and   the   three   estates,   and   "to 

establish  the  power  of  the  king,"  and  "to  make  all  the 

people  obedient  unto  him."^^ 

auctorite  que  les  gouverneurs  des  Isles  de  TAm^rique  ont  usurp^e, 
mais  comme  Ton  ne  peut  pas  le  tenter  sans  avoir  en  main  des  forces 
suffisantes  pour  se  faire  obeir  et  ne  pas  mettre  en  compromise 
I'auctorite  de  Sa  Majesty,  je  vous  diray  en  secret  que  je  prends  des 
k  present  des  mesures  pour  cela  et  que  I'annde  prochaine  ou  la 
suivante  j'espere  que  nous  pourrons  armer  une  escadre  de  vaisseaux 
afin  de  I'envoyer  dans  les  Isles  non  seulement  pour  fortifier  nos 
colonies,  mais  meme  pour  y  establir  un  bon  ordre  dans  I'administra- 
tion  de  la  justice  de  la  police  et  de  tout  ce  qui  pourra  procurer  aux 
habitants  de  ces  quartiers-la  une  liberte  entiere  dans  leur  commerce." 

13  Clement,  I,  5,  note  3. 

14  Du  Tertre,  III,  17. 

15  The  text  of  de  Tracy's  commission  is  to  be  found  in  Du  Tertre, 
III,  17-19. 

59 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

De  Tracy  set  sail  from  La  Rochelle  on  February  26, 
1664.  He  accompanied  de  La  Barre,  who  was  just  leav- 
ing France  with  a  colony  to  establish  a  French  settlement 
at  Cayenne.  After  remaining  with  de  La  Barre  a  short 
time  to  see  that  all  went  well  with  the  new  colony,  he  set 
sail  for  Martinique,  where  he  arrived  the  first  of  June. 
He  remained  in  the  West  Indies,  for  the  most  part  in 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique,  until  the  close  of  the  follow- 
ing spring.  He  then  proceeded  to  Quebec,  arriving  there 
on  June  30,  1665,  and  remaining  in  Canada  until  August 
26,  1667,  when  he  set  sail  for  France.  Colbert  was  so 
pleased  with  the  way  that  he  acquitted  himself  of  his 
work  that  some  two  years  later  in  a  letter  to  a  governor 
in  the  East  Indies  he  cited  him  as  a  model.  He  there 
spoke  of  him  as  having  given  a  "new  life  to  Canada  and 
the  West  Indies."^' 

The  task  before  de  Tracy  in  the  West  Indies  was  gigan- 
tic. He  had  not  cast  anchor  at  St.  Pierre  (Martinique) 
before  certain  planters  and  officers  came  aboard  to  ask 
redress  against  the  injustice  of  the  governor  and  they 
were  so  favourably  impressed  with  his  personality  and  the 
way  in  which  they  were  received  that  they  declared,  on 
returning  ashore,  that  he  was  an  "incomparable  man  who 
would  make  the  islands  flourish  under  his  administration."" 
The  planters  were  so  deeply  in  debt  to  the  Dutch  and  to 
one  another  that  there  were  many  lawsuits  to_Jie.. settled. 
The  courts  were  in  s«eh  fi-^tate  of  c'orruption.and  confusion 
that  de  Tracy  was  forced  to  undertake  the  arduous  task 

i6C16ment,  III,  2,  p.  434,  Letter  to  M.  de  Mondevergue,  Mar.  30, 
1669.  For  an  account  of  de  Tracy's  work  in  Canada,  see  Th.  Chapais, 
Jean  Talon,  Intendant  de  la  Nouvelle  France  {1665-1672),  64  if. 

17  The  facts  related  here,  unless  otherwise  stated,  are  taken  from 
Du  Tertre,  III,  passim.  Du  Tertre  was  perhaps  acquainted  with 
de  Tracy  and  certainly  had  access  to  the  journal  which  he  kept  during 
his  sojourn  in  the  islands,  for  he  says  in  one  place,  "tout  ceci  est 
tir^  mot  par  mot  du  register  de  M.  de  Tracy,"  p.  77. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

of  judging  cases  personally.  He  showed  such  diligence 
and  such  impartiality  in  his  decisions  that  "even  those 
who  were  condemned  went  away  content  and  praised  him." 
His  rectitude  as  a  judge  was  maintained  by  the  scrupulous 
way  in  which  he  refused  all  manner  of  favours.  He  refused 
both  at  Martinique  and  at  Guadeloupe  to  lodge  at  the 
chateau  of  the  governor.  He  refused  to  accept  any  pres- 
ents, even  those  of  fresh  meat,  confining  himself  to  a  diet 
of  salt  meat  and  leading  a  most  frugal  life.  His  conduct 
in  this  respect  was  so  extraordinary  that  Colbert  wrote 
to  him  in  the  following  terms: 

"If  it  is  true  that  it  would  have  been  an  error  on  your  part 
to  have  failed  to  render  an  exact  account  of  the  disorders  which 
reign  in  the  islands^  it  is  equally  true  that  it  would  have  been 
wrong  for  you  to  conceal  the  fact  that  you  are  leading  such  a 
frugal  life  and  observing  such  rigid  discipline.  Although  the 
sacrifices  which  you  are  making  by  refusing  to  accept  the 
presents  of  refreshments,  which  are  being  offered  you,  and  by 
confining  yourself  to  a  diet  of  salt  meat,  might  prove  prejudicial 
to  your  health  and  hence  detrimental  to  the  advancement  of  His 
Majesty's  service,  yet  I  am  compelled  to  tell  you  that  it  has 
proved  entirely  agreeable  to  him  to  see  that  one  of  his  com- 
manders knows  how  to  adjust  himself  to  an  austere  life,  which 
so  few  know  how  to  do.  His  Maj  esty  has  not  been  able  to  praise 
enough  to  his  satisfaction  the  good  discipline  which  has  char- 
acterized the  conduct  of  your  soldiers,  who  have  not  even  turned 
aside  from  their  line  of  march  to  take  an  orange  from  the 
premises  of  a  farmer.  If  this  proof  of  their  self-restraint  and 
of  their  obedience  to  their  commanders  has  won  the  admiration 
of  the  planters  in  the  islands,  it  is  certain  that  it  has  not  failed 
to  call  forth  here  praise  for  their  chief.  The  great  number 
of  suits,  which  you  have  settled  by  forcing  payments  to  poor 
servants  and  artisans  at  the  hands  of  the  little  tyrants  who 
have  grown  rich  by  the  sweat  of  those  poor  wretches,  has  also 
given  us  cause  to  praise  your  zeal  and  your  charity."^® 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  letter  from  Colbert  to  de 
Tracy,  September  29,  1664.    This  letter  is  of  unusual  interest  in  giving 

61 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

De  Tracy  published  an  ordinance  on  June  19,  1665, 
which  put  an  end  to  the  chaos  that  had  been  reigning  in 
Martinique  under  the  arbitrary  rule  of  Vaudroque.  Cred- 
itors were  protected  by  being  empowered  to  lay  claim  upon 
the  movables  and  even  the  slaves  of  their  debtors.  Uni- 
formity in  weights,  measures  and  currency  was  re-e&tahr 
lished.  Servants  and  slaves  were  protected  against  the 
tyranny  of  their  masters.  As  a  protection  against  the 
abuse  of  power  by  governors,  permission  was  granted  to 
emigrate  to  any  other  French  colony.  Arbitrary  taxes 
were  abolished  and  all  officers  were  forbidden  to  levy  other 
taxes  than  those  which  were  wont  to  be  levied  during  the 
administration  of  the  late  du  Parquet.^^ 

From  Martinique  de  Tracy  passed  to  Guadeloupe, 
where  in  a  remarkably  short  time  he  put  an  end  to  the 
unrest  and  discontent  caused  by  the  strife  between  Houel 
and  his  nephews.  Houel  was  put  aboard  a  vessel  and  sent 
to  France  to  answer  for  his  conduct  to  the  king.  Arbj:^ 
trary  taxes  were  abolished  and  du  Lion  was  placed  in 
comjnand  of  the  island.  Order  and  peace  were  completely 
restored.  De  Tracy  accomplished  similar  work  in  the 
other  islands. 

Contemporaneous  with  the  mission  of  de  Tracy  was 
Cplberl;!s,.approval  of  the  plan  to  organize  the  Company 
of  Cayenne.  Only  very  superficial  facts  of  the  formation 
of  that  company  seem  to  be  known,  for  it  has  almost 
escaped  notice  that  it  was  connected  with  a  much  larger 
plan. 

Lefebvre  de  La  Barre  presented  to  Colbert,  probably 
at  the  close  of  1662,  a  plan  for  the  "formation  of  a  com- 
pany for  the  establishment  of  the  colony  at  Cap  du  Nord 
et  Cayenne,^*  to  be  composed  of  some  twenty  members  and 

an  insight  into  what  de  Tracy  was  doing  in  the  islands  and  at  the 
same  time  in  disclosing  what  Colbert  wished  to  have  accomplished. 
19  The  text  of  this  ordinance  is  to  be  found  in  Du  Tertre,  III,  Tl-Te*. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

capitalized  at  200,000  livres.  He  said  that  it  would  be 
more  prudent  to  organize  only  a  small  company,  because 
the  success  of  the  enterprise  depended  upon  keeping  it 
secret  from  the  Dutch,  who  would  become  jealous  at  once 
and  try  to  thwart  its  plans.  Besides  it  would  be  difficult 
to  enlist  a  large  number  of  subscribers  for  the  enterprise, 
as  two  attempts  of  the  French  to  establish  colonies  at 
Cayenne  had  already  proved  failures.^"  De  La  Barre  pro- 
posed two  chief  ends  for  the  company  to  realize,  (1)  the 
establishment  of  a  strong  colony  at  Cayenne  and  the 
occupation  of  the  coast  between  the  Amazon  and  the 
Orinoco,  (2)  the  establishment  of  a  trade  with  the  French 
Antilles.     In  regard  to  the  latter  he  was  very  explicit: 

"As  soon  as  a  good  post  has  been  established  and  a  colony 
of  500  or  600  men  has  been  founded,  the  company  intends  to 
strengthen  itself  by  enlarging  the  number  of  its  members  and 
increasing  its  capital.  It  will  then  equip  10  or  12  ships  for  an 
over-sea  trade.  I  mean  by  that,  trade  with  the  Antilles  and 
the  mainland,  which  has  become  important.  It  will  be  very 
easy  to  do  this  for,  inasmuch  as  the  risk  is  very  small  to  under- 
take a  trade  which  merchants  of  every  nation  of  Europe  carry 

on  every  day,  new  members  will  not  be  difficult  to  find 

The  small  company  in  this  way,  together  with  the  support  of 
the  king  and  that  of  his  ministers,  will  become  large  and 
powerful.  Its  ships  will  find  not  only  a  good  port  of  refuge 
at  the  coast  for  its  vessels,  but  also  a  supply  of  provisions. 
....  One  will  be  able  in  less  than  two  years  to  take  possession 
of  the  trade  of  the  islands  and  drive  out  the  Dutch  who  will 
have  no  right  to  complain.     This  trade  amounts  to  more  than 

20  In  regard  to  the  jealousy  of  the  Dutch,  there  is  a  very  interest- 
ing passage  in  an  anonymous  letter  dated  at  Amsterdam,  January 
24,  1664,  "Mess,  d' Amsterdam  apprenans  le  dessein  que  I'on  a  en 
France  de  faire  une  descente  dans  I'isle  de  Cayenne  ou  ils  ont  une 
colonic  de  2000  en  prennent  de  I'ombrage  et  y  envoyent  k  ce  qu'on 
dit  plus  de  vaisseaux  et  de  gens  de  guerre."  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  500 
Colbert,  203,  fol.  405. 

63 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

6,000,000   livres   annually.      These  two   plans   are   so  closely 
united  that  the  one  cannot  succeed  without  the  other."^^ 

It  seems  very  clear  from  this  passage  that  de  La  Barre 
in  the  proposal  for  the  establishment  of  a  colony  at 
Cayenne  was  at  the  same  time  proposing  the  commercial 
conquest  of  the  French  Antilles.  His  suggestion  of  the 
utilization  of  Cayenne  as  a  basis  for  the  establishment  of 
trade  with  the  Antilles  was  jaot^  a  good  one,  for  expe- 
rience proved  that  Cayenne  was  far  too  much  to  the  lee- 
ward to  make  such  a  thing  practicable.  In  regard  to  his 
other  suggestion,  however,  that  the  smaller  company 
serve  as  a  basis  for  the  formation  of  a  larger  one,  it  was 
actually  adopted  by  Colbert. 

One  naturally  asks  what  sources  of  information  de  La 
Barre  had  at  his  command  in  the  formation  of  such  a 
plan.  Du  Tertre  remarked  that  he  "derived  nearly  all 
of  his  information  in  regard  to  the  enterprise  from  Sir 
Bouchardeau,  a  man  of  honour  and  intelligence,  who  in 
the  voyages  which  he  had  made  to  the  mainland  of  South 
America  and  to  the  islands  had  acquired  a  certain  knowl- 
edge which  gave  him  a  reputation  as  being  very  well 
informed  in  regard  to  the  affairs  of  America."^  Bouchar- 
deau became  a  member  of  the  company  and  undoubtedly 
aided  de  La  Barre  in  carrying  out  his  plans,  for  he  went 
with  him  to  Cayenne  on  the  initial  voyage  in  1664.  A 
memoir  of  1662,  found  among  the  documents  relating  to 
the  history  of  Cayenne,  proves,  however,  that  information 
was  sought  elsewhere  and  probably  utilized.  The  memoir 
is  anonymous  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  to  whom  it  was 
addressed,  but  it  is  improbable  that  it  was  not  commu- 
nicated both  to  de  La  Barre  and  Colbert.  The  author 
states  that  he  had  just  returned  from  a  voyage  to  Havre 

21  Arch.  Col.,  Ci4,  I,  fols.  85  ff. 

22  Du  Tertre,  III,  13.  See  also  a  note  on  Bouchardeau  in  Arch. 
Col.,  Ci4,  I,  fol.  84,  "B.  a  este  deux  fois  sur  les  lieux." 

64 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

and  Dieppe  and  that  at  the  former  place  he  had  conferred 
with  a  captain,  Paul  Languillet  by  name,  and  at  the  latter 
with  "a  friend,"  in  regard  to  Cayenne.  Captain  Lan- 
guillet had  made  a  voyage  to  Cayenne  in  1660-1661  in 
the  employment  of  the  Dutch.  He  reported  that  at  that 
time  there  were  about  thirty  or  forty  men  and  women  at 
Cayenne,  and  that  one  hundred  and  twenty  slaves  had 
recently  been  imported  to  cultivate  the  soil.  In  addition 
there  were  about  fifteen  or  twenty  families  of  Jews  who 
were  planters.  The  fort  which  had  been  built  by  the 
French  (in  1652)  was  now  under  the  command  of  Langue- 
dek,  a  Dutchman,  and  had  been  named  Nassau.  Large 
quantities  of  cane  had  been  planted  and  some  land  had 
been  cleared  for  the  cultivation  of  tobacco,  which  sur- 
passed in  quality  that  of  Brazil.  Cotton  and  roucou  grew 
naturally  there  and  the  cassava-plant  could  be  easily  made 
to  grow,  as  could  indigo.  This  settlement  had  been  made 
by  individuals  and  not  by  the  Dutch  West  India  Company. 
In  addition  to  this  information,  given  by  the  captain,  the 
memorialist  volunteered  the  following  reflections: 

"You  will  not  take  it  amiss,  if  I  repeat  to  you  what  I  have 
already  said  in  regard  to  enterprises  of  the  French  in  establish- 
ing colonies.  Captain  Languillet  has  confirmed  my  opinion  by 
saying  that  those  who  have  previously  tried  to  make  a  settle- 
ment at  Cayenne  failed,  because  its  leaders  conducted  them- 
selves with  too  little  gentleness  and  with  too  much  ostentation 
and  pretentions  and  paid  too  little  attention  to  production. 
He  is  of  the  opinion  that  failure  awaits  other  attempts  unless 
these  faults  are  eliminated.  Most  of  those  who  formed  part 
of  the  last  expedition  were  lazy  and  knew  not  how  to  work, 
a  fact  which  caused  disorders  in  the  colony.  To  insure  success, 
there  is  more  need  of  a  good  fatherly  leader  who  will  know  how 
to  direct  workmen  than  of  a  captain,  all  decorated  with  plumes 
and  accompanied  by  blasts  of  trumpets,  who  knows  how  to 
command  soldiers.    .    .    .    Experience  teaches  that  the  enter- 

65 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

prises  of  the  French  have  served  merely  for  blazing  the  trail 
for  other  nations. "^^ 

Colbert- straightway  ^pj^roved  the  plan  presented  by 
de  La  Barre,  pledged  his  support  and  gained  the  favour 
of  the  king  for  the  enterprise.^*  Inspired  by  this  encour- 
agement, de  La  Barre  communicated  his  design  to 
Pelissary,  one  of  the  treasurers  of  the  marine,  who  in 
turn  communicated  it  to  Bibaud,  one  of  his  friends.  These 
three,  after  conferences  with  ^ouchardeau,  decided  to 
form  a  company.  They  succeeded  in  enlisting  some  fifteen 
others  and  raising  a  subscription  of  200,000  livres.^ 
Letters-patent  were  issued  in  October,  which  granted  to 
the  company J;]ie.JiiainlanxLQf_South_A 
Amazon  and  the  Orinoco,  together  with  the  island  of 
Cayenne,  and  also  a  monopoly  of  commerce.^ 

The  company  sent  out  its  first  expedition  from  La 
Rochelle  on  February  26,  1664.  It  was  composed  of  two 
vessels  belonging  to  the  king,  Le  Breze  (800  tons)  and 
Le  Terron,  and  of  four  belonging  to  the  company,  two 
flutes  of  300  tons  each,  a  fly-boat  of  120  tons  and  a  frigate 
of  150  tons.^  There  were  aboard,  according  to  a  con- 
temporary English  writer,  "near  1500  passengers  and 
soldiers  to  recover  and  assert  the  French  title  as  to  these 
islands  [Antilles] ,  as  to  Canada  and  Cayenne,"®  but  there 
were  aboard,  according  to  Du  Tertre,  who  perhaps  was 
more  accurately  informed,  only  "1200  healthy  strong 
men."^     A  food  supply  for  one  year  was  taken  in  the 

23  Arch.  Col.,  Ci4,  I,  fols.  190-194. 

24  Du  Tertre,  III,  13. 

25  A  list  of  the  stockholders  is  to  be  found  in  Arch.  AfF.  Etr.,  M^m. 
et  Doc,  Am6rique,  V,  fols.  41-42. 

26  The  text  of  the  letters-patent  is  to  be  found  in  ibid.,  fols.  46-50. 

27  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.  Col.,  119  bis,  fol.  917,  letter  from  Colbert 
de  Terron,  Mar.  16,  1664. 

28  CaZ.  St.  Pa.,  Am.  ^  W.  I.,  1661-1668,  898. 

29  Du  Tertre,  III,  23. 

66 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

cargo.  The  fleet  arrived  at  Cayenne  in  May.  The  Dutch 
offered  no  opposition,  but  accepted  a  peaceful  settlement 
by  which  they  were  paid  something  for  tBeir  plantations 
and  left  the  French  in  possession  of  the  islands.^"  Posses- 
sion was  taken  of  the  mainland  on  May  22.  The  news  was 
published  in  France  in  July  that  de  La  Barre  had  met 
with  success,  that  there  were  already  tj^ree  villages  in- 
habited by  three  hundred  families  and  that  there  "were 
large  plantations  of  sugar-cane,  sb  that  according  to  ap- 
pearances a  profitable  commerce  could  he  built  up  in  a 
short  time."^^ 

With  the  establishment  of  the  colony  at  Cayenne  and 
the  mission  of  de  Tracy  to  all  the  French  Colonies  oi 
America,  came  to  an  end  the  period  of  preparation.  The 
ships  which  bore  de  La  Barre  and  de  Tracy  had  hardly, 
disappeared  beneath  the  horizon  before  Colbert  began  to 
put  in  operation  his  larger  plans  for  the  upbuilding  of 
commerce  with  the  colonies  across  the  seas. 

30  The  treaty  is  to  be  found  in  Arch.  Col.,  C14,  I,  f ols.  74,  90.  The 
contract  made  with  the  Dutch  governor  granted  him  21,850  florins 
for  his  plantation.  The  following  items  were  given:  A  very  beautiful 
and  excellent  plantation,  situated  at  Matoury,  together  with  ten 
houses,  a  quantity  of  sugar-cane  ready  for  the  mill  and  other  planted 
some  10  months  ago  and  a  large  crop  of  cassava-plant,  8000  florins; 
a  tract  of  land  with  cane,  6000  florins;  26  trained  negroes,  6850 
florins;  1  dwelling-house  and  kitchen,  1000  florins. 

31  Gazette,  1664,  p.  761. 


67 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Establishment  of  The  West  India 

Company.    Its  Concessions^  Privileges 

AND  Composition 

TT^XACTLY  at  what  date  the  project  to  establish  the 
-■— ^  West  India  Company  took  form  in  the  mind  of  Col- 
bert, it  is  impossible  to  say  with  absolute  precision.  Un- 
fortunately a  letter  written  to  Colbert  by  Berthelot,  who 
was  soon  to  become  one  of  the  general  directors,  was  not 
dated  by  the  author.  It  is  endorsed  in  another  hand,  how- 
ever, "Mars,  1664,"  and  very  probably  is  of  that  date.  A 
passage  of  that  letter  is  as  follows :  "You  may  count  defi- 
nitely upon  me  for  the  enterprise  of  establishing  trade  with 
Cayenne  and  the  acquisition  of  the  islands  of  St.  Christo- 
pher, Martinique  and  Guadeloupe  and  other  things  which 
will  be  done  to  sustain  and  extend  this  trade. "\  If  the 
date  of  this  letter  is  really  March,  it  is  possible  to  say 
that  the  plan  to  form  a  company  for  trade  with  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  was  made  not  later  than  that  time.  The 
plan  was  certainly  formed  before  April  17,  for  on  that 
day  the  members  of  the  old  Company  of  the  Isles  of  Amer- 
ica were  commanded  to  bring  before  a  specially  appointed 
commission  all  papers  bearing  upon  the  sale  of  the  several 
islands  to  proprietors.  The  preamble  of  the  arret  which 
gave  this  order  stated  very  clearly  that  the  king  had 
decided  to  have  the  islands  transferred  "into  the  hands  pf 
a  strong  company,  which  would  be  able  to  equip  a  number 
of  vessels  in  order  to  colonize  and  furnish  them  with  all  the 
merchandise  of  which  they  had  need."^ 

1  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  119,  fol.  794. 

2  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  98-99. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Letters-patent  were  issued  in  May,  1664.  To  the  com- 
pany were  granted  the  mainland  of  South  America  from 
the  Amazon  to  the  Orinoco,  together  with  the  island  of 
Cayenne,  all  the  French  West  Indies,  Canada,  Acadia, 
Newfoundland,  and  "other  islands  and  the  mainland  of 
North  America,  from  the  north  of  Canada  to  Virginia 
and  Florida,"  and  finally,  the  western  coast  of  Africa 
from  Cape  Verde  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

All  lands  within  this  concession,,  conquered  and  colonized 
by  the  company  during  the  space  of  forty  years,  as  well  as 
the  Antilles,  already  inhabited  by  the  French,  were  granted 
with  full  and  perpetual  property  rights.  For  the  West 
India  islands  sums  were  to  be  paid  to  the  several  proprie- 
tors which  would  represent  the  original  purchase  price  plus 
a  certain  amount  for  improvements  and  increased  value, 
to  be  determined  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the  king. 
No  other  claims  based  on  concessions  made  to  former  com- 
panies were  to  be  considered  valid.  The  company  became 
full  suzerain  of  all  the^f Qresaid-lan<is  with  no  other  obli- 
gation than  that  of  acknowledging  the  king  as  its  lord. 
At  each  change  of  king  "a  crown  of  gold  of  the  weight  of 
thirty  marks"  was  to  be  presented  to  the  new  king.  At 
the  end  of  the  forty  years,  it  was  empowered  to  dispose 
freely  of  all  the  aforesaid  lands  together  with  all  forts, 
vessels,  merchandise,  etc.,  on  the  condition,  however,  that 
np  sale  thereof  be  made  to  foreigners  without  the  special 
permission  of  the  king.  /It  was  empowered  to  build  forts, 
to  manufacture  ammunition,  to  levy  troops,  to  build  and 
equip  whatever  number  of  ships  it  chose,  with  the  privi- 
lege~of1ying  the  royal  pennant  at  their  masts.  It  was 
further  given  the  power  to  appoint  governors,  judges,  all 
sorts  of  officials  for  the  administration  of  the  lands  in  its 
concession,  and  to  make  all  sorts  of  regulations,  as  well 
as  the  power  to  declare  war  and  make  treaties  with  non- 
European  kings  and  princes.     The  king  pledged  the  sup- 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

port  of  his  arms  and  of  his  vessels  to  defend  the  company 
against  the  attacks  of  foreigners. 

A  monopoly  of  trade  was  granted  for  the  space  of  forty 

I  years.  A  single  exception  was  made  to  this  in  the  case  of 
the  fisheries  of  Newfoundland  to  which  all  the  subjects  of 
His  Majesty  were  to  be  admitted  without  exception.^  A 
premium  of  thirty  Uvres  was  offered  by  His  Majesty  for 
every  ton  of  merchandise  exported  to  the  colonies  from 
France  and  forty  livres  for  every  ton  imported  into  France 
from  the  colonies.  This  was  changed  almost  immediately 
afterwards  to  an  exemption  from  half  the  import  and 
export  duties  usually  paid  on  such  cargoes.*  A  right  of 
entrepot  was  granted,  whereby  colonial  products  might 
be  re-exported  into  foreign  countries  free  from  all  export 
duties.  Exemption  was  accorded  from  all  import  and 
export  duties  on  ammunition,  food  supplies  and  other 
things  necessary  for  the  building  and  equipment  of  the 
company's  vessels.  Sugar,  refined  in  any  refineries  estab- 
lished by  the  company,  might  be  exported  to  foreign  mar- 
kets free  of  duty,  if  shipped  in  French  bottoms. 

J  The  company  was  to  be  composed  of  the  stockholders 
of  the  Company  of. Xayenne,  of  all  French  subjects  of 
whatever  quality  and  estate,  and  finally  of  all  foreigners 
who  chose  to  subscribe.  Subscriptions  could  be  made  for 
3000  livres  or  more.  A  subscription  of  10,000  livres  gave 
the  right  to  attend  the  general  assemblies  of  the  company 
and  of  exercising  deliberative  power  therein,  and  one  of 
20,000  made  one  eligible  as  general  director  and  conferred 
the  right  of  bourgeois.  Officials  subscribing  20,000  livres 
were   freed   from   the   obligation,   imposed  by   the   royal 

3  This  exception  is  easily  explained  by  the  fact  that  too  many 
interests  of  all  the  principal  ports  were  centered  in  this  industry.  A 
study  of  the  inquest  of  1664,  referred  to  above,  reveals  the  fact  that 
a  great  majority  of  the  vessels  suited  to  ocean  voyages  were  engaged 
in  the  fisheries.     Bib.   Nat.   MSS.,  500  Colbert,   199. 

*Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  114. 

70 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

declaration  of  December,  1663,  of  residing  in  the  locali- 
ties where  the  duties  of  their  offices  were  to  be  discharged. 
Foreigners,  contributing  the  sum  of  20,000  livres,  acquired 
and  enjoyed  the  rights  of  native-born  Frenchmen  during 
the  time  that  such  a  sum  remained  to  their  credit  in  the 
company.  If  this  time  were  prolonged  to  twenty  years, 
the  enjoyment  of  these  rights  would  become  permanent.^ 
The  administration  of  the  company's  affairs  was  vested 
in  a  centraL  bureajLi  at  Paris  and  in  subsidiary  bureaux  in 
the  provinces  wherever  interests  demanded  their  establish- 
ment.    The  former  was  to  be  comprosed  of  nine  general 

5  Colbert  made  one  serious  attempt  to  interest  foreigners  in  the 
company  and  thus  to  enlarge  the  narrow  limits  of  its  personnel.  On 
being  informed  that  an  effort  had  been  made  by  the  Spanish  king  to 
attract  the  German  princes  to  trade  with  the  Indies,  he  drew  up  a 
memoir  on  the  subject,  in  which  he  attempted  to  show  that  the  French 
could  offer  much  greater  advantages.  The  most  interesting  passages 
of  the  memoir  are  the  following:  "If  the  kings  of  the  North  and  the 
princes  of  the  Empire  are  of  a  mind  to  consider  seriously  the  estab- 
lishment of  trade  with  the  two  Indies,  the  king  is  able  to  make  them 
propositions  which  are  safe,  solid  and  much  more  advantageous  than 
all  those  which  the  Spaniards  can  propose.  His  Majesty  has  recently 
formed  two  large  companies,  one  for  trade  with  the  West  Indies, 
which  already  has  a  capital  of  4,000,000  livres  and  fifty  vessels  employed 
in  its  commerce,  the  other  for  trade  with  the  East  Indies,  which  has  a 
capital  of  10,000,000  livres  and  employs  more  than  thirty  vessels.  .  .  . 
The  former  is  at  present  in  possession  of  the  islands  of  St.  Christo- 
pher, Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  Marie  Galante,  the  Saints,  St.  Croix, 
Grenada,  Tortuga,  and  other  islands,  in  which  there  are  at  present 
20,000  Frenchmen;  of  a  considerable  settlement  in  the  island  of 
Cayenne  of  1000;  of  Canada,  where  there  are  more  than  5000  French- 
men; of  Newfoundland,  with  200,  and  finally  of  a  settlement  on  the 
coast  of  Africa  [Senegal].  The  kings  and  princes  who  wish  to  enter 
into  this  company  may  do  so  for  considerable  sums.  In  order  to 
give  a  proof  of  the  king's  good  will,  His  Majesty  will  furnish  double 
the  amounts  furnished  by  them.  His  Majesty  will  also  grant  them 
the  privilege  of  being  represented  by  a  director  in  the  central  bureau 
of  the  company's  administration  at  Paris."     Clement,  II,  2,  p.  429. 

The  plan  of  making  a  settlement  on  the  coast  of  South  America 
seems  to  have  been  seriously  considered  at  one  time  by  the  electors 
of  Mayence  and  of  Bavaria.     Du  Fresne,  who  was  in  Germany  at 

71 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 


Rectors  who  were  to  be  elected  in  a  general  assembly  of 
stockholders,  three  each  year  for  a  term  of  three  years  in 
such  a  way  that  at  the  end  of  each  election  six  old  and 
three  new  ones  remained.  The  latter  were  to  be  composed 
"of  merchants  and  of  none  others."  The  capital  of  the 
company  was  not  fixed.  Subscriptions  were  to  be  received 
during  the  period  of  three  months,  counting  from  the  first 
of  June. 

The  letters-patent  thus  provided  for  the  organization 
of  a  gigantic  commercial  company  with  an  immense  field 
for  exploitation,  with  complete  and  extensive  powers,  and 
with  enticing  inducements  to  attract  subscribers.  i 

the  beginning  of  1665  in  quest  of  iron-workers  for  the  establishment 
of  foundries  in  France,  was  charged  by  Colbert  with  the  task  of 
interesting  the  German  princes  in  his  proposal.  He  wrote  from 
Wiirtzburg  on  January  29,  1665,  exposing  at  length  the  Elector  of 
Mayence's  ideas  in  regard  to  the  matter  and  his  willingness  to  under- 
take in  the  following  spring  a  settlement  under  the  protection  of  the 
West  India  Company.  In  August  the  two  electors  of  Bavaria  and  of 
Mayence  made  the  following  proposals: 

1.  Concession  of  one  degree  of  territory  on  the  coast  of  Guiana. 
2.  The  said  land  to  be  held  as  a  fief  from  the  king  of  France.  3. 
Shipments  to  be  made  from  France.  4.  Full  liberty  within  the  said 
concession.  5.  The  right  to  sub-feoff.  6.  Privilege  of  making  a 
contract  with  the  West  India  Company  for  the  transportation  of 
settlers  and  of  provisions.  7.  Privilege  of  buying  slaves,  either 
at  the  coast  of  Africa  directly  or  from  those  to  whom  the  com- 
pany granted  the  privilege  of  that  trade.  8.  Privilege  of  trading 
with  all  French  colonies  in  America  and  with  the  French  in  Europe. 
Arch.  Col.,  Ci4,  II,  fols.  197-199.  All  of  these  proposals  were  granted. 
To  Article  6,  however,  a  condition  was  made  that  the  ships  of  the 
West  India  Company  alone  could  be  used  for  commerce  with  the  pro- 
posed settlement;  and  one  also  to  Article  7,  that  slaves  should  be 
bought  only  from  the  company.  No  record  has  been  found  that 
there  was  a  sequel  to  these  negotiations  with  the  Electors.  Attention 
has  been  called  to  them  because  they  show  that  Colbert  made  one 
serious  attempt,  at  least,  to  give  a  larger  development  to  the  narrow 
personnel  of  the  West  India  Company.  His  efforts  proved  fruitless, 
however,  and  it  remained  an  enterprise  directed  for  the  most  part  by 
oflBcials  who  had  never  had  the  necessary  experience  to  manage  its 
affairs  wisely. 

72 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Their  official  registration  met  with  opposition  at  the 
hands  of  the  proprietors  of  the  several  West  Indies.  First 
of  all,  they  paid  no  attention  to  the  arret  of  April  17, 
which  ordered  them  to  bring  all  papers  concerning  the 
purchase  of  the  islands  before  a  designated  commission,  or 
yet  to  a  similar  arret  of  May  8.  Their  opposition  con- 
tinued throughout  the  months  of  May  and  June.  Becha- 
meil,  who  had  been  especially  charged  by  Colbert  with  the 
organization  of  the  company,  wrote  on  July  1 : 

"I  thought  that  I  should  be  able  to  notify  you  today  of  the 
ratification  of  the  letters-patent  which  had  been  agreed  upon 
Saturday  evening  by  the  presidents  [of  Parlement].  The 
commissioners  and  M.  Ferrand,  reporter,  in  a  meeting  held 
this  morning  agreed  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  presidents, 
but  at  the  moment  of  their  adjournment  they  found  them- 
selves surrounded  by  Mesdames  Champigny,  Houel  and  de 
Cerillac  with  their  families,  who  said  that  they  had  filed 
l^rotest  against  the  registration  of  the  letters-patent.  They 
cried  out  loudly  against  the  concession  which  the  king  had 
made  of  their  possessions  in  control  of  which  one  wished  to 
jjlace  the  company,  even  before  it  paid  anything  or  guaranteed 
them  against  loss." 

Bechameil  added  that  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
prevent  Parlement  from  forcing  the  company  to  make 
satisfactory  settlements  with  the  proprietors  before  enter- 
ing into  the  possession  of  the  islands.^  Another  letter  from 
the  same  person  on  July  10  states  that  a  satisfactory  con- 
tract had  been  made  with  M.  and  Mme.  de  Champigny  for 
the  cession  of  their  share  of  Guadeloupe  and  of  the  islands 
of  Marie  Galante  and  Desirade.  The  opposition  of  Houel 
for  the  cession  of  his  share  of  Guadeloupe,  and  that  of  de 
Cerillac  for  the  cession  of  Grenada  continued.     No  agree- 

6  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  122,  fol.  13,  and  also  fol.  127,  for  a 
letter  of  July  3,  in  regard  to  the  same  matter. 

73 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ment  was  yet  made  with  the  Knights  of  Malta  for  the 
cession  of  St.  Christopher/ 

In  spite,  however,  of  this  opposition  of  the  proprietors, 
the  letters-patent  were  officially  registered  in  the  Parle- 
ment  of  Paris  on  July  11,  and  on  the  27th  of  the  same 
month  at  the  Chambre  des  Comptes.  The  company.was 
thus  empowered  to  enter  into  the  possession  of  the  lands 
of  its  concession,  before  contracts  had  been  made  for  their 
transfer,  for  such  contracts  were  not  made  until  several 
months  later.^ 

No  contract  was  made  with  Houel  for  his  possessions  at 
Guadeloupe.  He  refused  to  sell  and  remained  theoretically 
in  control  of  them  until  the  edict  of  revocation  of  the  West 
India  Company  in  1674,  when  they  were  declared  annexed 
to  the  royal  domain.^ 

Before  attempting  to  follow  the  history  of  the  company 
in  the  exploitation  of  its  grant,  some  questions  of  capital 
importance  may  be  asked.  Of  whom  was  the  company 
composed.?  Who  were  its  directors  to  guide  it  in  the  con- 
quest of  the  commerce  of  such  a  vast  field .^^  Whence  came 
the  funds  placed  at  its  disposal.? 

7  Ibid.,  fol.  353. 

8  They  were  as  follows :  One  on  November  28,  1664,  with  the  Com- 
pany of  Rouen,  whereby  the  possessions  of  that  company  on  the  west 
coast  of  Africa  (Senegal),  together  with  its  ships  and  merchandise, 
were  ceded  for  the  sum  of  150,000  livres  (Chemin  Dupont^s,  Les 
Compagnies  de  colonisation  en  Afrique  occidentale,  p.  32) ;  one  in 
July,  1665,  whereby  the  Knights  of  Malta  agreed  to  cede  the  islands 
of  St.  Christopher,  St.  Martin,  St.  Bartholomew  and  St.  Croix  for  the 
sum  of  500,000  livres  tournois;  one  on  August  25,  with  M.  and  Mme. 
de  Champigny  for  the  cession  of  their  share  of  Guadeloupe  and  of 
Marie  Galante  and  Desirade,  for  120,000  livres;  another  on  August 
27,  with  de  C6rillac  for  Grenada  in  payment  of  100,000;  one  with  the 
Sir  Dyel  d'Enneval  on  August  14,  whereby  Martinique  was  ceded  for 
240,000  livres.  For  the  statements  regarding  the  contracts  with  the 
Knights  of  Malta,  with  the  de  Champignys,  de  C6rillac,  see  Du  Tertre, 
III,  250,  266-267;  for  that  with  d'Enneval,  see  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  17, 
Contract  d'acquisition  de  la  Martinique. 

9  Du  Tertre,  III,  267,  and  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  283. 

74 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Fortunately  a  list  of  all  the  subscriptions,  made  from 
the  beginning,  June  2,  1664,  until  December  27,  1669, 
the  date  of  the  last  subscription,  has  been  preserved  in 
the  national  archives  at  Paris.  Under  the  date  of  June 
2,  appear  the  names  of  no  less  than  twenty-three  persons 
whose  subscriptions,  varying  from  sums  of  10,000  to  30,- 
000  livres,  amount  to  the  formidable  total  of  520,000 
livres.^"  It  is  upon  this  fact  that  a  recent  French  writer, 
M.  Chemin-Dupontes,  has  asserted  that  the  West  India 
Company  met  with  success  at  the  hands  of  public  sub- 
scribers.^^ We  are  forced,  however,  to  disagree  with  the 
assertion. 

In  the  letters-patent,  issued  on  October  12,  1663,  for 
the  formation  of  the  Company  of  Cayenne,  the  names  of 
its  mernhsrs  are  given.  There  are  sixteen  and  all  of  them 
appear  on  the  list  of  June  2.  Thus  sixteen  out  of  a  total- 
of  the  twenty-three  names  are  accounted  for.  Did  the 
remaining  seven  also  belong  to  the  Company  of  Cayenne.'' 
Evidence  points  to  that  conclusion.  In  the  first  place, 
the  names  of  the  sixteen  stockholders  appear  three  times 
in  the  letters-patent,  and  in  each  case  a  blank  space  is 
left  at  the  end  of  their  enumeration,  as  though  the  list 
were  not  yet  complete  and  more  names  were  to  be  added 
later.  Berthelot,  a  revenue  farmer,  wrote  to  Colbert  some 
time  before  the  formation  of  the  West  India  Company  that 
he  could  count  upon  his  support  in  the  affair  of  the  main- 
tenance of  trade  with  Cayenne  and  of  the  acquisition  of  the 
French  West  Indies  and  added :  "I  shall  pass  the  rest  of  the 
day  with  M.  de  Rambouillet [not  legible],  my  asso- 
ciates, and  I  shall  let  you  know  the  results  of  my  inter- 
view."^   The  names  of  both  Berthelot  and  de  Rambouillet 

10  This  list  is  to  be  found  in  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1313,  Estat  g€nir&l 
de  toutes  les  actions  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes  Occidentales. 

11  Chemin-Dupontes,  op.  cit.,  36. 

12  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  119  his,  fol.  794. 

75 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

appear  on  the  list  of  June  2,  for  the  sums  of  30,000  livres 
each.  It  is  impossible  to  say  for  certain  that  these  sub- 
scriptions were  not  made  with  a  view  to  the  establishment 
of  the  West  India  Company,  but  Berthelot's  letter  rather 
implies  that  the  subscriptions  were  made  to  the  Company 
of  Cayenne.  If  that  is  true,  it  means  that  at  least  eight- 
een out  of  the  twenty-three  subscribers  of  June  2  to  the 
West  India  Company  were  stockholders  in  the  earlier 
company.  As  to  the  remaining  five  no  information  has 
been  found.^^  Thus,  although  it  is  impossible  to  say  that 
all  the  twenty-three  subscriptions  of  the  list  of  June  2 
represent  subscriptions  made  to  the  Company  of  Cayenne, 
there  is  a  strong  probability  that  such  was  the  case.  This 
means  that  the  so-called  favourable  reception  at  the  hands 
of  the  public,  noted  by  M.  Chemin-Dupontes,  was  nothing 
more  than  a  simple  transfer  to  the  books  of  the  new  com- 
pany of  the  capital  stock  of  the  Company  of  Cayenne. 
Such  a  transfer  had  been  ordered  by  an  arret  of  May  30  : 
"The  company,  which  has  been  formed  for  the  coloniza- 
tion of  the  island  of  Cayenne  and  of  the  mainland  of 
South  America,  is  hereby  dissolved,  and  the  funds  sub- 
scribed to  that  company  hereby  become  the  property  of 
the  West  India  Company."^* 

It  remains  to  be  asked  whether  the  members  of  the 
earlier  company  increased  their  original  subscriptions  at 
the  formation  of  the  Company  of  the  West  Indies.  Du 
Tertre  states  that  each  of  the  twenty  stockholders  of  the 
Company  of  Cayenne  subscribed  originally  10,000  livres, 
or  a  total  of  200,000  livres,  but  pledged  their  credit  for 
an  additional  10,000  livres,  or  for  a  total  of  400,000 
livres.    De  La  Barre,  who  certainly  had  more  opportunity 

13  Du  Tertre  asserts  that  the  Company  of  Cayenne  was  composed 
of  twenty,  but  that  may  be  a  rough  statement  which  means  eighteen 
as  well  as  twenty-three.    Du  Tertre,  III,  13-14. 

14  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1717,  fol.  163. 

76 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

to  know  the  facts,  states,  however,  in  a  memoir,  written 
probably  on  the  eve  of  the  formation  of  the  company,  that 
all  the  associates  were  "resolved  to  furnish  to  the  amount 
of  30,000  livres  each,  according  to  needs  and  circum- 
stances."^^ Whether  such  "needs  and  circumstances" 
arose  before  the  formation  of  the  West  India  Company, 
we  do  not  know.  The  initial  expedition  which  the  com- 
pany sent  to  Cayenne  was  a  large  one  and  must  have  cost 
a  considerable  sum  to  fit  out.  It  was  composed  of  no  less 
than  four  vessels  belonging  to  the  company,  two  of  which 
were  of  300  tons,  and  of  over  1200  soldiers  and  settlers. 
It  was  much  larger  than  the  first  fleet  sent  out  by  the 
West  India  Company  at  the  end  of  the  year.  How  great 
an  expenditure  of  funds  this  required  it  is  not  possible  to 
say,  but  it  may  well  be  that  the  stockholders  were  called 
upon  to  increase  their  original  subscriptions  in  order  to 
insure  the  strength  and  success  of  the  establishment  of  the 
colony.  Of  the  twenty-three  subscriptions  of  June  2,  there 
are  eleven  of  30,000  livres,  five  of  20,000  livres,  four  of 
15,000  hvres,  and  three  of  10,000  hvres.  This  might 
mean  that  all  but  three  of  the  stockholders  found  it  neces- 
sary to  increase  their  original  subscriptions  to  finance  the 
enterprise.  In  that  case,  the  somewhat  formidable  sum 
of  520,000  livres  for  one  day's  subscription  represented 
nothing  in  the  way  of  capital  for  the  new  company  except 
the  value  of  the  new  settlement  at  Cayenne  and  did  not 
furnish  the  ready  cash  which  is  so  necessary  in  launching 
a  commercial  enterprise. 

This  explains  why  the  West  India  Company  did  not 
send  out  its  initial  expedition  before  December,  some  seven 
months  after  its  letters-patent  were  granted.  It  would 
likewise  explain  the  letter  of  distress  which  Bibaud,  one 
of  the  directors,  wrote  to  Colbert  on  June  10: 

15  Arch.  Col.,  Ci4,  I,  fol.  85. 

77 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

"I  feel  obliged  to  say  to  you,  Monsdgneur,  that  the  small 
fund  which  the  company  has  at  present  and  the  poor  prospects 
which  it  has  of  obtaining  more,  unless  it  is  aided  by  the  king, 
will  ruin  its  reputation.  It  is  certainly  an  excellent  affair 
and  one  of  the  best  that  has  ever  been  proposed  in  France. 
There  are  very  few  merchants  of  the  seaports  who  would  not 
subscribe  to  the  enterprise,  if  they  saw  that  our  force  was  in 
proportion  to  the  grandeur  of  the  design.  They  know  as  well 
as  we  that  four  or  five  millions  are  necessary  to  make  the 
company  strong  enough  for  that  and  to  prevent  it  from  fail- 
ing. That  is  why  those  merchants  instead  of  uniting  with  us 
are  talking  publicly  of  our  weakness." 

Bibaud  added  that  a  delay  on  the  part  of  the  king  to 
come  to  the  aid  of  the  company  meant  ruin.^^  In  spite  of 
the  urgent  appeal  of  Bibaud,  the  royal  treasury  remained 
closed  throughout  the  year  1664,  and  public  subscriptions 
came  in  exceedingly  slowly.  Thus,  for  June  S,  there  was 
one  of  10,000  livres,  another  on  August  18  for  15,000 
livres,  and  that  was  all  until  September  7.  That  is  to 
say,  if  we  except  the  sum  of  520,000  livres  entered  on  the 
subscription  list  of  June  2,  which  has  been  under  discus- 
sion, the  total  subscriptions  for  the  three  months  of  June, 
July  and  August  amounted  to  only  25,000  livres.  If  the 
books  of  the  company  had  been  closed  on  the  first  of  Sep- 
tember, as  was  provided  by  the  letters-patent,  the  com- 
pany, whose  task  was  the  commercial  conquest  of  a  hemi- 
sphere, would  have  had  at  its  disposal  about  enough  money 
to  pay  a  first-class  clerk. 

The  months  of  September,  October,  November  and 
December  were  more  productive.  During  the  month  of 
September,  there  were  four  subscriptions  of  20,000  livres, 
four  of  10,000  livres  and  one  of  3000  livres,  making  a 
total  of  123,000  livres;  during  the  month  of  October, 
there  were  ten  subscriptions  for  a  total  of  123,000  livres ; 

16  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  121,  fol.  365. 

78 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

in  November,  eight  for  a  total  of  71,000  livres;  in  Decem- 
ber, ten  for  a  total  of  1^1,000  livres.  This  made  a  grand 
total  of  438,000  hvres  for  the  four  months. 

Although  the  fact  that  the  subscriptions  of  these  four 
months  showed  a  marked  increase  over  those  of  the  three 
preceding  months  might  be  taken  as  indicating  that  public 
interest  had  at  last  been  aroused  in  the  enterprise,  it  is 
much  more  probable  that  the  difference  is  to  be  accounted 
for  by  the  fact  that  Colbert  had  created,  in  the  meantime, 
the  East  India  Company  and  had  begun  to  wage  a  verit- 
able campaign  for  subscriptions  to  that  enterprise.  The 
story  is  too  old  to  be  repeated  here  of  how  Colbert  brought— 
pressure  to  bear  upon  revenue-farmers,  judges,  courtiers 
and  officials  to  make  them  contribute  funds.  The  long  list 
of  names  of  these  classes  among  the  stockholders  of  that 
companj'^  proves  the  success  of  his  efforts.  Colbert  recom- 
mended to  the  king,  in  his  famous  Memoire  sur  commerce, 
of  August,  1664,  that  both  the  East  and  West  India  Com- 
pany receive  the  hearty  support  of  His  Majesty  and  that 
everything  be  done  to  encourage  them.  A  comparison  of  - 
the  lists  of  stockholders  of  the  two  companies  will  show 
that  out  of  a  total  of  thirty-six  who  subscribed  to  the 
West  India  Company  during  the  months  of  September  to 
December,  seven  also  subscribed  to  the  East  India  Com- 
pany. This  is  a  very  strong  indication  that  the  new  sub- 
scriptions to  the  West  India  Company  were  a  result  of 
Colbert's  campaign  of  browbeating  and  intimidation,  and 
that  they  were  made  out  of  a  spirit  of  complacency  to  the 
king  and  to  his  powerful  minister,  rather  than  from  any 
great  interest  in  the  company. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1664,  the  nominal  capital  of 
the  West  India  Company  was  988,000  livres.  For  reasons 
already  assigned,  it  is  probable  that  not  more  than  half 
of  this  amount  represented  ready  capital  for  the  com- 
pany's use.     This  was  quite  insufficient  to  insure  success. 

79 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Before  continuing  the  inquiry  as  to  the  subscriptions  which 
were  made  to  the  company  in  the  following  years,  it  may 
be  asked  who  were  the  subscribers  and  from  what  classes 
they  came. 

Of  the  first  twenty-three  names  on  the  subscription  list, 
representing,  as  we  have  seen,  the  stockholders  of  the 
Company  of  Cayenne,  information  has  been  gleaned  from 
various  sources  in  regard  to  twenty.  Of  the  twenty, 
only  two  were  merchants  and  all  the  rest  occupied  various 
positions  in  the  administrative  hierarchy  of  the  realm. 
Thus  there  were  Bechameil,  a  secretary  of  the  conseil 
d'etat,  Matharel,  a  secretary  in  the  department  of  the 
marine,  Menjot,  one  of  the  secretaries  to  the  king,  Col- 
bert de  Terron,  intendant  at  Brouage,  de  La  Sabliere  and 
Berthelot,  revenue-farmers,  etc.  Very  Httle  information 
has  been  found  in  regard  to  the  thirty-six  new  names  which 
appear  on  the  list  from  June  3  to  December  31.  The  occu- 
pations of  only  nineteen  are  known.  But  of  these,  only 
four  were  merchants  and  the  remaining  fifteen  were  offi- 
cials of  various  rank. 

The  point  is  of  capital  importance  not  only  for  the  com- 
pany under  consideration,  but  also  for  all  commercial  com- 
panies organized  during  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.  Failing 
to  gain  support  of  merchants,  either  because  they  were  too 
poor,  or  because  they  were  not  willing  to  risk  their  money 
in  such  enterprises,  Cslbert  and  his  successors  resorted  very 
often  to  the  expedient  of  launchingHsueh  commercial  enter- 
prises hy  employing  government  officials  and  employees, 
men  for  the  most  part  without  experience  in  such  matters 
and  ignorant  of  the  conditions  of  the  trade  which  they 
attempted  to  carry  on.  That  fact  accounts  for  the  failure 
of  many  a  company  and  has  received  as  yet  too  small 
attention  at  the  hands  of  historians. 

In  1665,  the  total  subscriptions  amounted  to  1,604,360 
livres.     Of  this  sum,  the  king  subscribed  187,000  livres 

80 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

on  March  26;  100,000  livres  on  April  22;  100,000  livres 
on  May  16,  June  22,  July  31 ;  300,000  livres  on  Septem- 
ber 4,  and  500,000  livres  on  December  4,  making  a  total 
for  the  year  of  1,387,000  livres  ;  Colbert  himself  subscribed 
30,000  livres;  the  President  of  the  Parlement  of  Paris 
8000  livres ;  des  Forges,  a  revenue-farmer,  8000  livres ; 
three  members  of  the  company  increased  their  holdings  by 
subscriptions  amounting  to  a  total  of  22,000  livres.  This 
leaves  onlj^  149,360  livres  subscribed  during  the  year  by 
individuals  of  whom  no  information  has  been  found. 

The  total  subscriptions  for  the  two  years,  1666-1667, 
amounted  to  1,846,440  livres.  Of  this  sum  the  king  con- 
tributed 1,135,000  livres;  the  fermiers  des  aides,  200,000 
livres;  the  fermiers  des  gabelles,  150,000  livres;  278,940 
livres  were  paid  to  the  company  by  various  farmers  of  the 
department  of  justice.  All  these  sums  made  a  total  of 
1,773,940  livres,  leaving  only  a  remainder  of  72,500  livres 
for  the  two  years,  subscribed  by  individuals  of  whom  no 
information  has  been  obtained. 

The  total  subscriptions  for  the  year  1668  amounted  to 
only  144,000  livres,  of  which  the  king  subscribed  100,000 
livres  ;  the  salt-farmers  at  Paris,  10,000  Hvres ;  the  farmers 
of  fines  imposed  by  the  Chambre  de  Justice  at  Paris,  6500 
livres;  making  a  total  of  116,500  livres  and  leaving  only 
27,000  livres  for  subscriptions  by  individuals. 

For  1669,  the  total  was  944,545  liv.  8s.  6d.  Of  this  the 
king  contributed  404,545  liv.  8s.  6d.  The  remaining  sum 
was  all  subscribed  by  members  of  the  company,  evidently 
as  the  result  of  corporate  action  which  may  have  been 
dictated  by  Colbert. 

Thus  of  the  grand  total  of  5,522,345  liv.  8s.  6d.,  the 
king  furnished  no  less  than  3,026,545  liv.  8s.  6d.  Almost 
all  of  the  remainder  was  furnished  by  revenue-farmers,  tax- 
collectors  and  officials,  acting  in  the  great  majority  of 
cases  under  the  orders  of  Colbert.     Only  very  insignificant 

81 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

sums  were  furnished  by  merchants  or  others  capable  of 
directing  such  an  important  enterprise.  The  Wast^Jndia 
Company  was  thus,  from  the  first  and  remained  through- 
out its  Tiistory,  a  commercial  enterprise  created  by  the 
government,  supported  by  it  and  directed  by  the  king's 
greatest  minister.  The  almost  unlimited  powers  which  had 
been  bestowed  upon  it  by  its  letters-pateht  were  pjowers 
only  in  name.  It  was  subjected  at  every  moment  to  the 
orders  of  Colbert  and  became  the  puppet  of  his  wiU.  In 
a  word,  the  company  was  maintained  and  controlled  by 
the  state  to  perform  a  national  service  and  to  make  pos- 
sible the  success  of  a  national  policy. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  West  India  Company^  1664-1665 

/^OLBERT  imposed  a  difficult  task  upon  the  West 
^^  India  Company.  He  wished  by  a  stroke  of  the  pjgit 
to  exclude  the  Dutch  from  the  islands  and  to  have  the  c(X00r 
pany  satisfy  at  once  the  needs  of  the  trade  which  they  had 
been  accustomed  to  carry  on.  He  chose  the  somewhat 
plausible  excuse  of  the  danger  of  admitting  Dutch  vessels 
to  the  island  while  the.  pest  raged  at  Amsterdam.  Accord- 
ingly an  arret  of  September  30,  1664,  forbade  the  govern- 
ors of  the  islands  to  receive  Dutch  vessels,  and  "the  trade 
with  the  Dutch  began  to  stop,  .  .  .  and  the  inhabitants 
to  sufFer."^ 

Preparations  to  trade  were  made  by  the  company  imme- 
diately after  the  granting  of  its  letters-patent.  Bechameil, 
Matharel,  Bibaud,  Bouchet,  Berthelot,  DaHbert  and  Jac- 
quier,  all  members  of  the  Company  of  Cayenne,  became 
the  first  directors  of  the  new  company.  Bechameil  was  espe- 
cially charged  by  Colbert  with  the  direction  of  affairs  and 
seems  to  have  kept  him  constantly  informed  of  what  was 
being  done.  On  June  5,  he  reported  in  person  the  details 
of  the  company's  preparations.  On  June  28,  he  wrote: 
"In  obedience  to  your  orders  I  shall  tell  you  that  the  West 
India  Company  is  busy  buying  merchandise  for  the  cargoes 
of  the  two  vessels  which  are  being  equipped  for  the 
islands."^  Two  days  later  in  another  letter  he  complained 
that  his  colleagues  were  showing  indifference  to  the  com- 
pany's affairs,  but  added  that  progress  was  being  made 

1  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1717,  fol.  209;  Du  Tertre,  III,  92. 

2  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  119,  Berthelot  to  Colbert,  June, 
1664. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

and  that  he  personally  was  working  persistently  at  the 
task.^  Another  letter  of  July  21  informs  us  that  an  expe- 
dition to  the  islands  was  being  prepared  at  La  Rochelle, 
and  one  on  July  24  declared  that  within  three  or  four  days 
the  cargoes  for  this  expedition  would  be  complete,  but 
added:  "We  are  expecting  every  day  the  arrival  of  our 
three  vessels  which  are  to  come  from  Holland  and  Bayonne. 
If  they  arrive  at  the  time  which  we  expect  them,  they  will 
be  ready  to  sail  for  the  islands  on  August  1."* 

Either  the  "three  vessels  from  Holland  and  Bayonne" 
did  not  arrive  or  other  obstacles  arose  which  prevented 
them  sailing,  for,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  first  expedition 
of  the  company  did  not  sail  from  La  Rochelle  until  more 
than  four  months  later.  This  delay  may  have  been  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  company,  as  has  been  shown,  did  not 
have  adequate  funds  at  its  command  to  equip  an  expedition 
at  such  an  early  date.  In  the  meantime,  something  had  to 
be  done  to  supply  the  pressing  needs  of  the  islands.  The 
situation  was  all  the  more  exacting,  because  news  which 
Bechameil  received  was  rather  disconcerting : 

"I  have  received  intelligence  from  Holland  that  no  ves- 
sel has  sailed  for  the  islands  for  a  long  time,  and  that  none 
will  be  sent  because  it  is  feared  that  our  company  will  pre- 
vent them  from  discharging  their  cargoes."^ 

There  seems  very  little  doubt  that  the  Dutch  had  con- 
siderably diminished  the  number  of  vessels  which  they  sent 
ordinarily  to  the  islands,  for  Du  Tertre  tells  us  that  suf- 
fering was  great  there.^     One  might  explain  this  diminu- 

3  Ibid.,  121  bis,  fol.  1010. 

4  Ibid.,  fol.  809. 

5  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M6\.  Colbert,  122,  fol.  699. 

6  Du  Tertre  notes  the  arrival  of  two  Dutch  vessels  at  Martinique 
two  months  later.  One  of  these  vessels  had  a  cargo  of  300  slaves,  the 
other  a  cargo  of  horses  from  Curasao.  "This  aid,  brought  by  the 
Dutch  at  a  time  when  need  was  so  great,  reopened  the  wound  which 
had  been  made  by  the  rupture  of  commerce  with  them."  Du  Tertre, 
III,  101. 

84 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

tion  by  saying  that  it  was  due  to  the  approaching  struggle 
with  England,  or  yet,  as  has  been  suggested,  by  the  fear 
that  the  West  India  Company  would  assert  its  monopoly 
and  prevent  Dutch  vessels  from  discharging  their  cargoes. 
A  letter  from  Matharel,  one  of  the  directors  of  the  com- 
pany, written  on  July  22  to  Colbert,  suggested  another 
explanation  of  more  than  passing  interest: 

"There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  Dutch  have  delayed 
sending  several  vessels  which  had  already  been  partly  freighted 
for  the  islands^  because  they  feared  to  find  an  opposition  on 
the  part  of  our  company  to  the  sale  of  their  merchandise  and 
to  the  freighting  of  their  vessels  for  the  return  voyage.  I 
am  of  the  opinion  that  with  these  motives  there  is  mixed  a 
bit  of  malice  aforethought  with  the  desire  to  cause  by  this 
means  a  dearth  of  supplies  in  the  islands  and  to  make  the 
planters  cry  out  against  our  company,  if  it  cannot  supply 
promptly  the  aid  and  refreshments  which  they  need.  M. 
Bechameil,  who  is  of  the  same  opinion,  will  inform  the  other 
members  of  the  fact  and  they  will  not  fail  to  take  measures 
to  meet  the  situation."^ 

Bechameil  was  of  the  opinion  that  to  meet  the  crisis  the 
merchants  of  La  Rochelle,  Dieppe  and  Havre,  who  were 
accustomed  to  send  vessels  to  the  islands,  should  be  com- 
pelled either  to  send  some  on  their  own  account,  or  to  char- 
ter them  to  the  company.^  No  records  have  been  found, 
however,  which  show  that  this  suggestion  ever  bore  fruit. 
The  first  fleet  of  the  company  was  not  ready  to  sail  before 
the  middle  of  December.  On  December  13,  de  Chambre, 
the  general  agent  of  the  company  for  the  islands,  wrote 
that  four  vessels  were  ready  to  sail  and  that  for  "the  most 
part  they  were  new,  mounted  by  one  hundred  pieces  of 
artillery,  well  equipped  in  every  respect,  well  laden  with 

7  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M^l.  Colbert,  132,  fol.  793. 

8  Ibid.,  fol.  699. 

85 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

cargoes  of  food  supplies  and  merchandise  for  the  islands."^ 
Aboard  the  flag-ship,  UArmonyey  was  de  Chambre,  on  the 
vice-admiral,  the  St.  Sehastien,  were  de  Clodore,  the  new 
governor  of  Martinique,  his  wife,  priests  and  curates,  and 
clerks  who  were  to  be  charged  with  the  distribution  and 
sale  of  the  company's  merchandise. 

The  fleet  sailed  from  La  Rochelle  on  December  14,  with 
favourable  winds.  The  third  day  out  a  storm  arose  which 
separated  all  the  vessels,  but  they  were  all  reunited  except 
Le  Mercier,  which  was  seen  no  more  by  the  others,  until 
their  arrival  at  Martinique.  On  reaching  the  Canaries, 
La  Suzanne  left  the  other  two  in  order  to  pursue  her  way 
to  Cayenne,  for  which  her  cargo  was  intended.  UArmonye 
and  the  St.  Sebastien  called  at  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  to 
pay  their  compliments  to  the  Portuguese  governor  and 
thus  prepare  the  way  for  good  relations  between  him  and 
the  company.  This  done,  they  continued  their  route  to 
Martinique,  where  they  arrived  in  February,  1665.^° 
There  they  found  Le  Merciery  which  had  sailed  with  them 
from  La  Rochelle,  Le  Terrony  a  vessel  of  the  king,  which 
had  sailed  also  from  La  Rochelle  a  short  time  before  them 
with  a  cargo  of  provisions  for  the  troops  of  de  Tracy, 
and  La  Fortu/ne,  a  vessel  belonging  to  the  company  which 
had  sailed  from  Nantes  about  the  middle  of  December." 

9 Ibid.,  134  bis,  fols.  454-455.    The  fleet  was  composed  as  follows: 


L'Armonye  (flying  the  AdmiraPs  pennant) 

St.  Sebastien  (Vice- Admiral's)  . 

Le  Mercier         ...... 

La  Suzanne        ...... 

The  fleet  had  thus  a  total  of  1250  tons,  was  armed  with  72  cannon  and 
had  on  board  593  persons.     Du  Tertre,  III,  160. 

^^  Relation  de  VAmSrique,  I,  14. 

11  Arch.   Nat.   Col.,   Cy,   I,  letter   from   du   Lion,   April   8,    1665; 
Gazette,  1665,  No.  156. 

86 


Tons 

Passengers 
Can-  Crew 
non  Soldiers 

300 

24   160 

250 

16   153 

400 

16   120 

300 

16   160 

TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  arrival  of  these  five  large  vessels,  with  cargoes  of 
food  supplies  and  of  merchandise,  was  hailed  with  joy. 
For  a  moment  the  bitterness,  which  had  been  felt  at  the 
news  that  the  islands  had  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
company,  was  forgotten.  When  the  sale  of  merchandise 
began,  the  planters  gathered  in  great  numbers  from  all 
parts  of  the  island.  Everyone  sought  to  have  a  supply 
of  wine,  of  salt  meat,  of  powder,  of  lead,  of  cloth,  of  shoes, 
of  hats,  and  of  everything  of  which  they  had  need.  The 
willingness  of  the  company  to  grant  credit  seemed  un- 
bounded. Consequently  nothing  seemed  too  dear  to  buy. 
The  worst  knaves  and  the  most  insolvent  planters  were 
the  loudest  in  their  demands  and  bought  the  most.  Many 
persons  who  would  not  have  been  given  a  pound  of  salt 
meat  on  credit  by  the  Dutch,  received  a  whole  barrel  from 
the  company.  The  distribution  of  merchandise  was  made 
with  such  confusion,  that  to  those  who  had  demanded  salt 
meat  was  bailed  out  brandy .^^ 

The  extravagance  which  the  company  displayed  on  this 
occasion  was  due  to  lack  of  judgment  and  to  failure  to 
protect  its  interests.  It  had  chosen  a  corps  of  employees 
who  were  unprepared  for  their  duties.  De  La  Barre  insists 
that  for  this  fact  the  directors  were  not  to  be  blamed,  as 
they  were  forced  "to  take  those  who  offered  to  go  into 
a  land  so  little  known  as  yet  and  the  directors  believed  that 
they  had  accomplished  much  in  being  able  to  find  persons 
who  were  willing  to  make  a  voyage  which  appeared,  even 
to  the  most  hardy,  a  great  undertaking."^^  The  agents 
who  were  chosen  believed  that  the  company  was  under 
obligations  to  them  for  their  willingness  to  go  to  the 
islands,  and  they  conducted  themselves  as  though  all  were 
owed  to  them  and  they  owed  nothing  to  the  company. 
Whatever  may  be  the  explanation  of  the  choice  which  was 

i2DuTertre,  III,  166-167. 

^^  Relation  de  I'Amerique,  I,  15-16. 

87 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

made  of  inexperienced  and,  as  events  proved,  of  rather 
insolent  agents,  two  very  deplorable  facts  resulted  from 
it.  In  the  first  place,  the  affairs  of  the  compaiij  were 
yery  poorly  administered  and  serious^  fij[iancial  losses  were 
inevitable  ffdm"such  a  scene  as  the  debut  at  Martinique; 
in  the  second  place,  the  haugkty  jcharacter_  and  the  domi- 
neering spirit  of  these  agents  alienated  the  planters,  for 
de  La  Barre  remarked  "that  their  severity,  presumption 
and  foolish  pride  destroyed  in  the  planters  all  the  respect 
which  they  might  have  had  for  the  company."^* 

The  relatively  small  amount  of  supplies  furnished  by 
the  company  caused  dissatisfaction.  "It  seemed  like  a 
drop  of  water  upon  the  tongue  of  a  man  with  a  fever."^^ 
The  planters  began  to  murmur  and  cry  out  against  the 
company,  saying  that  it  could  not  satisfy  their  needs 
itself  and  yet  prevented  the  Dutch  from  doing  so.  Still 
greater  was  the  disappointment  and  still  greater  the  dis- 
content, when  the  St.  Sehastien  and  UArmonye  sailed 
from  Martinique  without  discharging  their  cargoes.  It 
was  then  that  the  planters  began  to  consider  more  closely 
the  West  India  Company  and  began  to  fear  the  renewal 
of  suffering  which  the  islands  had  experienced  under  the 
earlier  companies.  They  cursed  it  and  expressed  openly 
^eir  sorrow  at  the  exclusion  of  Dutch  traders.  If  there 
had  been  some  means  of  escape,  niany  would  have  left  the 
island.  Efforts  to  silence  these  complaints  and  to  calm 
this  spirit  of  discontent  proved  ineffective.  A  rebellion 
was  threatened  and  would  probably  have  broken  out  at 
once  had  not  de  Tracy  been  at  Martinique  and  exerted 
his  influence  for  the  company .^^ 

It  was  indeed  fortunate  that  de  Tracy  was  still  in  the 
islands  and  that  the  inauguration  of  the  company  could 

14  Ibid.,  pp.  17-18. 

15  Du  Tertre,  III,  167. 
i«  Ibid. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

take  place  under  his  high  authority.  The  dignity  of  the 
high  commission  which  he  held  from  the  king,  and  the 
sterling  qualities  which  he  possessed  as  a  brave  soldier  and 
an  honest  man,  inspired  both  fear  and  love  for  him  among 
the  planters  of  the  islands. 

February  19,  1665,  was  chosen  as  the  day  for  the 
foXJOaLfi^Iieiaonxjof  the  company's  inauguration  at  Martin- 
ique. On  that  day,  in  obedience  to  official  summons  by 
de  Tracy,  the  conseil  souverain,  the  clergy,  the  nobility, 
representatives  of  the  tiers  etat  assembled  in  the  market- 
place before  the  Chamber  of  Justice.  They  were  sur- 
rounded by  a  great  crowd  of  the  common  people.  De 
Tracy  appeared  and,  accompanied  by  de  Chambre  and  de 
Clodore,  entered  the  Chamber,  followed  by  the  different 
estates.  Only  a  small  part  of  the  common  people  could 
gain  admission  to  the  hall. 

After  the  assembly  was  called  to  order,  de  Chambre 
arose  and  declared  that  he  was  bearer  of  the  king's 
proclamation  which  made  the  West  India  Company  lord 
of  the  islands.  In  presenting  it  to  de  Tracy,  he  demanded 
in  the  name  of  this  company  that  it  be  read  and  officially 
registered  and  that  the  company  be  placed  in  possession 
of  the  island  of  Martinique.  The  registration  of  the  proc- 
lamation was  forthwith  made.  The  acquiescence  of  the 
whole  assembly  was  obtained  on  the  condition  that  the 
interests  of  the  children  of  du  Parquet,  the  former  pro- 
prietor of  the  island,  be  safeguarded.  De  Tracy  there- 
upon declared  the  company  in  possession  of  the  island. 
De  Clodore  then  presented  his  credentials  and  was  declared 
governor.  Oaths  of  fidelity  to  the  king,  to  the  company 
and  to  de  Clodore  were  straightway  taken  by  the  conseil 
souverain  and  the  three  estates.  Whereupon,  de  Tracy 
expressed  his  high  esteem  for  de  Clodore  and  exhorted  all 
to  accord  him  their  obedience  and  their  support.  A  reply 
by  de  Clodore  formally  ended  the  ceremony. 

89 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

The  assembly  quit  the  hall  and  gathered  in  the  square, 
where  several  barrels  of  wine  furnished  by  the  company 
had  been  tapped.  The  health  of  the  king  was  drunk  amid 
the  shouts  of  the  people,  "Vive  le  Roi !"  and  the  booming 
of  the  cannon  of  Fort  St.  Pierre.  "The  health  of  the  com- 
pany was  drunk  even  by  the  planters,  for  wine  makes  all 
the  world  akin."  Feasting  followed,  and  the  same  toasts 
were  drunk  with  joy.  Thus  the  day  passed,  and  the  West 
India  Company  had  entered,  apparently  under  good  aus- 
pices, into  the  possession  of  Martinique.^^ 

On  the  morrow,  February  20,  de  Tracy,  with  de  Cham- 
bre,  sailed  for  Guadeloupe.  Here  on  March  S,  before  an 
assembly  composed  of  the  three  estates,  he  declared  the 
company  in  possession  of  the  island  and  renewed  in  its 
name  the  powers  of  du  Lion  as  governor .^^  In  the  months 
following,  the  company  took  formal  possession  of  St. 
Christopher,  St.  Martin,  St.  Croix,  St.  Bartholomew,  St. 
Domingo,  Marie  Galante  and  Grenada. 
^  Nowhere  does  the  inauguration  of  the  company  seem 
to  have  been  received  with  joy  or  without  murmur.  At 
St.  Christopher,  so  we  learn  from  a  letter  written  by  de 
Sales,  the  governor,  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  company 
was  taken  with  a  pronounced  lack  of  enthusiasm,  some  of 
the   important    planters    absenting   themselves    from    the 

17  Du  Tertre,  III,  168. 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  Prise  de  pos.  de  I'isle  de  la  Guad.  We 
learn  from  a  letter  written  by  du  Lion  to  Colbert  under  date  of  April 
8,  that  this  ceremony  was  followed,  as  at  Martinique,  by  drinking  and 
feasting:  "We  left  the  hall  to  gather  in  the  square,  where  several 
barrels  of  wine  had  been  tapped,  and  there  we  had  the  honor  to  drink 
the  health  of  the  king  amid  the  shouts  of  'Vive  le  Roi !'  and  the  boom- 
ing of  cannon.  We  then  attended  the  banquet  offered  by  the  West 
India  Company  to  the  most  important  persons  of  the  island.  It  was 
spread  beneath  an  arbor  which  had  been  prepared  at  the  Place 
d'armes.  .  .  ,  There  were  eighty-two  covers  on  each  side  which 
proved  insufficient.  .  .  .  Courtesy,  order,  entertainment  and  rejoic- 
ing characterized  the  occasion."    Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I. 

90 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

ceremony  on  purpose  not  to  take  it.  The  principal  offi- 
cers and  planters  assembled  and  drew  up  a  series  of  ten 
articles,  in  which  they  sought  a  guarantee  that  the  rights 
which  they  had  enjoyed  under  the  proprietorship  of  the 
Knights  of  Malta  would  be  respected  by  the  company.^* 
The  great  majority  of  these  articles  concerned  questions 
of  taxation  and  feudal  dues.  Article  6  demanded  that 
the  relations  with  the  English  should  continue  unchanged, 
that  is  to  say,  that  trade  should  be  carried  on  freely 
between  the  two  nations.  The  articles  were  presented 
to  de  Chambre  and  his  response  demanded.  In  reply  to 
Article  6,  he  said  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  recog- 
nize the  principle  of  free  trade  between  the  two  nations, 
but  added:  "Nevertheless,  as  it  would  not  be  reasonable 
to  let  the  planters  remain  in  need,  the  said  agent  agrees 
that,  whenever  there  is  not  to  be  had  in  the  stores  of  the 
company  any  articles  of  which  the  planters  have  need, 
they  may  demand  a  permit  from  the  general  agent,  which 
shall  be  granted  freely,  and  they  may  forthwith  purchase 
the  said  articles  either  from  English  merchants,  or  wher- 
ever else  they  choose. "^° 

At  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo  and  the  island  of  Tortuga, 
the  company  encountered  long  and  bitter  opposition. 
In  spite  of  the  heroic  efforts  of  the  able  governor, 
Ogeron,  whom  the  company  had  placed  in  command,  the 
untamed  spirit  of  the  buccaneers  and  freebooters  refused 
to  submit  to  the  rule  of  a  commercial  company. 

At  Guadeloupe  the  planters,  although  in  a  spirit  of 
submission,  viewed  the  departure  of  the  Dutch  with  sad- 
ness. Du  Lion  wrote  to  Colbert  on  April  8,  1665 :  "The 
liason  of  the  planters  with  the  Dutch  is  still  dear  to  them 
[the  planters].  The  oldest  and  well-to-do  inhabitants  are 
Dutch  and  have  always  maintained  a  correspondence  with 

19  Du  Tertre,  III,  255. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  265. 

91 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Holland.  I  have  already  informed  you  that  these  islands 
received  much  aid  from  these  foreigners.  .  .  .  Most  of 
the  excellent  sugar-mills  which  we  have  here  were  built 
from  capital  furnished  by  the  Dutch."  Du  Lion  closed 
this  interesting  letter  by  expressing  the  hope  that  the 
company  would  send  enough  vessels  to  satisfy  the  needs 
of  the  planter s.^^ 

It  was,  however,  at  Martinique,  the  most  important  and 
the  most  central  for  trade  with  the  islands,  that  the  West 
India  Company  met  with  the  spirit  of  greatest  opposition. 
Its  inauguration  in  the  island,  described  above,  was  auspi- 
cious only  in  appearance.  In  reality  there  was  much  mur- 
muring among  the  people.  The  very  evening  following 
the  ceremony,  the  spirit  of  revolt  against  the  company 
was  manifest.  Some  shots  were  fired.  De  Tracy,  how- 
ever, persuaded  that  there  was  no  immediate  danger, 
sailed  for  Guadeloupe  on  the  morrow.  But  the  sails  of  his 
vessels  had  not  long  disappeared  from  view  before  a-xeyolt 
broke  out. 

One  oi  the  chief  clerks  of  the  company,  du  Buc  by  name, 
went  into  the  district,  Precheur,  situated  immediately  to 
the  north  of  St.  Pierre,  to  establish  a  warehouse  for  the 
sale  and  storage  of  merchandise.  He  found  a  very  pro- 
nounced spirit  of  antagonism.  There  were  jjiurmurings 
against  the  company,  because  it  sold  its.  merchandise  too 
dear.  Soon  after  his  arrival  he  was  attacked  by  a  little 
band  of  rebels,  led  by  one  Rodomont.  He  succeeded  in 
gaining  his  boat  and  making  his  escape  amid  a  shower  of 
stones  and  the  cries  of  rebellion :  "Aux  armes !  Vive  M.  du 
Parquet !  Narque  de  la  compagnie !"  Du  Buc  immediately 
reported  the  aif  air  to  de  Clodore,  who  at  once  took  prompt 
action,  fearing  lest  the  revolt  become  general.  He  gave 
orders  to  different  captains  to  hold  their  troops  in  readi- 

21  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  April  8,  1665;  also  ibid.,  letter  May  11, 
1665. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

ness  and  sent  one,  whom  he  trusted,  into  the  infected  quar- 
ter to  learn  the  state  of  affairs.  The  captain  reported 
at  his  return  that  Rodomont  and  some  five  or  six  of  his 
immediate  followers  were  preparing  a  general  revolt  and 
that  for  this  purpose  they  were  going  from  house  to  house 
to  gain  adherents.  The  governor  sent  de  Laubiere,  his 
lieutenant,  to  take  into  custody  the  young  du  Parquet, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  rebels  from  placing  him  at  their 
head  and  from  using  him  as  a  pretext  for  revolt  against 
the  company.  Then  de  Clodore,  at  the  head  of  a  small 
body  of  troops,  marched  against  the  mutineers. 

The  spirit  which  characterized  the  governor's  actions 
during  the  first  trying  months  of  his  service  to  the  com- 
pany may  be  very  well  illustrated  by  the  following  incident, 
occurring  at  this  time  and  related  by  Du  Tertre: 

"A  captain  who  apparently  would  not  have  been  sorry  to 
see  the  rebellion  succeed^  had  the  boldness  to  ask  the  governor, 
just  before  he  started  on  his  march,  whither  he  was  going,  say- 
ing that  everyone  was  in  revolt,  and  asking  if  there  were  some 
enemies  to  fight  in  the  island.  The  governor,  who  was  not  a 
man  to  be  frightened  by  such  questions,  replied  proudly:  T 
am  going  to  chastise  the  seditious  and  I'll  fire  a  pistol  at  the 
head  of  the  first  person  who  fails  to  respond  to  his  duty.  As 
for  you  follow  me !'  Whereupon  he  forced  the  captain  to  fol- 
low him^  which  he  did  without  daring  to  say  a  word."^ 

Thanks  to  the  vigour  and  the  promptness  of  attack,  the 
resistance  offered  by  the  rebels  was  small.  The  principal 
leaders  were  promptly  arrested.  Rodomont  was  hanged 
and  three  of  his  companions  were  condemned  to  the  galleys, 
another  was  banished,  the  rest  were  pardoned.  Thus 
ended  the  first  rebellion  against  the  company.  De  Clo- 
dore suppressed  it  before  it  had  a  chance  to  become  well 
organized,  and  for  this  he  received  warm  commendation 

22  Du  Tertre,  III,  189. 

93 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

from  Bechameil,  in  the  name  of  the  company,  and  from 
Colbert,  in  the  name  of  the  king.^^ 

In  the  meantime,  the  company  had  not  been  idle  in 
France.  Special  boards  of  directors  were  chosen  at  Rouen 
and  La  Rochelle.  Agents  or  correspondents  were  estab- 
lished at  Honfleur,  Havre,  Dieppe,  St.  Malo,  Nantes,  Bor- 
deaux, and  in  Holland.  Contracts  were  let  for  the  con- 
struction of  vessels  in  different  ports  of  France.  By  early 
summer  of  1665,  "two  very  beautiful  ships"  had  been 
launched,  and  two  others  were  to  be  ready  by  the  end  of 
the  year.  At  St.  Malo  another  large  vessel  was  being 
built  for  the  company.  On  the  eve  of  its  completion,  in 
November,  1665,  fire  destroyed  half  of  its  hull.^^  Many 
more  vessels  were  purchased.  Janon,  the  French  consul  at 
Middleburg,  seems  to  have  been  charged  with  the  purchase 
of  vessels  for  the  company.  Thus,  on  April  17,  1665,  he 
wrote  to  Colbert  as  follows :  "There  arrived  here,  two  or 
three  days  ago,  a  French  crew  from  Havre,  sent  to  me  by 
the  West  India  Company  to  man  a  vessel,  which,  in  accord- 
ance with  its  orders,  will  take  cargo  at  St.  Malo  and  sail, 
thence  for  the  West  Indies. "^^  A  week  later  he  wrote  that 
some  Flemish  merchants  had  bought  a  vessel  of  260  tons 
which  he  had  intended  to  buy  for  the  company .^^  One  of 
the  directors  affirmed  in  a  memoir  that  before  the  end  of 
the  year  1665  the  company  was  in  possession  of  fifty-two 
vessels.^ 

23  Pierre  Margry,  Les  Seigneurs  de  la  Martinique  in  Revue  Mari- 
time et  Coloniale,  vol.  58,  publishes  a  letter  written  by  de  Chambr6; 
see  Du  Tertre,  III,  192-193,  for  the  texts  of  the  two  letters.  De  Cham- 
br6  remarked  that,  in  the  opinion  of  all  the  islands,  de  Clodor^  had 
conducted  himself  most  admirably  in  the  aifair. 

24  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  Memoire  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes  Occid. 
sur  I'Etat  ou  elle  se  trouve,  1665;  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.  Colbert,  133, 
fol.  328,  Letter  from  B6chameil  to  Colbert,  November  14,  1665. 

25  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M6\.  Colbert,  128  bis,  fols.  898-899. 

26  Ibid.,  fol.  1048. 

27  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  M6moire,  1665. 

94 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

All  accurate  records  of  the  vessels  sent  out  to  the  islands 
and  of  their  cargoes  has,  perhaps,  been  lost  for  ever  by 
the  disappearance  of  the  company's  registers.  The  Ga- 
zette has  preserved,  however,  some  important  informa- 
tion.^^ A  dispatch  of  January  23,  1665,  from  La  Rochelle, 
noted  sailings  for  the  island  of  vessels  belonging  to  the 
company,  as  follows:  one  from  Bordeaux  on  January  8, 
one  from  Texel  (in  Holland)  about  the  same  time,  and 
two  from  La  Rochelle  on  the  15th.  The  dispatch  added  that 
twelve  more  vessels  were  being  equipped  at  La  Rochelle 
for  trade  with  the  islands,  "for,"  it  remarked,  "the  com- 
pany has   undertaken   a   commerce  which  formerly   gave 

28  In  a  dispatch  of  December  31,  1664,  from  La  Rochelle,  the 
following  news  is  given:  "A  few  days  since,  there  sailed  from  this 
port  with  favourable  winds,  seven  vessels  for  the  Islands  of  America. 
They  form  a  part  of  the  vessels  which  the  West  India  Company  is 
having  equipped  here  and  in  several  other  ports  of  France  for  its 
commerce.  The  Sieur  Chambr6,  general  agent  of  the  said  company, 
was  aboard,  as  were  also  the  governor,  the  lieutenant,  and  other  ofl&- 
cers  which  the  company  sent  out  to  take  possession  of  the  islands  and 
to  establish  trade.  There  was  also  a  large  number  of  passengers. 
Many,  in  fact,  were  obliged  to  remain  behind,  but  will  sail  on  the  six 
large  vessels  which  the  same  company  is  diligently  preparing  together 
with  some  of  the  most  important  merchants  of  this  city  who  have  an 
interest  in  it."    Gazette,  1664,  No.  156. 

This  will  be  recognized  at  once  as  the  description  of  the  sailing  of 
the  first  fleet,  which  has  been  noted  above.  It  will  also  be  remarked 
that  it  differs  very  much  from  the  information  which  has  been 
reported  from  Du  Tertre,  for  that  historian  states  that  only  four 
vessels  composed  the  first  fleet  and  the  Gazette  says  seven.  Inasmuch 
as  Du  Tertre  gives  such  definite  details  in  regard  to  the  tonnage, 
equipment  and  number  of  persons  aboard  each  vessel,  one  would  be 
inclined  to  suppose  that  the  account  given  in  the  Gazette  was  pur- 
posely exaggerated  in  order  to  stimulate  subscriptions  to  the  com- 
pany. If  one  adopted  such  a  view,  the  reliability  of  later  reports 
found  in  the  Gazette  would  be  seriously  called  in  question  and  all 
information  gleaned  from  that  source  would  be  of  doubtful  value. 
Fortunately  a  letter,  written  by  de  Chambr6  to  Colbert,  on  the  eve 
of  departure  of  the  fleet  from  La  Rochelle,  makes  it  possible 
to  reconcile  the  two  accounts.  "There  are  ready  to  sail  from  this 
port  several  vessels  belonging  to  the  West  India  Company,  UHat' 

95 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

employment  to  100  or  120  ships.  It  will  send  out  to  th 
islands  at  least  eight  or  ten  each  month.  "^  From  Diepp 
came  the  news  that  on  January  14  there  sailed  from  tha 
port  two  vessels  which  had  been  equipped  by  orders  o 
the  company's  directors  at  Rouen.  Other  vessels,  belong 
ing  to  the  company,  it  stated,  had  sailed  from  the  sam 
port  only  a  few  days  before.  Four  more  vessels  would  b 
prepared  to  sail  at  the  end  of  the  month.^  There  is  thu 
indicated  by  the  Gazette  a  total  of  eight  ships  sailing 
for  the  islands  during  the  month  of  January,  1665. 

The  company  had,  however,  allowed  its  expenditures  t 
run  far  ahead  of  the  amount  of  money  subscribed  to  it  o 

monie,  Le  St.  Sebastien,  Le  Mercier  and  La  Suzanne,  all  of  300  t 
400  tons.  .  .  .  There  has  already  sailed  a  little  vessel  named  L 
Cheramy,  to  carry  dispatches  to  M.  de  Tracy.  She  carried  also 
cargo  of  merchandise.  Another  vessel,  named  Les  Armes  de  la  Com 
pagnie,  which  is  almost  laden  and  is  of  500  tons,  will  sail  in  five  o 
six  days.  This  makes  six  vessels  without  counting  the  one  belongin 
to  the  king,  named  Le  Terron.  Another  vessel,  named  La  Marie,  c 
about  400  tons,  which  is  being  equipped  in  this  port,  will  sail  in  abov 
fifteen  days."    Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.  Colbert,  134  bis,  fols.  454-455. 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  in  the  first  part  of  this  letter,  the  informs 
tion  which  Du  Tertre  gives  about  the  sailing  of  the  first  fleet  i 
entirely  confirmed.  It  remains  to  be  seen  if  the  report  printed  in  th 
Gazette  is  also  confirmed.  The  dispatch  in  the  Gazette  is  dated  a 
La  Rochelle  on  December  21,  a  week  after  the  sailing  of  the  flee 
De  Chambre  remarked  that  Les  Armes  de  la  Conipagnie  would  b 
ready  to  sail  on  December  18  or  19,  which  would  make  a  total  of  si 
vessels  going  to  the  islands  without  counting  Le  Terron,  which  ha 
sailed  a  few  days  before  the  fleet,  and  arrived  at  Guadeloupe  o 
February  3.  (Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  letter  from  du  Lion,  April  i 
1665.)  It  is  possible  that  Les  Armes  de  la  Compagnie  sailed  befor 
December  21,  as  de  Clodor^  thought  it  would  do,  and  that  the  write 
of  the  dispatch  from  La  Rochelle  included  it  and  Le  Terron  in  hi 
count,  so  that  he  reported  that  seven  vessels  had  sailed  for  the  island: 
This  would  seem  to  oflFer  a  plausible  explanation  of  the  lack  of  agree 
ment  between  the  dispatch  printed  in  the  Gazette  and  the  accour 
given  in  Du  Tertre.  It  enables  one  to  accept  with  more  convictio 
the  later  reports  which  appear  in  the  Gazette. 

29  Ibid.,  1665,  p.  109. 

30  Ibid. 

96 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

placed  at  its  disposal.  It  is  necessary  only  to  recall  what 
has  been  recounted  in  a  former  chapter  to  know  that  the 
total  subscriptions  for  the  year  1664  amounted  only  to 
983,000  livres,  and  that  probably  of  this  sum  only  about 
500,000  livres,  at  most,  represented  funds  which  could  be 
expended  by  the  company.  It  was  not  with  such  a  com- 
paratively small  sum  that  the  purchase  of  many  vessels 
and  of  many  cargoes  could  be  made. 

The  directors  frankly  admitted  that  their  expenditures 
had  been  much  larger  than  their  funds.  They  justified 
their  conduct  to  Colbert  in  the  following  way : 

"Inasmuch  as  the  first  design  in  the  establishment  of  the 
said  company  was  to  exclude  from  the  islands  the  Dutch  trad- 
ers, who  were  in  control  of  commerce,  and  as  it  was  not  possi- 
ble to  do  that  except  by  sending  at  once  enough  merchandise 
for  the  subsistence  of  the  planters,  the  directors  should  not  and 
could  not  have  regulated  their  expenditures  according  to  the 
sums  actually  subscribed  to  the  company.  .  .  .  The  letters 
of  M.  de  Tracy,  filled  with  complaints  that  not  half  of  what 
was  necessary  was  being  sent  to  the  islands,  justified  haste,  and 
when  he  wrote  that  it  would  take  at  least  eighty  vessels  and 
3,000,000  livres  worth  of  merchandise  to  satisfy  the  needs 
of  the  islands  and  drive  out  the  Dutch  (which  is  much  exagger- 
ated), the  said  directors  were  forced  to  make  large  expendi- 
tures for  vessels  and  merchandise."^^ 

These  large  expenditures  alarmed  the  stockholders  and 
made  them  fear  that  they  would  be  held  responsible  for  the 
debts  of  the  company  to  an  amount  larger  than  that  of 
their  subscriptions.  To  allay  this  fear,  an  arret  of  Decem- 
ber 16,  1664,  was  published  which  guaranteed  shareholders 
in  the  company  against  any  such  responsibihty.^  In  spite 
of  this  assurance,  subscriptions  came  in  very  slowly.  Thus, 

31  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  15,  M6moire  des  Directeurs  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc. 
pour  rendre  raison  a  Mgr.  Colbert  de  leur  conduite,  1665. 

32  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1717,  fol.  259. 

97 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

for  the  first  month  of  the  new  year,  1665,  only  five  were 
received  for  a  total  of  53,000  livres.  The  king  had  not  as 
yet  contributed  a  cent.  Colbert  seemed  too  absorbed  in  the 
promotion  of  the  East  India  Company  to  devote  much 
attention  to  the  affairs  of  the  Wfest  India  Company. 

Colbert  did  open  a  small  source  of  revenue  for  the  com- 
pany by  granting  it,  on  February  12,  the  farm  for  the 
collection  of  a  special  import  duty  of  6d.  the  pound, 
levied  at  Rouen  on  sugar  and  wax.  The  farm  was  granted 
on  the  condition  that  the  company  pay  yearly  24,000 
livres  to  the  city  of  Rouen  and  20,000  Uvres  to  the  king, 
or  a  total  of  44,000  Uvres.  The  surplus  was  to  go  to  the 
profit  of  the  company.  With  the  exception  of  the  year 
1666,  when  the  revenue  was  1601  liv.  8s.  6d.  less  than 
the  aforesaid  44,000  livres,  the  farm  proved  a  source  of 
profit,  varying  from  11,669  Hv.  15s.  in  1665,  to  77,981 
livres  in  1672,  and  representing,  for  the  years  1665  to 
1672,  a  total  profit  of  372,478  liv.  8s.  3d.  The  com- 
pany also  profited  from  the  fact  that  it  was  not  forced  to 
pay  this  tax  on  the  sugar  which  it  imported  from  the 
islands  to  Rouen.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that 
although  the  farm  later  proved  profitable,  it  offered  no 
immediate  relief  to  the  company,  for  it  yielded  a  gain  of 
only  11,669  liv.  Is.  in  1665,  a  loss  of  1501  liv.  18s.  in 
1666,  and  a  gain  of  18,151  liv.  16s.  in  1667,  or  a  total 
gain  for  the  first  three  years  of  less  than  30,000  livres.^ 

The  directors  were  forced  to  seek  money  elsewhere. 
They  decided,  in  their  meeting  of  February  11,  to 
borrow  600,000  livres.  An  arret  of  February  14  author- 
ized the  company  to  borrow  the  said  sum  "for  one  year 
and  at  whatever  rate  of  interest  it  chooses,  for  the  pay- 

33  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1312,  Extrait  du  grand  livre  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind. 
Oc.  "Comptes  des  droits  de  6d.  pour  livre  sur  les  sucres  et  cires 
entrants  en  la  ville  et   banlieu  de   Rouen."     Chemin-Dupont^s,  pp. 

37-38. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

ment  of  which  sum  the  directors  may  pledge  all  the  effects 
of  the  company."  It  was  from  the  fermiers  generaux  des 
aides  that  the  sum  was  borrowed.^  With  these  funds  at  its 
disposal  the  company  was  enabled  to  continue  its  ship- 
ments, which  had  been  interrupted  during  the  last  two 
weeks  in  January  and  throughout  the  month  of  February. 
On  March  3,  three  large  vessels  sailed  from  La  Rochelle 
for  the  islands.  Three  others  were  being  equipped  in  the 
same  port  and  would  be  ready  to  sail  within  another  week. 
On  March  6,  another  sailed  from  Honfleur  and  according 
to  the  calculations  of  the  directors  at  Rouen,  two  more 
would  be  ready  to  sail  from  Dieppe  at  the  end  of  the 
month.^ 

In  spite  of  the  very  praiseworthy  efforts  made  by  the 
directors,  the  company  had  not  proved  itself  equal  to  the 
task  of  satisfying  the  needs  of  the  islands.  Thus,  near  the 
beginning  of  April,  1665,  de  Chambre  wrote  from  Guade- 
loupe to  de  Clodore:  "We  are  in  about  the  same  state  of 
affairs  as  you.  The  proof  is  that  I  should  be  obliged  to 
drink  water,  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  M.  de  Tracy 
is  here.  As  for  meat,  five  days  from  now  there  will  not 
be  a  pound  in  our  stores.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  both 
you  and  we  are  in  great  need  of  the  arrival  of  vessels.  It 
must  be  that  bad  weather  has  prevailed,  for  according  to 
the  letters  which  I  have  received,  eight  or  ten  vessels  should 
have  arrived."^  Du  Lion,  governor  of  Guadeloupe,  wrote 
about  the  same  date  that  the  company  was  not  seriding 
more  than  half  enough  vessels  to  satisfy  the  neeSs  of  the 
planters.^  Even  the  vessels  which  had  been  sent  lately 
failed  to  contain  in  their  cargoes  one  important  article, 

34  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1717,  fol.  259;  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  M^moire  sur  la  Cie. 
des  Ind.  Oc,  1667.  Against  55,000  livres  of  this  amount  shares  of  the 
company's  stock  were  issued. 

35  Gazette,  1665,  p.  254,  La  Rochelle,  March  6,  1665. 

36  Du  Tertre,  III,  195. 

37  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  April,  1665. 

99 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

a  fact  which,  according  to  Du  Tertre,  aroused  much  dis- 
content against  the  company.  This  article  was  shoes  for 
the  women.  "This  omission,"  remarks  the  historian,  "was 
all  the  more  dangerous,  because  it  aroused  natures  more 
sensitive  and  vindictive  than  those  of  men.  When  the 
women  saw  that  there  was  nothing  for  them  in  the  com- 
pany's ships  and  that  some  of  them  would  have  to  go 
barefooted  to  mass,  they  lost  patience.  It  is  certain 
that  the  anger  of  the  women  who  had  thus  been  disap- 
pointed contributed  much  toward  the  rebellion  of  which 
we  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  presently,  especially  so, 
for  in  the  islands  women  have  much  influence  over  their 
husbands."^ 

The  company  had  also  failed  to  provide  enough  small 
barks  by  which  the  transportation  of  crops  from  the  plan- 
tations along  the  coast  to  centers  of  trade  was  made.  The 
harvest  in  the  islands  gave  promise  in  the  spring  of  1665  of 
being  "so  abundant  that  more  than  twenty  vessels  seemed 
necessary  for  its  exportation."^^  Du  Lion  remarked  that 
only  about  half  enough  vessels  were  in  sight  to  take  away 
the  products  of  Guadeloupe.  Letters  from  difl^erent  ports 
of  France  to  correspondents  in  the  island  brought  the  news 
that  the  West  India  Company  refused  to  transport  mer- 
chandise of  individual  traders  in  spite  of  the  promises 
which  had  been  made  to  the  planters.*"  All  of  these  things, 
together  with  the  fact  that  the  company  sold  its  merchan- 
dise much  dearer  than  the  Dutch  had  been  accustomed  to 
do,  caused  a  widespread  feeling  of  discontent  and  of  rebel- 
lion in  the  islands,  and  especially  in  that  of  Martinique, 
where  rebellion  shortly  afterwards  broke  out. 

First  came  word  to  de  Clodore  from  one  of  the  com- 
pany's agents  that  some  rebels  in  Cabesterre  had  hoisted 

38  Du  Tertre,  III,  218-219. 

39  Ibid. 

«•  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  April  8,  1665. 

100 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES'       " 

the  Dutch  flag  with  the  cry,  "Vive  les  Hollandais  et  les 
Flamands  !"  The  governor  let  the  incident  pass  unnoticed 
for  the  moment  in  order  to  abide  a  more  favourable  season 
to  reply.  A  few  days  later,  the  planters  of  Basseterre 
came  in  great  numbers  to  present  a  petition  to  the  gov- 
ernor, in  which  they  complained  that  the  company  had 
failed  to  carry  out  the  regulations  estabhshed  by  de 
Tracy.  The  framers  of  the  petition  had  been  very  care- 
ful to  address  de  Clodore  as  governor  for  the  king,  and 
not  as  governor  under  the  authority  of  the  West  India 
Company.  De  Clodore  received  the  petition  and  read  it. 
Thereupon,  he  harangued  the  crowd,  urging  patience  and 
promising  to  send  the  petition  to  the  company  and  to 
exert  his  own  influence  in  obtaining  satisfaction  for  them. 
He  urged  them  to  remain  loyal  in  the  meantime,  and  not 
to  assemble  again  without  his  permission.  Thanks  to  the 
spirit  of  moderation  of  some  of  the  planters,  the  gov- 
ernor's words  were  heeded.  Promises  were  made  to  be 
obedient  to  his  requests,  and  the  crowd  dispersed,  appar- 
ently in  a  spirit  of  submission.*^ 

This  was  followed  a  short  time  afterwards  by  a  similar 
demonstration  on  the  part  of  the  tobacco  "stringers,"  who 
were  the  most  turbulent  class  in  the  islands  and  who 
during  about  half  the  year  were  idle,  spending  their  time 
roaming  from  plantation  to  plantation,  from  cabaret  to 
cabaret,  and  who  "under  the  shadow  of  bottles  and  mugs 
hatched  out  all  the  rebellions  in  the  Antilles."  They 
marched  in  great  numbers  to  the  governor.  De  Clodore 
was  indignant  at  seeing  such  a  crowd  and  refused  to 
listen  to  their  grievances  unless  they  chose  some  repre- 
sentatives to  present  them  to  him.  The  governor's  wishes 
were  complied  with.  Their  representatives  made  the  com- 
plaint that  the  agents  of  the  company  were  insolent  and 
that  only  about  half  of  their  needs  were  being  satisfied 

41  Du  Tertre,  III,  217. 

101 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

by  the  company.  De  Chambre  urged  patience,  assuring 
them  that  in  a  short  while  the  stores  of  the  company 
would  be  adequately  supplied  to  provide  plenty  for  all. 
"To  remove  present  disorders,  they  had  only  to  place  an 
honest  planter  in  each  store  who  could  supervise  the  dis- 
tribution of  merchandise,  with  the  understanding  that  if 
the  clerks  did  not  heed  the  orders  given  them,  he  [de 
Chambre]  would  either  dismiss  them,  or  punish  them 
according  to  their  merits.  This  gave  satisfaction,  and 
for  the  second  time  a  band  of  rebels  disbanded,  apparently 
contented."*^ 

Both  (le  Clodore  and  de  Chambre  were  so  alarmed  oyer 
the  spirit  of  the  planters,  however,  that  they  decided  to 
bjiild  a  fort  as  a  refuge  in  time  of  rebellion.  Plans  were 
accordingly  drawn  up,  the  foundations  dug,  the  stones 
dressed,  aU  the  material  collected  and  the  construction 
actually  begun,  when  orders  arrived  from  the  directors  of 
the  company  to  stop  the  work.  It  is  to  be  remarked  that 
the  directors  gave  these  orders  on  the  recommendation  of 
de  La  Barre,  who  had  recently  returned  to  France,  and 
who  made  the  recommendation  apparently  through  hos- 
tility to  de  Clodore.  The  fact  is  worth  noting,  because  the 
hostility  between  de  Clodore  and  de  La  Barre  became  very 
pronounced  in  1666  and  was  not  without  certain  impor- 
tance in  the  history  of  the  company. 

Bechameil  seems  to  have  recognized  the  importance  of 
sending  ships  to  the  islands  in  order  to  quell  the  spirit  of 
revolt,  for  he  wrote  to  Colbert  that  it  was  necessary  to 
send  twenty  vessels  to  the  islands  during  the  months  of 
April  and  May.*^  It  was  undoubtedly  to  enable  the  com- 
pany to  accomplish  this  that  Colbert  decided  at  last  to  aid 
it  financially.  On  March  16,  he  made  a  personal  sub- 
scription of  30,000  livres,  but  much  more  important  was 

42  Ibid.,  pp.  220-221. 

«  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  128,  fol.  30. 

102 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  fact  that  he  opened  the  royal  treasury.  Thus  there 
were  subscribed,  in  the  name  of  the  king,  187,000  livres  on 
March  26;  100,000  hvres  on  April  22;  100,000  livres  on 
May  16;  and  100,000  livres  on  June  22,  making  a  total 
of  487,000  livres  furnished  by  the  royal  treasury  within 
the  space  of  three  months. 

The  company  was  thus  enabled  to  send  out  immediately 
two  expeditions.  About  May  15,  a  fleet  of  seven  vessels 
sailed  from  La  Rochelle  for  the  islands,  and  on  May  17, 
four  others  sailed  from  St.  Malo.**  None  of  these  vessels 
arrived  in  time,  however,  to  prevent  a  very  serious  rebel- 
lion at  Martinique,  which  arose  in  the  following  way.  In 
the  regulations  established  by  de  Tracy  at  Martinique  oii^ 
March  17,  1665,  it  was  provided  that  the  ships  of  the 
company  should  transport  into  the  ports  of  France  sugar, 
tobacco,  indigo,  and  other  products  for  the  planters  at  the^ 
rate  of  seven  livres  the  hundredweight,  all  import  duties 
to  be  paid  by  the  company.  The  company  refused  to  be 
bound  by  this  agreement,  for  de  Tracy,  in  establishing  the 
rate,  supposed  that  the  exemption  from  the  payment  of 
one-half  the  import  duties  ordinarily  levied  in  France  on 
products  of  the  islands  was  valid  not  only  for  goods 
belonging  to  the  company  but  for  all  those  imported  in 
its  ships,  and  therefore  thought  that  the  company  would 
be  obliged  to  pay  only  two  livres  as  import  duty  and  would 
have  the  remaining  five  livres  the  hundredweight  as  pay- 
ment for  transportation.  This,  however,  was  not  the  case, 
for  the  revenue-farmers  demanded  four  livres  per  hundred- 
weight on  all  products  belonging  to  individuals  and 
brought  by  the  company's  own  ships.  The  company  felt 
itself  justified  in  interpreting  the  spirit  of  de  Tracy's 
regulation  by  demanding  five  livres  per  hundredweight  for 
freight  and  four  livres  instead  of  two  for  the  import  duty, 

44  Gazette,  1665,  p.  510. 

103 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

thus  making  a  total  of  nine  livres  instead  of  seven.^^  An 
arret  of  the  conseil  d'etat  of  June  6,  1665,  sustained  the 
company's  decision  and,  when  judgments  were  rendered  in 
the  admiralty  courts  of  Dieppe  and  Rouen  against  the 
company  in  favour  of  individual  merchants  who  refused 
to  pay  more  than  seven  livres  per  hundredweight  on  goods 
consigned  to  them  from  the  islands  and  transported  in  the 
company's  vessels,  another  arret  of  November  26,  1665, 
annulled  the  decisions  and  ordered  the  arret  of  June  6  to 
be  enforced.*® 

This  refusal  of  the  company  to  abide  by  the  regulations 
of  de  Tracy  was  taken  as  an  excuse  by  some  planters  at 
Martinique  to  stir  up  a  rebellion.  On  June  1,  in  the  dis- 
trict of  Casepilote,  one  Guillaume  Roy  with  ten  or  twelve 
companions  attacked  the  agent  of  the  company  and  forced 
him  to  flee  for  his  life.  They  were  joined  by  about  a  hun- 
dred other  planters  and  sacked  the  company's  store,  with 
cries  of  "Aux  armes !"  They  forced  everyone  to  obey  the 
cry  and  marched  from  plantation  to  plantation  exciting 
all  to  rebellion.  They  attempted  to  win  as  their  leader 
Sieur  de  Merville,  a  lieutenant,  assuring  him  that  they  were 
in  communication  with  all  the  other  parts  of  the  islands  and 
that  by  the  morrow  all  would  be  in  their  hands.  At  his 
refusal  they  attempted  to  win  Sieur  de  Lisle,  who  in  his 
turn  refused  the  command  by  feigning  a  case  of  gout, 
and  went  straightway  to  inform  the  governor.*^ 

Again  the  courage  and  promptness  of  de  Clodore  saved 
the  day  for  the  company.  "The  diligence  which  the  gov- 
ernor showed  is  almost  inconceivable.  It  was  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  when  he  received  news  of  the  outbreak  of 
the  rebellion.  Casepilote  was  a  distance  of  ten  long  miles 
over    a   very    difficult   mountain    road.      Nevertheless,    he 

«Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1717,  No.  297. 

«Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  Extrait  de  Reg.  du  conseil  d'6tat. 

47  Du  Tertre,  III,  226-227. 

104 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

assembled  his  troops  and  arrived  there  before  nightfall, 
which  comes  before  six  o'clock."^  On  the  point  of  depar- 
ture, de  Laubiere,  the  lieutenant-governor,  informed  him 
that  rebelUQn  had  also  br^^^^^^  diistrict  of  Carbet 

at  three  miles  distance  from  St.  Pierre,  and  that  there 
were  signs  of  a  general  rebellion.  De  Clodore  commanded 
the  ships  in  the  harbour  to  draw  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
shore  in  order  that  their  cannon  might  be  utilized  in  case 
of  emergency.  He  then  set  his  troops  in  march  to  attack 
the  rebels  of  Casepilote. 

On  arriving  in  the  district  of  Carbet,  he  found  that  the 
rebels  had  taken  flight  and  returned  to  their  homes.  At 
Casepilote,  a  loyal  lieutenant,  de  Valmeniere,  had  per- 
suaded many  rebels  to  return  to  their  allegiance.  The 
rest  fled  to  the  woods  at  the  appearance  of  the  governor 
with  his  armed  force.  De  Clodore  was  firmly  resolved  to 
punish  the  leaders  of  the  revolt  and  yet  was  afraid  that 
he  would  frighten  them  farther  into  the  woods.  Sharp 
practice  was  resorted  to.  He  had  an  interview  with  the 
curate  of  the  district  in  which  he  said  that  it  was  necessary 
for  everyone  to  return  to  his  post  of  duty  and  employed 
other  ambiguous  expressions,  so  that  good  curate  inferred 
that  the  governor  would  pardon  everyone,  and  so 
announced  it  in  the  church  on  the  morrow.  This  an- 
nouncement gave  assurance  to  all  those  whom  fear  had 
driven  into  hiding  and  even  the  most  guilty,  except  two, 
returned  to  their  homes.  But  the  two  were  captured  by 
a  sergeant  who  was  implicated  in  the  rebellion,  and  who 
thereby  gained  his  pardon.  All  the  leaders  were  then 
arrested  and  imprisoned.^' 

No  sooner  had  this  rebellion  been  put  down  than  the 
news  came  of  the  preparation  of  a  more  serious  uprising 
in- Cabesterre.     It  presented  the  most  difficult  task  which 

48  Ibid.,  Ill,  226. 

49  Du  Tertre,  III,  229. 

105 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

the  governor  had  yet  encountered,  because  it  was  the  dis- 
trict the  farthest  distant  from  St.  Pierre  and  the  most 
inaccessible  of  the  whole  island.  Promptness  and  shrewd- 
ness again  proved  effective.  De  Clodore  at  once  sent  to 
Cabesterre,  du  Chesne,  a  lieutenant,  with  twelve  soldiers  of 
his  own  troops.  In  order  to  disguise  the  real  purpose  of 
the  act  he  commanded  du  Chesne  to  arrest  Planson,  the 
West  India  Company's  agent  in  the  district,  against  whom 
the  planters  were  making  violent  complaints.  At  the  same 
time  he  wrote  a  letter  to  de  Vepre,  one  of  the  commanding 
officers  in  Cabesterre,  to  send  him  full  information  of  the 
rebelHon,  and  to  conduct  into  his  presence  his  father-in- 
law,  Sieur  de  Masse,  one  of  the  chief  planters  and  also  one 
of  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion.  It  was  in  this  way  that  the 
rebellion  was  suppressed  before  it  had  a  chance  to  break 
out. 

Fortune  again  played  into  the  governor's  hands.  This 
time  he  received  news  in  advance  of  a  plot  being  formed  at 
Canonville.  A  Jesuit  priest  appeared,  conducting  into  his 
presence  a  woman  who  was  the  wife  of  one  of  the  conspira- 
tors in  a  plot.  On  being  assured  that  her  husband  would 
not  suffer,  she  disclosed  to  the  governor  that  the  night 
before  some  fifty  men  had  come  to  her  house  and  had  a 
prolonged  conference  with  her  husband  and  that  it  was 
there  agreed  that  on  the  morrow  at  nightfall,  two  hun- 
dred armed  men  would  assemble  to  march  straight  against  , 
the  governor.  Again  the  principal  leaders  were  arrested 
and  another  revolt  was  nipped  in  the  bud.^^ 

It  is  necessary  to  reflect  only  for  a  moment  to  recognize 
in  these  rebellions  and  plots  of  rebellions  a  spirit  of  unrest 
and  discontent  which  was  all  but  universal  at  Martinique, 
and  which  had  not  proved  disastrous  for  the  authority  of 
the  company,  because  an  energetic  and  courageous  gov- 
ernor held  the  reins  of  power. 

so  Du  Tertre,  III,  231. 

106 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

De  La  Bar  re,  who  was  actually  at  Martinique  en  route 
from  Cayenne  to  France,  was  requested  by  de  Clodore  to 
give  his  opinion  as  to  the  punishment  which  should  be 
meted  out  to  the  leaders  of  the  late  rebellions.  He  replied 
in  writing  under  date  of  June  20 : 

"...  Before  expressing  my  opinion  on  this  matter,  I  deem 
it  necessary  to  consider  two  things  of  importance.  The  first 
is  the  condition  of  the  islands  and  the  state  of  mind  of  the 
planters;  the  second,  the  interests  of  the  company.  As  to  th«' *" 
first,  one  should  recognize  that  the  planters  are  comppsed  of 
two  classes,  namely  those  who  have  property  and  hence  inter- 
ests at  stake,  and  those  who  have  none  nor  the  meansrpf  acquir- 
ing any.  Both  classes  are  sore  from  the  fact  mat  His  Majesty 
has  prohibited  the  commerce  of  the  islands  to  foreigners. 
They  are  both  convinced  that  ihef  will  be  made  to  suffer  losses 
in  their  commerce,  in  the  value  of  their  property  and  in  their 
affairs  in  general.   ..." 

'As  to  the  inteirests  of  the  company,  it  is  undeniable  that 
from  its  debut  the  company  has  not  been  able  to  furnish  the 
islands  with  supplies-  in  the  f same  abundance  as  foreigners  had 
been  accustomed  to  do  for  more  than  twenty  years.  It  is  to 
the  interest  of  the  company  to  silence  complaints,  to  appease 
the  troubled  spirits,  and  to  break  up  the  factions  of  do-noth- 
ings who  would  be  able  in  course  of  time  to  win  the  more  in- 
fluential planters  to  their  cause,  who  might  join  them  either 
from  a  desire  to  protect  their  own  interests  or  from  fear  of 
seditions.  It  is  thus  clear  that  it  is  to  the  company's  interest 
to  calm  the  spirit  of  rebellion  and  to  make  it  possible  for  every 
one  to  return  to  work.  ...  To  accomplish  this  two  things, 
I  believe,  are  necessary,  namely,  a  prompt  settling  of  all  cases 
now  pending  before  the  courts  and  an  assurance  of  pardon  for 
all  those  who  have  reason  to  fear.  Let  matters  be  conducted 
in  such  a  way  that  .  .  .  punishment  may  fall  on  a  few  and 
fear  on  all."^^ 

De  Chambre  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  rebellions 
at  Martinique  were  being  caused  by  two  classes  of  people, 

51  Du  Tertre,  III,  234-237.    See  also  Relation  de  VAmirique,  I. 

107 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

the  rifFrafF,  and  the  merchants,  who  as  a  consequence  of 
the  company's  monopoly  remained  without  employment 
and  with  their  stores  empty  and  their  fortunes  wrecked. 

"To  tell  the  truth  as  I  see  it,"  remarked  Du  Tertre, 
"one  must  seek  for  the  real  cause  of  all  these  rebellions  in 
the  inveterate  hatred  of  the  people  against  the  name  of 
a  company  and  its  agents.  This  hatred  has  always  been 
stimulated  by  the  adroit  employment  of  two  bugbears 
which  have  been  dangled  before  the  eyes  of  the  planters  by 
those  who  have  wished  to  be  masters  of  the  commerce. 
The  first  is  the  small  amount  of  succour  furnished  by  the 
first  two  companies  and  the  tyrannical  and  capricious 
spirit  of  their  agents,  the  second  is  the  high  price  at  which 
supplies  are  sold  by  companies. "^^ 

Whatever  may  be  the  principal  causes  of  this  spirit  of 
rebellion,  it  is  certain  that  afeirs  at  Martinique  were  in 
a  bad  way  in  this  summer  of  1665^  and  that  the  Wfest 
India  Company,  more  than  a  year  after  its  creation,  had 
not  proved  itself  equal  to  the  task  of  satisfying  the  needs 
of  the  planters,  of  stimulating  the  growth  of  industry  and 
of  building  up  a  thrifty  trade.  It  must  not  escape  notice, 
however,  that  the  spirit  of  rebellion  seems  to  indicate  that 
the  monopoly  of  trade  was  being  asserted  by  the  com- 
pany and  that  Dutch  vessels  were  no  longer  bringing  mer- 
chandise from  Holland.  If  this  be  true,  it  means  that  a 
part  of  Colbert's  plan  in  creating  the  company  had  been, 
at  least  temporarily,  realized. 

It  may  be  recalled  that  according  to  the  dispatches 
contained  in  the  Gazette,  the  company  sent  out  eleven  ves- 
sels during  the  month  of  May.  It  apparently  sent  no 
more  until  the  month  of  July.  During  the  first  week  of 
that  month,  three  of  its  vessels  sailed  from  Havre  for  the 
islands.  They  were  all  three  captured  by  the  English 
frigates,  searched  for  Dutch  goods,  but  allowed  to  con- 

62  Du  Tertre,  III,  238. 

108 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

tinue  their  way.^^  Bechameil  wrote  to  Colbert  on  July  23, 
1665,  that  200  soldiers  would  be  sent  to  Martinique 
"aboard  vessels  which  will  sail  during  the  month  of 
August."^  But  no  records  have  been  found  of  the  saihng 
of  vessels  either  during  the  month  of  August  or  during  the 
months  following.  One  of  the  company's  vessels  arrived 
from  the  islands  at  Dieppe  about  July  1,  and  on  the  6th 
another  at  Havre  with  a  cargo  valued  at  150,000  livres. 
On  July  15,  there  arrived  at  Dunkerque  "one  of  the  first 
vessels  which  the  West  India  Company  had  sent  out  to  the 
islands  of  America.  It  had  a  cargo  of  tobacco  and 
sugar.  "*^ 

No  evidence  has  betn  found,  however,  which  makes  it 
possible  tO\say  that  the  number  either  of  vessels  sent  out 
to  the  islands,  or  of  those  received  in  France,  was  of 
importance.  One  of  the  directors  asserted  in  a  memoir 
that  the  company  received  but  small  returns  from  the  large 
outlay  of  capital  in  the  islands.  This  explains  why  the 
company  was  in  its  chronic  state  of  lack  of  funds.  Its 
books  were  still  open  for  subscription,  but  no  appreciable 
sums  were  subscribed.  Colbert  was  forced  to  provide 
funds.  On  July  31,  the  king  subscribed  100,000  livres, 
300,000  livres  on  September  4,  and  finally,  500,000  livres 
on  December  4.  This  made  a  total  of  1,387,000  livres 
subscribed  by  the  king  within  ten  months.  The  large  sub- 
scription of  December  4  was  perhaps  made  in  order  to 

^Gazette,  1665,  p.  699.  These  three  vessels  were  probably  those 
referred  to  in  the  following  extract  from  the  Calendars:  "Warrant  to 
the  commissioners  for  Prizes  at  suit  of  the  French  West  India  Com- 
pany, the  three  ships  of  Dieppe,  the  Jonas,  the  Hercules,  and  Floris- 
sant, laden  with  goods  for  Barbary  and  Martinique  which  will  spoil  if 
they  wait  the  usual  forms  of  the  Admiralty  Court."  Cal.  St.  Pap., 
Dorr..,  1664-1665,  p.  476,  July  14,  1665.  The  Jonas  was  captured  near 
Brest,  on  its  return,  by  English  corsairs. 

54  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.  Colbert,  130  his,  fol.  905. 

55  Gazette,  1665,  p.  699. 

109 


[ 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

aid  the  company  in  the  crisis  of  an  approaching  war  with 
England.^ 

The  company's  commerce  became  considerably  embar- 
rassed by  English  corsairs.  During  the  summer  and  fall  of 
.IfifiS?  although  France  and  England  were  yet  nominally  at 
peace,  they  captured  five  vessels  belonging  to  the  West 
India  Company .^^  In  order  to  offset  these  losses,  an  arret 
of  February  24,  1666,  authorized  the  West  India  Company 
to  seize,  either  on  land  or  on  sea,  English  goods  to  the 
value  of  620,000  livres,  notwithstanding  the  three  months 

66  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1312. 

57  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1733,  fols.  93-95.  Arret  portant  represailles  centre 
les  Anglais  pour  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc,  February  24,  1666;  Gazette,  1666, 
No.  897;  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  M6moire  importante  pour  la  Cie  des  Ind. 
Oc,  1667.  La  Fortune,  250  tons,  captain  J.  Thomas,  laden  in  July, 
1665,  at  the  island  of  Martinique  with  a  cargo  of  8000  rolls  of  tobacco, 
of  which  5800  belonged  to  the  company  and  the  rest,  together  with 
a  certain  quantity  of  sugar,  ginger  and  other  goods,  to  planters  of  the 
said  island,  en  route  for  France,  was  captured  by  some  English  ves- 
sels under  the  pretext  that  the  vessel  was  of  Dutch  construction  and 
in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  captain,  was  taken  to  Nevis  and  after- 
wards to  Jamaica.  Loss,  120,000  livres  to  the  company  and  40,000  to 
individuals. 

The  St.  Jean  d'Hambourg,  Nicolas  Billiet,  captain,  laden  at 
Hamburg  with  a  cargo  of  masts,  tar,  clay,  lumber  and  other  merchan- 
dise for  the  company,  was  captured  by  English  corsairs,  in  September, 
1665,  taken  to  Dover,  ordered  released,  recaptured  and  taken  to  Ply- 
mouth. After  a  delay  of  six  weeks,  the  Admiralty  Court  ordered  its 
release,  but  merchandise  to  the  value  of  60,000  livres  was  seized  under 
the  pretext  that  the  king  had  need  of  it.  No  payment  had  yet  been 
made  for  the  said  merchandise  in  February,  1666. 

The  St.  Pierre  of  La  Rochelle,  Pingault,  captain,  was  captured  in 
the  English  Channel  in  October,  1665.  It  had  a  cargo  of  sugar, 
tobacco  and  other  products  laden  at  Guadeloupe,  and  belonging  to 
the  company  and  planters  of  said  island.  It  was  taken  to  Plymouth 
and  declared  good  prize.  Loss  to  the  company,  100,000  livres  and 
"much  more  to  individuals."  .    .    . 

The  St.  Jean  de  Dieppe,  300  tons,  Le  Moyne,  captain,  which  had 
sailed  from  Dieppe  in  May,  1665,  for  Cape  Verde  and  Senegal,  on  its 
return  voyage  was  forced  by  stress  of  weather  to  put  into  Waterford, 
Ireland.  In  spite  of  the  assertion  of  the  captain  that  his  vessel  and 
cargo  were  French,  it  was  seized  and  searched.     "Many  letters  were 

110 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

grace  which  had  been  granted  English  merchants  at  the 
declaration  of  war  in  January.^  The  British  Admiralty 
Courts  granted  the  West  India  Company  £10,639  9d.  ster- 
hng  for  its  claims  in  regard  to  the  St.  Jean  of  Hamburg, 
the  Jonas  and  the  *S'^.  Jean  of  Dieppe.  They  declared  the 
St.  Pierre  good  prize  and  refused  to  pronounce  judgment 
on  the  La  Fortwne  before  receiving  news  from  Jamaica.^^ 
The  directors  of  the  company  asserted  that  the  total  loss 
sustained  from  these  captures  amounted  to  465,900  livres.^" 

Navigation  became  so  dangerous  that  an  embargo  was 
laid  which  forbade  French  vessels,  without  special  permis- 
sion, to  go  into  the  English  Channel,  or  to  carry  on  com- 
merce with  England,  Scotland,  or  Irelg,nd.^^  Bechameil 
addressed  a  memoir  to  Colbert  in  November,  1665,  to 
explain  the  very  serious  embarrassments  which  the  com- 
pany faced  in  the  present  crisis.  "The  company,"  he  said, 
"has  at  present  twenty  vessels  in  the  ports  of  the  Channel 
and  in  Holland,  which  already  have  their  cargoes  or  are 
ready  to  take  them."^^  In  addition  it  had  two  vessels  char- 
found  in  her  directed  to  merchants  in  Amsterdam  and  to  others  of 
the  United  Province.  Many  Dutch  were  also  found  aboard."  The 
vessel  with  her  cargo  was  therefore  ordered  confiscated.  Loss  to  the 
company,  50,000  livres.  Cal.  St.  Papers,  Ireland,  1663-1665,  p.  669, 
contains  a  letter  from  the  Earl  of  Orrey  to  Secretary  Arlington,  of 
November  15,  1665,  in  which  the  news  is  given  of  the  capture  of  the 
St.  Jean.  Id.  1666-1669:  "Copy  of  the  note  of  the  appraisement  of 
the  St.  John  of  Dieppe,  her  apparatus  and  goods." 

Le  Jonas  was  captured  near  Brest  in  the  fall  of  1665,  and  confis- 
cated at  Tangier.  Her  cargo,  according  to  the  estimates  of  the 
British   authorities,  was   about  60,000   livres. 

58  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1733,  fols.  93-95. 

59  Arch.  Aff.  Etrang.,  M6m.  et  Doc,  Am6rique,  V,  fol.  268. 

60  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  Memoire  des  pieces  touch,  les  navires  pris  par 
les  Anglais  avant  la  declaration  de  la  guerre. 

61  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.  Colbert,  133,  fol.  328. 

62  They  were  as  follows : 
At  Havre: 

Le  Mercier,  400  tons,  with  a  cargo  for  Cayenne.     It  will  take  120 
young  women  together  with  a  certain  number  of  servants. 

Ill 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

tered.  Of  these  twenty-two  vessels,  fourteen  were  actually 
taking,  or  prepared  to  take,  cargoes  for  the  West  Indies ; 
one,  the  St,  Pierre,  had  been  captured  on  its  return  from 
Guadeloupe.  There  were  thus  fifteen  out  of  a  total  of 
twenty-two  occupied  with  the  trade  of  the  islands.  To  these 
must  be  added  the  three  vessels  indicated  in  the  memoir  as 
being  ready  to  sail  for  the  coast  of  Guinea,  whence  they 
were  to  carry  cargoes  of  slaves  to  the  islands,  making  thus 
a  grand  total  of  eighteen.  Only  one  vessel  was  destined  for 
Cayenne  and  one  for  Senegal,  and  none  for  Canada.  This 
is  quite  a  striking  indication  of  how  completely  the  affairs 
of  the  company  were  centered  in  the  islands.     Bechameil 

Le  St.  Michel  with  a  cargo  for  the  islands.    It  is  to  call  at  Madeira. 

Le  Maraouin,  300  tons,  with  a  cargo  for  the  islands.    It  is  to  call  at 
Madeira. 

La  Marie,  350  tons,  with  a  cargo  for  the  islands.     It  is  to  call  at 
Madeira. 
At  Honfleur: 

St.  Jean.     Is  taking  cargo  for  the  islands. 
At  Dieppe: 

L'EspSrance,  300  tons,  with   cargo   for  Cape  Verde   Islands   and 
Senegal. 

La  Bergdre,  250  tons,  to  take  cargo  for  the  islands. 
At  Dunkerque: 

Les  Armes  de  France,  350  tons,  with  cargo  for  the  islands. 

St.  Antoine,  130  tons,  to  take  cargo  for  the  islands. 
At  St.  Malo: 

Le  Grand  St.  Jean,  with  cargo  for  the  islands. 

La  Pucelle,  260  tons,  with  cargo  for  the  islands. 

Le  Lion  d'Or,  250  tons,  to  take  cargo  for  the  islands. 
In  Holland: 

La  Justice,  300  tons,  ready  to  sail  with  cargo  for  Guinea. 

L'AngSlique,  350  tons,  ready  to  sail  with  cargo  for  Guinea. 

Le  St.  Ouillawme,  350  tons,  ready  to  sail  with  cargo  for  Guinea. 

L'Yrondelle,  160  tons,  ready  to  sail  with  cargo  for  the  islands. 

Le  Comte  Frangois,  300  tons,  ready  to  sail  with   cargo   for   the 
islands. 

Le  Dauphin,  to  take  cargo  in  France  for  the  islands. 
[These  last  two  were  chartered  by  the  company.] 
In  Zealand: 

La  Lucorne,  250  tons,  ready  to  sail  with  cargo  for  the  islands. 

112 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

informed  Colbert  that  the  four  vessels  at  Havre  were 
waiting  for  the  six  from  Holland  in  order  to  sail  in  com- 
pany with  them,  but  added  that  "unless  they  were  escorted 
by  some  armed  vessels,  it  would  be  very  dangerous  to  let 
them  risk  the  voyage."  He  requested  that  a  suitable  escort 
be  provided  by  the  king.®^ 

How  many  of  these  vessels  really  sailed  it  is  not  possible 
to  say.  The  Gazette  fails  to  indicate  any  sailings  for  the 
West  Indies  between  those  of  the  month  of  July,  1665, 
which  have  been  noted  above,  and  the  month  of  March, 
1666.  An  order  was  issued  on  December  14  to  the  Admir- 
alty officials  of  St.  Malo  to  permit  three  vessels,  Le  St, 
Jean,  La  Pucelle  and  Le  Lion  d'Or,  to  sail  from  that  port 
for  the  islands.^  Janon,  French  consul  at  Middleburg, 
wrote  to  Colbert,  under  the  date  of  December  4,  1665,  that 
two  vessels  had  recently  sailed  for  the  islands  from  that 
port  by  way  of  the  north  of  Scotland,  but  had  been  forced 
to  return  on  account  of  bad  weather.^^  Were  these  vessels 
two  of  those  belonging  to  the  West  India  Company  men- 
tioned in  the  memoir  of  November,  1665.?  If  so,  it  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  plan  of  sending  the  vessels  in 
Holland  with  those  actually  at  Havre  by  way  of  the  Chan- 
nel  had   been   abandoned,   either  because   suitable   escort 

At  Gothenburg: 

Le  Chariot  d'Or,  with  a  cargo  of  masts  for  La  Rochelle. 
In  England: 

Le  St.  Pierre,  260  tons,  with  a  cargo  from  the  islands. 

The    vessel    referred    to    above    as    being   captured    by    English 

corsairs. 
At  Hamburg: 

A  flyboat  with  a  cargo  for  France.  Arch.  Col.,  Eg,  17,  M6m.  de  la 
Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc,  Besoin  des  Isles  et  Terre  ferme  de  I'Am.  et  la  n^ces- 
sit6  de  pourvoir  k  la  seuret^  des  pais  de  ladite  compagnie  tant  pour 
lesd.  Isles  que  pour  la  Guin6e  dans  la  conjoncture  de  la  rupture  avec 
les  Anglais. 

63  Ibid. 

64  Arch.  Aif.  Etrang.,  Mem.  et  Doc,  Am6rique,  V,  193. 

65  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert,  134,  fol.  131. 

113 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

could  not  be  furnished  by  the  king,  or  because  prudence 
dictated  such  a  course.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  the  vessels  from  Havre  did  not  sail.  There 
is  a  passage  in  a  memoir  presented  by  the  directors  to 
Colbert  in  May,  1666,  which  seems  to  indicate  the  same 
thing : 

"The  company  has  at  present,  in  the  ports  of  Holland,  of 
Zealand,  Dunkerque,  Dieppe,  Havre  and  St.  Malo,  fifteen  of 
its  vessels  freighted  for  Cape  Verd,  Senegal,  Cayenne  and  the 
West  Indies,  which  have  been  waiting  for  three  months  for  the 
Channel  to  be  free.  There  is  more  than  600,000  livres  worth 
of  merchandise  in  these  vessels.  .  .  .  The  company  can  very 
well  stop  making  new  purchases,  as  it  has  actually  done,  for 
it  is  well  supplied  with  vessels,  but  it  cannot  afford  to  stop 
its  expeditions  to  the  islands  for,  besides  the  fact  that  the 
planters  would  suffer,  it  would  be  unable  to  market  in  France 
all  the  merchandise  which  it  has  on  hand  to  the  value  of  1,000,- 
000  livres."^ 

Of  the  twenty-two  vessels  enumerated  by  the  memoir  of 
November,  1665,  the  St.  Pierre  was  being  detained  in  Eng- 
land as  a  prize,  Le  Chariot  d*Or  was  at  Gothenburg,  and 
a  flyboat  was  at  Hamburg.  The  other  nineteen  were  in 
the  ports  of  Holland  and  of  northern  France.  Of  these 
nineteen  we  have  already  indicated  that  the  passports  were 
issued  on  December  14  to  three  vessels,  Le  St.  Jean,  La 
Pucelle  and  Le  Lion  d'Or,  to  sail  from  St.  Malo  for  the 
West  Indies.  La  Pucelle  and  Le  Lion  d'Or,  however,  did 
not  proceed  at  once  to  the  islands,  for  both  were  at  La 
Rochelle  in  April,  and  they  formed  part  of  de  La  Barre's 
fleet  which  sailed  from  that  port  in  June.^^  Le  St.  Jean  did 
continue  its  way  to  the  islands,  for  its  presence  at  St. 
Christopher  on  April  27,  1666,  is  noted  by  the  Gazette.^ 

66  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  Estat  pr6s.  des  aflPaires  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind. 
Oc.  de  France,  mai,  1666. 

67  Du  Tertre,  IV,  116. 
^Gazette,  1666,  p.  975. 

114 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Thus  we  know  positively  that  three  of  these  nineteen  ves- 
sels sailed.  This  leaves  sixteen  vessels  of  which  we  have  no 
information  up  to  the  beginning  of  May,  1666.  The 
memoir  of  May,  1666,  says  that  fifteen  of  the  company's 
vessels  had  been  waiting  for  three  months  to  set  sail.  It 
is  more  than  probable  that  the  phrase  "depuis  trois  mois" 
does  not  state,  or  did  not  attempt  to  state,  with  precision 
the  time  which  the  vessels  had  been  kept  waiting.  We 
know,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  this  is  true  in  regard  to 
La  Justice  and  Le  St.  Antoine,  for  the  former  is  indicated 
in  the  memoir  of  1665  as  being  in  Holland  ready  to  set 
sail,  and  the  latter  at  Dunkerque  also  ready.  These  ves- 
sels, however,  did  not  set  sail  from  Holland  before  May 
25.  They  turned  the  north  of  Scotland  and  arrived  at 
Martinique  on  July  28.^^  We  have  no  less  than  four  long 
dispatches  written  from  the  islands  and  published  in  the 
Gazette  of  1666.  They  bear  the  dates  of  April,  May  and 
August,  1666.  None  of  the  other  sixteen  vessels  in  ques- 
tion is  mentioned  as  being  in  the  islands.^"  It  seems  highly 
probable,  therefore,  that  the  W'est  India  Company's  com- 
merce, so  far  as  the  important  northern  ports  were  con- 
cerned, was  almost  completely  blocked  during  a  period  of 
several  months.  Wfe  have  no  positive  evidence  of  any  im- 
portant aid  at  all  being  sent  to  the  islands  by  the  company 
between  July,  1665,  and  June  7,  1666,  the  date  of  the 
departure  of  the  expedition  sent  out  from  La  Rochelle 
under  de  La  Barre's  command,  of  which  an  account  will 
be  given  in  the  following  chapter. 

The  close  of  the _y eat  JL665  marks  i:he-aT^ 
period  of  the  West  India  Company,  for,  shortly  after  the, 
beginning  of  the  following  year,  the  war  with  England 


began,  which,  as  we  shall  see,  had  an  important  influence 

69  Gazette,  1666,  p.  752,  and  No.  138,  p.  1166.    Letter  from  Martin- 
ique to  the  directors  of  the  West  India  Company. 

70  Ibid.,  1666,  Nos.  106,  115,  138,  and  157. 

115 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

upon  its  history.  One  naturally  pauses  to  ask  what  the 
company  had  been  able  to  accomplish.  We  are  fortunate 
in  having  had  preserved  for  us,  in  the  few  papers  of  the 
company  which  have  survived,  a  memoir  presented  by  the 
directors  to  Colbert,  very  probably  in  the  month  of 
November,  1665,  and  containing  a  statement  of  the  things 
which  the  company  had  done.  The  most  interesting  pas- 
sages are  the  following : 

"After  a  year  or  a  little  more,  the  company  has,  to  the 
astonishment  of  all  nations,  placed  upon  the  sea  sixty  vessels 
of  200,  300  and  400  tons,  of  which  it  has  bought,  or  had  built, 
forty  representing  an  outlay  of  1,200,000  livres.  ...  It  has 
laden  vessels  for  1,500,000  livres  worth  of  various  sorts  of 
merchandise  for  the  islands,  150,000  livres  for  Canada,  200,- 
000  livres  for  Senegal,  Cape  Verde  and  the  coast  of  Guinea. 
Returns  are  beginning  to  come  in  from  the  islands,  but  in 
such  small  measure  that  the  company  has  not  as  yet  received 
any  revenue  of  importance,  for  it  has  received  only  tobacco, 
for  which  there  is  no  sale  on  account  of  the  Dutch  war.  The 
only  profit  gained  is  that  from  freight.  It  has  been  spent 
for  the  repairing  of  vessels  in  order  that  they  might  return 
promptly  to  the  islands.  .  .  .  The  pressing  need  to  supply 
food-stuffs  and  furnishings  in  order  to  prevent  a  recurrence 
of  the  deplorable  state  of  affairs  of  last  year,  has  forced  the 
directors  to  stock  all  of  the  warehouses,  situated  in  the  ports 
where  the  company  has  subdirectors  and  correspondents,  with  a 
supply  of  these  articles  ...  so  that  the  company  has  in 
these  several  warehouses  goods  to  the  value  of  more  than 
600,000  livres,  without  counting  the  contracts  which  it  has 
made  for  the  delivery  of  salt  meat. 

"Inasmuch  as  the  number  of  vessels  which  the  company  has 
at  present  cannot  satisfy  the  needs  of  commerce  in  all  of  the 
countries  which  His  Majesty  has  conceded  to  it,  the  said 
directors  have  made  contracts  for  the  construction  in  France 
of  several  more,  which  are  actually  being  built.  Two  of  these 
vessels,  large  and  beautiful,  have  already  been  launched  and 
two  more  will  take  the  water  before  the  end  of  the  year. 

116 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

"The  company  has  also  amassed  a  supply  of  lumber,  flax, 
cordage,  tar,  masts  and  other  things  necessary  for  the  calking, 
equipment  and  armament  of  its  vessels.  Thus  by  its  orders 
two  large  flutes  have  come  from  Hamburg  with  full  cargoes 
of  these  articles,  the  value  of  which  amounts  to  20,000  or 
25,000  ecus. 

"Besides  all  of  this  ...  it  has  taken  possession  of  the  dif- 
ferent lands  of  its  concession,  or  rather  restored  them  to  the 
allegiance  of  His  Majesty.  For  this  it  has  had  to  make  large 
expenditures,  as  in  the  case  of  Cayenne,  of  Cape  Verde  and 
of  Senegal,  and  besides  to  buy  the  several  islands  from  pro- 
prietors, for  which  it  assumed  large  obligations,  amounting 
to  more  than  1,000,000  livres,  of  which  sum  it  has  actually 
paid  154,000  livres  and  must  pay  the  remainder  on  the  dates 
exacted  by  the  contracts. 

"This  is  but  a  short  resume  of  the  things  which  the  com- 
pany has  accomplished  since  its  establishment."^^ 

The  West  India  Company  had,  in  fact,  as  this  memoir 
asserts,  done  much  to  deserve  praise.  It  had  occupied  with 
varying  success  different  parts  of  its  concession.  Thus, 
near  the  beginning  of  1665,  itsent  Sieur  Jacquet  to  Sene- 
gal as  the  director  of  its  commerce.^^  By  the  end  of  the 
year,  according  €6  thedaiihs  of  its  directors,  it  has  estab- 
lished there  a  post  of ,  sixty  mea  and  merchandise  to  the 
value  of  250,000  livres.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  it 
sent  out  one  of  its  vessels,  Le  St.  Jean,  from  Dieppe,  in 
May,  1665,  which  on  its  return  was  captured  with  its 
cargo  in  November,  1665.^^ 

Efforts  had  been  made  to  develop  trade  on  the-xoast 
of  Guinea  in  order  to  supply  the  islands  with  slaves.  Thus, 
on  February  8,  1665,  a  contract  was  made  with  Sieur 
Carolof,  "  heretofore  commander  for  the  West  India  Com- 

71  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  Memoire  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  sur  I'^tat  oil 
elle  se  trouve  et  les  secours  qu'elle  attend  du  Roy,  1665. 
72Labat,  Nouvelle  Relation  de  VAfrique,  I,  16. 
73  Arch  Col.,  F2,  15,  Memoir,  1665. 

117 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

pany  and  at  present  a  naturalized  French  citizen,  assisted 
by  Jean  Andre,  Baron  de  Woltrogue,  a  German  gentle- 
man and  his  brother-in-law."    This  contract  gave  Carolof 
command  for  six  years  of  all  posts  which  he  might  estab- 
lish in  the  kingdoms  of  Luango,  Congo,  Angola,  and  aU 
others  situated  on  the  coast  of  Africa  between  the  equator 
and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.     It  bound  him  to  carry  to 
the   French   islands   all   negroes   captured   or    gained   by 
trade.     He  was  given  full  freedom  to  sell  these  negroes 
freely  in   the   islands,   on   condition   that   the   company's 
agent  be  permitted  to  choose  seven  per  cent  of  them  before 
they   were    offered    for    sale.      All   products    received   in 
exchange  were  to  be  brought   directly   to  La   Rochelle, 
Dunkerque,  or  any  other  port  of  France.     All  sugar  was 
to  be  delivered  directly  to  the  company  at  the  rate  of 
eighteen   livres    per   hundredweight    net.      The    company 
assumed  the  obligation  to  pay  all  import  duties  and  the 
expense  of  unloading  the  cargo.     Of  all  merchandise  sent 
to  France  directly  from  the  coast  of  Guinea,  Carolof  was 
to  pay  seven  per  cent  to  the  company.     Finally,  Carolof 
was  permitted  to  fly  the  company's  ensign  on  all  vessels 
which  he  employed  in  this  commerce.     In  November  of 
this  same  year,  1665,  the  company  had  three  vessels  in 
Holland  ready  with  cargoes  to  sail  for  the  coast  of  Guinea. 
Whether  these  vessels  had  been  equipped  by  Carolof  in 
fulfillment  of  the  above  contract,  or  by  the  company  on 
its  own  account,  the  writer  is  unable  to  say.     In  a  later 
chapter  it  will  be  shown  that  Carolof  commanded  an  expe- 
dition equipped  by  the  company  in  1670  and  sent  to  Mar- 
tinique with  cargoes  of  slaves.     He  was  also  in  Guade- 
loupe in  1672,  engaged  in  the  same  trade. 

The  company  had  also  taken  possession  of  Canada  in 
1665.  It  sent  three  large  vessels  there  during  the  course 
of  that  year.^* 

74  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  M6moire  sur  le  Canada  par  les  directeurs  de 

118 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Most  important  of  all,  the  company  had  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  several  West  India  islands  and  thereby  had 
brought  to  an  end  the  period  of  proprietary  rule,  and  had 
restored  these  islands  to  the  national  domain.  It  gained 
for  itself,  thereby,  a  rich  field  for  the  development  of  its 
commerce,  and  it  was  in  this  field  that  it  expended  its  most 
important  efforts. 

What  had  the  company  done  in  equipping  vessels  and 
establishing  commerce  ?  It  is  necessary  to  correct  an  error 
which  has  been  repeated  time  after  time  in  endeavoring  to 
answer  this  question.  The  Dictionnaire  du  Commerce  of 
the  Encyclopedic  methodiqiie,  in  its  article  on  the  West 
India  Company,  remarks :  "The  funds  to  maintain  such  an 
extensive  commerce  were  proportional  to  the  enterprise 
and  were  so  considerable  that  in  less  than  six  months  the 
company  equipped  more  than  forty-five  vessels,  by  means 
of  which  it  took  possession  of  all  the  lands  of  its  conces- 
sion and  established  trade  with  them."^^  This  statement 
has  been  accepted  by  Bonnassieux  and  repeated  from  him 
by  Chemin-Dupontes.^^  We  have  already  seen  that  the 
first  expedition  of  the  company  was  not  sent  out  before 
December  14.  That  is  to  say,  the  West  India  Company, 
far  from  being  able  to  arm  "more  than  forty-five  vessels  in 
less  than  six  months,"  armed  seven  at  the  most  before  the 
end  of  the  year  1664,  which  was  nearly  eight  months  after 
its  letters-patent  were  granted.  It  has  also  been  shown 
that  the  company  was  not  able  to  take  possession  of  the 
islands  before  February  and  the  months  following  of  the 
year  1665.  Furthermore,  the  directors  of  the  company 
claimed  in  the  memoir,  written  probably  in  November, 
1665,  and  quoted  above,  that  the  company  had  at  that 

la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc,  1666;  Cal  St.  Pap.,  Am.  and  W.  I.,  1661-1668, 
No.  1227. 

75  Tome  I,  p.  641. 

76  Bonnassieux,  Les  Orandes  Compagnies  de  Commerce,  p.  371 ; 
Chemin-Dupont^s,  pp.  36-37. 

119 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

time  at  its  disposal  some  sixty  vessels,  of  which  forty  were 
owned  by  it,  and  the  remainder,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  char- 
tered. It  is  nowhere  claimed  in  that  memoir  that  the  com- 
pany had  actually  equipped  and  sent  out  that  number  of 
vessels.  On  the  contrary,  as  has  been  seen,  at  the  end  of 
1665  the  company  had  some  twenty  vessels  locked  in  the 
Channel  ports  and  in  the  ports  of  Holland,  unable  to  sail 
on  account  of  the  danger  of  being  captured  by  English 
corsairs.  It  has  also  been  shown  that  almost  all  these  ves- 
sels were  still  at  anchor  in  these  ports  in  May,  1666.  But 
May,  1666,  is  two  years  after  the  establishment  of  the 
company.  So  that  it  is  more  than  probable  that  it  had 
not,  even  at  that  date,  actually  equipped  forty-five  vessels 
for  voyages  to  the  islands,  and  that,  therefore,  the  state- 
ment quoted  from  the  Encyclopedie  methodique  is  entirely 
inaccurate. 

According  to  the  sailings  reported  in  the  Gazette  in 
1664  and  1665,  fifteen  of  the  company's  vessels  sailed 
from  La  Rochelle,  one  from  Nantes,  one  from  Bordeaux, 
four  from  St.  Malo,  three  from  Havre,  two  from  Dieppe, 
and  one  from  Honfleur,  and  one  from  Texel  (Holland), 
which  makes  a  total  of  twenty-eight.  One  cannot  be  sure, 
of  course,  that  the  reports  in  the  Gazette  contain  a  com- 
plete list  of  all  sailings  for  the  two  years,  but  it  is  prob- 
able that  they  indicate  the  approximate  activity  of  the 
company.  If  so,  it  is  a  most  creditable  showing,  especially 
when  one  considers  that  the  company's  capital  was  small, 
and  that  it  did  not  succeed  in  sending  its  first  expedition 
to  the  islands  before  December,  1664,  and  that  conse- 
quently the  above  figures  would  represent  the  sailings  for 
the  year  December,  1664,  to  December,  1665.  Further- 
more, the  list  of  vessels  which  the  company  had  ready  to 
send  out  in  November,  1665,  shows  that  it  was  well  on  the 
road  to  increase  the  trade  which  it  had  begun.  As  com- 
pared with  what  the  French  East  India   Company  had 

120 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

accomplished  within  the  same  period,  results  were  very 
encouraging.  It  is  the  most  creditable  showing  that  any 
commercial  company  had  ever  made  in  France. 

There  can  be  but  little  doubt  that  the  directors  had 
worked  conscientiously  against  great  odds  for  the  accom- 
plishment  of  the  gigantic  task  of  driving  out  the  Dutch 
and  of  supplying  the  islands.  There  can  also  be  but  little 
doubt  that  they  had  fallen  far  short  of  attaining  this 
goal.  Even  if  it  be  supposed  that  the  company  had  actu- 
ally sent  out  the  sixty  vessels  said  to  be  at  its  disposal  in 
November,  1665 — the  most  favourable  estimate  which  was 
made  of  its  activity — it  would  still  be  far  short  of  supply- 
ing the  place  of  the  hundred  or  hundred  and  twenty  vessels 
which  the  Dutch  had  been  accustomed  to  send  to  the  islands 
annually  according  to  the  estimate  of  de  Formont.  The 
cries  of  "Vive  les  Hollandais!"  which  resounded  through 
Martinique  told  their  story  of  the  company's  failure  to 
supply  the  needs  of  the  planters. 

In  spite  of  the  1,387,000  livres  contributed  by  the  king 
during  the  last  ten  months,  the  end  of  the  year  1665  found 
the  company  deeply  in  debt.  To  the  total  of  2,587,000 
livres  of  subscription  was  opposed  an  indebtedness  of  more 
than  4,000,000  livres.  Its  deficit  amounted,  in  January, 
1666,  to  more  than  2,000,000  livres.^^  To  aid  the  com- 
pany to  escape  from  its  financial  embarrassments,  the 
directors  made  a  most  interesting  suggestion: 

"The  directors^  in  searching  for  every  means  to  sustain  the 
company,  cannot  refrain  from  proposing  to  Monseigneur 
[Colbert]  a  suggestion  which  he  entertained  at  one  time  him- 
self, of  uniting  the  two  companies  [the  East  and  West  India 
Companies]  and  thus  place  the  funds  of  the  East  India  Com- 
pany at  the  disposal  of  the  West  India  Company.  ...  Or 
one  might  consolidate  a  part  of  the  capital  of  the  former,  say 
for  1,000,000  or  1,500,000  livres,  with  that  of  the  latter  and 

77  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  M6moire  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc,  1665. 

121 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

place  two  or  three  of  its  directors  on  the  board  of  the  West 
India  Company. "^^ 

This  suggestion  was  not  adopted,  but  it  is  most  interesting 
in  disclosing  to  us  the  fact  that  Colbert  had  at  one  time 
thought  of  uniting  the  two  companies  and  thus  bringing 
into  existence  a  company  even  more  gigantic  in  its  scope, 
and  offering  to  it  the  world  for  its  conquest. 

The  West  India  Company  faced  the  outbreak  of  a  war, 
which  was  destined  to  occur  in  the  following  year,  heavily 
burdened  with  debt  and  with  its  ships  locked  in  the  ports 
of  northern  France.  It  was  highly  regrettable  that  just 
at  a  moment  when  it  seemed  prepared  to  advance  upon  the 
road  of  commercial  expansion,  the  affairs  of  state  dictated 
a^ileclAratioTt-of-war-JH^th'Frngland  which  called  into  play 
all  the  company's  capital  and  all  of  its  resources  for  the 
military  defense  of  the  islands,  and  thus  made  it  impossible 
to  use  them  for  the  development  of  its  commerce. 

78  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  M6moire  des  Directeurs  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind. 
Oc,  mai,  1666. 


122 


CHAPTER  V 

The  West  India  Company,  1666-1667 

rfl  HE  year  1666  dawned  beneath  the  clouds  of  an 
-■-  approaching  war.  It  has  already  been  seen  that 
the  company's  commerce  suffered  from  the  captures  oper--—- JL 
ated  by  English  corsairs  and  that  the  English  Channel 
was  considered  too  dangerous  to  risk  the  cargoes  of  mer- 
chant vessels  in  its  waters.  The  directors  seem  to  have 
entertained  at  first  some  hopes  of  maintaining  neutrality 
between  the  two  nations  in  the  islands.  "The  orders  of 
the  court  and  of  the  company  to  the  governors  to  main- 
tain the  principle  of  neutrality,"  says  Du  Tertre,  "were 
so  explicit  that  they  considered  it  as  a  matter  which  had 
been  agreed  upon."  One  of  the  directors  of  the  company, 
Pocquelin  by  name,  seemed  so  convinced  of  the  fact,  that, 
so  late  as  May  2,  1666,  he  sent  out  a  vessel  with  a  cargo 
of  wine  under  instructions  to  call  at  Barbadoes  to  trade, 
before  proceeding  to  Martinique.^  De  Sales,  the  French 
governor  at  St.  Chris.tapHer^  §g?F?s  to  have  renewed  the 
treaty  with  the  English  governor  that  peace  would  be 
maintained  between  the  two  nations  in  that  island,  in  case 
of  a  declaration  of  war  in  Europe.^  These  hopes,  however, 
pi:oyed„Yain.  The  war  was  destined  to  prove  more  violent  ., 
in  the  islands  than  in  Europe. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  follow  the  events  of  the 
war.  The  reader  will  find  a  detailed  account  thereof  in 
Du  Tertre.  It  will  be  attempted  to  give  an  account  only 
of  those  events  in  which  the  interests  of  the  company  were 

iDu   Tertre,   IV,   10. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  4. 

123 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

affected  and  in  which  it  was  called  upon  to  expend  its 
energy  in  the  defense  of  the  islands. 

The  official  decIajra^onof_.Eflx--»gainst  the  English  was 
signed  at  St.  Germain-en-Laye,  on  January  26,  1666.  Du 
Tertre-^fla^liW  fSj  voyjf  serous  charge  against  the -West 
India  Qompany  in  regard  to  notifying  the  islands  of  thisN 
f «^ct.  {'The  English  governors,"  he  says,  "received  the  ; 
news  of  the  fact  by  the  middle  of  April,  whereas  the  West 
India  Company  displayed  such  small  diligence  in  inform- 
ing our  governors  that  Captain  Forant,  commanding  the 
St.  Nicolas,  which  bore  the  dispatches  of  the  court,  did 
not  sail  from  France  before  the  month  of  March,  so  that 
the  commander,  de  Sales,  was  killed  [in  the  first  battle  at 
St.  Christopher]  before  learning  from  France  the  news 
of  the  declaration  of  war."^ 

We  have,  however,  a  letter  from  de  Clodore  to  Colbert, 
dated  at  Martinique,  May  23,  1666,  in  which  he  says :  "I 
received  on  March  19,  the  letters  which  His  Majesty  and 
you  did  me  the  honour  to  write  on  February  2  and  6,  and 
by  which  I  was  informed  of  the  declaration  of  war  against 
England."*  It  seems  very  evident  from  this  letter  that 
either  Du  Tertre  was  misinformed  or  that  there  was  some 
unexplained  negligence  on  the  part  of  de  Clodore  at  Mar- 
tinique in  sending  news  to  St.  Christopher.  The  latter  is 
highly  improbable.  On  the  contrary,  either  the  govern- 
ment or  the  company  showed  promptness  in  communicat- 
ing the  news  to  the  islands.  The  declaration  of  war 
signed  on  January  26,  letters  written  on  February  2  and 
6,  received  at  Martinique  on  March  19,  is  a  most  respect- 
able schedule  for  the  seventeenth  century. 

De  Clodore,  before  the  arrival  of  the  news,  became  con- 
vinced of  the  bad  faith  of  the  English  and  made  prepara- 
tions for  the  conflict.     Thus  he  sent  a  special  warning  to 

3Du  Tertre,  IV,  13. 

4  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.   Colbert,  138  bis,  fol.  684. 

124 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

de  Sales,  governor  of  St.  Christopher,  to  be  on  his  guard. 
Du  Lion,  the  governor  at  Guadeloupe,  was  warned  per- 
sonally by  de  Chambre,  and  the  governors  of  the  other 
islands  by  letters.  De  Clodore  completed  the  forts  and 
batteries  which  were  under  construction  at  Martinique, 
increased  his  forces  and  put  everything  in  such  good 
order  that  all  approaches  to  the  islands  were  well  guarded 
against  attacks  by  the  enemy.  Du  Lion  likewise  placed 
Guadeloupe  in  a  state  of  defense.  The  governors  of  St. 
Christopher,  Marie  Galante,  Grenada  and  St.  Domingo, 
in  response  to  the  warnings  given  by  de  Clodore,  prepared 
their  forces  of  varying  strength  fgr  the  conflict.^ 

The  company,  however,  had  not  made  adequate  provi- 
sion  for  the  protection  of  the  islands.  Ammunition  was  r^ 
exceedingly  scarce.  There  was  not  enough  in  all  the 
islands  to  sustain  a  battle  of  two  hours'  duration.  This 
was  partly  relieved  by  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  brought 
800  pounds  of  powder  to  Guadeloupe.  Furthermore, 
there  was  a  scarcity  of  food  supplies  which  made  the  plant- 
ers murmur  against  the  company.  It  was  not  wholly 
responsible  for  this  fact,  however.  The  vessels  which  were 
ready  with  their  cargoes  to  sail  for  the  islands  in  Novem- 
ber, 1665,  did  not  do  so,  because  suitable  escorts  could 
not  be  furnished  by  the  king  to  conduct  them  beyond  the 
zone  of  danger.  Bechameil  had  distinctly  stated  the 
necessity  for  such  escort.  Colbert  seems  to  have  made  no 
response  to  this  request  and,  in  failing  to  do  so,  he  must 
be  held  at  least  partially  responsible  for  the  lack  of  ammu- 
nition and  food  supplies  which  the  company's  vessels 
would  have  brought. 

Fortunately  the  islands  did  not  suffer  seriously  from 
these  facts,  because  the  Engjish  were  not  jorepared_j^  .take  "^f 
the  offensive.     They  seemedio^-fchiTS^t  the  FrenT!h-were-J    X^ 
in  an  excelkiit  state  of  preparation.    Thus  Governor  Wil- 

5  Du  Tertre,  IV,  4  ff. 

125 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

loughby  wrote  to  the  king  on  May  12,  1666 :  "The  French 
spare  no  cost  to  supply  their  plantations  with  shipping, 
men,  arms,  and  ammunition,  all  from  home,  and  keep  gar- 
risons in  every  island,  well  paid  and  disciplined,  all  done 
by  a  company."^ 

The  edition  of  the  Gazette  for  September  3,  1666,  was 
devoted  entirely  to  the  description  of  the  first  important 
event  of  the  war  in  the  islands.  The  headlines  announced : 
"The  details  of  the  defeat  of  the  English  and  of  the  cap- 
ture of  their  forts,  arms  and  standards  in  the  island  of  St. 
Christopher  in  America  effected  by  the  French  under  the 
command  of  M.  de  Sales,  commander  under  the  authority 
of  the  West  India  Company."^  It  told  the  story  of  the 
victory  gained  by  the  French  in  April  preceding.  The 
English  had  been  reinforced  by  some  600  or  700  men,  prin- 
cipally buccaneers  under  the  command  of  Captain  Morgan 
from  Jamaica,  so  that  they  greatly  outnumbered  the 
French,  in  the  proportion  of  six  to  one,  according  to  Du 
Tertre,  of  two,  three  and  four  to  one,  according  to  various 
English  accounts  as  given  in  the  Calendars.^  They  fur- 
thermore had  the  advantage  of  position,  for  they  occupied 
the  center  of  the  island  and  were  united,  whereas  the 
French  occupied  the  two  extremities  and  were  disunited. 
In  spite  of  these  advantages,  the  courageous  and  well- 
directed  attacks  of  the  French  leaders,  de  Sales  and  St. 
Laurent,  won  a  rapid  and  decisive  victory.  The  English 
claimed  that  their  defeat  was  due  to  cowardice  shown  by 
their  leaders.^  The  French  account  in  the  Gazette  reported 

6  Cat.  St.  Pap.  Col,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1661-1668,  No.  1204. 

1  Gazette,  1666. 

^Cal.  St.  Pap.,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1661-1668,  No.  1179,  Relation  of 
the  loss  of  St.  Christopher. 

9  Thus  a  band  of  refugees,  on  arriving  in  a  small  vessel  at  Swan- 
sea in  September,  reported  that  St.  Christopher  had  been  lost  by 
reason  of  the  cowardice  and  indiscretion  of  the  governor.  Watts, 
and  the  other  officers.  Ibid.,  No.  1278.  See  also  other  accounts, 
Nos.  1204  and  1206. 

126 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

that  Governor  Watts  was  accused  of  treason  by  Morgan 
and  forced  at  the  point  of  a  pistol  to  march  to  battle.^" 
Captain  Morgan  and  his  buccaneers,  on  the  other  hand, 
seemed  to  have  shown  much  courage.  Thus  out  of  a  total 
of  360,  there  remained  only  about  seventeen  of  them  who 
had  not  been  killed  or  wounded.  Captain  Morgan  him- 
self was  among  the  killed.  "This  victory,"  says  Du  Ter- 
tre,  "is  beyond  doubt  one  of  the  most  remarkable  and 
noteworthy  of  this  century,  for  the  French,  with  800  or 
900  men,  killed  more  than  1000,  disarmed  or  made  prison- 
ers more  than  3000,  captured  five  standards  and  con- 
quered with  all  of  its  forts  one  of  the  most  beautiful 
islands  of  the  Antilles."" 

By  the  articles  of  surrender  the  English  ceded  all  forts, 
artillery  and  firearms.  Vagabonds  and  persons  not  pos- 
sessing plantations  were  forced  to  leave  the  island  at  once. 
Own«:'5~of~^lajitaliDJisjcouMjren^^  as  they  chose, 

If  they_chose  to  retire,  they  could  dispose  of  their  real 
estate,  slaves  and  live  stock  to  the  French  and  embark 
with  their  families  and  movables.  If  they  chose  to  reniain, 
they  would  be  forced  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
French  king  and  to  the  West  India  Company.  They 
would  be  granted  religious  liberty,  provided  they  did  not 
exercise  it  in  public  assemblies.^^ 

Most  of  the  English  refused  to  take  the  oath  of  alle^- 
giance  and  their  expulsion  began.  The  task  of  super- 
intending their  transportation  was  performed  by  St.  liaux- 
ent  and  de  Chambre,  the  general  agentruf  tfie  West  India 
Company,  who  had  come  to  St.  Christopher  with  reinforce- 
ments from  Guadeloupe  on  learning  of  the  victory.  From 
May  8  to  June  8,  no  less  than  8000  persons,  according  to 

^^  Gazette,  1666,  p.  912. 
11  Du  Tertre,  IV,  45. 

l2CaZ.  8t.  Pap.,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1661-1668,  No.  1180;  and  Du 
Tertre,  IV,  47. 

137 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Du  Tertre,  were  transported  to  various  places.  Some  were 
sent  to  Montserrat  and  Antigua,  others  to  Jamaica,  Ber- 
muda and  St.  Domingo,  still  others  to  Virginia.  Some 
800  or  900  Irish  were  sent  to  St.  Bartholomew  to  culti- 
vate the  plantations  which  the  French  planters  had  left, 
in  order  to  strengthen  the  colony  at  St.  Christopher. 
Three  or  four  hundred  more  were  sent  to  Martinique  and 
Guadeloupe.  No  less  then  400  contracts  of  sale  were 
registered  for  the  transfer  of  plantations  by  the  English 
to  the  French,  which  represented  a  total  value  of  3,000,000 
pounds  of  sugar  or  450,000  livres  of  money." 

The  news  of  this  victory  was  received*with  joy  in  France. 
The  king,  Colbert,  and  the  directors  of  the  company, 
wrote  most  eulogistic  letters  to  St.  Laurent.  Colbert 
informed  him  that  the  king,  as  a  mark  of  his  apprecia- 
tion, granted  him  1000  ecus.  The  directors  informed  him 
that  they  had  chosen  him  to  succeed  the  late  de  Sales  as 
governor  of  St.  Christopher. 

The  first  battle  had  ended  decidedly  in  favour  of  the 
French  and  the  ^gbple  of_St.  Christopher  passed  into  the 
hands  of^theWest-jndia  Company.  The  burden  of  defense 
thereby  became  greater.  The  victory  meant  an  increase 
of  responsibility  and  an  additional  drain  upon  its  re- 
sources. 

The  company  had  faced  the  crisis  of  a  foreign  war  in 
a  very  embarrassing  financial  condition.  The  directors 
consequently  hesitated  to  engage  the  company's  credit  by 
further  expenditures.  But  conferences,  held  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1666  with  de  Laubiere,  lieutenant-governor  of 
Martinique,  who  had  been  sent  to  France  by  de  Clodore  to 
depict  the  deplorable  condition  of  affairs  at  Martinique 
and  to  urge  them  to  send  relief,  made  the  directors  decide 
to  equip  another  expedition.  De  La  Barre,  who  was  in 
Holland  occupied  with  the  affairs  of  the  company,  was 

13  Du  Tertre,  IV,  62-63. 

128 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

summoned  to  Paris  to  give  his  advice.  The  directors  had 
not  yet  given  up  hope  that  a  treaty  of  neutrahty  could 
be  made  with  England  and  thought  that  the  expedition 
of  two  or  three  vessels  would  be  sufficient.  De  La  Barre, 
on  arriving  at  Paris,  quickly  destroyed  this  illusion  by 
assuring  them  that  the  English  were  waiting  only  for  the 
outbreak  of  a  war  in  order  to  attempt  the  conquest  of  all 
the  French  islands.  In  accordance  with  his  advice  it  was 
decided  to  equip  a  strong  fleet  and  send  it  to  the  islands 
under  his  command.^* 

Preparations  were  immediately  begun  at  La  Rochelle.  | 
The  king,  in  response  to  a  request  by  the  directors, 
granted  permission  to  levy  four  companies  d|  100  sol- 
diers each  and  to  place  in  command  Sieur  de  Leon,  cap- 
tain of  a  company  of  the  regiment  of  Navarre.  Haste  was 
made  to  put  the  fleet  in  readiness  to  sail.  The  vessels  were 
laden  with  ammunition  for  the  defense  of  the  islands  and 
with  supplies  for  the  relief  of  the  planters.  Troops,  pas- 
sengers, and  cargoes  were  all  embarked  and  the  fleet  set 
sail  from  La  Rochelle  on  May  26,  1666.^^ 

It  was  a  mistake,  as  events  proved,  to  place  de  La  Barre 
in  command.  Even  before  the  sailing  of  the  fleet,  Colbert 
de  Terron  warned  Colbert  of  the  danger:  "M.  de  La 
Barre  is  impatient  to  sail.  .  .  .  It  is  very  easy  to  see 
that  his  thoughts  are  not  of  warfare,  for  which  he  has  no 
disposition.  He  has  no  thought  than  that  of  estabHshing 
at  Cayenne  a  part  of  his  family  which  is  to  accompany 
him.  .  .  .  Under  the  smallest  pretext,  he  will  change  his 
route  and  proceed  to  Cayenne  with  the  women  and  best 

14  Du  Tertre,  IV,  116-117. 

15  Ibid.,  pp.  118-119.  It  was  composed  of  ten  vessels,  Le  St. 
Georges,  25  cannon,  flying  the  admiral's  pennant,  Le  St.  Christopher, 
26  cannon,  Le  Mercier,  24  cannon,  L'Hirondelle,  14  cannon,  Le  Lion 
d'Or,  14  cannon.  La  Doroth4e,  8  cannon,  Le  Cher  Amy,  10  cannon, 
La  Pucelle,  14  cannon,  a  galiot  and  a  bark  of  50  tons. 

129 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

men  whom  he  has  on  board. "^^  Most  prophetic  words, 
which  should  have  served  as  a  warning  to  Colbert  and  to 
the  directors  of  the  company! 

The  fleet  sailed  with  favourable  winds,  but  encountered 
such  a  rude  southwester  that  it  was  forced  to  return 
almost  immediately  to  La  Rochelle.  The  flagship,  Le  St. 
Georges,  was  found  so  badly  damaged  that  it  was  consid- 
ered unfit  to  make  the  voyage.  Fortunately  another  of 
the  company's  vessels,  Le  Florissanty  armed  with  twenty- 
eight  cannon,  was  found  near  La  Rochelle  and  substituted. 
The  fleet  sailed  again  on  June  8.  This  time  the  St.  Chris- 
topher was  fouled  by  one  of  the  other  ships  and  so  badly 
damaged  that  it  was  forced  to  return  to  La  Rochelle. 
The  rest  of  the  fleet  continued  its  way.  It  arrived  at  the 
Madeira  Islands  on  June  27,  where  de  La  Barre  learned 
that  war  had  already  broken  out  in  the  islands  and  that, 
furthermore,  a  squadron  of  twelve  English  vessels  had 
sailed  from  the  Madeiras  on  June  6  for  the  West  Indies. 
Instead,  however,  of  making  haste  to  carry  relief  to 
the  islands,  as  duty  commanded  him  to  do,  he  decided  to 
direct  his  whole -fl^et  to  Cayenne. ^^ 

De  La  Barre  himself  explains  the  reason  for  this  deci- 
sion by  saying  that  after  his  arrival  at  the  Madeiras,  he 
took  counsel  with  the  most  experienced  navigators  in  his 
fleet,  who  said  that  inasmuch  "as  it  was  not  possible  to 
sail  from  the  Madeiras  before  July  10,  by  reason  of  the 
cargoes  which  they  were  compelled  to  take  aboard,  it 
would  not  be  possible  to  arrive  in  the  islands  before  the 
first  days  of  August  which  is  the  season  of  the  greatest 
danger  on  account  of  storms  and  during  which  only 
rash  and  imprudent  sailors  dare  approach  near  the 
coasts  of  the  islands  ;  .  .  .  that  thus  the  fleet  in  arriving 
in  the  islands  at  such  a  season  would  be  obliged  to  take 

16  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Mel.  Colbert,  137  bis,  fol.  649. 

17  Du  Tertre,  IV,  124. 

130 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

refuge  in  the  cul-de-sac  of  Martinique,  which  was  a  very 
unhealthy  anchorage  and  where  the  greater  part  of  the 
crews  might  die  from  sickness ;  that  it  could  not  render 
any  service  to  the  islands  at  such  a  season.  .  .  .  These 
considerations,  after  being  discussed,  influenced  Sieur  de 
La  Bar  re  to  change  the  plan,  which  had  been  agreed  upon 
with  Sieur  Colbert  de  Terron,  to  sail  directly  to  the 
islands,  and  made  him  decide  to  go  first  to  Cayenne  in 
accordance  with  the  first  orders  which  had  been  given 
him."'' 

This  explanation  is  not  convincing.  One  naturally 
asks  why  it  was  necessary  for  de  La  Barre  to  go  all  the 
way  to  the  Madeiras  before  learning  that  it  would  be  dan- 
gerous to  arrive  in  the  Antilles  toward  the  first  of  August. 
It  is  evident  that  de  La  Barre  did  not  act  in  good  faith 
and  that  he  gave  this  explanation  only  as  a  pretext  to  hide 
the  truth,  which  Colbert  de  Terron  had  already  divined, 
namely  that  he  had  his  heart  set  on  building  up  the  colony 
at  Cayenne  and  was  willing,  at  almost  any  cost  to  the 
Antilles,  to  sidetrack  the  expedition  for  the  profit  of  that 
colony. 

In  accordance  with  his  decision,  de  La  Barre  reprovi- 
sioned  his  ships  in  the  Madeiras,  made  a  stop  of  another 
ten  days  at  Santiago  in  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  to  buy 
live  stock,  and  finally  sailed  on  July  25  for  Cayenne.  He 
was  separated  on  July  27  and  30  from  the  rest  of  his 
vessels,  all  of  which  arrived  at  Cayenne  between  October 
6  and  12,  except  one,  which  did  not  arrive  until  the  last 
of  October.'^  They  were  thus  nearly  three  months  on  the 
way  from  Santiago  to  Cayenne.  Their  cargoes  were  so 
badly  damaged  that  they  furnished  small  aid  to  the  col- 
ony. Much  surprise  was  felt  at  the  failure  to  find  de  La 
Barre  at  their  arrival.     For  forty-eight  long  days  he  had 

'i^  Relation  de  VAmMque,  I,  73  ff. 
19  Ibid. 

131 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

struggled  against  head  winds  and  unfavourable  tides.  At 
the  end  of  that  time,  finding  himself  separated  from  his 
fleet  and  still  far  from  his  destination  and  without  a 
supply  of  water  to  drink,  he  at  last  gave  up  hope  of  reach- 
ing Cayenne  and  turned  his  lone  vessel  toward  Martinique. 
In  the  meantime,  the  colonies  had  been  suffering  and 
the  spirit  of  rebellion  had  reappeared,  which  might  have 
been  prevented,  had  de  La  Barre  obeyed  orders  and  arrived 
in  season  with  his  fleet.  After  the  defeat  of  the  EngHsh 
at  St..  Christopher,  the  planters,  who  had  shown  them- 
selves courageous  and  loyal  subjects  in  combating  the 
enemy,  grew  impatient  at  the  unfulfilled  promises  of  the 
company's  agents.  Many  found  their  plantations  dam- 
aged by  the  war,  and  poverty  seemed  greater  than  ever, 
in  spite  of  the  brilliant  victory.  A  sedition  would  have 
broken  out,  but  for  the  prompt  action  of  de  St.  Laurent 
in  arresting  two  of  the  most  rebellious  leaders.  In  Mar- 
tinique, a  revolt  of  some  importance  did  break  out  against 
the  company. 

On  July  13,  de  Qlodope  ^received-word  4iiat.5ome-plantr 
ers  in  Cabesterre  had  refused  to  obey  his  orders  to  aid 
in  strengthening  the  fortifications  of  the  islands,  com- 
plaining that  they  did  not  have  food  to  eat.  A  little 
later  in  the  day,  he  received  additional  news  that  all  the 
planters  of  the  district  were  in  open  revolt  and  were  mov- 
ing towards  the  district  of  Precheur  which  was  to  serve  as 
a  rendezvous  with  other  rebels.  De  Clodore  was  thus 
forced  to  turn  his  attention  from  defense  against  the 
enemy  to  the  quelling  of  a  rebellion  against  the  company. 
Only  four  days  before,  yielding  to  the  urgent  requests  of 
de  Chambre  and  de  St.  Laurent,  he  had  sent  his  own  picked 
troops  to  St.  Christopher.  He,  however,  gave  orders 
promptly  to  the  commanders  of  the  different  districts  to 
hold  their  troops  in  readiness.  He  commanded  de  la 
Calle,   chief   agent   of  the  West  India   Company   in   the 

132 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 


island,  to  assemble  his  troop  of  sixty  clerks  and  employees 
of  the  company  and  to  use  it  as  a  guard  for  the  fort. 

Father  Forcade,  a  Dominican,  was  sent  to  Cabesterre 
in  order  to  persuade  the  planters  to  desist  from  rebellion, 
or,  persuasion  faihng,  to  attempt  to  frighten  them  by 
assuring  them  that  God  would  not  desert  the  governor  and 
that  the  larger  planters  would  march  with  him  against 
them.  The  leaders  refused  either  to  be  persuaded  or  to  be 
frightened.  The  two  leading  rebels,  La  Riviere  and  Daniel 
Jousselin,  assured  the  good  father  that  they  were  deter- 
mined to  perish  rather  than  to  submit  to  the  company 
longer ;  that  they  were  in  intelligence  with  the  planters  of 
Basseterre,  but  that,  nevertheless,  they  would  send  some 
one  to  confer  with  the  governor.  The  rebels  had  already 
made  the  two  commanding  officers  of  the  district  prisoners. 
Father  Forcade  returned  and  reported  to  de  Clodore  that 
he  was  convinced  that  the  rebels  were  determined  to  make 
good  their  threats. 

De  Clodore  found  very  little  enthusiastic  support  among 
the  commanding  officers.  When  he  assembled  some  of 
them  to  take  counsel,  he  found  many  of  the  opinion  that 
it  would  be  wise  to  yield  to  the  rebels  or  at  least  to  satisfy 
them  temporarily.  He  refused,  however,  to  listen  to  the 
expression  of  such  ideas,  saying  that  such  a  course  would 
mean  the  ruin  of  all  and  put  the  island  in  danger  of  being 
taken  by  the  English.  Delay  in  attack  meant  a  rapid 
spread  of  the  rebellion.  Success  of  a  rebellion  meant 
savage  treatment  of  the  officials  and  of  the  rich  planters. 
As  for  him,  he  was  resolved  to  march  directly  against  the 
insurgents.  He  summoned  those  who  loved  him  and  their 
dut}^  to  follow  him. 

The  plan  of  the  rebels  of  Cabesterre  was  to  traverse  Mt. 
Pelee  in  order  to  join  those  of  Precheur.  De  Valmeniere, 
one  of  the  most  trusted  officers,  was  sent  with  a  body  of 
troops  to  capture  the  mountain  and  combat  them  at  their 

133 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

passage.  At  dawn  of  July  15,  he  set  his  troops  in  march 
and  arrived  at  the  summit  of  Mt.  Pelee  about  ten  o'clock. 
The  rebels  had  anticipated  his  movements  and  were  firmly 
entrenched.  They  fell  victims,  however,  to  their  own 
stupidity  and  lost  their  vantage.  They  had  forced  the 
two  commanders,  Periere  and  Bouillon,  whom  they  had 
taken  prisoners  before  leaving  Cabesterre,  to  accompany 
them.  As  quickly  as  these  two  officers  realized  that  the 
troops  commanded  by  de  Valmeniere  were  those  sent  by 
de  Clodore,  they  very  adroitly  made  use  of  their  situation 
to  defeat  and  rout  the  rebels.  They  persuaded  them 
that  the  troops  in  sight  were  none  other  than  their  friends 
from  Precheur,  who  had  come  to  join  them.  Under 
this  pretext,  Periere  and  Bouillon,  who  had  gained  some 
fifteen  or  twenty  wavering  rebels  to  their  plot,  were  able 
to  join  de  Valmeniere  and  inform  him  of  the  situation. 
They  returned  straightway  to  the  band  of  insurgents  and 
informed  them  that  de  Clodore  was  not  present  and  they 
could  confer  with  de  Valmeniere  in  all  security.  The 
rebels  fell  at  once  into  the  trap.  They  deserted  their 
posts  of  vantage  and  went  down  to  the  point  which  de 
Valmeniere  occupied.  The  two  officers  quickly  rallied 
about  them  those  whom  they  had  won  over  and  de- 
manded of  the  others  whether  they  did  not  recognize  them 
as  their  officers,  and  at  the  same  time  began  to  shout: 
"Vive  le  Roi  et  M.  de  Clodore !"  The  most  of  the  insur- 
gents were  so  surprised  by  these  cries  that  they  began  to 
cry  the  same  thing.  An  energetic  attack  was  made  upon 
the  others.  A  volley  was  fired  and  some  fifteen  or  six- 
teen of  the  mutineers  lay  dead  or  wounded.  Periere 
sprang  upon  Jousselin,  smote  him  with  his  sword  and 
captured  him.  This  quick  turn  of  affairs  spread  terror 
among  the  rebels.  They  took  to  their  heels  and  escaped 
into  the  woods.  Some,  however,  in  their  flight  encountered 
the  troops  led  by  de  Clodore  himself,  who  had  marched 

134 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

straight  into  Cabesterre,  and  were  captured.  The  lead- 
ers were  captured,  thanks  to  rewards  offered  by  the  gov- 
ernor. Jousselin  was  hanged  and  Riviere  severely  pun- 
ished. Some  of  the  rest  were  condemned  to  three  years 
of  service  to  the  company,  others  to  the  payment  of  large 
fines.^'^ 

"Such  were  the  misfortunes  caused  by  the  dishonesty  of 
the  West  India  Company's  agents  and  by  the  scarcity  of 
supplies  which  prevailed.  One  must  admit  that  the  company 
was  very  fortunate  on  this  occasion  in  having  a  governor, 
who  was  loved  and  respected  enough  by  the  planters  to  make 
them  fight  and  destroy  their  brothers,  who  were  in  revolt, 
as  they  themselves  believed,  only  by  reason  of  motives  which 
they  could  not  condemn.  The  design  of  the  rebels  was,  after 
uniting  themselves  with  those  of  Precheur^  to  march  against 
St.  Pierre,  where  they  would  force  the  governor  to  surrender 
his  commission,  to  overthrow  the  company  and  to  establish 
himself  governor  under  the  proprietorship  of  M.  D'Esnambuc, 
provided  that  he  permitted  the  Dutch  to  trade  in  the  island. 
They  were  nevertheless  divided  as  to  the  choice  of  a  governor, 
some  desiring  de  Valmeniere,  others  de  Clodore.  But  God 
willed  otherwise.  "^^ 

It  can  easily  be  imagined  with  what  impatience  de  Clo- 
dore awaited  relief  from  France.  But  de  La  Barre  failed 
to  appear.  Some  aid  arrived  shortly  afterwards  from 
another  quarter.  Three  of  the  company's  vessels  which 
had  sailed  from  Holland  on  May  25  arrived  at  Martinique 
on  July  28.  They  were  Le  Lys,  La  Justice  (300  tons) 
and  Le  St.  Antoine  (130  tons).  They  brought  with  them 
two  small  English  prizes,  one  with  a  cargo  of  salt  fish  and 
the  other  with  a  cargo  of  tobacco  from  Virginia.^  About 
the   same   time,   there    arrived  three   Dutch   vessels   with 

20  Du  Tertre,  IV,  82  ff. 

21  Ibid.,  IV,  12. 

22  Gazette,  1666,  No.  138  and  pp.  752  and  1166. 

135 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

cargoes  of  supplies.^^  Some  two  weeks  later,  on  August 
9,  arrived  the  St,  Christopher^  which,  it  may  be  recalled, 
formed  a  part  of  de  La  Barre's  fleet,  but  was  forced  to 
put  back  into  La  Rochelle  for  repairs.  It  had  aboard  a 
hundred  soldiers  of  the  regiment  of  Poitou  under  the  com- 
mand of  Sieur  de  I'Alou  and  de  Laubiere,  the  lieutenant- 
governor  of  Martinique.  The  latter  raised  high  the  hopes 
of  all  by  telling  them  that  their  suffering  would  soon  be  at 
an  end,  for  a  strong,  well-equipped  fleet,  under  the  com- 
mand of  de  La  Barre,  well  laden  with  provisions,  was  on  its 
way,  that  it  had  already  touched  at  the  Madeiras  and 
should  arrive  shortly.^ 

Every  eye  was  turned  toward  the  horizon  to  see  some 
sign  of  the  approaching  fleet.  If  that  horizon  had  not 
been  so  limited,  they  might  have  seen  a  sight  to  turn 
them  mad,  for,  thanks  to  the  obstinate  selfishness  of  de  La 
Barre,  the  precious  cargoes  of  supplies  which  they  awaited 
were  wasting  away  in  mid-ocean  in  a  struggle  against 
adverse  winds  and  unfavourable  tides. 

At  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the  victory  at  St.  Chris- 
topher, the  king  resolved  to  send,  at  his  own  expense, 
another  expedition  to  the  islands.  Orders  were  issued  for 
the  levying  of  400  soldiers  in  Normandy  and  Navarre. 
The  following  vessels  were  equipped  by  the  king:  Le  St. 
Sehastien  (28  cannon),  UAigle  Noir  (26),  UAurore 
(16),  Le  Cher  Amy  (8),  UEglise  (16).  "Two  or  three 
other  vessels  belonging  to  the  W'est  India  Company  were 
joined  to  this  squadron."^  This  fleet  sailed  from  La 
Rochelle  on  July  27  and  arrived  at  Martinique  on  Septem- 
ber 15,  two  weeks  before  the  arrival  of  de  La  Barre.  The 
troops  brought  by  this  fleet  remained  only  a  very  short 

23  Du  Tertre,  IV,  95. 

24  Ibid.,  pp.  100-101. 

25  Du  Tertre,  IV,  122-123.  See  also  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  M61.  Colbert, 
138  his,  fols.  812  and  936,  for  letters  from  Colbert  de  Terron  in  re- 
gard to  the  expedition;  also  vol.  140,  fols.  1084  and  161.     The  last 

136 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 


while  at  Martinique  as  they  were  shortly  transferred  to  St. 
Christopher.  Finally  de  La  Barre  arrived,  on  October  1, 
not  with  his  fleet,  but  with  one  lone  vessel.  The  disappoint- 
ment of  all  must  have  been  great,  as  they  saw  this  poor 
remnant  of  the  strong  fleet  which  they  had  awaited  so 
impatiently  and  on  which  they  had  placed  so  much  hope.^ 
De  La  Barre  was  forced,  soon  after  his  arrival,  to  deal 
with  a  problem  which  he  had  done  much  to  create  and  which 
demanded  an  immediate  solution.  The  principal  officers 
and  planters  of  Martinique  assembled  and  drew  up  a  peti- 
tion which  they  presented  to  him.  Their  principal  demands 
were:  that  the  articles  of  de  Tracy's  ordinance  be 
respected;  that  foreigners  be  admitted  to  trade  in  the 
islands ;  and  that  they  be  not  discouraged  from  doing  so 

reference  contains  a  statement  of  the  expenses  of  equipping  the  fleet 
which  was  as  follows: 
For  levying  400  men   . 

400  swords     . 

280  muskets 

150  guns 
4  standards 

300  shoulder    straps 

600  lbs.   fuses 

600  lbs.  powder     . 

A  quantity  of  flints 

A  quantity  of  lead 

400  belts 

800  shirts 

400  uniforms 

400  pairs   stockings 

800  pairs  shoes 

400  hats 

800  cravattes 

Salaries   for   soldiers 

For  their  board  and  lodging 

Total       . 


4,800  livres. 
4,800  livres. 
2,250  livres. 
1,800  livres. 

160  livres. 

375  livres. 

172  livres. 

300  livres. 
6  livres. 

100  livres. 

600  livres. 
1,400  livres. 
2,400  livres. 

240  livres. 
2,200  livres. 

900  livres. 

240  livres. 

3,720  livres. 

28,380  livres. 


50,568  livres. 


26  The  other  vessels  of  de  La  Barre's  fleet,  after  having  discharged 
most  of  their  damaged  cargoes  at  Cayenne,  set  sail  for  the  islands 
on  November  13.    See  Relation  de  VAmMque,  I,  376. 

137 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

by  excessive  duties  laid  on  their  merchandise;  that  the 
planters  might  bargain  freely  for  the  transportation  to 
Europe  of  their  sugar,  indigo  and  tobacco  without  being 
forced  to  ask  permission  of  the  company's  clerks,  pro- 
vided they  were  not  indebted  to  the  company;  and  that 
the  maximum  rate  of  transportation  be  fixed  at  ten 
deniers  (money  of  France)  the  pound.  The  other  demands 
concerned  minor  details  of  regulating  and  distributing 
merchandise.  Among  others  the  following  regulations 
were  made  by  de  La  Barre,  de  Clodore  and  de  Chambre: 

"All  Frenchmen  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  trade  freely  in  the 
island  of  Martinique.  They  may  import  into  the  island  what- 
ever merchandise  they  wish  and  may  export,  into  whatever 
comitry  in  alliance  with  France  which  they  choose,  the  pro- 
ducts received  in  exchange.  For  the  said  privilege  they  shall 
pay  to  the  company  an  import  duty  of  2^  per  cent  and  an 
export  duty  of  2^  per  cent. 

"Likewise  foreigners,  at  peace  and  in  alliance  with  France, 
shall  enjoy  the  same  privilege  on  the  condition  of  paying 
5  per  cent  on  cargoes  imported  into  the  island  and  5  per  cent 
on  cargoes  exported  therefrom."^^ 

The  directors  of  the  West  India  Company  in  France, 
some  three  or  four  weeks  previously,  had  come  to  a  similar 
decision.  They  agreed  to  admit  the  Dutch  to  trade  in  the 
West  Indies,  on  condition  of  paying  ten  per  cent  both  on 
incoming  and  outgoing  cargoes,  and  private  French  trad- 
Jex&^n  paying  five  per  cent.^  On  learning  of  the  terms  of 
the  regulations  made  at  Martinique,  the  directors  sent 
instructions  that  the  regulations  which  they  had  made 
should  have  precedence  over  the  latter.^  This  action  by 
the  directors  in  admitting  private  French  and  Dutch  trad- 
ers was  of  course  an  abnegation_of. jhe„<x)mpany's  monop- 

27  Du  Tertre,  IV,  135-139. 

28  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Fg,  52,  September  24,  1666. 

29  S.  Daney,  Hist,  de  la  Martinique,  II,  135. 

138 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

oly,  but  was  regarded  as  a  temporary  expedient  to  relieve 
the  crisis  created  by  the  war. 

After  this,  the  attention  of  de^  Lar-Ba,ixeL  and  of  all  was 
turned  to  the  struggle  with  the  English.  It  was  decided 
to  make  an  attack  upon  the_enemy_ajid_jfirst  upon  the 
island  of  Antigua.  All  ships,  belonging  to  the  West 
India  Company  actually  in  the  islands,  were  commanded 
by  de  La  Barre  to  report  for  duty  at  Martinique.  Ejght^ 
responded  to  his  call.  The  fleet  sailedjrom  Martinique 
forAntigua  on  November  2,  and  on  the  4th  an  attack 
was  made  under  the  command  of  de  La  Barre.  The  resis^  . 
ance  off^ered^bxJiha-Engli.sh  .was  slight,  for  a  landing  was 
eff^ected,  the  forts  taken  and  the  governor  and  his  princi- 
pal officers  captured  all  on  the  same  day.  On  the  morrow 
de  Clodore  and  du  Lion  were  sent  with  troops  to  complete 
the  conquest  of  the  island,  which  they  did  after  some  sharp 
fighting.  Articles  of  surrender,  essentially  the  same  as 
those  at  St.  Christopher,  were  signed.  The  conquest  of 
the  island  seems  not  to  have  been  thorough,  however,  due 
perhaps  to  the  failure  of  de  La  Barre  to  grant  the  full 
quota  of  troops  demanded  for  the  purpose  by  de  Clodore. 
Three  weeks  later,  at  the  refusal  of  the  English  to  abide 
by  the  treaty,  de  Clodore  was  compelled  to  return  to  the 
attack.^ 

De  La  Barre  attacked  and  took  Montserrat  in  Febru- 
ary, 1667.  Du  Tertre  states  that  he  had  no  less  than 
twenty-five  vessels  under  his  command  when  he  quit  Mar- 
tinique. The  French  for  the  moment  "were  masters  of 
the  sea."^^  This  was  changed,  however,  by  the  arrival  in 
April,  1667,  of  a  strong  English  fleet  which  chose  Nevis 
as  the  base  of  operations  and  captured  five  Dutch  mer- 
chant vessels  trading  at  Guadeloupe  and  blockaded  effec- 
tively the  island  of  St.  Christopher. 

30  Du  Tertre,  IV,  173. 

31  Ca?.  St.  Pap.  Col.,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1661-1668,  No.  1273. 

139 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

De  La  Barre  returned  to  Martinique  and  made  prepara- 
tions to  attack  the  fleet.  He  united  under  his  command 
the  following  vessels:  Le  Lys  Couronne  (38  cannon),  La 
Justice  (32),  La  Concorde  (32),  Le  Florissant  (30),  Les 
Armes  d*Angleterre  (24),  Le  St.  Christopher  (26), 
UHarmonye  (32),  UHercules  (26),  Le  St.  Sehastien 
(34),  UHirondelle  (14),  La  Nostre  Dame  (10),  Le  Mer- 
cier  (24),  Le  Marsouin  (12),  and  two  fireships.  All  these 
vessels  belonged  to  the  West  India  Company.^  In  addi- 
tion there  were  four  Dutch  vessels  armed  with  108  cannon. 
In  spite,  however,  of  most  elaborate  preparations  in  the 
details  of  the  order  of  battle,  the  fight  with  the  English 
fleet  off  Nevis  on  May  20  was  indecisive.  De^lodor^ 
attributed  the  laek-of  victory  to  llie  cuwm'dl(iU  ijliuvvu  by^ 
de  La  Barxe.  De  X*a-Barrain„~turn  attrib»t©dJLt-la,.tlie 
"failure  of  de  Clodore  to  obey  orders.^^  The  Dutch  seemed 
to  have  been  disgusted  with  the  poor  seamanship  of  the 
French.  De  La  Barre  withdrew  to  St.  Christopher  and  a 
few  days  later  the  whole  fleet  returned  to  Martinique  to 
await  the  attack  of  the  English.  They  did  not  have  to 
wait  long,  for  the  English  fleet,  under  the  command  of 
Sir  John  Harman,  began  a  series  of  attacks  upon  the 
island,  which  lasted  from  June  29  until  July  6,  and  which 
proved  of  much  consequence  to  the  West  India  Company. 

After  three  unsuccessful  attacks  the  English  fleet 
entered  the  road  of  St.  Pierre  on  July  6.  On  that  day, 
after  five  hours  of  cannonading,  an  English  fireship  suc- 
ceeded in  attaching  itself  to  Le  Lys  Couronne,  the  French 
admiral,  and  setting  her  afire.  Le  St.  Jean,  an  unnamed 
vessel,  and  two  large  flutes,  Le  Mercier  and  Le  Lion  d'Or, 
the  last  two  named  laden  for  Holland  with  cargoes  valued 

32  Du  Tertre,  IV,  242-243. 

33  See  on  this  controversy  a  pamphlet,  entitled  Plaintes  et  griefs 
prSsentSs  d,  Mgr.  de  Colbert  par  M.  de  ClodorS,  and  de  La  Barre,  Be- 
lation  de  l'Am4rique,  and  finally  Du  Tertre,  IV,  243-260. 

140 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

at  1,200,000  livres,  also  took  fire  and  were  "reduced  to 
ashes,  nothing  being  saved  aboard  them."  The  crews 
leaped  into  the  sea  and  many  were  drowned.^  Terror 
spread  to  the  other  vessels,  soldiers  and  sailors  jumped 
into  the  water,  believing  that  all  would  be  burned.  Be- 
sides, they  were  no  longer  able  to  resist  the  cannonading 
of  the  enemy  which  was  riddling  their  ships.  But  for  a 
change  of  wind,  all  the  other  twenty-eight  vessels  might 
have  been  destroyed  by  fire,  for  they  were  all  anchored 
close  together.  "The  fire  and  the  booming  of  cannon  and 
the  slaughter  of  our  forces  so  frightened  those  who  escaped 
from  the  vessels  that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  stop  them 
in  their  flight."^  Only  by  heroic  efforts  was  de  Clodore 
able  to  check  their  rout,  restore  their  courage,  rearm  them 
and  offer  resistance  to  the  enemy.  Heroism  saved  the  day 
from  complete  disaster.^  The  English,  apparently  dis- 
heartened by  the  stubborn  resistance,  or  else  satisfied  with 
the  damage  which  they  had  wrought,  retired  at  the  moment 
when  they  seemed  to  have  a  complete  victTnyin  their  grasp. 
At  their^withdrawal,  de  La  Barre  gave  orders  that  all 
vessels  which  remained  should  be  entirely  unladen,  and 
that  portholes  be  made  so  that  they  could  be  easily  sunk, 
if  the  enemy  returned. 

The  English  fleet  reappeared  on  the  morrow  for  a  final 
attack.  Again  the  heroic  efforts  saved  Martinique  from 
capture,  but  the  English  did  not  retire  without  forcing 
the  French  to  sink  their  vessels  near  the  shore  in  order  to 
save  them  from  capture  or  destruction.  "Sir  John  Har- 
man  has  burned  nineteen  or  twenty  great  French  ships  in 

34  Du  Tertre,  IV,  286-287;  Relation  de  I'AmMque,  II,  261. 

35  Du  Tertre,  IV,  287. 

36  «A  woman,  named  Madeleine  d'Orange,  whose  husband  was 
gunner  at  the  battery  of  St.  Sebastien,  remained  unflinching  by  his 
side  during  the  combat,  bringing  courageously  ammunition  to  aid  in 
the  conflict."  See  du  Motey,  Ouillaume  d'Orange  et  Us  Origines  des 
Antilles  Frangaises,  Chap.  XXXI. 

141 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Martinico  road,"^^  was  a  rather  exaggerated  English 
account  of  what  happened,  but  it  told  the  story  of  the 
great  disaster  which  had  been  inflicted  upon  the  French. 
The  significance  of  the  victory  was  that  it  gave  the  Eng- 
lish control  of  the  sea  and  made  commerce  almost  impos- 
sible for  the  French,  and  that  it  inflicted  a  most  serious 
financial  loss  upon  the  West  India  Company,  for  the 
directors  estimated  that  the  vessels  destroyed  by  fire  alone 
represented  a  loss  of  400,000  livres.^ 

St.  Christopher  remained  effectively  blockaded,  but  the 
English  seemed  unable  to  capture  it.  Cayenne  was  cap- 
tured easily.  The  French  settlement  was  pillaged,  farm- 
houses were  burned  and  sugar-mills  destroyed.^^  Thus 
much  of  the  work  for  which  the  company  had  expended 
such  large  sums  was  undone  and  the  losses  were  heavy. 

The  proclamation  of  peace  alone  seems  to  have  saved 
the  French  from  greater  disaster.  The  treaty  of  Breda 
was  signed  on  July  31,  1667.  The  status  ante  helium  was 
restored  so  far  as  the  islands  were  concerned.*" 

The  war  had  proved  disastrous  to  the  West  India  Com- 
pany. Before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  company  lost  no  less  than  five  vessels  from  capture  by 
English  corsairs.  This  represented  a  loss  of  some  272,000 
livres,  deduction  being  made  for  the  sums  awarded  by  the 
English  admiralty  courts.  It  lost  during  the  course  of 
the  war:  by  shipwreck  in  the  islands,  Le  St.  Sehastien,  a 
vessel  of  250  tons,  and  UAngelique  of  350  tons ;  by  cap- 
ture. La  Suzanne  (350  tons)  and  an  unnamed  vessel;  by 
destruction  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy  in  "Martinico  road," 
Le  Lys  Couronniy  Le  St.  Jean,  an  unnamed  vessel,  Le  Lion 

37  CaZ.  8t.  Pap.  Col.,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1661-1668,  No.  1520.  Wil- 
loughby  to  Williamson,  July  19,  1667.    Id.,  1521  and  others.  See  index. 

38  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  M6m,  sur  I'^tat  des  affaires  de  la  Cie.  des 
Ind.  Oc,  November,  1667. 

39  Du  Tertre,  IV,  313. 

40  Du  Tertre,  IV,  318-325,  prints  the  text  of  the  treaty. 

143 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

d'Or  (250  tons)  and  Le  Mercier  (400  tons),  the  two  last 
named  containing  cargoes  of  sugar  for  France.  Further- 
more, the  company  had  been  forced  to  expend  its  funds, 
or  rather  to  sink  itself  deeper  in  debt,  not  for  the  advance- 
ment of  its  commerce,  but  for  the  defense  of  the  islands 
against  the  enemy.  What  this  meant  is  clearly  under- 
stood, when  one  recalls  such  an  attack  as  that  of  de  La 
Barre  against  Antigua  in  November,  1666,  where  all  the 
vessels  of  the  company  in  the  islands  were  put  in  battle 
array  and  thus  called  from  the -peaceful  pursuits  of  com- 
merce into  the  exacting  duties  of  warfare,  or  when  one^.- 
remembers  that  many  of  the  cargoes  sent  out  to  the  islands 
were  composed  entirely  of  ammunition  and  of  provisions 
for  soldiers.  The  loss  to  the  company  from  the  fact  that 
production  was  virtually  arrested  during  the  war  is  incal- 
culable. The  planter  had  been  forced  to  turn  his  face  to 
the  battlefield  and  his  back  upon  his  plantation,  with  the 
result  that  there  was  not  enough  tobacco  or  sugar  or 
indigo  at  the  close  of  the  war  to  lade  the  company's  ves- 
sels. To  the  devastation  and  privation  of  war  had  been 
added,  in  the  case  of  St.  Christopher,  the  ravages  of  a 
violent  storm.  There  on  the  first  of  September,  store- 
houses and  sugar-mills  had  been  overturned,  trees  up- 
rooted, sugar-cane  blown  down  and  the  plantations  all 
ruined.^^ 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  estimate  made  by  the  direct- 
ors of  how  much  the  war  had  cost  the  company.  In  a  mem- 
oir,*^ addressed  by  them  to  Colbert  in  November,  1667,  they 
remarked:  "It  is  evident  from  the  company's  books  that 
without  the  expense  of  the  war  and  the  losses  incurred 
therein,  which  together  amount  to  more  than  2,000,000 
Hvres,  it  would  have  gained  during  the  first  four  years  of 

41  Du  Tertre,  IV,  298-299. 

42  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  M6moire  sur  I'etat  des  affaires  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind. 
Oc,  November,  1667. 

143 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

its  existence  500,000  livres.  .  .  .  Thus  without  the  burden 
of  a  war  which  the  company  has  sustained  for  two  years 
and  in  which  it  has  employed  all  of  its  vessels  and  during 
which  its  agents  and  even  all  the  planters  of  the  islands 
have  had  time  to  think  of  nothing  except  their  defense,  the 
company  would  not  have  been  forced  to  appeal  constantly 
to  His  Majesty  for  aid."  The  directors  estimated  the 
losses  as  follows: 

Expenses  of  the  war        .  .  .        1,000,000  livres. 

Captures  by  the  English  before  the 

war 272,000  livres. 

Sundry  losses  caused  by  the  war       .  250,000  livres. 

Destruction  by  fire  of  five  vessels  and 

their  cargoes  at  Martinique        .  400,000  livres. 

Depreciation  of  value  of  vessels  which 

served  in  the  war    .  .  .  300,000  livres. 


Total 2,222,000  livres.^^ 

The  actual  deficit  of  the  company  in  November,  1667, 
was  1,639,860  livres.  If,  said  the  directors,  one  compared 
these  two  sums,  it  would  be  seen  that  the  losses  caused  by 
the  war  were  greater  by  581,140  livres  than  the  deficit. 

The  company  very  naturally  found  itself,  at  the  close  of 
th^  war,. jn  serious  financial  embarrassments,  for  Colbert 
had  responded  very  feebly  to  the  appeals  for  aid  during 
the  course  of  the  war.  T^Hiis  in  May,  1666,  the  directors 
had  informed  him  that  the  company  was  forced  to  meet 
pressing  obligations  amounting  to  650,000  livres  (300,- 
000  livres  at  Lyons,  150,000  livres  at  Rouen,  and  200,000 
livres  at  Paris),  and  that  it  would  be  forced  to  go  into 
bankruptcy,  if  some  funds  were  not  placed  at  its  disposal. 
They  estimated  that  the  sum  of  2,000,000  livres  was  neces- 

43  The  directors  remarked  that  to  this  should  be  added  the  losses 
sustained  by  the  company  by  reason  of  cessation  of  commerce,  which 
were  incalculable. 

144 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

sary  to  enable  the  company  to  meet  those  obligations 
and  to  continue  its  commerce.  But  the  royal  treasury 
remained  closed.  Colbert  attempted  to  satisfy  temporarily  | 
these  needs,  however,  by  commanding  the  farmersj)f  the  | 
taxes  imposed  for  non-pursuit  by  the  Chambre  de  Justice,  % 
to  pay  to  th£....CQmpLany .  sums  amounting  to  1,084,000 
livr^a.**  The  total  sum  realized  from  this  source  for  the 
year  1666  amounted  to  only  245,400  livres  and  this  seems 
to  be  the  entire  amount  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
pany during  the  year.*^  The  income  from  the  farm  at 
Rouen  was  in  deficit  to  the  sum  of  1601  liv.  8s.  6d.  Col- 
bert did  not  aid  the  company  directly  until  1667.  On 
April  27,  230,000  livres,  and  again  on  September  4,  192,- 
000  livres  from  the  royal  treasury  were  placed  at  its  dis- 
posal. But  it  was  another  case  of  "a  drop  of  water  on  the 
tongue  of  a  man  with  a  fever." 

In  November,  1667,  the  financial  state  of  the  company 
was  as  follows: 

Debit. 

Funds  furnished  by  the  king 
at  different  times  August 
17;,  1664,  to  September  4, 
1667       ....  1,922,000  liv. 

The  Fermiers  gen.  des  Aides 

paid  in  1665    .  .  .       600,000  liv. 

For  which  stock  in  the  com- 
pany was  issued  for  .         55,000  liv. 


545,000  liv.  545,000  liv. 

44  Thus  Sieur  Coquille  was  ordered  to  pay  for  the  g6n6ralite  of 
Paris,  45,000  livres  in  ten  equal  payments  at  intervals  of  three  months, 
the  first  payment  to  be  made  on  March  1,  1666.  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  17, 
Mem.  de  ce  qui  doibt  estre  pay6  par  les  soubstraitans  des  taxes  faicts 
pour  la  descharge  des  recherches  de  la  Chambre  de  Justice  dans  les 
generalites  de  ce  royaume. 

45  Arch.   Nat,  G7,  1312. 

145 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Stock  subscribed  .  .  1,784,000  liv. 

Farmers  of  taxes  of  Chambre 

de   Justice,    paid,    1666-67      607,000  liv. 

For  which  stock  in  the  com- 
pany was  issued  for  .         72,940  liv. 


The  Company  owes  534,060  liv.  534,060  liv. 

To   Correspondent   at  Am- 
sterdam        .  .  .         84,000  liv. 

To   different  individuals    .  930,000  liv. 
Deficit  in  cash  account       .         70,000  liv. 


1,084,000  liv.        1,084,000  liv. 


,   Total       .  .  .  .  5,883,860  liv. 

Credit. 
32  vessels,  estimated  value     .  600,000  liv. 

Small  boats  in  the  islands      .  20,000  liv. 

Goods  sent  to  islands  on  which 

agents   have   not   made  re- 
port— for  2,262,000  livres. 

Adding  estimated  profit  of 

50    per    cent,    this    should 

yield        ....    3,393,000  liv. 
Returns      already      received, 

393,000  liv.,  plus  probable 

expenses    during   the    war, 

1,000,000   liv.,   equals         .    1,393,000  liv. 


2,000,000  liv.  2,000,000  liv. 
The  Company  has  paid  on  the 

sums  due  for  the  islands  .  179,000  liv. 
It  has  effects: 

At  Tortuga  for          .           .  30,000  liv. 

At  Cape  Verde  and  Senegal  200,000  liv. 

In  Canada        .           .           .  260,000  liv. 

In  warehouses  in  France  .  285,000  liv. 

In  Madeira      .           .           .  20,000  liv. 

146 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Its  establishments  at  Cayenne 

have  cost  .  .  .  600,000  liv. 


Total      ....  4,194,000  liv. 

The  Company,  therefore,  was  in  arrears  for  1,639,860 
livres.*® 

An  examination  of  the  credit  sheet  will  show  that  the 
company^  assets— were  ot  doublhlt~Yscht^i^  It  is  hard  to 
accept,  for  instance,  the  calculation  that  from  2,262,000 
livres  of  merchandise  sent  to  the  islands,  the  company 
would  realize  2,000,000  hvres  after  the  expenses  of  the 
war  had  been  deducted.  It  is  much  more  probable  that  a 
very  large  part  of  this  sum  would  be  and  was  lost  in  debts, 
especially  when  one  takes  into  account  the  reckless  way  in 
which  the  company's  agents  granted  credit  to  the  planters. 
Again,  among  the  company's  assets  one  finds  the  value  of 
the  colony  at  Cayenne  estimated  at  600,000  livres.  It  is 
very  evident  that  news  had  not  yet  been  received  of  the 
pillage  wrought  by  the  English  in  that  island.  Much  of 
the  amount  expended  by  the  company  for  the  establish- 
ment of  that  colony  had  been  undoubtedly  lost. 

At  the  end  of  November,  Colbert  opened  the  royal  treas- 
ury and  placed  713,000  livres  at  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
pany. On  December  26,  the  fermiers  generaux  des  aides 
paid  200,000  livres  and  the  fermiers  generaux  des  gabelles 
paid  150,000  livres.  The  total  sum  received  by  the  com- 
pany for  the  year  1667  was  1,601,040  livres,  of  which  His 
Majesty  alone  had  contributed  1,134,000  livres.  It  was 
proposed  to  employ  these  new  funds,  half  for  the  pay- 
ment of  pressing  debts  and  half  for  the  maintenance  of 
commerce.*^ 

The  directors  informed  Colbert  that  the  company  had 
thiiiy-two   vessels   with   an   aggregate  tonnage   of  7610 

46  Arch.  Col.,   F2,   15,  Memoir  by  the  directors,   November,   1667. 

47  Ibid. 

147 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

tons.*^  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  in  comparison  with  the  num- 
ber of  vessels  owned  by  the  company  at  the  close  of  1665, 
which  was  estimated  at  forty,  the  company's  fleet  had 
decreased;  that  instead  of  having  a  large  number  of  ves- 
sels well  equipped  and  laden  ready  to  sail  for  the  islands, 
as  in  November,  1665,  nearly  half  of  its  fleet,  namely  four- 
teen, were  in  the  islands  awaiting  cargoes — many  of  them 
perhaps  in  much  worse  condition  than  the  directors  of  the 
company  realized.  Of  the  vessels  actually  in  Europe, 
two  were  being  prepared  to  be  sent  to  Cayenne,  one  to 
Santiago  (Cape  Verde  Islands)  to  take  a  cargo  of  live 
stock,  one  to  the  coast  of  Guinea  for  a  cargo  of  slaves, 
and  ten  to  the  islands.  It  is  to  be  remarked  in  passing  how 
completely  the  commerce  of  the  islands  was  still  absorbing 
the  company's  attention.  It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  out 
of  fifteen  vessels  in  France  eleven  were  at  La  Rochelle,  for 
in  1665,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  great  majority  of  the 
company's  vessels  were  in  the  ports  of  northern  France. 
Attention  is  called  to  this  fact  here,  because  the  continual 
wars  of  Louis  XIV's  reign  almost  destroyed  commerce 
between  the  Antilles  and  the  northern  ports  and  left  it 

^  They  were  distributed  as  follows : 

In  the  islands:  Le  St.  Antoine  (130  tons),  La  Marye  (350),  L' Har- 
mony e  (350),  La  Concorde  (380),  Les  Armes  de  France  (350), 
L'Hercules  (300),  L'AngSlique  (350),  La  Justice  (300),  La  Nostre 
Dame  (150),  Le  St.  Nicolas  (250),  L'Hirondelle  (160),  Le  St.  Paul 
(250),  La  Licorne  (250),  Le  St.  Georges   (400). 

In  Holland:  La  Bergbre  (250  tons),  ready  to  sail  for  the  islands. 

At  Havre:  Le  Marsouin  (300  tons),  Le  Florissant  (350),  Le  St. 
Guillaume  (50),  Le  Marchand  (an  English  prize,  30). 

At  La  Rochelle:  Les  Armes  de  L'Angleterre  (prize,  180  tons).  La 
Vierge  (120),  Le  Postilion  (120),  La  Pucelle  (260),  La  Ste.  DorotMe 
(250),  L'Oranger  (250),  UAs  (250),  to  take  cargo  at  Bordeaux,  Le 
Soucy  (50),  Le  Chasseur  (200),  La  Catherine  (180),  Le  St.  Christo- 
pher  (300). 

On  the  sea:  L'Esp^rance  (300  tons),  en  route  for  Cayenne,  Le  St. 
Louis  de  Bayonne   (300),  coming  from  Senegal. 

148 


; 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  traders  of  Bordeaux, 
La  Rochelle  and  Nantes. 

Thus  ended  the  second  period  of  the  company's  history. 
Its  finances  were  in  a  deplorable  state,  its  commerce  was  in 
a  state  of  decadence,  its  monopoly  of  trade  was  broken, 
for,  foreigners  had  been  re-admitted  to  the  privileges  of 
commerce,  and  private  French  traders  were  permitted  io^ 
trade  freely.  Between  the  two  the  company  had  been 
cheated  out  of  the  few  crumbs  which  had  fallen  from  the 
table  of  the  planters  during  the  war.  It  had  a  most  diffi- 
cult task  to  gain  its  feet  after  such  an  enfeebling  struggle. 
"It  passed  from  a  period  of  embarrassment  into  the  period 
of  its  downfall."*^ 

49  Chemin-Dupont^s,  op.  cit.,  64. 


149 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  West  India  Company,  1668-1670 

T  T  was  the  general  opinion  in  the  islands  at  the  close  of 
-*■  the  war,  according  to  Du  Tertre,  that  the  West  India 
Company  was  totally  ruined  £ind  that  its  restoration  could 
be  effected  only  at  the  expense  of  much  suffering  to  the 
planters.  Houel  would  soon  be  back  at  Guadeloupe  and 
du  Parquet  at  Martinique.  The  Dutch  ships  would  soon  be 
coming  freely,  well  laden  as  before  with  all  sorts  of  mer- 
chandise to  satisfy  their  needs.^  There  was  much  to  justify 
such  an  opinion.  The  company  was  heavily  in  debt;  a 
large  number  of  its  ships  lay  idle  in  different  ports  of  the 
islands,  some  of  them  being  much  the  worse  for  the  ser- 
vice which  they  had  been  called  upon  to  perform  during 
the  war.  It  was  but  an  easy  step  backwards  for  the  com- 
pany to  retire  and  yield  the  place  to  the  former  proprie- 
tors, because  it  had  as  yet  paid  only  a  small  part  of  the 
sums  due  them  for  the  islands.  The  Dutch,  re-admitted 
to  the  privileges  of  commerce  during  the  war,  were  already 
trading  with  increased  freedom,  even  without  permits  from 
the  company.  Thus  the  cry  of -the  rebels,  "Vive  les  Hol- 
landais,^*  and  the  dream  of  all  the  planters  to  see  the  return 
of  the  old  days  of  comparative  prosperity  seemed  well  on 
the  road  to  realization. 

There  was,  however,  the  indomitable  will  of  a  great 
minister,  which  had  not  been  fully  reckoned  with  or  fully 
understood.  Colbert  never  debated  for  a  moment  the  plan 
of  taking  a  backward  step  by  restoring  proprietary  rule. 
Least  of  all  did  he  think  of  permitting  the  Dutch  trader 
to  reconquer  the  commerce  of  the  French  islands.     A  spe- 

iDu  Tertre,  IV,  335-336. 

150 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

cial  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  the  study  of  the  persistent 
and  uncompromising  fight  which  he  pursued  against  him 
and  no  further  attention  need  be  paid  to  the  subject  here. 
As  to  the  belief  that  the  company  was  ruined  and  would 
be  dissolved,  some  modern  writers  have  misunderstood  Col- 
bert's attitude  toward  the  company  at  this  time.  M. 
Pigeonneau,  for  instance,  remarks:  "From  the  commence- 
ment of  1668,  Colbert  retained  very  few  illusions  as  to  the 
future  of  the  West  India  Company.  He  regarded  it  hence- 
forth as  a  pis  aller  and  awaited  a  propitious  day  to  dis- 
solve it."^  This  opinion  has  been  accepted  by  M.  Chemin- 
Dupontes.^  There  are  several  facts,  however,  which  show 
that  this  opinion  is  erroneous.  Colbert  placed  almost  a 
million  livres  at  the  disposal  of  the  company  near  the  end 
of  the  year  1667.  No  less  than  713,000  livres  of  this  sum 
were  granted  as  late  as  November  30.  This  fact  was 
regarded  by  the  planters  of  the  islands  as  ample  evidence 
that  the  company  was  to  be  continued  and  would  receive 
the  support  of  Colbert.*  Again  in  the  autumn  of  1667,  His 
Majesty  ordered  a  squadron  of  his  vessels  to  be  sent  for  a 
year's  cruise  in  the  W«st  Indies  and  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
It  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Sieur  de  La  Rabes- 
nieres  de  Treillebois.  He  was  commanded  to  remain  three 
months  in  the  islands,  and  was  ordered  to  direct  his  atten- 
tion principally  to  the  maintenance  of  order  and  to  the 
exclusion  of  foreigners  from  trade  and  to  the  protection  of 
the  interests  of  the  West  India  Company.  In  regard  to 
the  last  point,  his  instructions  were  very  definite : 

"His  Majesty  wills  that  Sieur  de  Treillebois  make  it  clearly 
known  to  the  planters  that  he  intends  to  maintain  the  West 

2  Pigeonneau,   La   Politique   coloniale   de  Colbert,   in   Annates   de 
VEcole  des  Sciences  Politiques,  1886,  p.  800. 

3  Chemin-Dupont^s,  Les   Compagnies   de  Colonisation  en   Afrique 
Occid.  sous  Colbert,  pp.  66-67. 

4Du  Tertre,   IV,  335. 

151 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

India  Company  in  possession  not  only  of  the  islands  which  he 
has  granted  them^  but  also  of  all  the  commerce  thereof;  that 
he  will  see  to  it  that  the  said  company  treat  them  well  and 
that  he  will  always  be  disposed  to  listen  to  their  complaints."^ 

In  the  instructions  to  de  Baas,  on  the  eve  of  his  departure 
for  the  islands  in  1668  to  succeed  de  Clodore  as  governor 
at  Martinique,  there  is  another  very  clear  expression  of 
the  same  policy: 

"M.  de  Baas  should  know  that  the  interests  of  the  king  and 
those  of  the  West  India  Company  are  one  and  the  same.  He 
should  be  thoroughly  persuaded  that  everything  which  he  can 
do  to  advance  these  interests  will  be  very  agreeable  to  His 
Majesty." 

De  Baas  was  further  instructed  to  act  in  concert  with 
the  directors  of  the  company  in  order  to  promote  their 
trade.* 

When  Bechameil  suggested  in  a  memoir  that  subscrip- 
tions to  the  company  be  closed  on  January  1,  1669,  Col- 
bert remarked:  "I  do  not  believe  that  it  is  necessary  to 
close  the  books  of  the  company."^  In  fact,  during  the 
course  of  1669,  Colbert  subscribed  from  the  royal  treasury 
half  a  million  livres  to  aid  the  company. 

At  the  beginning  of  1668,  Colbert  himself  made  out  a 
plan  of  reform  for  the  administration  of  the  company.^ 
He  continued  to  keep  in  very  close  touch  with  the  admin- 
istrators of  the  company's  affairs,  especially  by  corre- 
spondence with  Pelissier,  one  of  the  directors,  who  was  sent 
out  to  the  islands  in  1670  to  look  after  the  company's 
affairs.  Even  as  late  at  February  26,  1670,  he  seems  to 
have  had  in  mind  a  possible  restoration  of  the  company's 

5  element,  III,  2,  p.  400. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  410. 

7  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  17,  Memoire,  1668. 

8  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  Projet  de  reglement  propos6  par  M.  Colbert 
le  7  d6c.  1667,  et  adopt6  par  la  Cie. 

153 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

monopoly.     In  a  memoir  which  he  addressed  to  the  direct- 
ors at  that  date,  the  following  passage  is  to  be  found: 

"So  long  as  the  company  grants  permission  to  trade  to 
French  private  traders,  it  will  suffice  merely  to  grant  the  free- 
dom to  those  who  trade  in  the  islands  to  sell  their  goods  to 
whatever  persons  and  in  whatever  way  they  wish,  on  the  con- 
dition that  they  complete  their  sales  before  the  lapse  of  one 
month  after  their  arrival,  under  penalty  of  having  them  seized 
and  sold  at  public  auction.  When^  however,  the  company 
ceases  to  grant  such  permission  and  will  hold  all  of  this  com- 
merce in  its  own  hands,  the  only  policy  to  be  adopted  is 
that  the  company  act  in  good  faith  in  its  relation  with  the 
planters."^ 

It  is  very  clear  from  these  facts  that  Colbert  had  not 
reached  the  point  at  the  beginning  of  1668  or  even  much 
later,  where  he  planned  to  abohsh  the  West  India  Com- 
pany. On  the  contrary,  the  maintenance  of  that  company 
was  still  an  essential  part  of  his  policy. 

There  was  one  point,  nevertheless,  where  one  might  say 
that  Colbert's  attitude  toward  the  company  had  changed. 
He  was  unwilling  that  its  monopoly  of  trade  be  restored 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  French  private  trader.  Bechameil 
remarked  that  a  large  number  of  private  traders  were 
going  to  the  islands  at  the  beginning  of  1668,  and  that, 
if  it  continued,  the  Dutch  could  soon  be  driven  out.  In 
the  margin  of  the  memoir  containing  this  remark,  Col- 
bert made  the  following  comment:  "There  is  nothing  so 
important  as  to  influence  the  French  to  send  ships  to  the 
islands  and  to  exclude  all  the  Dutch  from  this  trade."^° 
By  an  arret  of  the  conseil  d^etat  of  September  10,  1668, 
the  directors  of  the  company  were  forbidden  to  grant  any 
passports  whatever  to   the  Dutch,  but  were   specifically 

9  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  472-476. 


158 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ordered  to  grant  them  freely  to  all  Frenchmen.^^  Meas- 
ures were  passed,  and  instructions  constantly  given  to  the 
governors  of  the  islands  and  to  the  directors  and  agents 
of  the  company  to  insure  the  largest  possible  freedom  to 
the  French  private  trader. 

This  did  not  mean  necessarily  any  hostility  on  Colbert's 
part  toward  the  company.  It  meant  rather  that  he 
believed  that  the  company  needed  help  in  its  conquest  of 
the  islands.  In  this  he  was  in  accord  with  Bechameil, 
the  most  active  director  of  the  company,  who  remarked: 
"If  that  continues  [the  trade  by  individual  Frenchmen], 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  we  shall  be  able  to 
take  this  trade  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Dutch. "^^  The 
essential  point  in  Colbert's  mind  was  that  the  traders  in 
the  islands  be  French.  TJiisaJet  it  be  recalled,  was  the 
Teal  reason  of  the  creation  of  the  company  itself ,  and  the 
directors  were  heartily  in  sympathy  with  this  view.  Thus 
in  the  memoir  to  Colbert  under  date  of  November,  1667, 
they  said: 

"If  individual  French  traders,  by  sending  vessels  to  the 
islands  after  the  manner  of  the  Dutch,  could  carry  on  all  of 
this  trade,  the  company  would  willingly  consent  to  yield  it 
to  them  in  order  that  the  kingdom  might  profit  from  it,  but 
it  cannot  think  of  yielding  it  to  the  Dutch,  who  were  driven 
from  the  islands  during  the  first  year  of  the  company's  exist- 
ence.  " 

It  is  therefore  much  more  accurate  to  say  that  the  West 
India  Company  began  the  year  1668  with  the  sincere  sup- 
port of  Colbert  and  that  the  limitation  of  its  monopoly 
was  not  intended  as  a  step  towards  its  dissolution,  but 
rather  to  give  it  an  ally  in  building  up  its  trade. 

UMoreau  de  Saint-M^ry,  I,  174-175. 

12  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  15,  M6moire,  1668. 

13  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  M^moire  important,  November,  1667. 

154 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  company  had  just  passed  through  two  very  trying 
periods ;  the  first  was  a  period  of  organization,  during 
which  it  had  insufficient  capital  to  solve  a  tremendous 
problem  whose  solution  was  imperative,  with  the  result 
that  it  was  forced  to  plunge  itself  into  the  embarrass- 
ment of  heavy  debts ;  the  second  period  was  more  embar- 
rassing still,  for  the  company  had  to  defend  its  posses- 
sions against  the  attacks  of  a  foreign  foe  by  the  expendi- 
ture of  large  sums  and  had  to  suffer  a  cessation  of  its 
commerce.  It  is  not  surprising  that  during  these  two 
periods,  as  Bechameil  asserted,  the  directors  had  not  been 
able  to  pursue  a  well-defined  policy,  and  that  they  had 
often  lost  heart,  when  they  saw  so  many  interruptions 
to  the  carrying  out  of  their  plans.  But  the  war  was  now 
over  and  peace  had  come.  Prospects  seemed  much  more 
favourable  for  success. 

Some  reforms^  were  made.  One  was  in  the  organization 
of  the  board  of  directors,  adopted  in  accordance  with  the 
plan  drawn  up  by  Colbert  himself,  whereby  each  director 
was  given  definite  work  to  do.  All  were  required  to  report 
forjuty-^t  the  company's  office  "every  Tuesday,  Wednes- 
day, Friday  and  Saturday  at  four  o'clock  and  remain 
until  seven."  It  was  hoped  that  in  this  way  the  indiffer- 
ence of  many  directors  to  the  interests  of  the  company 
would  disappear.^*  A.  governor-general  was  placed  in 
conamand-Pf  all  the  islands.  They  had  been  governed  for 
the  first  four  years  of  the  company's  rule  separately  by 
individual  governors.  The  choice  for  the  first  governor- 
general  fell  upon  Jean  Charles^de  Baas,  a  lieutenant-gen- 
eral in  the  army  of  the  king.  After  instructing  the  new 
governor  in  the  duties  which  he  had  to  perform — the 
maintenance  of  law  and  order,  encouragement  to  early 
marriages,  promotion  of  clearing  new  lands  and  increased 

14  Arch.  Col.,   F2,  17,  Projet  de  reglement  propos6  par  Colbert; 
ibid.,  Memoire,  January  1,  1668. 

155 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

production — Colbert  specifically  commanded  him  to__aci_ 
conjointly  with  the  directors  to  re-establish  the  trade  of  the 
company.  De  Chambre,  who  had  served  as  general  intend- 
ant  since  1664,  was  replaced  by  Sieur  Cartiej",  who  had 
been  serving  the  company  as  its  agent  at  Bordeaux.  It 
was  decided  to  dismiss  the  great  body  of  agents  and  clerks 
in  the  islands  and  to  limit  the  company's  activity  to  whole- 
sale trade.  It  was  planned  to  maintain  henceforward  two 
large  warehouses  in  each  island,  from  which  individual 
traders  and  merchants  might  supply  themselves  with 
goods  at  a  price  that  would  assure  a  profit  of  ten,  twelve 
and  fifteen  per  cent  by  retailing  them  to  the  planters. 
Bechameil  expressed  his  belief  that  after  these  reforms 
were  inaugurated,  success  was  assured. 

With  perhaps  the  double  purpose  of  encouraging  old 
stockholders  and  attracting  new  investors,  Colbert  de- 
QJded  tflJiacYg  the  company  declaje  a  jdividend — the  first 

;^in  its  Jhist^gfj  All  those  who  had  voluntarily  subscribed 
as  much  as  3000  livres  before  December  1,  1665,  and  those 
who  had  supplemented  such  subscriptions  by  a  sum  of 
1500  livres  or  more  were  to  receive  a  dividend  amounting 
respectively  to  ^our  p€r  cent  and^ve  per_cent   animal 

jnterest  on  sums  subscribed,  the  time  to  be  reckoned  from 
December  1,  1665,  to  December  1,  1668.^^  To  make  the 
payment  of  such  a  dividend  possible,  300,000  livres  were 
furnished  from  the  royal  treasury  on  January  9,  1669, 
and  later  an  additional  sum  of  104,545  liv.  8s.  6d.  Toward 
the  close  of  the  year  some  fifteen  new  subscriptions  were 
made,  which  yielded  a  total  of  540,000  livres. 

In  spite,  however,  of  efforts  to  bolster  up  the  company 
by   reforms   and  by   the   subscription   of   new   funds,   its 

affairs 5eem  to^hav£Ljirif ted-f r-om  badta  worse.  No  mate- 
rial has  been  found  which  enables  one  to  estimate  even 
approximately  the  amount  of  commerce  carried  on  by  the 

15  Arch.  Nat.,  E,  1753,  Arret,  January  9,  1669. 

156 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

company  during'  the  years  1668  and  1669.  A  letter 
written  by  de  la  Cale,  the  company's  agent  at  Martinique, 
to  Sieur  Cartier,  the  general  agent  for  the  islands, 
reported  the  sailing  of  the  St.  Pierre  for  Dunkerque  in 
June,  1669,  with  a  cargo  of  3078  rolls  of  tobacco,  valued 
at  190,280  livres,  for  the  West  India  Company,  and  729 
rolls  of  tobacco  and  58%  hogsheads  of  sugar  for  private 
traders.  Likewise  in  a  letter  of  July  3,  he  noted  the  sail- 
ing of  the  St.  Joseph  for  St.  Malo.^^  But  these  cases  do 
not  indicate  anything  more  than  that  the  company  was 
still  carrying  on  some  trade.  Du  Lion,  in  a  letter  of 
December,  1669,  remarked  that  the  number  of  vessels 
which  the  company  was  sending  to  the  islands  at  that 
date  was  small.^^  Later  events  show  that  the  company's 
commerce  was  declining  at  this  time  and  that  it  was  far 
from  being  in  a  prosperous  condition.  It  is  very  clear 
that  its  affairs  were  being  managed  very  poorly.  Its 
general  agent,  Sieur  Cartier,  proved  to  be  both  a  thief 
and  a_  smuggler.  He  not  only^appropriated  some  of  the 
company's  property  for  his  own  personal  use,  but  accepted 
bribes  freely  from  the  Dutch  for  the  permission  to  intro- 
duce slaves,  live  stock  and  merchandise  in  the  islands.  He 
also  kept  up  a-  smuggling  trade  with  the  English  at 
Antigua.  He  kept  the  vessels  of  the  West  India  Company 
"wasting  away  in  the  roads  while  those  of  the  Dutch 
received  payments  for  their  smuggled  goods  and  sailed 
away  promptly  with  full  cargoes."  The  Dutch  were  also 
given  preference  in  the  collection  of  debts.  Du  Lion 
made  similar  charges  of  corruption  against  other  agents 

16  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  C7,  I. 

17  Ibid. 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  a  long  and  interesting  letter  by  du  Lion 
of  December  1,  1669.  The  charges  against  Cartier  were  substantiated 
by  de  la  Cale,  who  was  charged  by  the  company  with  the  investigation 
of  Cartier's  conduct.  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  letter  from 
de  la  Cale  to  directors,  November  18,  1669. 

157 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

of  the  company,  notably  against  Sieur  Royer,  the  agent 
at  St.  Christopher,  and  even  against  de  Baas,  the  gov- 
ernor-general. 

It  was  perhaps  to  remedy  this  situation  that  the  direct- 
ors decided  to  choose  a  new  general  agent  and  in  addi- 
tion, perhaps  at  Colbert's  suggestion,  to  send  out  to  the 
islands  one  of  their  own  number  to  protect  the  company's 
interests  and  to  introduce  some  necessary  reforms.  For 
the  former  position  it  chose  Bertrand  Pallu,  Sieur  du 
Ruau,  a  former  officer  of  justice  at  Tours.  He  remained 
in  the  islands  until  January,  1674,  the  eve  of  the  com- 
pany's dissolution,  and  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  he  gave 
satisfaction  in  his  service.  The  director  selected  to  repre- 
sent the  company  in  the  islands  was  Pelissier,  a  titular 
secretary  of  the  king. 

Colbert  de  Terron  demanded  at  the  time  of  Pelissier's 
selection  that  the  powers  of  intendant  be  conferred  upon 
him  during  his  sojourn  in  the  islands.  To  this  demand 
Colbert  made  the  following  response: 

"The  demand  which  you  have  made  in  regard  to  M.  Pelis- 
sier is  very  difficult  to  grant,  and  in  any  case  I  can  do  nothing 
before  the  return  of  the  king.  I  do  not  believe,  however,  that 
His  Majesty  will  be  willing  to  confer  upon  him  the  power 
which  you  ask,  all  the  more  so,  because  it  is  hardly  practicable 
to  confer  upon  a  member  of  a  commercial  company  the  same 
power  as  that  conferred  upon  intendants  in  the  provinces  of 
the  realm.  In  addition  I  am  not  at  all  informed  as  to  the 
way  in  which  justice  is  administered  in  the  islands  and  I  do 
not  know  Sieur  Pelissier  well  enough  to  confer  upon  him  such 
extensive  power.  But  if,  after  having  informed  himself  of 
the  general  practices  in  the  islands,  he  sends  me  an  excellent 
account  thereof,  more  extensive  powers  can  be  conferred  upon 
him  with  more  certainty  of  success. "^^ 

19  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  482,  May  5,  1670. 

158 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Although  no  record  has  been  found  which  shows  that  the 
powers  of  an  intendant  were  formally  conferred  upon 
Pelissier,  yet  Colbert  certainly  charged  him  in  his  letters 
with  the  duties  of  an  intendant.  In  one  letter,  for  instance, 
he  instructed  him  to  study  the  means  "of  estabHshing  order 
in  matters  of  religion,  justice,  and  police."^"  Further- 
more, he  regarded  Pelissier  as  directly  subject  to  his 
orders.     Thus  on  December  20,  1670,  he  wrote  him: 

"I  am  very  much  surprised  that  you  have  not  replied 
article  by  article  to  the  instructions  which  I  gave  you  and 
that  you  have  not  answered  my  letters.  Do  not  fail  to  do  so 
as  soon  as  you  receive  this  letter.  Inasmuch  as  the  company 
is  in  accord  with  the  orders  which  I  have  given  it  in  the  name 
of  the  king  and  with  all  the  suggestions  which  I  make  for  its 
advancement  and  welfare,  you  must  conform  your  conduct  to 
what  I  write.  You  may  rest  assured  that  the  company  will 
give  you  orders  to  do  the  same  thing."^^ 

The  original  instructions  to  Pelissier  present  very 
clearly  Colbert's  views  as  to  the  particular  duties  of  a 
director  and  as  to  the  principles  which  should  guide  the 
West  India  Company  in  its  efforts  to  build  up  trade.  He 
was  instructed  to  inform  himself  thoroughly  before  his 
departure  of  the  complete  history  of  the  company's 
activities  and  policy.  After  his  arrival  in  the  islands,  he 
was  to  examine  carefully  the  accounts  of  agents,  to  listen 
to  the  complaints  of  the  planters  against  them,  and,  in 
general,  to  examine  thoroughly  their  conduct.  In  case 
they  were  found  guilty,  they  were  to  be  dismissed  and 
punished.  The  most  interesting  passages  of  these  instruc- 
tions are  the  following: 

"As  the  interests  of  the  company  are  purely  commercial,  the 
conduct  of  the  directors  should  be  governed  by  three  unvary- 
ing maxims,  namely,  freedom  in  trade,  honesty,  and  content- 

20  Ibid.,  pp.  486-496. 

21  Ibid.,  p.  503. 

159 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

merit  with  a  small  profit.  As  to  freedom  in  trade,  although  it 
may  prove  difficult,  if  the  company  monopolizes  commerce,  it 
is  nevertheless  certain  that  some  expedient  can  be  found  which 
will  give  satisfaction  to  the  planters  on  this  point.  It  is  very 
important  to  maintain  this  principle,  as  it  is  the  only  thing 
which  will  promote  the  cultivation  and  the  development  of 
the  islands  .  .  .  for  liberty  is  the  soul  of  commerce  and 
alone  can  work  its  increase.  As  everything  which  is  contrary 
to  it  will  retard  the  development  of  the  colonies  some  means 
of  establishing  it  must  be  found.  So  long  as  the  company 
grants  permission  to  French  private  traders,  it  will  be  sufficient 
merely  to  grant  the  liberty  to  those  who  send  merchandise 
to  the  islands  of  selling  to  whomever  they  wish  and  for 
whatever  price  they  wish.  .  .  .  When,  however,  the  company 
ceases  to  grant  such  permission  and  assumes  a  monopoly  of 
this  commerce,  one  will  be  compelled  to  trust  to  the  good 
faith  of  the  company  in  establishing  storehouses  in  each  of 
the  islands,  where  an  abundance  of  all  sorts  of  merchandise 
will  be  on  sale,  and  in  selling  its  merchandise  at  auction  to 
the  highest  bidder,  in  order  in  this  way  to  make  it  possible 
for  a  large  number  of  people  to  carry  on  a  retail  trade. 

"In  regard  to  sugar  and  the  other  products  of  the  islands, 
their  price  will  be  regulated  by  the  sale  of  merchandise  at 
public  auction.  But  if  it  is  found  that  the  introduction  of 
specie,  recently  made,  interferes  with  the  system  of  exchange, 
and  that  merchandise  is  being  bought  for  cash,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  find  some  means  of  limiting  liberty  of  sale  or 
at  least  of  regulating  the  price  in  such  a  way  that  both  the 
company  and  the  planters  will  find  an  honest  gain.  The  profit 
and  development  of  the  company  depend  on  the  consider- 
able increase  in  the  number  of  inhabitants  in  all  the  islands, 
because  such  an  increase  brings  with  it  an  increase  both  in 
the  demand  for  the  merchandise  and  in  the  quantity  of  pro- 
ducts in  the  islands.  These  two  sources  of  increase  should 
prove  instrumental  in  enriching  the  company.  The  company, 
therefore,  must  work  for  the  comfort  of  the  planters,  so  that 
their  friends  in  France  may  be  attracted  to  the  islands. 
Thus  it  should  sell  its  goods  at  low  prices  and  leave  as  much 

160 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

liberty  as  possible  in  trade.  It  should  choose  two  seaports, 
such  as  La  Rochelle  and  Havre,  with  some  others  such  as 
Honfleur  or  Dieppe,  where  it  can  load  and  unload  its  vessels. 
In  these  ports  it  should  maintain  its  depots  well  filled  with 
all  merchandise  for  which  there  is  a  demand  in  the  islands. 
.  .  .  Vessels  on  arriving  in  France  should  be  unloaded,  re- 
paired and  reloaded  and  sent  back  to  the  islands  with  all 
diligence.  The  same  rule  should  be  observed  by  the  com- 
pany's agents  in  the  islands.  The  company  should  strive  to 
pay  all  debts  and  begin  a  new  record. 

"The  king  desires  that  Sieur  Pelissier  remain  an  entire 
year  in  the  islands.  He  is  not  to  return  to  France  without 
an  express  order  from  the  king,  or  before  another  director 
will  have  arrived  to  replace  him."^^ 

Pelissier  arrived  in  the  islands  at  the  beginning  of  July. 
His  credentials  were  formally  registered  at  Martinique 
on  the  14th.^^  He  spent  about  two  years  in  inspecting  and 
supervising  the  affairs  of  the  company.  During  this  time 
Colbert  was  in  constant  correspondence  with  him.  He 
instructed  him  to  work  at  the  larger  task  of  promoting 
the  interests  of  the  islands.  "Remember  that  I  count 
upon  it,"  he  wrote  in  one  letter,  "that  during  your  sojourn 
in  the  islands  you  will  pay  much  attention  to  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  king's  orders  that  foreigners  be  entirely 
excluded  from  trading  and  that  French  private  traders 
enjoy  complete  liberty  to  trade.  Inasmuch  as  upon 
these  two  points  depend  the  advancement  of  the  com- 
pany's interests,  the  prosperity  of  the  islands  and  the 
increase  of  the  colonies,  bend  your  energy  to  their  enforce- 
ment."^ 

In  other  letters  he  urged  Pelissier  to  reduce  the  amount 
of  sugar  produced  in  the  islands  by  persuading  the  plant- 
ers to  undertake  the  culture  of  other  products;  to  see  to 

22  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  472-476. 

23Daney,  Histoire  de  la  Martinique,  II,  195. 

24  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  121  verso,  October  12,  1670. 

161 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

it  that  wise  regulations  were  made  for  the  preservation 
and  increase  of  live  stock  in  the  several  islands ;  to  urge 
the  inhabitants  to  build  ships  and  to  engage  in  commerce ; 
to  make  a  census  of  the  island ;  to  try  to  settle  the  dispute 
between  the  governors  of  Guadeloupe  and  St.  Christopher ; 
and  in  general,  to  consider  what  would  be  "the  most 
advantageous  and  wisest  thing  to  do  for  the  police  of  the 
islands  and  particularly  to  establish  an  entire  freedom  of 
commerce  to  all  Prench  traders,  to  drive  out  foreigners, 
to  establish  public  fairs  and  markets,  to  insure  full  lib- 
erty to  creditors,  to  compel  their  debtors  to  pay  them, 
and  finally,  to  perfect  the  manufacture  of  tobacco  and 
sugar."^^ 

Pelissier-  doe&  not  seem  to  have  carried  out  the  spirit 
of  Colbert's- instructions  that  the  company  work  for  the 
comfort  of  the  planters  and  sell  goods  at  small  profit. 
Thus  du  Lion  complained  to  Colbert,  "that  M.  Pelissier, 
a  short  time  after  his  arrival  at  Martinique,  ordered  the 
company's  agents  to  sell  at  prices  as  high  as  9000  and 
10,000  pounds  of  sugar  each,  horses  and  mares  of  Poitou 
for  which  the  company  had  paid  forty  of  fifty  ecus."^ 
Likewise  de  Baas  complained  that  Pelissier  had  given 
instructions  to  the  company's  chief  agent  at  Martinique 
to  sell  at  4000  pounds  of  sugar  slaves  for  which  the 
Dutch  used  to  demand  only  SOOO  pounds.  "That  is 
certainly  hard,"  remarked  de  Baas,  "and  it  is  not  a 
means  to  make  the  planters  love  the  company. "^^  Col- 
bert was  forced  to  interfere  by  ordering  that  this  ex- 
orbitant price  be  lowered.^  Pelissier  does  seem  to  have 
made  some  efforts  in  accordance  with  Colbert's  suggestion 
to  study  the  needs  of  the  islands  with  a  view  of  increasing 

25  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  526  ff. 

26  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cy,  II,  March  15,  1673. 

27  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  29,  1671. 

28  Ibid.,  February  28,  1672. 

162 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

commerce,  for,  in  a  letter  of  July  8,  1671,  he  enclosed  a 
memoir  regarding  "the  trade  which  can  be  carried  on 
with  the  French  Antilles  by  the  merchants  of  Marseilles 
and  of  other  French  ports  of  Provence  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean coast."  Detailed  information  was  given  as  to  the 
articles  which  the  islands  needed  and  the  current  prices 
there.'' 

Material  is  entirely  too  scanty  to  permit  any  estimate  of 
what  Pelissier  really  accomplished  in  the  islands.  Col- 
bert's letters  to  him  would  seem  to  indicate  that  he  had 
much  confidence  in  him  and  was  more  or  less  satisfied  with 
what  Pelissier  was  doing.  His  mission,  however,  certainly 
failed  to  restore  the  West  India  Company  to  a  prosperous 
condition,  or  to  check  it  on  the  downward  road  to  bank- 
ruptcy. 

The  more  Colbert  laboured  to  build  up  the  commerce 
of  the  French  West  Indies,  the  more  he  realized  that  all 
efforts  to  make  the  company  prosperous  were  proving 
fruitless,  and  that  much  more  hope  was  to  be  placed  in 
the  employment  of  the  private  trader  as  an  agent  in  the 
realization  of  his  plans.  He  seems,  however,  to  have  enter- 
tained one  last  hope  that  the  West  India  Company  could 
be  utilized  in  the  solution  of  his  important  problem.  He 
endeavoured  to  make  it  useful  by  forcing  it  to  concentrate 
its  forces  upon  the  importation  of  special  articles  which 
the  private  trader  was  not  supplying  satisfactorily  and 
which  were  very  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the  planters. 
"The  king  orders  me  to  inform  you,"  he  wrote  to  the 
directors  on  November  10,  16T1,  "that  it  is  his  will. that- 
the  West  India  Company  engage  in  no  other  commerce 

29  Thus  the  common  wine  of  Provence  was  sold  in  the  islands  for 
700  or  800  pounds  of  sugar  the  cask,  brandy  for  600  to  650  pounds 
the  barrel,  salt  fish  at  550  to  600  the  barrel,  salt  beef  at  200  to  250 
the  barrel.  Colbert  in  his  letter  of  December  8,  1670,  acknowledged 
the  receipt  of  Pelissier's  memoir  on  "the  price  of  sugar,  the  trade  in 
slaves  and  live  stock,"  but  no  trace  of  the  memoir  has  been  found. 


/ 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

in  the  jcoiintries  of  its  concession  than  that  of  importing 
into  the  islands  slaves  from  the  coast  of  Guinea  and  live 
stock  and  salt  meat  from  France."^^ 

This  short  letter,  which  has  been  quoted  entire,  is  an 
important  document  in  the  history  of  the  company,  and 
marks  a  milestone  in  the  history  of  the  commerektl-poliey 
of  Colbert,  for  it  is  proof  positive  that  the  great  minister 
had  realized  that  the  instrument  which  he  had  chosen  in 
1664  to  carry  out  his  plans  for  establishing  commerce  with 
the  West  Indies  was  no  longer  suited  to  that  end  in  1671. 
It  remains  to  see  in  the  succeeding  chapter  how  far  the 
company  succeeded  in  accomplishing  the  smaller  task 
which  Colbert  had  assigned  to  it  and  to  trace  briefly  the 
events  which  led  to  its  dissolution. 

30  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  97,  letter  to  the  directors  of  the  W.  Ind. 
Company,  November  3,  1671;  fol.  99,  circular  letter  to  the  officials  in 
the  ports,  November  10,  1671. 


164 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  West  India  Company,  1670-1674 

Its  Trade  in  Slaves,  Salt  Beef,  Live' Stock. 

Its  Downfall,  .,. 

■ «,  ■■'■ 

fTl  HE  West  India  Company  apparently  made  its  first 
-*-  attempt  to  establish,  on  its  own  account,  trade  on 
the  coast  of  Guinea  at  the  end  of  the  year  1669. '  It  is 
particularly  fortunate  to  have  an  account  of  this  attempt 
written  by  Sieui-  Delbee,  the  captain  of  one  of  the  vessels 
sent  out  by^  the  company.^  The  expedition  was  composed 
of  two  vessels.  La  Justice,  a  frigate  of  250  tons,  under  the 
command  of  Sieur  Delbee,  and  La  Concorde,  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Jasmin.  They  were  both  laden  with 
everything  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  trading 
'posts  and  for  the  commencement  of  trade.  On  board  La 
Justice  were  Sieur  du  Bourg,  who  was  to  become  com- 
mander for  the  company  at  the  coast,  and  Sieur  Carolof, 
with  several  clerks  and  passengers.  We  have  already  had 
occasion  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  Carolof,  for  it  was 
to  him,  it  may  be  remembered,  that  the  company  granted 
in  1665  the  privilege  of  trading  on  the  western  coast  of 
Africa.' 

They  set  sail  from  Havre  on  November  1,  1669,  doubled 
Cape  Verde  on  the  26th,  and,  having  passed  before  the 
English  settlement  at  Gambia,  were  becalmed  nearly  two 

1  Delbee  (le  Sieur),  Journal  du  Voyage  du  Sieur  Delbee,  com- 
missaire  general  de  la  Marine  aux  Isles,  dans  la  caste  de  Ouinee  pour 
Vestahlissement  du  commerce  en  ces  'pays  en  Vannee  1669,  Paris,  1671. 

2  He  had  apparently  been  engaged  in  the  slave  trade  during  the 
intervening  years,  for  Delbee  speaks  of  him  as  "one  who  had  traded 
at  this  coast  and  who  had  great  knowledge  of  the  practices  of  trade 
there."    Journal,  p.  387. 

165 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

weeks  at  the  mouth  of  the  Sierra  Leone.  On  December 
21,  the  Cape  of  Palms  was  rounded  and  on  the  26th  anchor 
was  cast  before  Assenay,^  where  an  EngHsh  ship  was  trad- 
ing with  the  natives,  but  set  sail  immediately  on  perceiving 
that  the  incoming  vessels  were  French.  "A  short  time 
afterwards  a  number  of  negroes  came  in  a  canoe  to  our 
vessels.  The  moment  that  they  saw  we  were  French,  they 
plunged  into  the  sea,  daring  not  to  come  near  us,  for  the 
English  had  told  them,  as  we  learned  afterwards,  that  we 
were  not  to  be  trusted  and  that  we  kidnapped  all  the 
negroes  who  came  to  trade  with  us  along  the  coast."* 
Seeing  that  it  was  impossible  to  trade  with  these  negroes, 
the  vessels  set  sail  on  the  27th,  and  after  encountering 
light  winds,  rounded  the  Cape  of  Three  Points  on  the  30th, 
and  anchored  before  Chateau  de  la  Mine,  "where  resides 
the  Dutch  general  who  is  in  command  of  all  those  of  his 
nation  who  frequent  the  coast. "^  As  the  French  possessed 
no  fort  there  and  realized  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  estab- 
lish one,  they  sailed  farther  to  the  eastward.  Carolof 
learned  from  the  directors  of  the  Danish  post  that  the 
Dutch  had  long  since  known  of  the  West  India  Company's 
plans  and  were  making  preparations  to  prevent  their 
realization.  Acting  under  instructions  from  Holland, 
they  "were  resolved  to  spare  no  pains  to  keep  us  from 
trading  or  at  least  to  render  our  trade  so  unprofitable 
that  our  voyage  would  prove  unfruitful." 

3  On  the  coast  between  Cape  of  Palms  and  Cape  of  Three  Points. 

^Journal,  p.  369. 

5  "It  is  a  place  well  fortified  with  a  good  garrison,  where  all  the 
Dutch  ships  take  water  and  wood  and  receive  their  orders.  The 
Dutch  pay  a  water  tax  to  the  king  of  the  country  who  has  never  per- 
mitted them  to  dig  a  cistern  in  their  chateau,  employing  this  means 
to  hold  them  in  subjection.  Cape  Corse  is  about  twelve  miles  from 
this  chateau,  where  the  fort  of  the  English  general  is  located.  Five 
miles  farther  to  the  east  is  the  chateau  of  the  Danes,  which  is  called 
Fredericksburg.  Still  farther  on  are  three  forts,  two  of  which  belong 
to  the  Dutch  and  one  to  the  English."    Ibid. 

166 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

La  Justice  anchored  at  the  gold  coast  in  the  kingdom 
of  Ardres  on  January  4,  1670.  Four  Dutch  vessels  were 
already  anchored  there  and  were  joined  by  a  fifth  a  few 
days  later.  On  January  5,  Carolof  debarked  and  went  to 
OfFra,  "a  burg  about  five  miles  from  the  seashore  where 
were  situated  the  trading  posts  of  all  foreigners  who 
traded  with  the  king  of  Ardres."  He  had  an  interview 
with  the  fidalque,  who  was  charged  with  the  commercial 
affairs  of  the  kingdom.  Carolof  at  once  perceived  that 
the  Dutch  were  using  shrewd  and  underhanded  means  to 
thwart  his  mission,  but  succeeded,  nevertheless,  in  obtain- 
ing a  promise  from  the  fidalque  to  demand  an  audience  of 
the  king  for  him.  He  also  sent  a  messenger  to  the  king  on 
his  own  responsibility.  Four  days  passed  without  a  word 
of  reply,  which  was  very  surprising,  "because  Carolof  had 
hoped  that  the  news  which  he  had  sent  the  king  of  his 
arrival,  in  recalling  to  his  memory  the  confidence  which  he 
had  honoured  him  with  in  former  years,  and  the  fact  that 
they  had  drunk  *bocca  a  hocca^  together  would  produce 
some  extraordinary  effect  in  his  favour  and  shorten  the 
delay  which  newly  arrived  foreigners  are  forced  ordinarily 
to  endure."^ 

On  the  9th,  a  coach  all  gilded  and  a  set  of  harness, 
with  gilded  trimmings  and  gilded  bridles,  were  brought 
from  the  ship  and  set  ashore.  It  was  the  present  of  the 
West  India  Company  to  the  king  of  Ardres.  All  was  put 
in  preparation  for  the  reception  by  the  king,  but  the 
French  were  kept  waiting  until  the  16th,  when  an  officer 
came  to  Offra  with  a  message  from  his  master  to  Sieur 
Carolof.  The  king,  said  the  message,  had  not  forgotten 
his  ancient  friendship  for  Sieur  Carolof,  and  as  a  proof 
of  his  esteem  for  him  he  would  not  require  presents  in 
advance,  as  he  had  the  habit  of  doing  with  others;  he 
was  favourably  disposed  to  grant  to  the  French  the  same 

^Journal,  p.  388. 

167 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

privileges  as  he  had  already  granted  to  those  who  were 
actually  engaged  in  trade  in  his  kingdom.  On  the  18th, 
the  prince  and  the  grand  captain  of  commerce  arrived  at 
OiFra  to  conduct  Carolof  into  the  presence  of  the  king. 
The  19th  and  20th  were  passed  in  exchanging  compli- 
ments. On  the  latter  day  the  prince  had  a  great  tent 
pitched  on  the  seashore,  whither  he  came  with  his  invited 
guests,  du  Bourg,  Carolof,  the  chief  agent  of  the  English, 
and  a  sub-agent  of  the  Dutch,  and  there  a  feast  was 
spread.^ 

On  the  26th,  du  Bourg  was  invited  to  lodge  in  the  royal 
palace  in  an  apartment  to  be  henceforth  reserved  for  the 
French.  He  was  received  by  the  king  on  the  morrow.  He 
paid  his  compliments  to  the  monarch  in  the  name  of  the 
West  India  Company  and  begged  him  to  accept  the  char- 
iot as  a  present  from  it.  He  then  asked  permission  to 
build  a  trading  post  at  Offra,  promising  to  send  four 
ships  yearly  to  trade.  The  reply  was  made  that  the 
Dutch  were  in  the  habit  of  sending  more  vessels  than 
could  be  supplied  and  that  during  the  last  year  some 
were  compelled  to  sail  without  cargoes ;  that  there  were  at 
present  six  Dutch  vessels  at  the  coast  and  four  more  were 
at  Chateau  de  la  Mine  near  by,  which  awaited  word  from 
their  agents  to  come  and  take  cargoes ;  that  thus  there 
was  no  scarcity  either  of  vessels  or  of  merchandise;  fur- 
thermore that  the  Dutch  had  made  very  attractive  offers 
to  establish  a  close  alliance  with  the  king  and  to  have  a 
monopoly  of  trade  which  the  king  would  perhaps  find 
advantageous  to  accept,  inasmuch  as  the  English  seemed 
to  have  neglected  his  coast  last  year,  and  as  the  French, 
who  used  to  come  in  former  years,  did  not  keep  their  word 
or  fulfill  their  promises,  of  which  no  one  could  with  justice 

7Delb6e  has  recorded  his  impressions  of  the  feast  which  may  be 
consulted  with  interest  by  all  those  who  love  the  curious.  Journal, 
p.  394. 

168 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

accuse  the  Dutch;  but  that  notwithstanding  all  of  these 
reasons,  "the  great  things  which  he  had  heard  of  the  king 
of  France  and  of  the  love  which  one  of  his  principal  min- 
isters had  for  commerce  .  .  .  made  him  desire  to  gain  the 
friendship  of  such  a  great  monarch  by  treating  his  sub- 
jects with  favour;  that  accordingly  he  had  given  orders 
to  his  great  captain  of  commerce  to  construct  a  post  for 
the  French  at  Offra  and  to  protect  them  in  all  things,  and 
to  favour  their  commerce."  Thereupon  were  brought 
before  the  king  the  chests  which  contained  the  most  pre- 
cious merchandise  which  had  been  brought.  The  king 
chose  "aU  the  pearls  and  the  large  red  and  blue  beads,  the 
carnavacques,  crystals  and  the  fine  cottons  of  India,  be- 
cause the  Dutch  did  not  bring  such  merchandise."^ 

Carolof  made  an  agreement  that  slaves  should  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  West  India  Company's  agent  at  the  rate  of 
eighteen  bars  of  iron  each,  although  the  former  price  had 
been  only  twelve.^  He  then  went  to  Assem,  where  he  traded 
with  the  prince  and  some  important  officials  for  260  slaves. 
He  returned  to  Offra  on  January  30,  and  spent  the  month 
of  February  trading.  By  March  1,  La  Justice  had  aboard 
a  cargo  of  434  negroes  and  was  ready  to  sail  for  the  West 
Indies.  When  she  was  on  the  point  of  sailing.  La  Con- 
corde arrived.  Carolof  was  unwilling  to  sail  before  pro- 
vision had  been  made  for  its  cargo.  Much  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  cargo  of  slaves  aboard  La  Justice,  many  days 
were  spent  in  new  interviews  with  the  king  and  the  prince. 
Delbee  reports  a  very  interesting  conversation  which  he 
pretends  to  have  had  with  the  king  during  the  course  of 
these  new  interviews: 

"The  king  remarked  that  he  was  somewhat  surprised  that 

^Journal,  p.  409. 

9  "He  had  reason  for  that  which  I  do  not  know  and  as  he  had  been 
given  direction  of  all  that  which  concerned  trade,  du  Bourg  permitted 
him  to  do  this  without  interfering."    Ibid. 

169 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

we  brought  only  merchandise  similar  to  that  which  the  Dutch 
for  a  long  time  had  been  in  the  habit  of  bringing.  To  this 
I  replied  that  the  Dutch  being  our  neighbours  carried  on  an 
important  commerce  with  France  and  were  in  the  habit  of 
choosing  those  articles  which  were  the  best  suited  and  would 
prove  the  most  agreeable  to  the  king;  and  that  inasmuch  as 
we  had  no  knowledge  ourselves  of  what  would  prove  most 
useful  to  the  king,  we  brought  those  articles  which  the  Dutch 
were  in  the  habit  of  bringing;  but  that  if  we  had  known  that 
had  he  desired  other  things,  we  would  not  have  failed  to 
bring  them.  Whereupon  the  king  asked  me  to  bring  him,  on 
my  next  voyage,  a  sword  of  silver  a  la  frangaise,  a  large  knife, 
two  large  mirrors,  some  fine  cloth,  lace  suitable  for  making 
two  vests,  two  pairs  of  slippers,  which  I  promised  to  do."^° 

La  Justice  set  sail  on  March  13  for  the  islands  and 
arrived  at  St.  Pierre  (Martinique)  on  June  7.  De  Baas 
wrote  to  Colbert  on  June  25,  1670,  as  follows : 

"I  found  on  arriving  here  [Martinique]  the  vessel,  named 
La  Justice,  commanded  by  Sieur  Delbee,  with  a  cargo  of 
310  negroes  or  thereabouts.  More  than  a  hundred  died  dur- 
ing the  voyage  and  certain  others  after  they  were  landed.  I 
gave  orders  for  an  equal  distribution  to  be  made  between 
the  three  islands,  Martinique,  Guadeloupe  and  St.  Christo- 
pher. Two-thirds  were  set  aside  for  the  last  named  islands, 
but  as  Captain  Delbee  assured  the  general  clerk  [of  the  com- 
pany] that  there  would  be  a  cargo  of  slaves  for  each  island, 
and  that  his  own  was  meant  for  Martinique,  the  whole  cargo 
was  sold  here."^^ 

The  vessel  had  taken  two  months  and  three  days  to 
make  the  voyage  from  Havre  to  the  coast  of  Guinea  and 

"^^  Journal,  p.  424. 

11  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  June  25,  1670.  Du 
Lion  in  his  letter  of  July  18  likewise  notes  the  arrival  of  the  vessel. 
As  to  its  cargo,  he  simply  says  that  the  vessel  "had  a  cargo  of 
slaves."  Du  Lion  notes  in  this  same  letter,  however,  the  arrival  of 
another  vessel  belonging  to  M.  de  Formont  "with  a  considerably  less 
cargo  of  negroes."    Ibid.,  Cy,  I. 

170 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

from  there  to  Martinique,  two  months  and  twenty-three 
days.  After  having  spent  a  little  more  than  three  months 
in  trade  at  St.  Pierre,  La  Justice  set  sail  for  France  on 
July  21  with  a  cargo  of  sugar  and  tobacco.  Cape  Lizard 
was  sighted  on  September  16,  and  on  the  20th  the  vessel 
anchored  at  Havre.  The  voyage  from  the  islands  was 
made  in  two  months,  less  a  day.  The  whole  voyage,  there- 
fore, had  taken  ten  months  and  twenty  days.^^ 

La  Concorde,  which  we  left  at  the  coast  of  Ardres, 
traded  successfully  and  sailed  for  the  islands  with  a  cargo 
of  bQS  slaves.  It  arrived  at  Martinique  on  September 
22,  1670,  with  443,  having  lost  120  en  route.^^  Aboard 
her  was  Matheo  Lopez,  sent  by  the  king  of  Ardres  as  his 
ambassador  to  the  French  king.  He  was  received  with 
great  pomp  at  Martinique  by  de  Baas  and  Pelissier.  He 
was  sent  to  France  aboard  La  Bergere,  one  of  the  com- 
pany's vessels,  which  sailed  from  Martinique  about  Octo- 
ber 1.  The  arrival  of  this  ambassador  with  three  of  his 
wives,  three  children  and  several  slaves  created  a  sensa- 
tion at  Versailles.^^ 

This  initial  expedition  of  the  company  to  the  coast  of 
Africa  seemed  auspicious,  for  it  had  yielded  good  profit. 
Colbert  seems  to  have  had  a  large  vision  of  what  might 
be  accomplished.  Thus  we  find  him  instructing  PeHssier 
to  "consider  carefully  what  advantage  there  will  be  for 
the  company  if,  after  having  furnished  some  2000  negroes 
to  meet  the  demand  in  the  islands,  it  can  obtain  2000  more 
to  sell  to  the  Spaniards  of  Terre  Ferme,  for  these  Span- 
iards never  refuse  to  buy  slaves  and  pay  very  dear  for 
them  to  the  Dutch  of  Cura9ao."^^  Encouragements  were 
offered  to  continue  the  trade.  An  arret  of  the  conseil 
d'etat  removed  all  duties  from  merchandise  exported  from 

^2  Journal,  p.  473. 

13  Ibid.,  p.  474. 

^^  Le  Commerce  de  I'AmSrique  par  Marseille,  II,  159. 

15  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  485,  June  21,  1670. 

171 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

the  kingdom  to  the  coast  of  Guinea,^^  and  a  bounty  was 
offered  of  thirteen  livres  per  head  for  all  slaves  imported 
into  the  islands." 

The  company  seems  to  have  continued  to  send  vessels  to 
Guinea.  Carolof  arrived  at  Guadeloupe  near  the  begin- 
ning of  1672  with  a  cargo  of  350  slaves.  One  of  the  com- 
pany's vessels,  the  St.  Francois  (captain,  Mallet)  of 
Dieppe,  brought  a  cargo  of  over  200  slaves  to  the  same 
island  at  the  close  of  the  year.  At  the  same  time.  La  Jus- 
tice was  being  expected  with  another  cargo  from  the  coast 
of  Guinea.^^  The  energetic  measures  which  Colbert  took 
to  keep  the  Dutch  out  of  the  islands,  especially  during  the 
years  1670-71,  by  maintaining  patrol  about  the  Wind- 
ward Islands,  probably  gave  the  West  India  Company 
and  private  French  traders  licensed  by  it  a  monopoly 
of  this  trade.  Pelissier  tried  to  take  advantage  of  this 
fact  by  putting  the  price  of  slaves  at  4000  pounds  of 
sugar,  which  was  100  per  cent  dearer  than  the  price  for- 
merly demanded  by  the  Dutch.^^ 

16  To  prevent  frauds  captains  of  vessels  were  forced  to  deposit  at 
their  return  a  certificate  of  discharge  of  cargo  signed  by  the  agents 
of  the  company  at  the  coast.  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  3;  Le  Commerce  de 
I'Amirique  par  Marseille,  II,  303,  arret  of  September  18,  1671. 

i7Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  259-260,  January  13,  1672;  ten  livres 
of  this  sum  were  to  be  paid  by  His  Majesty  to  merchants  who  sent 
the  ships  with  cargoes  of  slaves  and  three  livres  by  the  "West  India 
Company  to  the  captains  of  ships. 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cy,  II,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  December  5,  1672. 

19  Colbert  attempted  to  encourage  the  individual  French  trader  to 
share  the  slave  trade  with  the  company.  Thus  an  arret  of  August  26, 
1670,  removed  the  tax  of  5  per  cent  laid  by  the  company  on  them  for 
the  privilege  of  trading  at  the  coast  of  Guinea.  Moreau  de  Saint- 
M6ry,  I,  197.  They  were  also  admitted  to  the  benefits  of  the  arrSt 
which  granted  exemption  from  duties  on  cargoes  exported  to  Guinea 
and  of  that  which  granted  a  bounty  of  thirteen  livres  per  head  of 
slaves  imported  into  the  islands.  No  large  results,  however,  were 
obtained  from  this  policy.  Very  few  individuals  seemed  to  have  been 
attracted  to  the  trade.  Colbert  himself  expressed  his  disappoint- 
ment.   Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  137,  Colbert  to  the  directors. 

172 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

But  no  important  results  seem  to  have  been  realized  from 
the  efforts  of  the  company.  It  was  approaching  too  near 
to  its  debacle  to  be  able  to  accomplish  the  task  set  for  it. 
Du  Lion  wrote  in  1672  that  the  company  was  no  longer 
making  efforts  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  islands,  for  the 
vessels  it  sent  brought  only  cargoes  "of  planks,  coal  and 
barrels  in  order  to  carry  away  the  sugar  received  in  pay- 
ment of  debts  which  the  company  was  demanding  with 
utmost  vigour.^" 

It  is  to  be  recalled  that  Colbert  commanded  the  com- 
pany to  direct  its  attention  also  to  the  importation  of 
salt  beef  and  live  stock.  He  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
fact  that  the  large  amount  of  salt  beef  consumed  in  the 
French  islands  came  almost  entirely  from  Ireland  and  was 
often  imported  by  foreign  traders.  He  was  particularly 
anxious  that  Fxance  be  made  to  produce  the  supply  neces- 
sary and  most  of  all  that  it  be  carried  to  the  islands  by 
French  traders.  This  was  why  he  wished  the  West  India 
Company  to  devote  special  attention  to  the  matter. 

His  correspondence  with  Brunei,  one  of  the  directors  of 
the  company,  is  very  instructive  in  showing  the  persistence 
with  which  Colbert  attempted  to  realize  his  wishes.  On 
October  27,  1670,  he  wrote : 

"I  note  by  your  letter  the  application  which  you  are  giving 
at  present  to  carry  out  the  principal  points  of  the  instruc- 
tions which  I  gave  you,  and  especially  in  regard  to  the  pur- 
chase of  French  beef  to  send  to  the  islands  in  place  of  that 
of  Ireland.  As  you  know  how  very  much  I  cherish  the  suc- 
cess of  the  plan,  you  will  understand  how  happy  I  am  to 
learn  of  the  hopes  which  you  have  of  success.  .  .  .  Bend 
your  energy  in  that  direction  and  be  very  sure  that  you  can 
do  nothing  which  could  prove  more  agreeable  to  me."^^ 

20  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,   II,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  July  23,  1672. 

21  Depping,  Correspondance,  III,  522. 

173 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 
On  November  13,  he  wrote: 

"In  regard  to  the  matter  of  beef^  do  not  let  yourself  be 
discouraged  by  difficulties  which  you  encounter  at  first  and 
continue  without  exception  to  buy  French  beef.  In  order 
to  let  you  know  how  very  much  I  have  the  matter  at  heart, 
I  shall  tell  you  that  I  have  informed  the  directors  who  are 
at  Paris  that  if  the  company  will  ship  during  the  year  4000 
barrels  of  French  beef  to  the  islands,  I  shall  have  the  king 
pay  to  it  4000  ecus.^  During  your  sojourn  at  La  Rochelle 
take  measures  which  will  be  necessary  for  the  shipment  of  the 
said  amount  to  the  islands  during  the  year  l671.  Take  care, 
however,  that  this  be  done  in  good  faith,  and  that  only  beef  of 
France  be  furnished.  .  .  .  Let  me  know  every  two  weeks  how 
much  beef  you  have  bought  and  the  number  of  barrels  which 
you  have  in  condition  to  send  to  the  islands."^ 

To  the  objection  that  French  beef  was  too  dear,  Col- 
bert wrote  Brunet  that  is  was  necessary  to  convince 
traders  that  it  was  of  superior  quality.  When  Brunet 
found  that  merchants  resorted  to  smuggling,  Colbert 
wrote : 

"Continue  always  to  buy  French  beef.  ...  In  order  to 
force  merchants  who  trade  in  the  islands  to  buy  French  beef, 
you  can  forbid  them  to  use  He  de  Re  as  an  entrepot  for  the 
purchase  of  Irish  beef.  In  case  that  you  have  need  of  an  arret 
of  the  conseil  d'etat  to  aid  you  in  the  matter,  let  me  know  and 
I  shall  send  it  to  you  promptly. "^^ 

Such  an  arret  was  published  on  August  17,  1671,  which 
formally  annulled  the  right  of  entrepot  for  "beef  and  other 

22  Bonnassieux,  Les  Orandes  Comp.  de  Commerce,  p.  374,  states 
that  the  sum  of  3012  livres  was  accorded  to  the  West  India  Company 
as  a  bounty  on  salt  beef  which  it  had  shipped  to  the  islands. 

23Depping,  Correspondance,  III,  523;  see  also  other  letters  in 
regard  to  the  same  subjects,  pp.  524,  525,  526. 

24  Ibid.,  p.  527,  February  26,  1671. 

174 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

meats  from  Ireland."^^  This  was  followed  by  a  royal  ordi- 
nance which  forbade  the  importation  into  the  islands  of 
all  beef  and  bacon  from  foreign  countries  under  penalty 
of  confiscation  and  500  livres  fine  for  the  first  offense,  and 
of  bodily  punishment  in  case  of  repetition. 

Brunet  seems  to  have  made  some  purchases  of  beef  for 
the  company  in  upper  Guyenne.^^  Colbert  encouraged 
him  to  continue:  "I  see  already  from  news  which  reaches 
me  from  the  provinces  around  La  Rochelle  that  the  fact 
that  you  are  buying  cattle  has  aroused  interest.  I  am 
counting  on  you  to  arrange  matters  in  such  a  way  that  in 
the  future  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  buy  Irish  beef."^ 

In  spite,  however,  of  Colbert's  determination  "to  suc- 
ceed in  the  project  at  any  cost,"  he  was  doomed  to  dis- 
appointment. De  Baas  wrote  to  him  in  February,  1672, 
that  French  ships  were  bringing  no  beef  and  that,  as  a 
consequence,  suffering  was  great.^  The  West  India  Com- 
pany thus  met  with  even  less  success  in  supplying  the 
islands  with  salt  beef  than  in  furnishing  them  with  slaves. 

It  met  apparently  with  another  failure  in  trying  to 
supply  live  stock.  Brunet  received  instructions  to  pur- 
chase live  stock  during  his  sojourn  at  La  Rochelle  and  to 
ship  it  to  the  West  Indies.  He  seems  to  have  made  some 
shipments,  for  we  find  Pelissier  arousing  protests,  because 
he  demanded  the  exorbitant  price  "of  9000  to  10,000 
pounds  of  sugar  for  horses  of  Poitou,"  which  the  West 
India  Company  was  shipping  to  the  islands.  No  evidence 
has  been  found,  however,  which  shows  that  these  shipments 
were  of  any  considerable  importance. 

It  was  the  failure  to  perform  these  tasks,  together  with^ 
the  fact  of  an  increasing  number  of  private  French  trad- 

25Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  I,  230. 

^6  Depping,  Correspondance,  III,  528. 

27  E.  Jourdan,  Ephemerides  de  la  Rochelle,  II,  32,  33. 

28  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  28,  1672. 

175 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ers^,  tlrat  brought  Colbert  to  _the,.re&oJlution  to  abolish  the 
West  India  Company.  On  October  11  he  wrote  to  the 
directors : 

"Inasmuch  as  the  commerce  of  the  West  India  Company 
is  diminishing  every  day  by  reason  of  the  number  of  vessels 
which  private  traders  are  sending  to  the  islands  and  to  the 
coast  of  Guinea_,  and  consequently  as  some  of  the  company's 
vessels  may  remain  idle,  the  directors  may  charter  such  vessels 
to  the  Company  of  the  North,  which  will  pay  them  five  livres 
per  ton  more  than  they  pay  to  foreign  vessels."^® 

On  December  20,  Colbert  informed  the  directors  that  it 
would  not  be  necessary  to  maintain  any  longer  the  special 
boards  of  directors  at  La  Rochelle  and  at  Rouen,  but  only 
correspondents,  such  as  the  company  maintained  at  Bor- 
deaux, Nantes  and  other  ports. ^ 

Although  the  xfixxwiation  of  its  charter  did  not  occur 
until  December,  167.4,  for  all  practical  purposes,  as 
Chemin-Dupontes  remarks,  the  West  India  Company 
ceased  to  exist  after  1672.^^  On  April  9,  of  that  year, 
Menjot,  conseiller,  and  Guillaume  Mesnager,  a  stockholder 
and  former  director,  were  instructed  to  prepare  the  liqui- 
dation of  the  company's  efFects,^^  and  on  January  21,  a 
commission  was  named  to  make  a  thorough  examination 
of  the  company's  books  and  further  prepare  its  liquida- 
tion. This  commission  was  composed  of  Mess.  Hotman, 
le  Vayer,  Menjot,  de  Senteuil,  de  Manse,  de  Formont  and 
Denison.^ 

29  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  135. 

30  Ibid.,  fol.  137,  December  20,  1671. 

31  Chemin-Dupontfes,  op.  cit.,  p.  82. 

32  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17,  arr^t  du  cons.  d'6tat  qui  commet  les  srs. 
Menjot  et  Mesnager  int6ress6s  en  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  pour  pourvoir 
k  Tutilit^  employ,  des  eifets  de  ladite  Cie.  April  9,  1672. 

33  Ibid.,  Extrait  des  Reg.  du  conseil  d'etat,  January  21,  1673. 

176 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

On  February  21,  1674,  a  report  was  made  on  the  state 
of  affairs  of  the  company,  of  which  the  following  is  a 
summary : 

Credit. 


In  good  debts 

In  bad  debts  . 

Vessels 

Effects  in  the  islands 

Effects  at  Cayenne  . 

Effects  at  Tortuga,  St.  Domingo 

Furnishings  and  other  effects  in  stores 
at  Paris  .  .  .  .  . 

Value  of  taxes  levied  at  the  entry  of 
the  port  of  Rouen  on  sugar,  wax, 
etc.  ..... 

Estimated  value  of  land,  seigneurial 
rights  and  taxes  levied  in  the 
countries  of  its  concession  . 

Total 


liv. 

s. 

d. 

155,464. 

6 

8 

26,475 

1 

8 

3,000 

0 

0 

695,717 

15 

1 

96,309 

12 

9 

16,407 

4 

3 

2,423 

0 

1 

800,000 

0 

0 

1,473,000       0     0 


3,268,797      16     5 


(Estimated  value  of  the  above,  according  to  the  opinion  of 
Mess.  Bellinzani  and  Dalier,  3,074,000  livres.) 


Debit. 

Sums  owed  to  various  persons     . 
To   Fran9ois   Le   Gendre  or   to   notes 
held  by  him      .... 
To  His  Majesty       .  . 

Total 

Indebtedness  of  the  company     . 


514,730        8     0 

700,000       0     0 
5,382,628        8     6 


6,597,350     16 
3,328,553        0 


iiArch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  Proems  verbal  sur  les  affaires  de  la  Cie.  des 
Ind.  Oc. — Etat  officiel  des  comptes  de  lad.  Cie.  fait  suivant  les  ordres 
de  Sa.  Majest6;  also  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1316. 


177 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

From  its  origin  the  company  had  received  from: 

Voluntary  subscribers       .           .           .  1,297,000  livres. 
Sums  yielded  from  taxes  of  Chambre 

de  Justice        ....  2,000,000  livres. 

Total  paid  by  the  king  .           .           .  3,337,000  livres. 

Sums  paid  by  revenue  farmers  .           .  700,000  livres. 


Total 7,374,000  livres.^ 

In  addition  the  revenue  farm  at  Rouen  had  yielded  for 
the  years  1665-72  a  total  profit  of  372,478  liv.  8s.  5d. 
That  is  to  say,  the  West  India  Company  had  made  use  all 
told  of  a  capital  of  nearly  8,000,000  livres.^ 

The  liquidation  of  the  company  went  forward  rapidly. 
Its  effects  yielded  the  sum  of  1,047,195  livres  which  served 
for  a  partial  reimbursement  of  voluntary  subscriptions. 
The  king  supplied  250,000  livres  necessary  to  make  this 
reimbursement  complete  and  assumed  responsibility  for 
all  the  debts  of  the  company.^^  The  right  to  collect  taxes 
and  duties  in  the  islands  was  farmed  out.  This  revenue- 
farm  became  known  henceforth  as  Domaine  d'Occident. 
Of  the  350,000  livres,  the  annual  rent  paid  by  the  farmer, 
250,000  livres  were  set  aside  for  the  payment  of  the  com- 
pany's debts.  In  the  following  year  the  company's  pos- 
sessions in  Senegal  were  sold  to  the  first  Company  of  Sene- 
gal. All  of  its  other  possessions  were  reunited  to  the 
royal  domain  and  opened  freely  to  all  Frenchmen. 

35  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  M6m.  sur  les  avantages  procurez  par  la  Cie. 
des  Ind.  Oc. 

36  Chemin-Dupontfes,  op.  cit.,  68,  somewhat  exaggerates  matters 
when  he  asserts  that  the  company  had  absorbed  a  capital  of  10,000,- 
000  livres. 

37  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1312,  M6moire  touchant  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  par 
MM.  Mesnager  and  Dalier — ^''les  HoUandais  ayant  fait  offre  de  24,- 
000,000  livres  pour  ce  que  de  Roy  a  eu  par  le  moyen  de  ladite  com- 
pagnie  quoyque  le  tout  n'en  couste  pas  6,000,000  a  Sa.  Majeste." 

178 


f  TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  edict  of  revocation  was  issued  in  the  month  of 
December,  1674,  and  thus  came  to  an  end  the  famous 
West  India  Company.  It  had  been  founded  by  Colbert  in 
1664,  apparently  with  high  hopes,  certainly  with  gigantic 
plans  for  it  to  realize,  and  here  it  was  ten  years  later  in  a 
state  of  hopeless  bankruptcy. 

It  is  precisely  this  fact  about  the  company  which  has 
received  most  attention,  and  which  is  the  reason  why  it 
is  considered  ope  of  the  failures  of  JCd^bert's  ministry.*' It 
is  perfectly  true  that  the  company  did  not  realize  the 
hopes  which  both  its  mission  and  its  opportunities  justly 
raised.  Its  funds  were  not  always  wisely  expended,  for 
they  were  sometimes  foolishly  wasted,  as  we  have  seen. 
It  was  often  the  victim  of  the  dishonesty  and  ignorance  of 
its  agents  and  clerksu.  It  failed  to  satisfy  more  than  half 
the  needs  of  the  islands.  It  sometimes  abused  its  monopoly 
by  imposing  unreasonable.prices  and  impossible  conditions 
upon  the  planters.  It  was  constantly  in  debt  and  was 
forced  to  appeal  frequently  to  the  royal  treasury  for  sup- 
port. Many  of  these  points  of  failure  can  be  explained 
by  adverse  conditions,  some  of  which,  as  we  have  had 
occasion  to  see,  were  quite  beyond  the  power  of  the  com- 
pany to  control.  There  is  one  phase  of  its  history,  how- 
ever, which  presents  the  West  India  Company  in  a  totally 
different  light  and  which  must  not  escape  attention.  It 
is  presented  in  the  preamble  of  the  edict  of  revocation: 

"The  situation  of  our  kingdom  between  the  Mediterranean 
on  one  side  and  the  Atlantic,  on  the  other  facilitates  the  lad- 
ing and  discharging  of  merchandise  and  has  made  possible 
many  commercial  enterprises.  Success  has  not  always  crowned 
such  enterprises,  because  most  of  the  armaments  have  been 
made  by  individuals  and  have  not  been  supported  by  sufficient 
force  to  insure  their  success.  .  .  .  We  were  prompted  by  the 
affection  which  we  had  for  our  subjects  to  undertake  to  estab- 

38  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  17;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  383-289. 

179 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERTI'^    J 

lish  trade  with  the  islands  and  mainland  of  America,  whiqK 
foreigners  had  usurped  for  sixty  years,  in  order  to  preseipve 
for  our  people  the  advantages  which  their  courage  and  their 
industry  had  given  them  the  right  to  enjoy  from  the  discovery 
of  a  great  expanse  of  land  in  this  part  of  the  world.  For 
this  end  we  formed  the  West  India  Company.  .  .  .  Our  plan, 
both  useful  and  glorious,  has  attained  the  success  which  we 
could  expect,  and  this  company  has  happily  taken  possession 
of  the  lands  of  its  concession,  .  .  .  which  are  inhabited  at 
present  by  more  than  45,000  persons,  .  .  .  which  furnish 
trade  to  more  than  100  French  ships  of  50  to  300  tons,  giving 
employment  to  a  great  number  of  pilots,  sailors,  gunners, 
carpenters  and  other  artisans,  and  which  furnishes  a  market 
for  many  articles  produced  in  this  realm." 

One  might  be  inclined  to  dismiss  this  language  as  offi- 
cial jargon,  common  to  nearly  all  public  documents  of  the 
period,  but  it  may  be  asked  if  this  bit  of  official  jargon 
does  not  contain  many  grains  of  truth.  There  is  a  great 
difference  between  1664  and  1674  in  the  number  of  French 
vessels  going  to  the  West  Indies.  We  have  seen  that  in  the 
former  year  there  were  practically  none,  whereas  in  the 
latter  year  there  were  131  of  private  traders  alone.  The 
difference  is  notable.  It  means  that  during  the  ten  years 
a  comparatively  large  commerce  had  been  built  up.  We 
can  not,  of  course,  credit  the  West  India  Company  with 
a  very  large  per  cent  of  the  vessels  sent  to  the  islands 
during  the  last  five  years  of  its  existence.  After  October, 
1666,  private  traders  became  more  and  more  important. 
But  how  is  one  to  explain  the  somewhat  rapid  rise  of  the 
private  trader?  Was  it  not  from  the  fact  that  the  organi- 
zation of  the  West  India  Company  made  possible  a  con- 
centrated attack  upon  Dutch  traders  ?  ^  Its  capital  and  its 
resources,  together  with  its  centralized  administration, 
made  possible  a  kind  of  tour  de  force  both  in  closing  the 
doors  to  foreigners  and  in  re-opening  the  way  for  French 
merchants  and  French  merchandise.     The  comparatively 

180 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

large  number  of  vessels  which  it  collected  during  the  years 
1665  and  1666,  created  in  a  sense  the  nucleus  of  a  mer- 
chant marine  with  which  to  carry  on  this  trade.  The 
monopoly  of  the  company  existed  in  reality  only  for  two 
years,  and  after  that  time  private  traders  could  and  did 
profit  from  the  work  of  preparation  which  the  company 
had  done. 

Thus  the  West  India  Company  was  the  means  of  transi- 
tion from  the  period  of  Dutch  commercial  supremacy  to 
that  of  the  growth  and  development  of  French  commerce. 
It  was  constantly  stated  by  Colbert  and  by  the  directors 
themselves  that  the  mission  of  the  company  was  to  substi- 
tute French  trade  for  Dutch  trade.  As  early  as  1667  the 
directors  affirmed  in  a  memoir  to  Colbert  that  the  moment 
private  French  traders  grew  strong  and  numerous  enough 
to  carry  on  the  entire  trade  of  the  islands,  the  company 
would  willingly  cede  the  whole  field  to  them.  This  moment 
had  come  in  1672  and  the  company's  fall  should  not  be 
regarded  as  a  failure  or  as  a  check  in  Colbert's  commer- 
cial policy,  but  rather  as  an  indication  that  enough  pro- 
gress had  been  made  to  render  the  employment  of  such  a 
company  no  longer  necessary.  In  short,  the  West  India 
Company  rendered  a  definite  service  and  its  fall  marks  a 
post  of  progress  in  the  history  of  Colbert's  policy. 


181 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Exclusion  of  Foreign  Traders 

TT  has  already  been  remarked  that  de  Tracy,  at  his 
■•■  departure  from  France  in  February,  1664,  was 
charged  with  the  enforcement  of  an  arret  which  forbade 
the  Dutch  to  trade  in  the  islands  during  the  period  of  six 
months.  Although  the  fact  that  a  pest  was  raging  at 
Amsterdam  was  given  as  the  reason  for  this  action,  there 
can  be  but  httle  doubt  that  this  was  only  a  pretext  and  that 
the  measure  indicates  that  Colbert  had  already  reached 
the  decision  to  exclude  Dutch  traders  and  that  he  thereby 
laid  the  first  stone  in  the  construction  of  the  solid  wall 
which  he  intended  to  build  around  the  French  islands.  We 
have  just  seen  that  one  of  the  chief  tasks  imposed  upon  the 
West  India  Company  at  its  creation  Vas  to  maintain  its 
monopoly  of  trade  to  the  exclusion  of  all  foreigners.  The 
outbreak  of  the  war  with  the  English,  however,  forced  the 
company  to  expend  so  much  of  its  energy  in  the  defense 
of  the  islands  and  in  carrying  on  war  against  the  enemy, 
that  it  was  forced  to  forego  its  monopoly  by  admitting 
both  private  French  traders  and  the  Dutch  to  the  com- 
merce of  the  islands.  The  necessity  for  this  is  proved  by 
the  fact  that  the  directors  of  the  company  in  France  and 
the  administrators  in  the  islands,  acting  independently  of 
one  another,  took  the  step  almost  simultaneously. 

But  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  admission  of  foreign 
traders  during  the  war  was  made  necessary  by  the  inability 
of  the  West  India  Company  to  supply  the  islands  with 
food,  the  practice  of  admitting  them  did  not  cease  at  the 
close  of  the  war  in  July,  1667.  For  over  a  year  after  that 
date  the  Dutch  continued  their  efforts  to  draw  the  com- 
merce of  the  French  islands  back  into  their  control  and 

182 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

they  were  so  successful  that  Colbert  was  forced  to  begin 
a  long  and  difficult  campaign  to  drive  them  from  the 
French  possessions.  An  arret  of  the  conseil  d'etat  of 
September  lOj  1668,^  formally  forbade  the  West  India 
Company  "to  grant  permission  to  foreigners  to  trade 
within  its  concession,  under  penalty  of  being  deprived  of 
the  privileges  which  the  king  had  granted  it."  The 
reasons  for  taking  this  action  were  very  clearly  set  forth 
in  the  preamble  : 

"Whereas  the  king  has  been  informed  that  contrary  to  the 
intentions  which  he  had  in  organizing  and  establishing  the 
West  India  Company,  the  chief  of  which  was  to  draw  into  the 
kingdom  all  the  commerce  of  the  French  islands  of  America, 
fctjhen  in  the  hands  of  foreigners,  the  said  company  during  the 
Rate  war  with  England  has  granted  permission  to  a  number  of 
foreigners  to  trade  in  these  islands  in  consideration  of  a  cer- 
tain tax  levied  on  their  cargoes;  and  that  since  the  war  the 
said  company  has  continued  the  same  practice;  that  the  said 
foreigners,  incited  by  the  desire  to  regain  entire  possession  of 
this  trade,  have  not  remained  satisfied  with  sending  vessels 
for  which  they  had  obtained  permission  from  the  said  com- 
pany, but  have  sent  vessels  without  any  such  authorization; 
furthermore,  that  the  governors  of  the  said  islands,  in  spite 
of  orders  which  have  been  given  them  to  permit  no  vessels  to 
trade  without  the  company's  permission,  have  received  all  ves- 
sels indiscriminately  and  have  permitted  them  to  barter  their 
cargoes  freely;  that  foreigners  take  away  all  the  sugar  and 
tobacco  and  other  products  of  the  said  islands  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  sums  due  by  the  planters  to  the  West  India 
Company,  so  that  its  directors  have  been  forced  to  appeal  to 
His  Majesty;  His  Majesty,  therefore,  taking  into  considera- 
tion how  important  it  is  for  the  welfare  of  the  state  and  for 
the  cotomerce  of  the  realm  that  the  trade  of  the  islands  of 
America,  which  gives  employment  to  a  large  number  of  ves- 
sels and  furnishes  a  market  for  a  large  quantity  of  articles 
1  Arch.  Nat.  AD,xi,  48;  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  A,  24,  fol.  93;  Moreau  de 
Saint-M6ry,  I,  174. 

183 


^ 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

produced  in  the  provinces,  remain  in  the  entire  possession  of 
the  French  and  that  foreign  traders  be  excluded  in  accordance 
with  the  practice  which  other  nations  follow  in  regard  to 
their  colonies,  and  His  Majesty  having  for  this  very  purpose 
placed  such  large  funds  at  the  disposal  of  the  company  and 
lately  accorded  extraordinary  sums  in  order  to  repair  the  great 
losses  which  it  sustained  during  the  late  war  with  England, 
and  being  resolved  to  grant  to  the  said  company  additional 
sums  to  enable  it  to  regain  the  greater  part  of  its  com- 
merce .  .  •  wills  that  the  commerce  of  the  islands  of  Amer- 
ica and  of  the  other  lands  granted  to  the  West  India  Company 
be  carried  on  by  the  said  company  alone  and  by  French  trad- 
ers authorized  by  it." 

This  is  a  most  clear  statement  of  the  motives  which  Col- 
bert had  had  in  establishing  the  West  India  Company  and 
it  gives  expression  to  his  large  unchanging  purpose  to 
permit  no  compromises  with  foreign  traders  and  to  march 
with  determination  straight  to  the  commercial  conquest  of 
the  French  West  Indies. 

Colbert  was  still  willing,  however,  to  leave  in  the  hands 
of  the  company  the  power  of  granting  passports.  He  was 
satisfied  for  the  present  with  a  formal  prohibition  to  the 
company  to  issue  passports  in  favour  of  foreigners.  In 
spite  of  this,  the  company  continued  to  allow  the  Dutch 
some  liberty  of  trade,  for  the  directors  instructed  de  Baas, 
at  his  departure  from  France  in  the  fall  of  1668  to  become 
governor-general  of  the  French  West  Indies,  to  admit 
foreign  vessels  which  brought  cargoes  of  slaves  and  live 
stock.^  In  addition  the  report  reached  Colbert's  ears  that 
the  Dutch  were  obtaining  passports  in  the  name  of  French- 
men and  were  continuing  to  trade  in  the  islands.  He 
thereupon  established,  on  June  12,0^663,  the  following 
regulations:  (1)  that  all  passports  bearing  permission 
to  trade  in  the  islands  should  be  granted  by  His  Majesty 

2  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  26,  1669. 

184 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

on  certificates  of  recommendation  issued  by  the  West  India 
Company;  (2)  that  the  said  passports  be  granted  only  to.. 
Frenchmen;  (3)  that  the  passports  should  be  v-alid  only 
for  eight  months;  (4)  that  all  to  whom  passports  w.eie 
granted  should  give  bond,  either  to  the  directors  of  the 
West  India  Company  or  to  the  officers  of  the  Admiralty, 
thg-t  they  should  take  their  cargoes  to  the  port  specified  in 
the  passport  and  make  their  returns  either  to  the  port 
from  which  they  had  sailed  or  to  some  other  port  of  the 
realm;  and  (5)  that  certificates  of  discharge  and  of  lad- 
ing of  cargoes,  properly  signed  by  Admiralty  officers, 
should  be  deposited  at  the  Admiralty  bureau  where  the 
passport  was  issued,  otherwise  obligations  imposed  by  the 
bond  should  still  be  considered  binding.^  On  December 
30,  1670,  the  arret  of  June  12,  1669,  was  restated  with 
the  following  additions:  (1)  it  was„prohibited  to  trade  in 
the  islands  w^ithaut  passports ;  (2)  all  captains  of  vessels 
on  arriving  in  the  islands  should  present  to  the  Admiralty 
officers  their  passports  and  bills-of-lading,  properly  signed 
by  the  Admiralty  officers  of  the  port  from  which  they  had 
set  sail;  and  (3)  failure  to  comply  with  these  regulations 
subjected  one  to  the  penalty  of  confiscation  of  vessel  and 
cargo  and  of  1500  livres  fine  for  the  first  offense,  and  to 
corporal  punishment  in  the  case  of  repetition.* 

Colbert  did  not  content  himself  with  controlling  the 
issue  of  passports  and  with  making  regulations.  On  Sep- 
tember 12,  he  addressed  a  circular  letter  to  the  governors 
of  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  St.  Domingo,  St.  Christopher, 
Grenada  and  Cayenne  on  the  subject  of  foreign  commerce: 

"Having  resolved  that  all  the  commerce  of  the  islands  of 
America  under  my  obedience  shall  be  carried  on  by  the  French 

3  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  178-179.  The  last  clause  of  the  regu- 
lation seems  not  to  have  been  promptly  complied  with,  for  an  arrH 
of  July  1,  1670,  commanded  obedience  to  this  regulation.  Arch.  Aff. 
Etrang.,  Mem.  et  Doc,  France,  2007,  fol.  127  verso. 

4  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  117;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  206-207. 

185 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

West  India  Company,  and  by  my  other  subjects  with  permis- 
sion of  the  directors  of  the  said  company,  who  have  been  com- 
manded by  me  to  grant  no  permission  to  foreigners,  ...  I 
forbid  you  very  expressly  to  admit  into  the  island  under  your 
command  or  into  the  ports  which  depend  upon  it  any  foreign 
vessels  to  trade  there/'® 

Special  instructions  were  sent  to  de  Baas  on  June  13, 
1669: 

"Of  all  things  which  you  have  been  commanded  to  do,  there 
is  absolutely  nothing  to  which  I  desire  that  you  devote  your 
attention  so  much  as  to  drive  out  foreign  vessels  from  the 
islands  and  in  every  way  possible  to  prevent  them  from  trad- 
ing there,  without  suffering  a  single  exception  under  whatever 
pretext  that  may  arise.  I  desire  that  you  enforce  this  order 
with  all  the  precision  and  with  all  the  severity  which  are 
merited  by  an  affair  of  such  importance  to  the  well-being  of 
my  subjects."^ 

Colheri.  wrote  to  de  Baas  again  on  July  31 :  "In  regard 
to  commerce,  His  Majesty  wills  that  above  everything 
else  you  devote  all  of  your  attention  and  employ  all  of  your 
industry  and  every  means  at  your  command  to  exclude 
foreigners  from  trade  in  the  islands,  either  by  punishing 
inhabitants  who  aid  them  or  by  destroying  all  their  ships 
and  barks  which  frequent  our  islands.  Keep  special  watch 
on  the  Dutch  established  at  St.  Eustatlus,  who  will  miss  no 
opportunity  to  employ  every  means  to  sell  their  merchan- 
dise in  the  French  islands  and  to  carry  away  the  products 
thereof."^     These  instructions  were  repeated  with  the  same 

5  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bg,  7,  fol.  128;  ibid.,  CoL,  Fg,  67. 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  1,  fol.  153,  the  king  to  de  Baas,  June  13,  1669. 
On  the  same  day  instructions  were  addressed  to  Comte  d'Estrees, 
who  was  in  command  of  a  squadron  of  vessels  on  a  cruise  in  Ameri- 
can waters,  to  remain  in  the  islands  six  months  longer  and  "to  prevent 
in  every  way  possible  foreign  vessels  from  trading  in  the  islands 
under  any  pretext  or  for  any  cause  whatever."    Ibid.,  fol.  154. 

7  Ibid.,  fol.  159. 

186 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

emphasis  in  letters  to  de  Baas  on  August  8,  September  15, 
and  October  4.^ 

In  order  to  give  greater  publicity  to  the  orders  which 
had  been  issued  to  exclude  the  foreign  trader  from  the 
islands,  a  royal  ordinance  was  issued  on  June  10,  1670, 
which  was  as  follows: 

"His  Majesty^  having  already  ordered  Sieur  de  Baas, 
lieutenant-general  in  his  armies,  in  command  of  the  islands  of 
America  inhabited  by  his  subjects,  as  well  as  the  particular 
governors  of  the  several  islands,  not  to  suffer  any  foreign 
vessel  to  anchor  or  to  traffic  there,  and  having  sent  a  squadron 
of  three  ships  of  war  to  seize  and  capture  all  foreign  vessels 
found  in  the  ports  and  roads  of  the  said  islands,  or  in  their 
neighbourhood,  and  being  informed  that  the  said  prohibitions 
have  not  been  executed  as  rigidly  as  the  welfare  of  the  state 
and  the  interests  of  his  subjects  demand  and  that  even  ves- 
sels after  confiscation  have  been  repurchased  by  proprietors 
for  trifling  sums;  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  these  abuses,  His 
Majesty  expressly  forbids  any  foreign  ship  or  vessel  to  enter 
the  ports,  or  anchor  in  the  roads  of  the  said  islands,  or  sail 
near  their  shores,  on  pain  of  confiscation,  and  at  the  same  time 
he  expressly  forbids  his  subjects  who  are  inhabitants  of  the 
said  islands,  or  who  go  to  trade  there,  to  receive  any  foreign 
merchandise  or  any  foreign  vessel,  or  to  have  any  relations 
with  them,  on  pain  of  confiscation  of  said  merchandise,  500 
livres  fine  for  the  first  offense  and  corporal  punishment  in 
case  of  repetition.  His  Majesty  wills  that  the  proceeds  from 
the  confiscation  of  ships  and  merchandise  taken  at  sea  shall 
be  divided,  one-tenth  to  the  commander  of  His  Majesty's 
squadron,  another  tenth  to  the  captain  of  the  ship  that  has 
made  the  prize,  a  third  tenth  to  the  lieutenant-general  in  com- 
mand of  the  islands,  and  the  rest,  half  for  the  crew  of  the 
vessel,  and  half  to  the  West  India  Company,  to  be  employed 
by  it  for  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  hospitals  in 
the  said  islands ;  and  that  of  the  proceeds  from  prizes  made  on 
land,  one-third  shall  go  to  the  informer,  another  third  shall 

8  Ibid.,  fols.  164  and  170;  ibid.,  March  27,  October  4,  1669. 

187 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

be  equally  divided  between  the  lieutenant-general  and  the 
particular  governor  of  the  island,  and  a  third  shall  be  given 
to  the  aforesaid  company  for  the  establishment  and  mainte- 
nance of  hospitals.  His  Majesty  hereby  commands  and  orders 
Sieur  de  Baas,  lieutenant-general  in  his  armies  and  in  com- 
mand of  the  said  islands,  the  several  governors,  the  officers  of 
the  conseils  souverains  and  all  of  his  officers  and  subjects 
whom  these  presents  concern,  to  obey  and  to  enforce  the  pres- 
ent ordinance."^ 

A  copy  of  this  ordinance  was  sent  with  special  letters  to 
the  various  governors  and  officers  in  the  islands.^"  Other 
letters  and  instructions,  sent  by  Colbert  and  the  king  dur- 
ing the  year  1670,  show  the  immense  importance  which  was 
attached  to  its  enforcement.  Out  of  nineteen  letters  writ- 
ten to  de  Baas  in  that  year,  no  less  than  twelve  were 
devoted  largely  to  the  exposition  of  the  two  principles  of 
freedom  of  trade  to  all  Frenchmen  and  of  rigid  exclusion 
of  all  foreigners.^^ 

Both  the  ordinance  and  the  instructions  were  so  clear 
that  they  should  have  left  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  gov- 
ernors as  to  the  intentions  of  the  minister.  The  habit, 
however,  of  relying  upon  the  Dutch  for  a  supply  of  cer- 
tain articles,  such  as  slaves  and  live  stock,  was  of  such  long 
standing  that  de  Baas  seems  not  to  have  understood  at 
first  that  the  Dutch  should  be  prevented  from  bringing 
these  articles.  His  confusion  was  quite  natural,  for,  in 
the  first  place,  although  on  leaving  France  to  begin  his 
administration  in  the  islands  he  was  ordered  to  maintain 
the  principles  of  exclusion  of  foreigners,  he  was  specifically 
instructed  by  the  directors  of  the  West  India  Company 

9  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fols.  85-86;  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  2A;  Moreau 
de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  195-196;  Dessalles,  I,  516  (Note  2).  See  also  Cal. 
St.  Pap.  Col,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1669-1674,  No.  104,  for  a  translation, 
which  has  served  as  a  base  of  the  present  translation. 

10  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fols.  86,  86  verso,  95,  95  verso,  98,  100,  etc. 

11  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fols.  88-89,  94,  114  and  115-119. 

188 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

to  admit  Dutch  ships  which  brought  cargoes  of  negroes 
and  live  stock;  and,  in  the  second  place,  he  failed  to  see 
that  any  special  provisions  were  being  made  by  French- 
men to  supply  these  two  articles  of  such  prime  importance 
in  the  cultivation  of  the  islands.  He  could  not  understand 
that  such  vital  interests  could  be  sacrificed  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  principle  of  exclusion  of  foreigners: 

"In  regard  to  commerce  with  foreigners,  Monseigneur,  I 
must  say  to  you  that  inasmuch  as  the  efficiency  of  the  planters 
depends  upon  the  number  of  slaves  and  of  horses  which  they 
have,  the  directors  of  the  West  India  Company  instructed  me, 
when  I  sailed  from  France,  to  receive  foreign  vessels  which 
brought  these  two  articles.  I  have  acted  in  accordance  with 
these  instructions  up  to  the  present.  But  since  receiving  the 
orders  of  His  Majesty,  I  have  forbidden  all  foreigners  to 
trade  and  shall  continue  to  do  so  until  I  receive  instructions 
from  you  as  to  the  king's  will  in  the  matter.  It  may  be  well, 
nevertheless,  to  inform  you  that  the  planters  will  suffer  very 
much  from  the  maintenance  of  such  a  policy,  for  the  Dutch 
have  been  accustomed  to  bring  every  year  horses  from  Cura- 
9ao  and  Ireland — a  thing  which  French  merchants  will  not 
do — and  if  the  planters  cannot  replace  the  negroes  and  horses 
which  die,  they  will  suffer  seriously."^ 

Colbert's  reply  to  this  letter  left  no  doubt  as  to  the 
policy  which  he  meant  to  pursue:  "The  West  India  Com- 
pany has  taken  such  excellent  measures  to  furnish  the 
number  of  slaves  and  horses  necessary  for  clearing  and 
cultivating  lands  in  the  islands  that  any  brought  by  for- 
eign vessels  would  prove  superfluous.  I  desire,  therefore, 
that  you  receive  no  foreign  vessel  under  any  pretext  what- 
soever."^^ A  formal  order  was  addressed  to  Pelissier  to 
forbid  the  clerks  of  the  West  India  Company  to  continue 

12  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  26,  1669. 

13  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  19  verso,  the  king  to  de  Baas,  March 
25,  1670. 

189 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

the  practice  of  receiving  slaves  and  horses  brought  by 
Dutch  ships.  A  similar  order  was  addressed  to  the  general 
directors  of  the  West  India  Company/*  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Colbert  commanded  the  company  to  limit  its 
commerce  to  the  importation  of  live  stock  and  slaves.  We 
have  dealt  elsewhere  with  the  measures  which  it  took  in 
obedience  to  his  orders.  In  addition,  Colbert  attempted 
to  make  a  partial  provision  for  the  supply  of  live  stock 
by  requiring  every  vessel  going  to  the  islands,  to  take  two 
mares,  or  two  cows,  or  two  she-asses.^^  Although  the 
results  of  these  measures  were  not  encouraging,  a  strict 
exclusion  of  all  foreign  vessels  was  constantly  urged.  Thus 
a  letter  was  written  to  de  Baas  on  October  12,  1670: 

"I  shall  say  to  you,  in  short,  that  nothing  which  you  can 
do  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  which  I  have  imposed  upon 
you  could  prove  more  agreeable  to  me  than  a  rigourous  en- 
forcement of  my  orders  to  exclude  foreigners  from  the  trade 
of  the  islands.  You  are  not  to  admit  them  under  pretext  that 
there  is  need  of  slaves,  or  of  live  stock,  or  of  furnishings  of 
sugar-mills,  or  of  any  other  sort  of  merchandise,  however 
pressing  such  a  need  may  be.  I  repeat  that  you  are  not  to 
admit  any  foreign  vessel  or  permit  any  commerce  with  for- 
eigners. I  shall  take  pains  to  insure  a  supply  of  things  neces- 
sary for  the  islands  and  especially  of  slaves  and  live  stock."^^ 

Again,  de  Baas  did  not  seem  to  be  sure  that  French 
ships  should  be  prevented  from  trading  with  foreign 
islands : 

"M.  de  Gabaret  has  sent  here  [Martinique]  the  bark  of  a 
French  merchant,  named  Dartiagne,  which  he  ordered  seized 
when  he  arrived  at  Guadeloupe.  The  merchant,  who  hails 
from  St.  Jean  de  Luz,  confessed  that  the  merchandise  which 

14  Ibid.,  fols.  21,  22. 

15  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  145,  December  20,  1670. 

16  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  Ill,  the  king  to  de  Baas,  October  12, 
1670. 

190 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

he  had  on  board  had  been  bought  from  the  English  at  Nevis. 
That's  why  I  condemned  him  to  a  fine  of  4000  pounds  of 
sugar.  .  .  .  To  tell  the  truth^  I  imposed  this  fine  against  my 
own  feelings,  for  I  do  not  know  whether  or  not  the  king  intends 
that  a  French  merchant  who  goes  to  trade  in  New  England  and 
comes  back  to  barter  his  goods  in  Barbadoes  and  in  Martinique, 
for  instance,  be  punished.  The  arret  of  the  conseil  d'etat  pro- 
hibits foreigners  to  trade  in  the  islands.  I  understand  never- 
theless that  if  a  French  merchant  enjoyed  the  liberty  of  going 
to  the  English  islands,  he  could,  with  permission  of  their 
governor,  transport  our  sugar  to  St.  Eustatius  and  load  it  on 
Dutch  ships.  As  I  thought  that  Dartiagne  had  done  this,  I 
imposed  a  fine  upon  him.  Otherwise  I  should  have  had 
scruples  in  punishing  him  at  all."^^ 

Colbert's  response  could  not  have  left  any  doubt  as  to 
his  intentions.  He  commanded  de  Baas  to  prohibit  with 
the  utmost  rigour  "absolutely  all  foreign  commerce  in  the 
islands,  whether  carried  on  by  foreigners  themselves  or  by 
French  subjects.  That  is  to  say,  that  every  foreigner 
importing  merchandise  into  the  islands  from  whatever 
source  it  may  be,  unless  he  has  a  passport  from  the  king, 

17  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  22,  1670.  Du 
Lion,  governor  of  Guadeloupe,  in  a  letter  to  Colbert  on  March  39, 
mentions  the  capture  of  this  vessel.  He  says  that  Dartiagne  had 
permission  from  St.  Laurent  to  pass  from  St.  Christopher  to  Mar- 
tinique and  that  en  route  he  was  becalmed  off  Guadeloupe  where  he 
was  captured  by  de  Gabaret.  Du  Lion  adds  that  Dartiagne  had 
traded  with  an  English  vessel  which  he  had  met  on  his  way  probably 
by  appointment.  Ibid.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert.  In  another  letter 
de  Baas  shows  that  he  did  not  understand  at  first  the  earnestness 
and  thoroughness  with  which  Colbert  intended  to  make  his  fight 
against  the  foreign  trader.  "Two  inhabitants  of  this  island  who 
own  a  bark  have  applied  for  permission  to  trade  at  Barbadoes  two 
or  three  times  a  year  in  order  to  buy  provisions  of  which  the  plant- 
ers are  in  such  need  at  present  and  thus  to  bring  some  welcomed 
relief.  I  refused  to  grant  the  permission  and  shall  continue  to  do 
so  unless  you  should  see  fit  to  make  an  exception  of  an  affair  of 
such  small  consequence,  as  it  assuredly  is."  Ibid.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to 
Colbert,  January  16,   1670. 

191 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

should  suffer  the  penalty  of  confiscation,  and  that  every 
Frenchman,  importing  merchandise  from  foreign  countries 
and  even  from  the  nearest  foreign  islands,  should  likewise 
suffer  the  same  penalty,  and  besides  that,  all  foreign  ves- 
sels, and  particularly  those  belonging  to  the  Dutch,  which 
are  found  sailing  near  the  coasts  of  the  French  islands  are 
to  be  seized. "^^ 

Colbert  made  only  two  small  exceptions  in  his  rigid 
system  of  excluding  foreigners.  One  was  in  regard  to 
trade  between  the  English  and  French  inhabitants  of  St. 
Christopher,  and  the  other,  in  regard  to  trade  with  the 
Spanish  Main.  As  to  the  former,  he  defined  his  position 
very  clearly  in  a  letter  to  de  Blenac,  governor-general  of 
islands,  under  date  of  June  2,  1680 : 

"I  note  what  you  write  me  of  the  difficulties  encountered  at 
St.  Christopher  to  prevent  commerce  between  the  English  and 
French.  In  regard  to  the  commerce  of  that  island,  you  should 
distinguish  between  trade  by  sea,  carried  on  between  the  two 
nations,  which  should  be  prohibited  just  as  it  is  in  the  other 
islands,  and  trade  by  land,  which  cannot  and  should  not  be 
prevented  in  this  island."^^ 

As  to  commerce  with  the  Spanish  Main,  Colbert,  true  to 
the  ideas  of  his  age  and  to  his  own,  naturally  welcomed  any 
trade  which  brought  returns  in  gold  and  silver.  He  seems 
to  have  thought  at  one  time  of  establishing  an  entrepot 
at  Grenada  for  contraband  trade  with  the  Spaniards, 
and  at  another,  he  instructed  Pelissier  to  consider  the 
advisability  of  having  the  West  India  Company  send  2000 
slaves  to  the  Spanish  Main,  "for  these  Spaniards  never 
refuse  to  buy  slaves  and  always  pay  the  Dutch  of  Cura9ao 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fols.  87-89,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  June  22, 
1670. 

19  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  10,  fol.  2,  letter  to  de  B16nac,  June  2,  1680; 
also  fol.  18,  letter  to  Patoulet;  also  B,  9,  fol.  34,  letter  to  B16nac, 
April  19,  1679. 

192 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

very  dear  for  them."^"  When,  however,  Colbert  saw  that 
no  commerce  sprang  up  with  the  Spanish  Main,  he  forbade 
the  islands  to  trade  with  the  Spaniards : 

"The  exclusion  of  all  commerce  with  foreigners  should  be 
maintained  in  all  the  islands.  Trade, even  with  Spaniards  is 
to  be  prohibited,  for  His  Majesty  is  of  the  opinion  that  no 
Spanish  vessels  are  likely  to  come  from  the  Spanish  Main  and 
he  is  unwilling  that  any  commerce  be  carried  on  with  the 
Spaniards  of  Porto  Rico  and  the  other  islands  belonging  to 
Spain."2i 

These  two  small  exceptions  in  the  system  of  excluding 
foreigners  are  very  readily  understood  and  need  not  make 
one  stop  to  qualify  the  statement  that  Colbert's  exclusion 
of  foreign  traders  was  in  theory  complete. 

If  the  planters  were  hungry,  barefooted  and  in  rags, 
they  must  count  these  things  as  a  bit  of  temporary  suffer- 
ing to  be  endured  for  the  upbuilding  of  French  commerce. 
They  must  wait  for  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  to 
operate  and  bring  them,  sooner  or  later,  an  abundance 
from  France.  If  these  same  planters  were  in  need  of 
slaves  and  of  live  stock  to  cultivate  their  cane  and  turn 
their  sugar-mills,  they  must  await  the  ''bons  ordres''  which 
the  West  India  Company  had  given  to  supply  their  needs. 
Such  was  the  system  of  exclusivism  which  Colbert  wished 
to  impose  upon  the  islands.  Such  were  his  demands  upon 
the  planters.  Their  realization  would  mean  the  growth  of 
a  valuable  commerce  for  the  kingdom  and  thus  the  realiza- 
tion of  one  of  his  fondest  dreams.  But  he  was  demanding 
too  much.  What  meant  the  noble  idea  of  restoring  French 
commerce  and  the  upbuilding  of  a  mighty  colonial  empire 
to  the  planters  in  the  West  Indies,  whose  empty  bellies 
were  crying  for  food,  whose  nakedness  demanded  to  be 
clothed,  whose  sugar-cane,  like  time  and  tide,  tarried  for 

20  Clement,  III,  3,  p.  485,  June  10,  1670. 

21  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fols.  1-8,  letter  to  de  B16nac,  July  6,  1682. 

193 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

no  man,  but  ripened  for  the  harvest  in  its  season?  Under 
the  shelter  of  the  night  in  the  little  inlets  and  creeks,  or  in 
the  open  day,  thanks  to  the  corruption  of  the  officials,  for- 
eign traders  came  and  bartered  wine,  salt  beef,  slaves  and 
live  stock  for  tol^acco,  sugar,  ginger  and  dye-woods.  The 
great  Louis  and  his  determined  minister  might  thunder 
commands  from  Versailles  with  a  voice  of  Sinai,  and  the 
governors  might  be  obedient,  or  they  might  not,  but  one 
thing  was  certain,  such  a  rigid  system  could  be  enforced 
only  at  the  cannon's  mouth  and  only  by  a  long  and  deter- 
mined struggle  could  the  subjects  of  the  far-away  West 
Indies  be  brought  into  subjection  to  it. 


194 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Fight  Against  the  Dutch 

A  SQUADRON  of  IfeMftje&ty'8  vessels  under  the  com-, 
■^^^  mand  of  Sieur  de  Treillebois  was  sent  for  a  cruise  in 
the  West  Indies  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  at  the  end  of  1667. 
De  Treillebois  was  commanded  to  remain  in  the  islands  for 
three  months,  during  which  time  he  was  t^o^revent  all  for- 
eign vessels  from  trading.^  At  the  close  of  the  following 
.  year,  the  Count  d'Estrees,  vice-admiral,  was  sent  in  com- 
'  •  'liiand  of  a  squadron  on  a  Similar  mission.  He  arrived  at 
Martinique  about  February  1,  1669,^  and  was  commanded 
by  an  order  dated  June  13  to  remain  six  months  longer  in 
the  islands  in  order  to  prevent  "in  every  manner  foreigners 
from  coming  into  the  roads  of  the  islands  and  from  carry- 
ing on  trade  there  under  any  pretext,  or  for  any  motives 
whatever."^  No  evidence  has  been  found  which  shows  that 
either  de  Treillebois  or  d'Estrees  maintained  any  system- 
atic patrol  or  succeeded  in  any  large  measure  in  preventing 
foreign  traders  from  violating  the  strict  orders  which  had 
been  given  for  their  exclusion.  It  may  have  been  for  this  , 
reason  that  Colbert  decided  in  July,  1669,*  to  send  to  the  j 
West  Indies  three  vessels  charged  with  the  special  duty  of  | 
enforcing  regulations  by  maintaining  a  strict  patrol. 

In  accordance  with  this  decision,  Le  Normand,  Le  Gal- 
ant  and  UAurore  were  equipped  and  sent  to  the  West 
Indies  under  the  command  of  de  Gabaret.  De  Gabaret  was 
given  special  orders,  in  the  name  of  the  king  himself,  "to 

1  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  398,  October  1,  1667. 

2  Dessalles,  Histoire  generate  des  Antilles,  I,  506. 

3  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  1,  fol.  154,  June  13,  1669. 

4  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  456-459,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  July  31,  1669. 

195 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

sink  or  take  or  capture  all  foreign  vessels,  sailing  in  the 
waters  about  the  islands,  or  attempting  to  anchor  in  the 
roads  or  harbours  of  said  islands,  for  whatever  cause  and 
under  whatever  pretext  which  may  be  given,  under  penalty 
of  disobedience  to  the  king."^  He  was  commanded  to  keep 
his  vessels  "constantly  cruising  around  the  islands,"  and 
to  keep  his  plans  secret,  so  that  "he  could  surprise  foreign 
traders  in  every  inlet  and  harbour  where  they  might 
attempt  to  trade."^  He  was  ordered  to  make  special 
efforts  to  interrupt  contraband  trade  between  the  Dutch 
at  St.  Eustatius  and  the  colony  at  St.  Christopher.^  De 
Gabaret  received  during  the  year  no  less  than  fourteen 
letters  either  from  the  king  or  from  Colbert.^  Both  the 
frequency  and  the  contents  of  these  letters  bear  testimony 
to  the  importance  which  was  attached  to  his  mission. 

De  Gabaret  arrived  with  his  three  vessels  at  Martinique 
on  January  19,  1670.^  He  straightway  sent  one  of  his 
ships,  UAurore,  to  Grenada  to  capture  a  Dutch  vessel 
which  he  had  heard  was  trading  there.  The  vessel  in  ques- 
tion was  the  Queen  Esther^  of  300  tons,  Drik  Jansen,  cap- 
tain. In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  captain  had  a  pass- 
port, issued  by  the  French  West  India  Company  on  Novem- 
ber 9,  1668,  which  gave  him  permission  to  trade  in  the 
islands,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  governor  of 
Grenada  had  given  him  permission  to  sell  slaves  in  that 

5  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  47,  the  king  to  Capt.  de  Gabaret,  April 
9,  1670.  The  seriousness  with  which  de  Gabaret  regarded  the  last 
phrase  of  these  orders  was  shown,  when  he  refused  near  the  close  of 
the  year  to  obey  the  orders  of  de  Baas  to  go  to  St.  Domingo  to 
quell  a  rebellion,  on  the  grounds  that  he  had  been  commanded  by 
the  king  to  perform  the  task  of  patrolling  the  islands  and  was 
responsible  to  the  king  for  the  thoroughness  of  his  work.  Ibid.,  de 
Baas  to  Colbert,  October  19,  1670. 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  1,  fols.  89,  98  verso. 

7  Ibid.,  fol.  47. 

8  Ibid.,  'passim. 

9  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  24,  1670. 

196 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

island,  his  vessel  was  seized  and  taken  to  Martinique.^*^  De 
Baas  wrote  the  facts  to  Colbert  and  awaited  instructions. 
They  came  under  date  of  June  22,  and  were  very  brief: 
"I  believe  that  I  have  already  said  enough  for  you  to 
know  that  in  all  cases  where  there  is  any  doubt,  the  king 
wishes  that  they  be  decided  against  the  foreigner.""  The 
case  must  have  been  considered,  for  de  Baas  informed 
Colbert,  in  a  letter  of  March  29,  1671,  that  the  vessel  had 
been  restored  to  its  captain,  but  that  the  sums  due  him 
for  his  negroes  were  yet  to  be  collected  at  Grenada.^ 
About  the  same  time  another  small  Dutch  vessel  with  a 
cargo  of  wine  was  captured.  From  November  5  to  No- 
vember 9,  five  Dutch  vessels  were  seized  near  St.  Christo- 
pher.^^ 

De  Baas  complained  that  de  Gabaret  was  showing  too 
much  zeal  in  his  efforts  to  capture  Dutch  vessels.  Thus 
he  reported  his  capture  of  a  Dutch  bark  with  a  cargo  of 
wood  which  it  was  taking  from  Dominica  to  Cura9ao :  "I 
am  sending  you,  Monseigneur,  an  inventory  of  its  cargo 

10  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  22,  1670. 
The  passport  granted  to  the  Queen  Esther  is  to  be  found  ibid.,  Cio> 
La  Grenade,  1654-1729.  The  said  passport  was  granted  on  condi- 
tion of  paying  to  the  company  5  per  cent  on  negroes  and  live  stock 
imported  into  the  islands  and  10  per  cent  on  products  exported. 
The  incident  was  recounted  by  the  English  governor  of  Antigua 
as  follows:  "I  cannot  omit  one  ignoble  passage  of  the  governor  of 
Grenadoes.  A  Dutchman  from  Guinea  falling  in  with  the  islands 
with  200  negroes  was  invited  by  the  governor  to  trade  and  security 
assured  him,  but  no  sooner  were  the  negroes  landed  than  the  gov- 
ernor dispatched  a  shallop  to  La  Barret  [Gabaret]  who  sent  up  his 
vice-admiral  and  immediately  seized  poor  Hans  suspecting  no  danger, 
being  of  twenty-four  guns,  carried  him  to  St.  Kitts  and  keeps  him  as  a 
prize  till  the  business  be  decided  in  France."  Cal.  St.  Pap.,  Am.  ^ 
W.  Ind.,  1669-1674,  No.  508,  W.  Byam,  governor  of  Antigua,  to 
Willoughby. 

11  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  94. 

12  Ibid.,  Cg,  I. 

13  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Mem.  des  prises  faites  k  St.  Christopher 
par  M.  Gabaret,  commandant  I'escadre  des  vais.  du  Roy. 

197 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

and  a  copy  of  the  captain's  commission  in  order  that  you 
may  see  for  yourself  that  excessive  zeal  is  causing  M.  de 
Gabaret  to  seize  all  vessels  which  he  can  lay  his  hands 
upon.  He  says  that  he  is  doing  so  in  accordance  with 
orders  to  handle  the  Dutch  brutally."^*  To  this  com- 
plaint Colbert  made  the  following  reply: 

"In  regard  to  the  Dutch  or  the  Flemish,  as  they  are  called 
in  the  islands,  His  Majesty  commands  me  to  say  to  you  that 
we  have  the  right  to  capture  and  confiscate  their  vessels,  when 
they  are  found  trading  or  even  cruising  in  the  waters  of  our 
islands,  and  that  he  orders  you  to  enforce  with  the  utmost 
vigour  this  right  against  them.  You  cannot  render  a  service 
which  would  prove  more  pleasing  to  him  than  to  trouble  them 
in  their  commerce  and  even  to  chase  them  from  the  West  Indies 
entirely,  if  it  can  be  done  without  openly  violating  our  trea- 
ties, as  could  be  done,  for  instance,  by  secretly  aiding  the 
Caribs  against  them  in  case  of  a  war,  or  by  secretly  inciting 
them  to  attack  the  Dutch  by  furnishing  them  firearms  and 
ammunition.  It  will  be  necessary,  however,  to  be  very  cau- 
tious, so  that  the  Dutch  can  not  make  any  complaints  which 
could  be  justified  by  proof  of  an  unfriendly  act."^^ 

Colbert  stated  in  another  letter  that  he  wished  to  make 
the  Dutch  "lose  the  habit"  of  coming  to  the  French  islands, 
and  that  they  would  never  lose  it  until  the  news  of  confis- 
cation and  of  destruction  of  vessels  and  cargoes  produced 
its  effect  in  Holland.^^ 

De  Baas'  reply  has  something  of  the  sarcastic  in  it  and 
shows  a  disapproval  of  treating  the  Dutch  with  such 
severity : 

"Inasmuch  as  the  first  instructions  to  me  to  exclude  the  for- 
eign trader  did  not  specify  or  explain  the  policy  which  the 
court  wished  to  be  followed,  I  supposed  that  in  case  the  Dutch 

14  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  same  to  same,  March  22,  1670. 

15  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  487,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  July  3,  1670. 

16  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  115,  October  12,  1670. 

198 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

came  into  our  roads  to  trade,  they  should  simply  be  sent  away 
without  listening  to  their  offers  and  not  be  treated  as  enemies. 
M.  de  Gabaret,  however,  who  was  better  informed  than  I, 
as  he  had  been  enlightened  by  some  rays  from  the  sanctuary, 
began  to  treat  the  Dutch  in  a  fashion  which  he  knew  would 
prove  more  agreeable  to  you.  I  made  objections  to  his  brutal 
treatment,  and  was  so  shrouded  in  darkness  as  to  your  inten- 
tions, that  I  myself  was  groping  toward  the  abyss  of  error 
into  which  I  thought  he  was  already  falling.  It  is  thus  that 
the  ignorant  err  and  are  lost.  Nevertheless  since  receiving 
the  orders  of  His  Majesty  and  your  own,  Monseigneur,  I  see 
the  error  of  my  way.  .  .  .  You  may  rest  assured  that  I  shall 
henceforth  treat  the  Dutch  with  the  utmost  severity."^^ 

The  strict  exclusion  of  foreigners  from  the  French 
islands  brought  a  protest  from  the  English  government. 
Colbert  replied  to  it  in  a  very  interesting  letter  to  the 
French  ambassador  at  London: 

"In  reply  to  your  letter  of  the  20th  of  the  last  month,  I 
shall  say  that  the  ambassador  of  England  at  this  court  has 
filed  the  same  complaint  as  the  English  government  has  with 
you  in  regard  to  the  ordinance  of  June  10  last,  which  forbids 
foreigners  to  trade  or  cruise  in  the  waters  of  the  French 
islands  of  America  under  penalty  of  confiscation.  His  Maj- 
esty orders  me  to  say  that  he  was  forced  to  issue  this  ordi- 
nance in  order  to  drive  out  the  Dutch,  who  have  become  so 
accustomed  to  carry  on  all  of  this  trade  (in  which  they  are 
especially  favoured  by  all  the  planters)  that  it  was  impossible 
to  get  rid  of  them  without  the  employment  of  extraordinary 
measures;  that  for  this  purpose  His  Majesty  is  forced  to 
maintain  a  squadron  of  armed  vessels  in  the  islands.  As  the 
same  causes  of  complaint  did  not  exist  against  the  English, 
who  are  contented,  as  we  are  informed,  to  carry  on  trade  with 
their  own  islands.  His  Majesty  would  have  been  glad  to  make 
any  exception  in  their  favour  in  the  enforcement  of  the  afore- 
said ordinance,  but  he  was  obliged  to  make  the  terms  of  the 
regulation  general  in  regard  to  all  nations  on  account  of  the 

17  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  March  29,   1671. 

199 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

treaties  which  he  had  with  Holland.  He  has  given  orders  to 
Sieur  de  Baas^  who  is  in  command  of  the  islands,  to  enforce 
the  regulation  with  the  utmost  rigour  against  the  Dutch, 
but  at  the  same  time  to  treat  the  English  differently  by  reason 
of  the  fact  which  I  have  already  noted,  that  they  have  never 
engaged  in  this  trade  nor  at  present  are  attempting  to  do  so. 
You  can,  therefore,  assure  the  king  of  England  and  his  min- 
isters that  nothing  will  be  done  in  the  enforcement  of  the  pres- 
ent regulation  contrary  to  the  good  relations  which  the  king 
wishes  to  be  maintained  between  the  two  crowns  and  between 
their  subjects;  and  that  English  vessels  will  receive  in  all  of 
the  waters  and  lands  of  His  Majesty  good  treatment  and  all 
the  aid  which  his  own  vessels  and  those  of  his  subjects  receive 
from  the  English^  on  condition,  however,  that  they  attempt  to 
carry  on  no  trade  in  our  islands,  as  they  pretend  that  they  do 
not  do  and  in  accordance  with  the  regulations  which  the  king 
of  England  orders  to  be  enforced  in  the  islands  under  his  own 
obedience."^' 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  although  it  was  promised  here 
that  the  English  would  not  be  treated  with  severity  as 
were  the  Dutch,  Colbert  made  no  exception  in  their  favour 
as  to  the  privileges  of  trading  in  the  islands.  De  Gabaret, 
in  fact,  captured  a  French  vessel  which  attempted  trade 
with  the  English  islands.^^ 

The  effect  of  de  Gabaret's  activity  seems  to  have  been 
felt  at  once,  for  de  Baas  wrote  on  November  10,  1670: 
"The  Dutch  have  stopped  coming  to  our  coasts.  As  long 
as  there  are  vessels  of  the  king  here  they  will  flee  from  them 
as  from  dangerous  reefs.  M.  de  Gabaret  is  continually 
trying  to  surprise  them  by  laying  traps.  I  believe  that  in 
the  future  he  will  be  able  to  see  them  only  from  afar  off. 
They  are  greatly  frightened."^"     The  work  of  patrolling, 

18  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  491-493,  Colbert  to  Colbert  de  Croissy, 
August  5,   1670. 

19  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  22,  1670. 

20  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cjo,  St.  Christophe,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert, 
November  10,  1670. 

200 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

however,  had  to  be  interrupted  in  order  to  quell  a  rebeUion 
which  had  broken  out  in  St.  Domingo. 

When  Ogeron  took  command  at  St.  Domingo  as  gov- 
ernor for  the  West  India  Company,  the  inhabitants  said 
frankly  that  they  would  never  submit  to  the  company  and 
that  they  would  obey  him  only  as  governor  for  the  king, 
and  that  although  they  intended  to  be  obedient  to  the 
king,  there  was  one  point  in  which  they  would  never  yield, 
namely,  in  regard  to  trade  with  the  Dutch,  "who  had 
never  let  them  lack  for  anything  at  a  period  when  the 
presence  of  French  at  Tortuga  and  St.  Domingo  was 
unknown  in  France. "^^  There  was  a  spirit  of  too  much 
independence  and  too  great  a  habit  of  not  being  subjected 
to  any  other  law  than  that  of  force  for  these  inhabitants  to 
submit  peaceably  to  any  such  system  as  that  which  Colbert 
was  attempting  to  impose  upon  them. 

About  the  first  of  May  (1670),  Ogeron,  on  returning 
to  Tortuga  from  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo,  sighted  two 
large  vessels,  which,  on  seeing  him,  pretended  to  be  going 
to  Coridon,  where  the  English  were  accustomed  to  go  to 
get  salt.  Consequently  he  believed  them  to  be  English  ves- 
sels from  Jamaica  and  did  not  give  chase.  On  arriving 
at  Tortuga,  however,  he  learned  that  the  two  vessels 
were  Dutch,  armed  with  twenty-eight  and  thirty-two 
guns,  and  commanded  by  Peter  Constant  and  Peter 
Marcq;  that  during  his  absence  these  vessels  had  traded 
with  filibusters  at  Bayaha  and  then  had  anchored  on  the 
northern  coast  of  St.  Domingo  at  Port  de  Paix,  where 
they  had  remained  trading  during  eight  days.  They  had 
not  only  traded  with  all  comers,  but  had  sent  a  boat  to 
Tortuga,  and  although  the  West  India  Company's  agents 
forbade  them  to  trade,  Peter  Constant  replied  that  some 
one  stronger  than  he  would  have  to  keep  him  from  doing 
so. 

21  Charlevoix,  Histoire  de  VIsle  Espagnole,  II,  61. 

201 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Two  days  later,  having  learned  that  all  the  inhabitants 
of  Leogane  were  in  rebellion,  Ogeron  embarked  on  the 
vessel,  Les  Armes  de  la  Compagnie,  and  sailed  thither. 
On  arriving  at  Nippes  four  days  later,  he  found  the  same 
two  Dutch  vessels  anchored  there,  and  learned  that  the 
rebellion  had  spread  to  the  whole  western  coast.  The 
rebels  had  sent  messengers  to  the  northern  coast  in  order 
to  win  the  co-operation  of  the  filibusters  and  buccaneers 
there.  An  attempt  was  made  to  prevent  the  two  Dutch 
ships  from  continuing  their  trade  and  when  they  sent  two 
boats  ashore  they  were  ordered  seized.  The  Dutch  forth- 
with attacked  the  governor,  retook  the  boats  by  force, 
and  sent  Renou  and  another  commander,  de  Ville  Neufve, 
on  board  their  vessels  as  prisoners.  Ogeron  himself  was 
forced  to  leave  Nippes  before  the  attack  of  a  hundred 
armed  men.  He  sailed  and  arrived  two  days  later  at 
Petit  Goave.  There  the  inhabitants  pretended  to  welcome 
him.  As  a  bit  of  caution,  however,  he  first  sent  a  messenger 
with  letters  addressed  to  some  of  the  principal  inhabitants. 
The  messenger  had  hardly  set  foot  ashore  before  he  was 
arrested.  No  less  than  two  thousand  shots  were  fired  at 
the  governor's  vessel  and  he  was  forced  to  retire  to  Tor- 
tuga.  He  learned  on  arriving  there  that  the  rebels  of  the 
west  coast  were  marching  to  unite  themselves  with  those 
of  the  north  and  that  they  were  planning  to  attack  him  at 
Tortuga. 

He  straightway  dispatched  Renou,  a  lieutenant,  to  the 
Windward  Islands  in  order  to  inform  de  Baas  of  the  revolt 
and  to  demand  aid.  Renou  fell  sick  en  route  and  did  not 
reach  Martinique  before  September  25.^  De  Baas  gave 
orders  to  de  Gabaret  to  proceed  at  once  to  St.  Domingo 
in  order  to  quell  the  rebellion.  De  Gabaret,  however, 
refused  to  obey  the  order,  on  the  grounds  that  he  was 
under  special  orders  from  the  king  to  patrol  the  Windward 

22  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  September  30,  1670. 

203 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Islands.  Consequently  a  special  order  from  France  had 
to  be  waited  for  before  aid  was  sent  to  Ogeron. 

In  the  mean  time  the  revolt  continued.  Ogeron  was 
attacked  by  three  hundred  rebels,  but  succeeded  in  hold- 
ing his  ground  at  Tortuga.^^  St.  Domingo,  however,  was 
entirely  in  control  of  the  rebels  and  foreigners  were  trad- 
ing there  with  the  greatest  freedom.  The  hatred  against 
the  company  was  so  great  that  the  planters  asserted, 
according  to  Ogeron,  that  they  would  rather  have  their 
goods  perish  than  see  them  loaded  upon  one  of  its  vessels. 
The  governor  was  powerless  to  assert  his  authority,  be- 
cause he  found  no  support  among  the  planters.  He  was 
so  discouraged,  in  fact,  that  he  proposed  to  Colbert  the 
establishment  of  a  colony  on  the  coast  of  Florida  with  the 
few  who  remained  faithful  to  him.^* 

On  receiving  news  of  the  revolt,  Colbert  acted  promptly. 
He  first  filed  complaint  with  the  Dutch  government  against 
the  conduct  of  the  two  vessels  at  St.  Domingo,  and  at  the 
same  time  gave  warning  that  all  Dutch  vessels  found 
cruising  near  Tortuga  and  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo, 
would  be  sunk  or  confiscated.^^  He  then  sent  orders  to  de 
Gabaret  to  go  to  St.  Domingo,  to  restore  Ogeron,  and 
to  capture  or  sink  all  Dutch  vessels  found  near  the  coast. 

In  obedience  to  orders,  de  Gabaret  arrived  in  Tortuga 
on  February  7,  and  tried,  in  co-operation  with  Ogeron,  to 
quell  the  rebellion.  The  planters  of  Tortuga  were  per- 
suaded without  difficulty  to  take  a  new  oath  of  allegiance 
to  the  king.  De  Gabaret  and  Ogeron  then  sailed,  on 
February  9,  for  the  western  coast  of  St.  Domingo.  They 
arrived  at  Leogane  on  the  14th.  De  Sourdis,  captain  of 
UAurore,  was  sent  ashore  with  a  summons  to  the  rebels 

23  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Fran?.  Nouv.  Acq.,  9325,  Ms.  176-178,  Ogeron 
to  de  Baas,  October  9,  1670. 

24  Charlevoix,  II,  89. 

25  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  127,  Colbert  to  Ogeron,  November  6, 
1670. 

203 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

to  lay  down  their  arms  and  to  acknowledge  Ogeron  as 
their  governor.  In  reply  to  his  appeals  they  said  that 
although  they  were  good  subjects  to  the  king,  they  would 
not  submit  to  the  West  India  Company  or  acknowledge 
Ogeron  as  their  governor.  De  Gabaret  then  came  ashore 
himself  to  endeavour  to  persuade  the  rebels  to  change 
their  mind.  He  found  before  him  600  of  them  armed. 
He  received  the  same  reply.  When  he  tried  to  frighten 
them  by  threats,  he  was  greeted  with  cries  of  derision. 
He  then  tried  to  deal  directly  with  one  of  the  leaders, 
but  he  no  sooner  began  to  talk  with  him  than  the 
rebels  crowded  about  in  great  numbers  and  shouted  that 
this  leader  had  no  more  power  to  treat  than  anyone  else. 
De  Gabaret  returned  to  his  vessel  to  confer  with  Ogeron 
as  to  the  best  measures  to  be  taken.  An  immediate  attack 
seemed  imprudent,  because  the  landing  of  troops  would 
prove  exceedingly  difficult  on  account  of  the  marshes. 
Accordingly  they  sailed  on  the  16th  and  arrived  at  Petit 
Goave  the  following  day.  Here  they  found  also  all  the 
inhabitants  armed  and  drawn  up  in  battle  array.  Ogeron 
addressed  a  letter  to  them,  but  they  refused  to  listen 
to  its  contents,  and  began  to  cry,  *'Vive  le  Roy,  point 
d'Ogeron!''^  They  announced  their  intentions  to  do  as 
the  inhabitants  of  Leogane  had  done,  and  asserted  that 
they  would  be  re-inforced  by  the  rebels  from  there  on  the 
morrow.  In  spite  of  these  threats  an  attack  was  made  upon 
them  and  they  fled  into  the  woods.  The  royal  troops,  after 
burning  a  few  houses,  were  re-embarked  and  sailed  away. 
The   same  thing  was  repeated   at  Nippes.   No  thorough 

26  An  explanation  of  the  hostility  of  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Do- 
mingo towards  Ogeron  is  perhaps  to  be  explained  by  a  letter  written 
by  du  Lion  to  Colbert  on  September  30,  1670:  "The  people  of  St. 
Domingo  say  that  since  Ogeron  has  participated  in  commerce  with 
the  West  India  Company,  he  no  longer  governs  them  as  a  father, 
but  as  a  man  who  is  promoting  his  personal  interests.  I  don't 
know  whether  these  reports  are  true  or  not."    Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cj,  I. 

204 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

campaign  seems  to  have  been  attempted.  De  Gabaret  and 
Ogeron  both  decided  that  it  was  best  to  return  to  Tortuga, 
where  they  arrived  on  the  25th.  From  February  27  to 
March  4,  the  inhabitants  of  Port  de  Paix  and  Port  Fran- 
9ais  were  visited  and  finally  persuaded  to  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance.  With  this  de  Gabaret  seems  to  have  been  con- 
tented and  straightway  sailed  for  France. 

After  de  Gabaret's  departure,  Ogeron,  on  returning  to 
the  west  coast  of  St.  Domingo,  found  that  the  spirit  of 
rebellion  had  lost  much  of  its  zest.  He  agreed  that  no 
prosecutions  would  be  made  on  account  of  the  recent  rebel- 
lion, but  said  that  all  French  vessels  would  be  permitted 
to  trade  at  Tortuga  and  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo,  but 
that  foreigners  would  be  excluded.  The  inhabitants  there- 
upon returned  to  their  obedience  to  the  governor.  Renou 
was  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  France  with  a  letter  to 
Colbert  to  demand  pardon  for  the  rebels.  The  letter  bore 
the  date  of  May  7,  1671.  Colbert  replied  under  date  of 
October  21,  expressing  entire  satisfaction  with  the  con- 
duct of  Ogeron,  and  informing  him  that  the  king  had 
granted  general  pardon  to  all.  The  terms  of  the  pardon 
stated  that  it  had  been  granted  because  Ogeron  had 
affirmed  that  all  acts  of  hostility  had  ceased;  that  arms 
had  been  laid  down,  and  that  there  was  sincere  regret  for 
the  acts  of  rebellion.^ 

De  Gabaret  and  Ogeron  were  both  in  agreement  as  to 
the  cause  of  this  rebellion.  "This  rebelHon  occurred," 
said  Ogeron,  "only  by  reason  of  the  regulation  which  for- 
bade trade  with  foreigners.  Thus  it  is  certain  that  if  the 
two  Dutch  vessels  had  not  come  to  trade  and  made  strong 
appeals  to  the  inhabitants  to  do  so,  the  rebellion  would 
not  have  occurred."^    De  Gabaret  affirmed  that  the  rebel- 

-     27  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fols.  75-78,  79. 

28  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Proces  verbal  de  la  Revolte  arriv6e  k  la 
Coste  de  St.  Dom.,  August  13,  1670. 

205 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

lious  and  insolent  spirit  of  the  inhabitants  came  from  the 
fact  that  they  were  too  sure  of  trade  with  foreigners. 
Suzanne,  a  former  agent  of  the  West  India  Company  at  St. 
Domingo,  had  estabhshed  himself  at  Jamaica  and  offered 
good  prices  to  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Domingo  for  all  their 
products.  He  had,  in  fact,  made  a  contract  with  them  by 
which  he  agreed  to  take  all  they  produced  and  transport 
it  to  Holland,  for  which  purpose  he  would  furnish  a  vessel 
of  300  tons  armed  with  twenty-two  guns,  and  in  return  to 
bring  every  year  a  quantity  of  negroes  and  all  sorts  of  mer- 
chandise for  a  reasonable  price.  This  agreement  had  made 
the  planters  believe  that  they  could  be  quite  independent 
of  France  and  resist  all  attacks  against  them.^ 

In  the  following  year,  Ogeron  demanded  a  vessel  of 
twenty  or  thirty  guns  to  serve  as  a  patrol,^  but  his  de- 
mand seems  not  to  have  met  with  a  favourable  response, 
for  he  wrote  in  the  following  year,  on  the  eve  of  the  out- 
break of  the  war  with  Holland,  that  he  had  neither  vessels 
nor  armed  soldiers  nor  ammunition,  and  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  him  to  defend  himself  in  case  of  a  foreign 
attack  or  to  prevent  foreign  commerce.^ 

The  revolt  at  St^  Domingo  seems  to  have  awakened  some 
echo  in  the  other  islands,  but  beyond  a  bit  of  murmuring 
there  was  no  overt  act  of  rebellion.^^ 

De  Gabaret's  sojourn  in  the  islands  had  meant  much 
toward  the  enforcement  of  the  regulations  against  foreign 
traders.  The  presence  of  three  armed  vessels  which  cap- 
tured at  the  cannon's  mouth  Dutch  vessels  and  confiscated 
them, before  the  eyes  of  the  planters  must  have  made,  as 
Colbert  hoped  it  would  do,  a  big  impression  both  upon  the 
Dutch  and  upon  the  planters.     The  show  of  such  force 

29  Charlevoix,  II,  94;  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Ogeron  to  Colbert, 
March  4,  1671. 

30  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Co,  I,  September,  1671. 

31  Charlevoix,  II,  97. 

32  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  September  30,  1670. 

206 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

proved  much  more  effective  in  a  frontier  community  like  the 
West  Indies  than  ordinances  and  commands.  The  spirit  of 
revolt  was  hushed  and  the  planters  were  held  in  subjection. 
The  governor  of  a  neighbouring  English  island  remarked 
that,  although  the  French  were  "thus  huffing  it  at  sea," 
the  poor  planter  was  suffering  within  the  islands.^  The 
Dutch  fled  before  such  force  and  seem  to  have  suffered. 
Thus  du  Lion  wrote  to  Colbert  on  March  29,  1670 : 

"The  quantity  of  merchandise  is  so  great  at  St.  Eustatius 
that  the  Dutch  do  not  know  what  to  do  with  it  and  are  forced 
to  sell  it  at  very  low  prices  to  the  English  at  Nevis,  Montserrat 
and  Antigua.  .  .  .  The  Dutch  will  certainly  be  ruined  so  far 
as  the  islands  are  concerned,  if  the  policy  of  excluding  them  is 
strongly  enforced,  for  they  will  be  obliged  to  see  their  mer- 
chandise perish  or  to  send  it  back  to  Europe,  and  in  addition 
they  will  be  forced  to  send  away  their  vessels  without  any 
cargo  whatever."^ 

The  results  upon  French  shipping  seem  to  have  proved 
rather  satisfactory  to  Colbert.  He  wrote  to  de  Baas  on 
October  10,  1670,  as  follows: 

"I'll  tell  you  for  your  own  satisfaction  that  since  you  have 
turned  your  attention  to  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  against 
foreigners,  we  notice  that  a  much  larger  number  of  French 
vessels  demand  permission  to  go  to  the  islands  and  we  see  also 
that  the  number  of  refineries  is  increasing  constantly  in 
the  realm.  Foreigners  no  longer  bring  us  sugar.  We  have 
begun  since  six  weeks  or  two  months  to  export  it  to  them." 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose,  however,  that  the 
problem  of  excluding  the  foreign  trader  had  been  definitely 
solved,  for  the  presence  of  armed  vessels  was  still  neces- 
sary.    De  Gabaret  was  commanded  to  leave  at  his  depart- 

33  Cal.  St.  Pap.,  Am.  ^  W.  Ind.,  1669-1674. 

34  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  March  29,  1670. 

35  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  115. 

207 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ure  one  of  his  vessels,  UAurore,  a  frigate,  to  continue  the 
work  which  he  had  begun.^  Another  squadron  under  the 
command  of  d'Aplemont  was  sent  to  Martinique  at  the 
beginning  of  1672.  De  Baas  was  ordered  to  use  it  for  the 
protection  of  French  commerce  and  "in  order  to  prevent 
any  foreign  vessel  from  trading  in  the  French  islands. "^^ 
In  1673  three  vessels,  Le  BelUqueux,  La  Fee  and  La  Sibille, 
were  on  patrol  duty,  and  at  the  close  of  the  year  three 
others  were  sent  out,  L*Alcion,  Les  Jeux  and  La  Friponne, 
"which  were  to  be  employed  for  no  other  purpose  than  to 
give  chase  to  all  foreign  vessels  which  attempted  to  come 
into  the  roads  of  the  islands."^  Throughout  the  course 
of  the  Dutch  war,  ships  were  constantly  sent  to  the  West 
Indies,  both  to  defend  them  and  to  keep  out  foreign 
traders.^ 

But  Colbert  was  not  contented  with  the  ground  which 
he  had  gained  from  de  Gabaret's  work  in  1670.  Reports 
reached  his  ears  that  some  vessels,  purported  to  have  been 
built  in  Canada  and  in  the  West  Indies,  were  taking  car- 
goes to  foreign  ports  under  the  claim  that  they  were  not 
subject  to  the  regulations  which  governed  vessels  built  and 
owned  by  merchants  of  France.  To  meet  this  situation, 
a  royal  ordinance  was  proclaimed  on  July  18,  1671,  which 
forbade  such  practice.*"  In  this  same  year  he  advanced  to 
another  point  in  his  fight  by  attempting  to  exclude  Irish 
salt  beef. 

Salt  beef  was  indispensable  at  this  time  for  feeding 
slaves,  and  a  large  quantity  was  necessary  to  West  India 
planters.     The  supply  had  almost  from  the  beginning  been 

36  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol,  149,  order  to  de  Gabaret,  December 
28,  1670. 

37  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  fol.  29,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  March  24, 
1672. 

38  Ibid.,  5,  fol.  47,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  September  5,  1673. 

39  Ibid.,  6,  fols.  15  verso,  16. 

40  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fols.  62-64;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  227. 

208 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

brought  either  from  Ireland  directly,  or  indirectly  through 
Holland  or  the  ports  of  France.*^  But  one  of  the  cardinal 
points  in  Colbert's  economic  policy  was  independence  so 
far  as  possible  of  foreign  markets.  He  saw  no  reason 
why  the  French  should  seek  a  supply  of  salt  beef  in  Ire- 
land, when  it  might  be  produced  in  France.  The  privilege 
of  entrepot  in  France  was  annulled  for  Irish  salt  beef  by 
an  arret  of  August  17,  1671.^  Another  ordinance  of 
November  4,  1671,  forbade  the  importation  of  salt  meat, 
purchased  in  foreign  countries,  under  penalty  of  confis- 
cation of  vessel  and  500  livres  fine  for  the  first  offense 
and  corporal  punishment  for  the  second.*^  Bounties  were 
also  offered  for  the  exportation  to  the  islands  of  French 
salt  beef.  Salt  beef,  however,  became  so  scarce  that  gov- 
ernors were  forced  to  permit  trade  with  foreigners  to  save 
slaves  and  planters  from  suffering.  "I  saw  people  at 
Guadeloupe,"  wrote  one  official,  "come  to  thank  their  com- 
mander for  the  permission  which  he  had  given  to  the  Eng- 
lish to  sell  200  barrels  of  beef,  swearing  to  him  with  tears 
in  their  eyes  that  it  had  been  more  than  a  year  since  they 
or  their  families  had  had  a  morsel  of  meat  to  eat."*^  Two 
Jewish  merchants  of  Martinique  were  permitted  to  import 
from  Barbadoes,  a  cargo  of  codfish,  cheese,  butter,  bacon, 
beef,  candles,  cloth  and  shoes. *^  Permission  was  likewise 
granted  to  four  English  vessels  to  trade,  one,  a  ketch  with 
a  cargo  of  provisions  for  Guadeloupe,  the  other  three  with 

41  Du  Lion  states,  in  a  letter  of  July  25,  1670,  that  de  Formont,  a 
French  merchant,  was  preparing  a  quantity  of  salt  beef  and  live  stock 
in  Ireland  for  shipment  to  the  islands.  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I.  A 
further  discussion  of  trade  in  salt  beef  will  be  found  in  a  succeeding 
chapter. 

42Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  130.  Its  enforcement  was  postponed 
until  February  1,  in  order  to  enable  those  merchants  who  had  a  stock 
of  Irish  beef  on  hand  to  dispose  of  it. 

43  Ibid.,  p.  253. 

44  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 

45  Ibid.,  de  Baas  to  de  B16or,  February  6,  1674. 

209 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

similar  cargoes  for  Martinique.  Among  the  latter  was  a 
"ketch  coming  from  the  city  of  Boston."^  De  Baas  per- 
mitted another  foreign  vessel  to  bring  some  salt  beef  to 
St.  Pierre,  to  enable  the  labourers  to  continue  the  work  on 
the  fortifications  which  they  had  been  compelled  to  quit 
because  they  had  nothing  to  eat.*^ 

Colbert  sternly  rebuked  this  conduct  and  forbade  any 
exceptions  being  made  to  the  regulations  regarding  trade 
with  foreigners.^  He  was  forced,  however,  by  conditions 
in  the  islands  in  1673,  to  restore  the  right  to  import  Irish 
beef  and  never  renewed  the  fight. *^ 

De  Baas  wrote  on  February  8,  1674,  in  most  emphatic 
terms  that  all  foreign  commerce  had  ceased: 

"I  do  not  know,  Monseigneur,  what  can  be  your  thoughts 
on  the  subject  of  foreign  commerce  after  the  repeated  assur- 
ances which  I  have  given  you  that  there  is  none  at  all.  If 
anyone  has  written  you  differently  and  can  convince  me  that 
what  he  writes  is  so,  I  shall  submit  to  punishment  without 
asking  for  mercy.  It  is  true  that  on  the  eve  of  my  departure 
for  Cura9ao  a  small  English  vessel  which  asked  permission  to 
take  water  in  this  harbour  [St.  Pierre]  aided  me  by  bartering 
a  small  quantity  of  codfish,  herring  and  biscuits  for  French 
wine.  Lately  a  bark  brought  seven  or  eight  barrels  of  beef, 
which  were  bartered  for  French  brandy.  The  beef  was  needed 
to  feed  the  workmen  who  are  engaged  in  fortifying  the  har- 
bour and  who  had  been  forced  to  abandon  their  work  on 
account  of  a  lack  of  food.  It  is  perhaps  of  these  facts  that  you 
have  been  told.  If  beyond  these  two  cases  any  foreign  com- 
merce has  been  carried  on  in  the  French  islands  with  my 
knowledge,  I  wish  very  much  that  the  king  punish  me  with 
the  utmost  rigour.     Thus,  Monseigneur,  your  mind  can  be  at 

46  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 
« Ibid.,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  8,  1674. 

48  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  6,  fols.  32,  34-39,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  May  15, 
1674. 

49  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  5,  fol.  45,  September  5,  1673. 

210 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

rest  on  the  subject  of  foreign  trade^  for  the  truth  is  as  I  have 
represented  it."^" 

And  yet  in  the  same  letter  de  Baas  wrote  near  its  close 
that  as  the  price  of  sugar  was  exceedingly  low,  the  plant- 
ers had  begun  to  cultivate  indigo  and  ginger,  and  that 
they  had  devised  "other  means  for  their  subsistence  by 
raising  stock  and  poultry  of  every  description,  which  they 
sell  at  good  profit,  especially  to  foreigner s."^^ 

The  letter  raises  a  question  of  some  importance.  What 
did  de  Baas  mean  by  affirming  most  categorically  that 
commerce  with  foreigners  had  ceased,  and  yet  adding  that 
stock  and  poultry  were  being  sold  to  them?  He  could  not 
have  been  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  regulations  pro- 
hibited all  trade  with  foreign  islands,  even  when  carried  on 
by  Frenchmen,  for  he  had  raised  the  question  himself  in  a 
letter  to  Colbert  in  1670  and  had  received  most  definite 
and  clear-cut  instructions  on  the  point.^^  The  same  diffi- 
culty occurs  elsewhere  in  the  correspondence  of  de  Baas. 
Thus  only  a  few  months  later  he  wrote  Colbert  that  com- 
merce with  the  Dutch  had  ceased  and  that  regulations  were 
being  strictly  enforced,^^  and  yet  he  was  at  that  time, 
according  to  one  of  his  own  letters,  trying  to  establish 
trade  with  the  Dutch: 

"I  should  tell  you,  Monseigneur,  that  during  my  stay  at  St. 
Christopher,  I  wrote  to  a  Dutch  merchant,  named  Doukre, 
who  lives  at  Cura9ao  and  whom  I  knew  here  at  Martinique 
some  three  years  ago,  to  send  me  information  in  regard  to  the 
price  of  sugar,  ginger  and  indigo  at  Cura9ao  in  order  that  I 
might  have  some  idea  of  their  value.  I  shall  send  him  a  large 
enough  quantity  of  these  articles  to  yield  to  both  of  us  an 
honest  profit.     I  had  been  thinking  of  this  scheme  for  some 

50  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  8,  1674. 

51  Ibid. 

52  See  preceding  chapter. 

53  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  Cg,  I,  March  29,  1671 ;  Ciq,  St.  Christophe,  I,  de 
Baas  to  Colbert,  November  10,  1670. 

211 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

time,  but  I  did  not  wish  to  take  the  risk  of  sending  a  vessel 
to  Cura9ao  without  receiving  in  advance  some  assurance  that 
it  would  be  permitted  to  return.  Some  six  days  ago  I  received 
a  reply  not  only  from  the  merchant  to  whom  I  had  written, 
but  also  from  the  governor,  Otterinck,  who  informed  me  very 
civilly  that  M.  Doukre  had  informed  him  of  my  intentions  and 
assured  me  that  foreigners  received  the  same  treatment  at 
Cura9ao  as  the  Dutch.  His  letter  is  dated  at  Fort  Amsterdam, 
Cura9ao,  December  10,  l671.  I  believe,  Monseigneur,  that 
after  this  assurance  that  you  will  not  raise  any  objections,  if 
I  send  a  small  bark,  belonging  to  the  king,  which  is  still  here, 
and  carry  on  a  little  trade  with  Cura9ao.  ...  I  shall  do  so 
in  about  fifteen  days."^ 

Furthermore,  de  Baas  informed  Colbert  from  time  to  time, 
as  has  been  noted  above,  that  he  had  admitted  in  some 
cases  trade  with  foreigners  and  justified  his  conduct  by 
saying  that  it  was  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  suffering. 
The  motive  given  for  sending  a  vessel  to  Cura9ao,  however, 
was  not  the  relief  of  suffering,  but  personal  gain. 

Did  de  Baas  tell  Colbert  of  these  few  instances  in  order 
to  hide  from  him  a  larger  number  where  he  was  permitting 
foreigners  to  trade .?  Did  he  profit  from  his  situation  by 
sharing  in  the  profit  with  foreign  traders.^  Du  Lion,  the 
governor  of  Guadeloupe,  asserted  in  many  letters  that  de 
Baas  was  doing  so.  In  one  very  long  letter  he  gave  an 
account  of  the  corrupt  practices  of  Cartier,  the  West 
India  Company's  general  agent,  in  admitting  the  Dutch, 
and  cited  specific  instances  where  de  Baas  had  aided  him 
and  profited  personally  from  trade  with  the  Dutch.^^  In 
another  letter,  du  Lion  said  that  de  Baas  was  embarrassed 
by  the  presence  of  the  king's  vessels : 

"MM.  de  Gabaret  and  de  Sourdis,  captains  of  the  king's 
vessels,  have  stated  to  me  that  M.  de  Baas  is  not  pleased  with 

54  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1672. 

55  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  December  1,  1669,  a 
long  and  extremely  interesting  letter. 

213 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  way  in  which  they  have  been  capturing  foreign  vessels  in 
the  roads  of  Martinique  and  Grenada,  where  they  were  wont 
to  trade.  They  turned  over  their  prizes  to  him  and  had  diffi- 
culty enough  in  obtaining  receipts  from  him.  They  are  of  the 
opinion  that  this  arises  from  the  fact  that  M.  de  Baas  wishes  to 
have  more  leeway  in  granting  favours  to  foreigners,  to  whom  he 
must  have  made  promises,  for,  since  he  is  unable  to  grant  them 
freedom  to  trade  on  account  of  the  presence  of  the  king's  ships, 
they  have  complained  that  he  has  not  kept  his  promise  to 
them.  .  .  .  These  captains  are  determined,  however,  to  cap- 
ture as  many  Dutch  vessels  as  possible.  Notwithstanding  this, 
M.  de  Baas  has  granted  three  permissions  to  land  cargoes 
brought  from  Holland.  I  notified  him  that  I  would  not  permit 
the  cargoes  to  be  landed  in  Guadeloupe,  unless  he  gave  a 
written  order  forcing  me  to  do  so.  I  urged  him  to  remember 
that  you  had  given  me  orders  to  destroy  a  Dutch  vessel  rather 
than  let  it  trade  in  this  island.  M.  de  Baas  has  another  way 
of  regarding  the  matter."* 

Du  Lion,  the  author  of  these  charges,  seems  to  have 
been  a  jealous,  meddlesome  busybody  and  gossiper.  His 
letters  leave  the  impression  that  their  author  was  one  of 
those  unfortunate  self-righteous  individuals  who  are  quick 
to  see  the  faults  in  others  and  gloat  upon  them.  Colbert 
saw  fit  more  than  once  to  rebuke  him,  as  for  instance: 

"I  am  writing  you  only  a  few  lines,  in  response  to  all  the 
letters  which  I  have  been  receiving  from  you  for  a  long  time, 
to  tell  you  that  I  find  them  too  long,  too  tedious  and  of  too 
small  importance  to  spend  my  time  reading  them.  .  .  .  M.  de 
Baas  is  your  enemy,  the  West  India  Company  is  trying  to 
destroy  you,  Pelissier  is  also  your  declared  enemy,  as  is  also 
du  Ruau  Pallu  and  the  rest.  Their  enmity  toward  you  is  a 
creation  of  your  own  imagination,  for  as  a  matter  of  fact,  none 
of  them  has  ever  tried  to  play  you  a  bad  turn.  Your  own 
letters  prove  to  me  that  you  would  like  to  be  omnipotent  in 
the  government  which  the  king  has  confided  to  you,  as  well 

56  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  March  8,  1670. 

213 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

as  in  all  of  the  other  islands.  Judges  fail  to  do  their  duty,  if 
their  decisions  are  not  in  accord  with  your  views.  The  West 
India  Company  does  nothing  worth  while  if  it  does  not  meet 
with  your  approval."^ 

In  another  letter  he  rebuked  du  Lion  for  insubordination,^ 
and  in  still  others  he  told  him  that  it  was  needless  for  him 
to  keep  watch  on  what  de  Baas  did,  as  for  the  most  part 
he  was  commanded  to  do  many  things  against  which  he 
was  making  complaint.^^  It  must  be  stated  also  that  du 
Lion  was  decidedly  hostile  to  de  Baas,  because  he  had  been 
forced  by  de  Baas  to  leave  Guadeloupe  and  sail  for  France 
in  1669.'" 

But  one  cannot  read  carefully  the  charges  made  by  du 
Lion  without  being  on  the  whole  convinced  that  they  were 
based  partially  at  least  on  facts.  Colbert  stated  himself 
that  he  "continually  found  de  Baas  conniving  with  foreign 
traders  and  pardoning  them  too  easily."'^  Furthermore, 
Colbert  did  not  accept  the  statement  which  de  Baas  made 
in  the  letter  quoted  above  that  all  commerce  with  for- 
eigners had  ceased,  for  he  wrote  under  the  king's  name  in 
reply  as  follows : 

"I  receive  complaints  from  merchants  every  day  to  the  effect 
that  when  they  send  their  vessels  laden  with  merchandise  for 
the  use  and  consumption  of  the  inhabitants  of  my  islands, 
they  find  vessels  of  the  English  and  of  other  foreigners 
admitted  under  various  pretexts — a  fact  which  is  utterly  ruin- 
ing the  commerce  of  the  French.     It  is  this  which  forces  me  to 

57  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  5,  fols.  51  verso,  52. 

58  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  538,  May  1,  1672. 

59  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fols.  49  verso,  50,  April  9,  1670;  and  fol. 
100,  July  3,  1670. 

60  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  June  27,  1670,  and  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  457, 
July  31,  1669. 

61  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B2,  14,  Colbert  to  Colbert  de  Terron,  January 
2,  1671. 

214 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

write  you  that  it  is  my  will  that  my  ordinances  which  forbid 
foreigners  to  trade  in  the  islands  be  promptly  enforced."^^ 

It  seems  on  the  whole  probable  that  de  Baas  was  guilty 
of  admitting  foreign  traders  and  perhaps  that  he  even 
did  so  with  corrupt  purposes.  De  Baas'  actions,  how- 
ever, are  to  be  explained  in  part  by  the  fact  that  he 
yielded  in  some  cases  to  necessity  and  admitted  foreign 
ships  to  relieve  suffering,  and  it  must  be  added  that  on  the 
whole  de  Baas  made  an  excellent  governor,  and  was 
retained  in  his  position  until  his  death  on  January  24, 
1677. 

How  far  French  governors  of  the  West  Indies  were 
guilty  of  bribery  in  the  matter  of  foreign  trade  it  is 
impossible  to  state.  There  is  one  case  of  conviction  of  an 
official  at  St.  Christopher  in  1670,^^  and  about  the  same 
time,  St.  Marthe,  governor  of  Martinique,  was  convicted 
of  carrying  on  illicit  trade  with  the  English.'^ 

The  year  1677  was  marked  by  two  formal  renewals  of 
the  regulations  against  foreign  commerce,  one  on  Septem- 
ber 11,  1677,  by  the  proclamation  of  a  royal  ordinance,^ 
and  the  other  by  an  arret  of  the  conseil  d'etat  of  October 
16,  1677.^  The  latter  was  necessitated  by  the  fact  that 
the  conseil  sowverain  of  St.  Christopher  had  interposed 
its  authority  to  prevent  the  penalty  of  confiscation  from 
being  enforced  in  two  cases  of  conviction  for  trade  with 
foreigners.  The  circumstances  were  as  follows.  At  the 
liquidation  of  the  West  India  Company,  the  right  of  col- 
lecting duties   and  taxes  in  the  islands  had  been  trans- 

62  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  6,  fol.  17  his,  May  10,  1675. 

63  It  is  spoken  of  in  the  correspondence  between  de  Baas  and  Col- 
bert as  the  "affair  Royer."    See  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  490,  500  and  673. 

64  See  a  full  exposition  of  the  case  in  Dessalles,  Hist.  g4n.  des 
Antilles,  III,  194-197. 

65  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  7,  fol.  41  verso,  49;  Moreau  de  Saint-M^ry,  I, 
304-305. 

66  Arch.   Nat.,  G7,  1313. 

215 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ferred  into  a  farm  called  the  Domaine  d'Occident.  The 
fanner  in  taking  possession  of  the  farm  was  commanded 
to  instruct  his  agents  to  prevent  foreign  commerce.  The 
agents,  sent  to  St.  Christopher,  found  on  their  arrival 
the  inhabitants  trading  freely  with  foreigners.  Several 
attempts  at  arrest  proved  fruitless,  but  two  seizures  were 
made,  one  of  twenty-six  barrels  of  sugar  and  another  of 
six  barrels  of  beef.  Sieur  Dupas,  the  judge  of  the  island 
of  St.  Christopher,  declared  the  seizures  justified  and 
ordered  their  confiscation  according  to  law.  The  conseil 
souverairiy  however,  annulled  the  decision  and  ordered  the 
restitution  of  the  goods  in  question.  Oudiette,  the  farmer 
of  the  Domaine  d'Occident,  considered  the  case  of  enough 
importance  to  make  appeal  to  the  conseil  d'etat  in  France. 
It  was  in  answer  to  this  appeal  that  the  arret  of  October 
16  was  rendered,  sustaining  the  decision  of  the  judge,  and 
at  the  same  time  ordering  the  enforcement  of  the  laws 
against  foreign  trade.  In  spite,  however,  of  this  arrets 
trade  between  the  English  and  the  French  at  St.  Christo- 
pher continued.  The  task  of  preventing  it  was  exceed- 
ingly difficult.  A  double  frontier  existed  between  the  two 
peoples  from  the  fact  that  the  French  occupied  the  two 
ends  of  the  island  and  the  English  the  middle.  It  was 
consequently  only  a  matter  of  "one  kick  of  the  foot  to 
roll  a  barrel  of  beef  or  a  bale  of  cotton  to  the  French,  and 
another  to  roU  a  barrel  of  sugar  in  payment  to  the  Eng- 
lish."^^  Soldiers  were  posted  along  the  frontier,  but  they 
proved  entirely  untrustworthy,  for  they  profited  from 
their  situation  by  permitting  foreign  trade.  Commercial 
agents  also  proved  unfaithful.  They  stocked  their  stores 
with  foreign  goods  and  wrote  to  their  employers  in 
France  that  there  was  no  sale  for  French  goods  in  the 
islands,  because  the  governors  and  intendants  and  agents 

67  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cjo*  St.  Christophe,  I,  M6moire  sur  St.  Chris- 
tophe  par  Sr.  Cloche,  commis.  du  Dom.  d'Oc,  April  10,  1679. 

216 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

of  the  revenue  farmers  permitted  free  commerce  with  for- 
eigners. Only  about  one-fourth  of  the  vessels  which  went 
to  St.  Christopher  between  July,  1678,  and  April,  1679, 
were  officially  reported.^  Consequently  the  English  im- 
ported much  merchandise  from  Nevis  and  the  Dutch  from 
St.  Eustatius.  One  effect  of  this  was  that  beef  at  Martin- 
ique and  Guadeloupe  was  twenty  to  forty  per  cent  dearer 
that  at  St.  Christopher.^^  St.  Laurent,  the  governor  of 
St.  Christopher,  wrote  on  July  2,  1679,  that  two  com- 
panies of  marines  and  twenty  soldiers  from  the  garrison 
had  been  posted  along  the  frontiers  at  places  indicated  by 
Sieur  Cloche,  and  that  he  had  given  all  orders  necessary 
to  prevent  foreign  trade.  Englishmen  were  forbidden  to 
pass  with  merchandise  through  French  territory  without 
special  permission.^"  The  English  governor  objected, 
however,  to  such  a  regulation,  maintaining  that  all  har- 
bours and  roads  were  free  to  them  for  the  transportation 
of  all  of  their  goods  according  to  treaty  between  the  two 
nations.     This  constituted  a  very  serious  difficulty. 

"It  is  not  at  all  easy/'  St.  Laurent  wrote^,  "to  prevent  foreign 
commerce  at  St.  Christopher,  so  long  as  the  roads  and  har- 
bours remain  common  to  both  nations  for  the  transportation  of 
merchandise.  .  .  .  If  we  forbid  the  English  to  anchor  in  our 
harbours  of  Basseterre  and  Cabesterre,  whence  they  trans- 
port provision  to  their  quarters  of  Cabesterre  and  Cayenne, 
and  to  which  they  bring  their  goods  to  be  embarked,  they  will 
have  the  right  to  forbid  us  to  pass  across  their  territory  and 

68  Ibid. 

69  Ibid.,  Cloche  proposed  among  other  things  the  following  reme- 
dies: (1)  A  strict  enforcement  of  the  orders  of  His  Majesty  in  con- 
fiscating all  foreign  vessels  found  in  French  waters;  (2)  a  visitation 
of  stores  and  of  vessels  and  the  confiscation  of  foreign  goods  found 
in  them;  (3)  a  reward  of  three  dcus  to  soldiers  for  every  barrel  of 
sugar  which  they  intercepted  in  passing  into  English  territory;  (4) 
a  prohibition  for  soldiers  to  board  foreign  vessels. 

70  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cio,  St.  Christophe,  I,  M6moire  sur  le  commerce 
dtranger  k  St.  Christophe  par  St.  Laurent,  July  2,  1679. 

217 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

thus  interrupt  commerce  between  our  two  settlements.  In  case 
of  war  with  the  English  or  another  power,  the  French  gov- 
ernor would  not  be  able  to  unite  the  inhabitants  of  the  two 
colonies  or  to  send  aid  from  one  to  the  other  in  case  of 
danger."^ 

Another  very  serious  objection  was  that  there  was  no  ade- 
quate supply  of  water  in  the  French  territory  for  the 
supply  of  ships  and  that  the  French  had  always  been 
forced  to  go  into  English  territory  where  there  was  a 
small  river.  Matters  remained  in  this  state  until  the 
arrival  of  de  Blenac,  the  governor-general  of  the  islands, 
and  of  Patoulet,  intendant,  in  1679.  They  proposed  a 
treaty  with  the  English  containing  the  following  clauses: 
(1)  a  delimitation  of  the  harbours  with  a  prohibition  for 
one  nation  to  frequent  the  waters  of  the  other;  (2)  free 
passage  across  the  territories  of  each  nation  for  persons 
without  merchandise;  (3)  formal  permission  to  be  made 
obligatory  for  the  transportation  of  colonial  products  or 
of  merchandise  from  Europe  across  the  territories  of  the 
other  nation,  and  a  bond  to  be  given  in  order  to  insure 
good  faith;  (4)  free  access  for  the  French  to  the  sulphur 
mines  on  British  territory;  (5)  free  access  for  the  English 
to  the  salt  fields  on  French  territory.  The  treaty,  how- 
ever, was  refused  by  the  English.^^  Colbert  seemed  to  real- 
ize the  impossibility  of  preventing  trade  between  the  Eng- 
lish and  French  in  the  island,  for  he  instructed  de  Blenac 
to  remain  satisfied  with  the  prevention  of  commerce  be- 
tween the  two  nations  by  sea  and  not  to  attempt  to  pro- 
hibit it  within  the  island.^^ 

The  Dutch  attempted  to  send  some  vessels  to  the  islands 
in  1678,  on  the  pretext  that  the  passports  in  blank  which 

71  Ibid. 

72  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Ciq,  St.  Christophe,  I,  Un  project  de  traitt6  qui 
a  est6  envoye  aux  Anglais,  December  15,  1679. 

73  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fol.  34,  Colbert  to  de  B16nac,  April  19,  1679. 

218 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

were  given  them  by  the  treaty  of  Nymwegen  authorized 
them  to  do  so.  Colbert,  however,  wrote  letters  to  all  the 
governors  of  the  islands  to  respect  no  such  passports  and 
to  enforce  rigourously  the  regulations  against  all  foreign- 
ers without  exception/*  De  Blenac,  who  was  sent  out  to 
the  islands  in  1678  to  succeed  de  Baas,  deceased,  and 
Patoulet,  who  was  sent  out  to  become  the  first  intendant 
of  the  islands  in  1679,  were  both  ordered  to  keep  up  the 
fight  against  foreign  traders.  In  the  instructions  of  the 
latter  the  following  passage  occurs : 

"Inasmuch  as  His  Majesty  has  forbidden  all  foreigners  to 
trade  in  the  said  islands  and  has  reserved  the  trade  thereof 
for  his  own  subjects,  there  is  nothing  to  which  Sieur  Patou- 
let should  devote  more  attention  and  on  which  he  should 
concentrate  more  effort  than  to  prevent  all  foreign  vessels 
from  entering  into  the  harbours,  bays  and  inlets  of  his  islands 
and  trading  there  under  any  pretext  whatsoever.  He  is  not 
to  admit  them  even  when  the  inhabitants  are  in  need  of  some 
article  of  merchandise  for  their  subsistence."^^ 

When  Patoulet  wrote  Colbert  that  he  had  permitted 
three  French  vessels  to  trade  at  Martinique,  although  they 
had  no  passports,  and  another  one  from  Nantes  which  had 
called  at  Cadiz  and  taken  part  of  its  cargo  there,  Colbert 
rebuked  him  for  his  conduct  and  commanded  him  to  act 
in  concert  with  de  Blenac  in  order  to  insure  strict  enforce- 
ment of  regulations.^^ 

On  October  11,  1680,  de  Blenac  and  Patoulet  issued  an 
ordinance  which  forbade  French  vessels  to  bring  cargoes  of 

74  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B2,  38,  fol.  498  verso,  June  10,  1678;  ibid.,  Col., 
B,  7,  December  8,  1678. 

75  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  April  1,  1679. 

76  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fends  fran9ais,  11315,  fol.  54  verso.  He  in- 
structed the  same  official  a  few  months  later  that  in  case  the  officers 
of  the  Domaine  d'Occident  disobeyed  the  regulations  regarding  for- 
eign trade,  they  be  punished  as  all  other  subjects.  Ibid.,  fols.  150- 
151,  125-134. 

219 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

salt  beef,  bacon,  cloth,  and  other  merchandise  from  foreign 
countries/^  About  the  same  time  a  squadron  of  His  Maj- 
esty's vessels  was  sent  to  the  Wfest  Indies  under  the  com- 
mand of  Count  d'Estrees  "to  protect  the  commerce  which 
my  subjects  carry  on  in  the  islands  and  prevent  the  for- 
eigners from  participating  therein."^^  The  following  year 
order  was  given  for  two  small  vessels  of  120  and  150  tons 
to  be  equipped  at  Rochefort  and  sent  to  the  islands  to  serve 
as  a  patrol/^ 

Colbert  made  provision,  in  theory  at  least,  for  the  im- 
portation of  all  goods  from  Europe  of  which  the  planters 
had  need,  for  he  asserted  that  the  law  of  supply  and 
demand  would  force  French  merchants  to  bring  them.  He 
did  not,  however,  make  provision  for  the  marketing  of  the 
by-products  of  the  sugar  industry,  namely  molasses  and 
rum.  In  proportion  as  the  sugar  industry  developed, 
these  by-products  became  more  important.  Their  impor- 
tance became  especially  great  after  the  establishment  of 
refineries  in  the  islands.  By  1681,  Patoulet  estimated 
their  value  at  100,000  ecus.  But  neither  molasses  nor 
rum  could  be  marketed  in  France,  the  former  apparently 
because  there  was  no  demand  for  it,  the  latter  because  law 
forbade  its  importation,  in  order  to  prevent  it  from  enter- 
ing into  competition  with  various  distilled  liquors  manu- 
factured by  the  vine-growers  of  the  realm.  This  fact  gave 
rise  to  a  very  interesting  proposal  made  by  the  refiners  in 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique: 

"Whereas  his  honour  the  intendant  has  urged  the  chief 
planters  of  the  islands  to  undertake  trade  with  the  inhabitants 
of  Canada  and  the  coast  of  Acadia,  the  proprietors  of  the 
aforesaid  refineries  under  the  direction  of  Sieurs  Bouteiller 
and  Jamain,  .    .    .  offer  conjointly  to  open  commerce  with  the 

77Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  I,  343. 

78  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  April  8,  1680. 

79  Ibid.,  second  part,  fol.  10. 

220 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

inhabitants  of  Canada  and  of  the  coast  of  Acadia,  which  should 
be  promoted  in  order  to  facilitate  the  sale  of  all  syrups  and 
rum  made  from  cane,  and  to  stop  the  mixture  which  is  now 
being  made  of  syrup  with  sugar,  under  the  following  condi- 
tions: (1)  A  monopoly  of  trade  for  ten  years  to  be  granted 
them  with  exemption  from  all  import  and  export  duties;  (2) 
as  Quebec  and  Acadia  cannot  consume  all  the  syrup  and  the 
rum  which  are  being  made  in  the  French  islands  and  two- 
thirds  of  which  is  at  present  a  pure  loss,  permission  to  be 
granted  to  barter  these  syrups  with  the  English  colonies, 
especially  those  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Boston,  for  salt  meat 
and  live  stock  for  which  there  is  such  great  need  in  the  French 
islands." 

In  regard  to  the  latter,  the  petitioners  asserted  that 
they  would  be  able  in  this  way  not  only  to  satisfy  a  need 
in  the  islands,  but  also  find  a  market  for  a  product  which 
remained  a  pure  loss  upon  their  hands,  that  they  would 
thus  be  able  to  obtain  an  adequate  supply  of  salt  meat  by 
barter,  for  which  they  had  been  accustomed  to  pay  money 
to  the  Irish.  In  order  to  insure  their  good  faith  in  limiting 
their  trade  with  the  English  colonies  strictly  to  the  arti- 
cles enumerated,  the  petitioners  offered  to  submit  to  a 
strict  inspection  by  the  customs  officers  and  that  in  case 
any  other  merchandise  were  found  they  agreed  to  submit 
to  whatever  penalty  His  Majesty  wished  to  impose. 

"This  trade  would  occasion  no  diminution  in  the  revenue  of 
the  king  as  there  is  no  duty  on  syrups  and  rum.  It  would 
increase  considerably  the  earnings  of  the  planter,  would  per- 
fect the  manufacture  of  sugar,  and  would  encourage  the  estab- 
lishment of  refineries,  for  they  are  now  forced  to  throw  away 
their  syrups,  whereas  the  refiners  of  France  sell  theirs  to  the 
Dutch  for  seven  livres  a  hundred,  a  thing  which  the  refiners 
of  the  islands  cannot  do  by  reason  of  the  great  leakage  and 
cost  of  transportation." 

This  petition  received  the   approval  of  Patoulet,  who 

231 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

wrote  to  Colbert  that  he  regarded  the  project  as  very 
commendable : 

"I  am  convinced  that  if  trade  with  the  English  colonies, 
close  to  Boston,  can  be  established,  as  is  proposed,  the  king 
and  the  colonies  would  derive  great  profit  therefrom.  I  can 
hardly  persuade  myself,  however,  that  the  king  of  England 
will  suffer  his  subjects  to  receive  all  of  our  syrup  and  rum, 
as  they  have  an  annual  value  of  more  than  100,000  ecus.  The 
proprietors  of  the  refineries  here  believe  the  contrary,  and 
have  confidence  in  their  project,  because  they  have  learned 
that  the  English  islands  cannot  furnish  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
these  articles  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  those  colonies.  The 
English  who  dwell  near  Boston  will  not  worry  themselves 
about  the  prohibitions  which  the  king  of  England  may  issue, 
because  they  hardly  recognize  his  authority."^" 

Three  things  are  to  be  remarked  about  this  document: 
First,  it  presents  a  very  interesting  and  reasonable  pro- 
posal on  the  part  of  the  refiners,  which  throws  light  upon 
the  need  of  the  colonies  to  find  a  market  for  some  impor- 
tant commodities  outside  of  the  French  empire ;  second, 
it  shows  clearly  that  the  profit  in  exchanging  these  pro- 
ducts with  the  English  North  American  colonies  for  com- 
modities which  these  colonies  were  in  turn  forced  to  market 
outside  of  the  British  empire  was  great;  third,  that  the 
New  Englanders  had  already  won  a  reputation  among  the 
French  for  a  spirit  of  independence. 

The  petition  was  refused  by  Colbert,  partly  because  he 
did  not  approve  of  the  establishment  of  a  monopoly  of 
trade  between  Canada,  Acadia  and  the  islands,  but  chiefly 
because  he  did  not  wish  to  authorize  a  modification  of 
his  policy  to  exclude  all  foreign  trade.^^     He  thus  main- 

80  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  March  8,  1681.  The  text  of  this  peti- 
tion is  to  be  found  accompanying  the  letter  of  Patoulet.  What 
appears  to  be  the  original,  however,  is  found  in  the  correspondence 
of  Canada,  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C^,  V. 

81  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fols.  38-39,  Colbert  to  Patoulet,  July  13, 

222 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

tained  his  fight  to  the  end  and  refused  to  yield  a  jot  or 
a  tittle  in  the  principles  which  he  had  striven  so  long  to 
maintain. 

As  we  draw  to  the  close  of  the  ministry  of  Colbert,  we 
naturally  ask  how  far  his  indefatigable  efforts,  his  strict 
orders  had  borne  fruit.  Patoulet  stated  in  a  memoir  of 
December  26,  1680,  that  he  was  "convinced  that  no  for- 
eign commerce  is  being  carried  on  in  the  island."^^  De 
Blenac  assured  Colbert  in  1681  that  no  foreign  commerce 
existed  in  the  islands,  and,  finally,  in  1683,  St.  Laurent 
and  Begon  in  a  joint  memoir  gave  him  assurance  of  the 
same  fact.^^  Some  three  weeks  after  Colbert's  death,  the 
king  wrote  to  these  two  officials  that  he  was  satisfied  by 
the  assurance  which  they  had  given  him  that  foreign  com- 
merce had  been  effectively  interrupted  in  the  islands.^  It 
is  not  necessary  to  conclude  from  these  statements  that 
absolutely  all  commerce  with  foreigners  had  been  stopped, 
for  later  events  proved  that  there  was  still  some  contra- 
band trade,  but  the  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  French 
vessels  trading  in  the  islands  indicates  that  Colbert's  long 
and  determined  fight  against  foreign  traders  had  borne 
fruit  and  that,  on  the  whole,  the  great  minister  had  won 
a  signal  triumph. 

The  enemy  of  1669,  the  ubiquitous  Dutch  trader,  had 
been  defeated  and  the  French  islands  were  comparatively 
free  of  foreign  traders.  The  eyes  of  a  prophet  might  have 
seen,  however,  that  the  rapid  development  of  the  French 
sugar  colonies  with  a  constantly  increasing  supply  of 
molasses  and  rum,  for  which  there  was  no  market  in  the 
mother   country,   and  with   their   increasing   demand   for 

1681;  fol.  24,  instructions  to  Sieur  B6gon,  May  1,  1682;  Arch.  AfF. 
Etrang.,  Amerique,  V,  507. 

82  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  HI. 

83  Ibid.,  November  12,  1681. 

84  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  10,  fol.  20,  the  king  to  St.  Laurent  and  B6gon, 
September  24,  1683. 

233 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

food  stuffs,  live  stock,  slaves  and  lumber,  which  France 
could  not  satisfy,  and  the  growth  of  the  thrifty  New  Eng- 
land trader  who  could  find  neither  a  satisfactory  supply 
of  the  former  articles,  nor  a  sufficient  market  for  his 
increasing  quantity  of  the  latter  in  the  British  West 
Indies,  meant  an  inevitable  trade  between  the  two  groups 
of  colonies.  It  proved  an  economic  fact  of  prime  impor- 
tance in  the  eighteenth  century  and  was  destined  to  have 
momentous  consequences,  both  in  overthrowing  the  "sys- 
tem" of  exclusivism  which  Colbert  had  established,  and  in 
forming  one  of  the  chief  economic  causes  of  the  American 
Revolution. 


224 


CHAPTER  X 

Freedom  of  Trade  and  the  Rise  of  the 
Private  Trader 

WITH  the  dissolution  of  the  West  India  Company  in 
1674  came  to  an  end  the  administration  of  the  \ 
islands  by  a  commercial  company.  With  the  exception  of  ! 
the  slave  trade,  which  was  committed  into  the  hands  of 
contractors  or  of  companies  after  1673,  the  entire  com- 
merce of  the  French  West  Indies  was  henceforth  entrusted 
by  Colbert  to  private  enterprise.  Attention  has  already 
been  called  to  the  fact  that  the  private  trader  was  admitted 
to  the  trade  of  the  islands  during  the  English  war  (Octo- 
ber, 1666)  and  that  Colbert  refused  to  close  the  door  to 
him  at  its  termination  (July,  1667).  That  fact  must  be 
reconsidered  here  and  the  policy  of  the  great  minister 
stated  with  more  precision. 

By  an  arret  of  the  conseil  d'etat  of  September  10,  1668, 
the  privilege  of  trading  in  the  islands  was  guaranteed  to 
private  traders.  Heretofore  it  had  depended  upon  the 
wilHngness  of  the  company  to  grant  them  passports.  By 
this  arret  they  were  accorded  an  equal  right  with  the 
company  to  trade  in  the  islands  and  to  re-export  from 
France,  free  of  duty,  colonial  products  which  they  wished 
to  market  in  foreign  countries.^  For  a  while  their  vessels 
were  subjected  to  a  tax,  imposed  by  the  company,  of  six 
livres  per  ton  on  their  registered  tonnage,  when  they 
sailed  for  the  islands,  and  of  five  per  cent  on  their  cargoes 
at  their  return  to  France.  But  Colbert  forced  succes- 
sively the  abolition  of  the  tax  of  six  livres  (December  9, 
1669)  and  the  reduction  of  the  five  per  cent  to  three  per 

iMoreau  de  Saint-Mery,  I,  174-175. 

225 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

cent  (June  4,  1671).  He  also  abolished  the  special  tax 
imposed  by  the  company  on  cargoes  of  slaves  imported  by 
private  traders  into  the  islands  (August  26,  1670).^  Even 
after  the  West  India  Company  was  forced  to  concentrate 
all  of  its  efforts  upon  the  importation  of  salt  beef,  live 
stock  and  slaves,  the  private  trader  was  encouraged  to 
enter  into  competition  with  it  by  being  made  a  beneficiary 
of  the  same  premium  of  four  livres  on  every  barrel  of 
French  salted  beef,  and  of  thirteen  livres  per  head  for 
slaves  imported  into  the  islands. 

By  an  arret  of  June  12,  1669,  Colbert  took  into  his  own 
hands  the  power  of  granting  passports  to  private  traders.' 
He  gave  an  explanation  of  this  action  in  a  letter  to  Col- 
bert de  Terron  a  few  days  later:  "I  am  resolved  to  grant 
henceforth  all  passports  myself  in  order  to  prevent  the 
company  from  diminishing  this  commerce  by  preferential 
treatment  to  its  own  ships  and  in  order  to  encourage  indi- 
viduals to  apply  themselves  to  it."* 

These  measures,  which  favoured  in  such  an  unmistakable 
way  the  growth  of  the  private  trader,  were  accompanied 
by  reiterated  commands  of  their  enforcement  and  repeated 
statements  of  the  principle  of  freedom  of  trade.  The 
correspondence  between  Colbert  and  de  Baas,  governor- 
general  of  the  islands,  is  very  instructive  on  this  point. 

De  Baas  seems  to  have  had  very  little  sympathy  for 
the  private  trader.  "I  must  tell  you,"  he  wrote  to  Colbert 
at  the  beginning  of  1670,  "that  since  private  traders, 
coming  from  France,  have  begun  to  receive  their  passports 
directly  from  the  king,  they  hold  their  heads  too  high  and 
have  become  impertinent.  They  wish  to  sell  their  mer- 
chandise according  to  their  own  sweet  wills  without  so 
much  as  paying  the  taxes  usually  levied  on  such  cargoes 

2  Ibid.,  I,  187,  197. 

3  Ibid.,  I,  178. 

4  Clement,  II,  2,  p.  473. 

226 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

in  the  islands."^  He  complained  in  another  letter  that 
French  merchants  were  taking  advantage  of  the  fact  that 
the  king  was  assuring  them  a  monopoly  of  trade,  by  de- 
manding too  high  prices  for  goods,  and  that  they  were 
coming  to  the  islands  with  no  other  idea  than  that  of  per- 
sonal gain  and  without  thinking  of  the  real  needs  of  the 
planters.  Thus,  in  order  to  have  cargoes  of  sugar,  they 
were  bringing  fancy  articles  instead  of  the  supplies  which 
were  really  needed.^  Furthermore,  de  Baas  showed  par- 
tiality toward  the  ships  of  the  company,  and  recommended 
that  its  monopoly  be  restored/ 

To  these  reflections  and  recommendations,  Colbert  re- 
plied by  a  restatement  of  his  policy  and  a  command  of 
obedience  in  the  name  of  the  king  in  regard  to  it : 

"It  is  really  not  necessary  that  you  bother  yourself  with 
the  consideration  of  the  question  as  to  whether  it  would  be 
more  advantageous  or  not  for  the  company  to  carry  on  com- 
merce with  the  islands  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  You 
have  nothing  to  do^  in  fact^  except  to  attract  French  vessels 
which  have  my  passports  by  the  good  and  just  treatment  which 
you  accord  to  them.  ...  In  regard  to  the  company,  when  it 
becomes  strong  enough,  and  has  a  sufficient  number  of  vessels 
to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  islands,  I  shall  then  listen  to  the 
arguments  which  it  has  to  advance  why  permission  should  be 
refused  to  other  Frenchmen  who  wish  to  go  to  the  West  Indies 
to  trade.  ...  Be  assured  that  it  is  only  through  liberty  to  all 
of  my  subjects  to  trade  with  these  colonies  that  an  abundant 
supply  of  everything  can  be  obtained.  This  is  especially  true 
now,  because  my  subjects  are  applying  themselves  much  more 
than  formerly  to  the  pursuits  of  navigation  and  trade.  They 
will  surely  go  to  trade  where  they  receive  good  treatment  and 
gain  profit."^ 

5  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  February  94,  1670. 

6  Ibid.,  January  15,  1670. 

7  Ibid. 

8  C16ment,  III,  2,  p.  477,  note  1. 

237 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

In  regard  to  the  refusal  of  private  traders  to  pay  taxes 
on  their  cargoes,  Colbert  wrote:  "The  custom  which  has 
been  followed  up  to  the  present  of  levying  duties  on  incom- 
ing and  outgoing  cargoes  was  a  very  good  practice  for 
the  time,  when  foreigners  and  only  a  few  Frenchmen  car- 
ried on  this  trade,  but  at  present,  when  foreigners  have 
been  entirely  eliminated  and  only  French  traders  remain, 
the  custom  must  be  abolished."^  A  royal  ordinance  was 
proclaimed  on  June  9,  1670,  whereby  it  was  forbidden  to 
lay  any  tax  upon  merchandise  brought  in  French  bottoms 
from  France,  or  upon  sugar  exported  in  the  same  manner 
to  France.^" 

As  to  de  Baas'  complaint  that  French  merchants  were 
demanding  too  high  prices  for  their  goods,  Colbert 
replied  again  in  favour  of  the  private  trader  by  affirming 
that  it  was  only  an  entire  freedom  to  sell  goods  at  what- 
ever price  one  chose  which  could  produce  an  abundant 
supply,  and  only  an  abundant  supply  which  could  produce 
cheapness.  A  royal  ordinance  was  straightway  pro- 
claimed which  ordered  "that  all  merchandise  brought  in 
French  bottoms  into  the  French  islands  of  America  shall 
be  sold,  either  wholesale  or  retail,  at  whatever  prices  and 
under  whatever  terms  that  are  agreed  upon  between  buyer 
and  seller."^^  He  rebuked  de  Baas  for  preferential  treat- 
ment to  the  vessels  of  the  Wfest  India  Company  and  spe- 
cifically commanded  him  "to  leave  entire  freedom  to 
all  Frenchmen  to  ply  their  trade  in  accordance  with  their 
passports."^^  He  appealed  to  de  Baas'  patriotism  to  guide 
him  in  the  matter: 

"I  should  say  to  you  in  regard  to  freedom  of  trade  that  we 
should  not  be  surprised  to  find  that  the  directors  of  the  West 

9  Ibid.,  p.  478. 

10  Moreau  de  Saint-M^ry,  I,  194. 

11  Moreau  de  Saint-M^ry,  I,  194,  June  14,  1670. 

12  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  1,  fol.  156  verso,  July  10,  1669. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

India  Company  wish  to  keep  for  themselves  a  monopoly  of 
trade,  because  they  very  naturally  think  only  of  their  own 
interest  and  not  of  the  general  welfare  or  of  that  of  the  state. 
But  as  for  you  and  me,  we  should  raise  ourselves  above  the 
plane  of  personal  interests  to  that  of  public  welfare,  and  plant 
ourselves  squarely  upon  the  principle  of  freedom  of  trade."^^ 
In  order  that  there  might  be  no  mistake  as  to  what  he 
meant  by  freedom  of  trade,  Colbert  took  occasion  to  define 
it  himself  in  most  specific  terms: 

"The  maxim  of  freedom  of  trade  means  that  every  French 
trader,  holding  a  passport  from  the  king,  shall  be  received  in 
all  of  the  French  islands  and  shall  have  an  entire  liberty  to 
trade,  to  sell  and  to  exchange  goods  at  whatever  price  he 
chooses,  and  that  the  planter  shall  have  the  same  liberty  to 
dispose  of  his  sugar  in  the  same  way.  Any  doubts  which  may 
arise  in  the  application  of  this  principle  should  be  decided  in 
favour  of  the  trader,  except  where  suspicions  are  entertained 
that  the  cargo  contains  articles  purchased  in  foreign  coun- 
tries."!* 

Colbert  is  thus  very  clearly  presented  as  the  champion 
of  freedom  of  trade,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  principle  of  ^ 
assuring  to  all  Frenchmen  the  right  of  trading  in  the 
islands.  He  appears  in  this  role  only  after  1668,  and 
especially  in  his  correspondence  of  1669,  1670  and  the 
years  following.  Only  about  five  years  previously  he  had 
apparently  appeared  in  quite  a  different  role.  In  1664 
he  was  active  in  the  organization  of  the  West  and  East 
India  Companies.  Although  all  Frenchmen  and  even  for- 
eigners were  invited  to  become  stockholders  and  thus  the 
whole  nation  was  free  to  share  in  the  two  enterprises,  yet 
both  companies  were  endowed  with  monopolies.  The 
inference  is  natural  that  in  1664  Colbert  preferred  the 
emplo3'^ment  of  large  companies,  founded  on  the  principle 

13  element.  III,  2,  p.  479. 

14  element.  III,  2,  p.  487,  Colbert  to  P61issier,  June  21,  1670. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

of  monopoly  of  trade,  to  private  enterprise,  founded  on 
the  principle  of  freedom  of  trade,  and  that  after  five  years 
of  experience,  he  was  converted  from  the  error  of  his  way 
and  henceforth  espoused  the  cause  of  the  private  trader 
and  became  a  champion  of  the  principle  of  freedom  of 
trade.  Some  recent  French  historians  have  adopted  the 
view  that  this  inference  is  correct,  and  that  a  sharp  line 
separates  the  commercial-colonial  policy  of  Colbert  into 
two  periods,  namely,  that  before  1669  and  that  from  1669 
to  1683.^ 

But  had  a  great  change  really  gone  on  in  Colbert's 
mind  between  1664  and  1669?  Had  experience  really 
proved  to  him  that  the  principle  of  monopoly  was  really 
wrong  and  converted  him  to  that  of  freedom  of  trade? 
Is  one  forced  to  conclude  that  the  minister  made  a  radical 
change  in  his  commercial  policy  after  1669? 

It  must  be  said  at  the  outset,  that  there  is  really  no 
material  for  the  period  anterior  to  1669  which  enables 
one  to  say  that  Colbert  established  the  two  companies  of 
1664,  because  he  believed  in  the  principle  of  monopoly 
in  preference  to  that  of  freedom  of  trade.  Material 
throwing  light  upon  Colbert's  relations  to  the  colonial 
problem  previous  to  1669  is  exceedingly  meagre.  It  is 
only  for  the  period  after  that  date,  when  Colbert  was 
officially  charged  with  the  administration  of  the  colonies 
and  when  correspondence  became  regular  and  was  method- 
ically preserved,  that  one  has  any  very  satisfactory 
material  on  which  to  base  any  assertions  as  to  the  motives 
or  the  principles  on  which  any  given  action  of  the  minister 
was  based.  One  can,  at  best,  only  adopt  some  working 
hypothesis  to  explain  his  commercial  policy  previous  to 
1669. 

15  See  especially  E.  B6noit  du  Rey,  R^cherches  sur  la  politique 
coloniale  de  Colbert;  Chemin-Dupont^s,  Les  Compagnies  de  Com- 
merce en  Afrique  Occidentale  sous  Colbert. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

But  the  adoption  of  the  view  that  Colbert  accepted 
freedom  of  trade  as  the  principle  governing  his  commer- 
cial policy  after  1669  leads  at  once  to  difficulties.  The 
East  India  Company  continued  to  enjoy  a  monopoly  of 
trade  until  Colbert's  death  in  1683.  A  monopoly  of  the 
slave  trade  in  the  islands  was  granted  to  individual  con- 
tractors or  to  companies  in  1675,  1679  and  1681.  No 
less  than  five  commercial  companies — the  Company  of 
the  North,  the  Company  of  the  Levant,  the  Company  of 
the  Pyrenees,  the  first  Company  of  Senegal  and  the  second 
Company  of  Senegal — were  organized  after  1669,  and  to 
all  of  them  either  a  partial  or  a  total  monopoly  was 
granted.  These  facts  do  not  tend  to  make  one  accept  the 
view  that  Colbert  had  discarded  the  principle  of  monop- 
oly. Furthermore,  a  strange  confusion  at  once  appears 
in  his  correspondence,  if  this  view  is  accepted.  Thus  he 
wrote  to  de  Baas  on  July  31,  1669: 

"In  regard  to  trade  by  the  French,  His  Majesty  desires  that 
you  accord  an  equal  protection  to  the  ships  belonging  to  the 
West  India  Company  and  to  those  belonging  to  individuals 
who  have  passports,  and  he  desires  that  you  execute  with 
promptness  the  terms  of  the  said  passports.  .  .  .  His 
Majesty  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
company  carry  on  this  trade  or  not  [trade  between  France  and 
the  islands].  This  is  all  the  more  true  because  if  it  is  freed 
from  the  necessity  of  carrying  on  this  trade,  it  can  undertake 
that  of  Guinea,  or  some  other  which  will  prove  more  profit- 
able. ...  If  the  trade  of  the  islands  can  be  carried  on  in  full 
liberty  by  all  Frenchmen,  it  is  certain  that  both  the  kingdom 
and  the  islands  will  be  better  off."^^ 

Only  seven  months  later,  however,  he  addressed  a  mem- 
oir to  the  directors  of  the  West  India  Company  on  Feb- 
ruary 26,  1670,  which  said: 

16  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  456-457. 

231 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

"As  long  as  the  company  grants  permission  to  private  trad- 
ers, it  will  suffice  to  permit  all  those  who  send  cargoes  to  the 
islands  to  sell  their  goods  to  such  persons  and  in  such 
quantities  as  they  wish.  .  .  .  But  when  the  company  ceases 
to  grant  such  permission  and  asserts  its  monopoly,  in  order 
to  avoid  oppression  the  company  must  act  in  good  faith  toward 
the  planters."^^ 

But  on  April  9,  1670,  only  a  little  over  a  month  later, 
he  wrote  to  de  Baas  that  "inasmuch  as  commerce  was  an 
act  of  the  free  will  of  man,  it  should  be  necessarily  left 
free."^« 

Thus  Colbert  seems  to  be  shifting  from  the  thought  of 
delivering  the  trade  of  the  islands  entirely  into  the  hands  of 
private  traders  to  that  of  placing  it  again  under  the 
monopoly  of  the  West  India  Company.  De  Baas  com- 
plained of  this  fact  as  a  cause  of  much  unrest  among  the 
planters : 

"The  common  complaint  of  the  planters  at  present  is  that 
changes  are  continually  being  made  in  the  manner  of  gov- 
erning them  and  in  the  policy  which  controls  their  com- 
merce. Yesterday,  so  they  say,  they  were  under  the  rule  of 
individual  proprietors,  and  today  they  are  subjected  to  the 
rule  of  a  company  which  they  can  not  tolerate,  for  besides  the 
bad  treatment  which  they  receive  at  its  hands,  it  is  responsible 
for  the  fact  that  the  conditions  of  trade  are  ever  changing  so 
that  they  are  at  sea  as  to  what  to  do.  Sometimes  the  com- 
pany endeavours  to  monopolize  trade  and  drive  out  foreign- 
ers, sometimes  foreigners  are  readmitted  only  to  be  driven 
out  again  a  short  time  afterwards.  Then  private  French  trad- 
ers are  admitted.  Such  frequent  changes  confuse  and  dis- 
gust them  so  much  that  they  would  be  glad  to  see  the  com- 
pany decide  something  definite,  either  to  carry  on  the  trade 
all  alone,  or  to  admit  foreigners."^^ 

17  Ibid.,  p.  472. 

18  Ibid.,  p.  477. 

19  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  February  24,  1670. 

232 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  fact  is,  that  if  one  studies  the  acts  and  corre- 
spondence of  Colbert  with  the  hope  of  making  some  dog- 
matic assertion  as  to  whether  he  became  after  1669  a 
convert  to  the  principle  of  freedom  of  trade,  he  will  find 
himself  in  about  as  much  confusion  as  the  planters  of 
Martinique.  One  thing  is  certain,  Colbert  was  a  practical 
man,  not  a  doctrinaire  who  stopped  to  study  the  advan- 
tages or  disadvantages  of  monopoly  or  of  freedom  of 
trade  as  theories.  He  regarded  a  commercial  company 
and  a  private  trader  in  exactly  the  same  light.  They 
were  both  instruments  to  be  used  in  the  realization  of  a 
plan  which  meant  the  building  up  of  French  industry  and 
French  commerce.  He  never  organized  a  commercial  com- 
pany or  permitted  the  organization  of  one  to  which  he 
did  not  commit  some  mission  of  national  service.  It  was 
for  this  end  that  he  subsidized  and  often  entirely  supported 
them,  that  he  often  charged  some  special  officer  or  public 
official  with  their  administration,  and  for  this  purpose 
that  he  gave  so  much  of  his  own  busy  life  to  their  direction. 
The  dominating  note  of  Colbert's  industrial  and  commer- 
cial policy  was  patriotism.  He  worked  so  indefatigably 
for  its  realization,  because  he  saw  in  it  national  prosperity 
and  national  greatness.  It  has  already  been  shown  what 
importance  he  attached  to  the  establishment  of  commerce. 
For  that  end  he  was  willing  to  seize  any  means  at  his  com- 
mand, were  it  a  commercial  company  or  a  private  trader, 
which  gave  promise  of  being  an  effective  agent  in  accom- 
plishing his  work.  If  that  is  taken  as  a  working  hypothe- 
sis to  study  Colbert's  commercial  policy,  it  gives  to  it  a 
unity  from  the  commencement  to  the  end  of  his  ministry. 
He  knew  perfectly  well  that  a  regime  of  monopoly  was 
oppressive  and  that  one  of  freedom  of  trade  was  more 
natural  and  productive.  "Commerce  must  be  left  free," 
he  said,  ^'unless  there  is  an  indispensable  necessity  to  com- 
mit it  into  the  hands  of  a  company  or  of  a  few  contract- 

233 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

or*."^  Colbert  said  this  in  1670,  but  there  is  nothing  to 
show  that  he  did  not  hold  the  same  view  in  1664<,  when  he 
created  the  East  and  West  India  Companies.  At  that 
date  he  saw  the  Dutch  in  control  of  practically  all  of  the 
commerce  of  the  French  West  Indies,  which  had  been 
established  by  French  settlers  and  bought  by  French  blood. 
He  set  his  hand  to  the  task  of  driving  them  out  and  of 
laying  fast  hold  upon  their  riches  for  the  profit  of  France 
and  of  her  people.  But  Colbert  never  did  things  by  half 
measures.  He  saw  that  such  or  such  a  thing  should  be 
done  and  he  ordered  it  done  immediately.  So  in  this  case 
the  Dutch  must  be  driven  out  at  once.  De  Tracy  left 
France  in  February  with  orders  to  exclude  the  Dutch 
trader  during  the  space  of  six  months,  and  consequently 
the  problem  of  sending  a  large  number  of  ships  with  car- 
goes of  supplies  was  very  pressing.  Some  agent  must 
be  found  which  could  supply  without  delay  the  place  which 
the  Dutch  had  been  occupying  in  the  islands.  There  were 
too  few  private  traders  in  the  ports  of  France  to  make 
it  at  all  possible  to  leave  to  them  the  task  of  satisfying 
the  needs  of  the  planters.  Obviously  the  formation  of  a 
company  which  would  have  enough  capital  to  send  enough 
cargoes  of  supplies  to  the  islands  at  once  was  about  the 
only  means  at  hand.  One  is  justified  in  saying  that  the 
"indispensable  necessity  of  committing  commerce  into  the 
hands  of  a  company"  had  arisen,  and  perhaps  it  is  not 
too  much  to  add  that  Colbert  was  of  that  opinion  when  he 
created  the  company.  It  does  not  follow  at  all  that  as  Col- 
bert created  the  West  India  Company  in  1664,  and  en- 
dowed it  with  a  monopoly,  he  did  so  because  he  did  not 
believe  then,  as  he  believed  in  1670,  that  "commerce  must 
be  left  free"  wherever  possible. 

When  he  found  at  the  close  of  the  EngHsh  war  that  a 
number   of   private   French   traders   were    going    to    the 

20  C16ment,  III,  2,  p.  477,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  April  9,  1670. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

islands,  he  protected  them  and  encouraged  them  to  con- 
tinue. From  1669  to  1674,  he  insisted  that  the  ships  of 
the  company  and  those  of  private  traders  should  be  treated 
alike.  He  offered  to  both  the  same  premiums,  the  same 
freedom  from  import  and  export  duties,  and  subjected 
them  to  the  same  laws.  He  knew  that  every  French  ship 
which  went  to  the  islands,  whether  it  belonged  to  the  com- 
pany or  to  a  private  trader,  was  a  gain  for  French  com- 
merce and  was  a  step  forward  in  the  realization  of  his 
plans.  He  wished  to  see  a  large  number  of  vessels  carry- 
ing an  abundance  of  French  manufactures  and  merchan- 
dise to  the  West  Indies  and  bringing  back  with  them  rich 
cargoes  of  colonial  products. 

"When  the  company  becomes  strong  enough  and  has  enough 
ships  to  carry  on  all  of  this  trade  alone,  I  shall  then  listen 
to  arguments  which  it  has  to  advance  why  passports  should 
be  no  longer  granted  to  private  traders  who  wish  to  go  to  the 
islands. "^^ 

His  onty  concern  was  that  enough  ships  be  sent  to  the 
islands  and  that  they  be  French.  The  West  India  Com- 
pany was  discarded  in  1674,  simply  because  it  had  ceased 
to  be  an  effective  instrument  in  building  up  that  trade. 
Private  traders  had  become  numerous  and  into  their  hands 
was  committed  the  commerce  of  the  islands.  When  in  turn 
private  traders  showed  themselves  incapable  of  satisfying 
the  needs  of  the  planters  for  slaves,  Colbert  called  back 
into  play  commercial  companies  and  endowed  them  with 
a  monopoly  of  the  slave  trade. 

It  seems  much  more  accurate  to  say,  therefore,  that 
the  so-called  radical  change  in  Colbert's  policy  in  1669, 
dividing  his  ministry  into  two  halves,  was  not  an  impor- 
tant change  at  all.  The  only  difference  to  be  noted  be- 
tween the  two  periods,  1664-1668  and  1669-1674,  is  that 

21  Cldment,  III,  2,  p.  427,  note  1. 

235 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

in  the  latter  period  he  employed  two  instruments  instead 
of  one  to  realize  his  policy.  In  1674  he  discarded  one  of 
these  instruments,  because  it  had  become  too  old  and  too 
weak  to  be  of  further  service.  Later  he  employed  both 
commercial  companies  and  private  traders  in  the  com- 
merce of  the  islands. 

The  rapid  growth  of  the  number  of  private  traders  in 
the  West  India  trade  is  one  of  the  achievements  of  Col- 
bert's ministry,  and,  it  might  be  added,  one  of  the  most 
permanent  achievements,  if  it  be  measured  in  the  light  of 
its  influence  on  the  development  of  French  commerce  in 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  number  of  private  ships 
going  to  the  West  Indies  rose  from  three  or  four  in  1662^ 
to  60  in  1670,  89  in  1672,  131  in  1674^'  and  to  205  in 
1683.2' 

This  growth  took  place  principally  in  the  three  south- 
ern ports  of  Bordeaux,  La  Rochelle  and  Nantes.  The 
Norman  and  Breton  ports  of  Havre,  Honfleur,  Dieppe, 
Rouen  and  St.  Malo  became  considerably  handicapped  by 
the  frequent  European  wars  and  profited  much  less  from 
the  increase  of  trade  with  the  islands.  Thus,  out  of  a  total 
of  eighty-nine  passports  demanded  by  private  traders  in 
1672,  only  eighteen  were  demanded  by  the  ports  of  the 
north,  and  only  twenty-four  in  1674  out  of  a  total  of  131. 
Complete  statistics  are  lacking  for  the  later  years,  but 
it  is  certain  that  the  trade  of  the  northern  ports  with 
the  West  Indies  continued  to  be  of  much  less  importance 
than  that  of  the  three  southern  ports  mentioned. 

The  admiralty  records  of  Bordeaux,  although  incom- 
plete, enable  one  to  follow  with  reasonable  accuracy  the 
growth  in  that  port  of  trade  with  the  West  Indies.     The 

22  Lavisse,  VII,  2,  p.  235,  note  1. 

23  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  fols.  148-149;  4,  fols.  107-114;  6,  fols.  54-60. 

24  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  Memoir  marked  "Indes  Occidentales,"  and 
endorsed  "M.  Morel." 

236 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

registers  for  1640  and  1651  indicate  no  sailings  for  or 
arrivals  from  the  islands.^  La  Justice,  68  tons,  of  Amster- 
dam arrived  on  January  1,  1661,  with  a  cargo  of  sugar 
from  St.  Christopher,  and  the  St.  Joseph,  70  tons,  of 
La  Rochelle,  brought  a  similar  cargo  from  the  West 
Indies  on  February  28,  1667.^^  These  two  cases  are  the 
only  sailings  or  arrivals  indicated  for  the  two  years.  In 
1671,  twelve  ships,  with  an  aggregate  tonnage  of  1115 
tons,  sailed  from  Bordeaux  for  the  West  Indies  and  six 
entered,  all  coming  from  Martinique  except  one,  which 
came  from  St.  Christopher.^^  Fifteen  sailed  in  1672,  and 
twelve  more  (1087  tons)  in  1673.^^  In  1674  passports  were 
granted  to  twenty-four  private  vessels  to  trade  in  the 
islands,^  and  in  1676  nineteen  vessels  were  recorded  as 
sailing  for  the  West  Indies.^"  This  number  rose  to  twenty- 
six  in  1682  and  1683.^^  Twenty  vessels  arrived  at  Bor- 
deaux from  the  West  Indies  in  1684.^^  Of  these  twenty, 
six  came  from  Martinique,  of  which  one  had  touched  at 
St.  Domingo,  six  from  St.  Christopher,  one  from  Guade- 
loupe, one  from  Cayenne,  two  from  St.  Domingo,  and 
three  indicated  simply  as  coming  from  "the  islands  of 
America."  The  average  tonnage  of  these  twenty  vessels 
was  only  fifty  tons,  and  one  Le  Pierre  of  Royan,  gauged 
only  thirty  tons.  It  made  the  voyage  from  Martinique 
with  a  cargo  of  sugar.     The  log  of  La  Marie,  fifty  tons, 

25  Arch.  D6pt.,  Gironde,  B,  1640,  and  Malvezin,  Histoire  du  Com- 
merce de  Bordeaux,  II,  369.  Malvezin  consulted  the  admiralty  rec- 
ords for  1651,  1671,  1672  (sailings  only),  1676  and  1682  (arrivals 
only).  His  researches  have  been  supplemented  and  the  results  offered 
in  part  here. 

26  Arch.  D6pt.,  Gironde,  B,  153,  fol.  3,  and  154,  fol.  27  verso. 

27  Malvezin,  op.  cit.,  II,  369. 

28  Arch.  Dept.,  Gironde,  B,  186;  Malvezin,  II,  369. 

29  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  6,  fols.  54-60. 

30  Malvezin,  II,  369. 

31  Arch.  Dept.,  Gironde,  B,  187,  188. 

32  Ibid.,  159. 

237 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

may  be  taken  as  typical.  It  sailed  from  Bordeaux  on  Jan- 
uary 17,  and  arrived  at  Martinique  on  March  14.  After 
trading  there  until  May  7,  it  sailed  for  St.  Domingo, 
arriving  at  Port  de  Paix  on  May  13.  No  mention  is  made 
of  any  cargo  being  taken  at  Martinique,  but  at  Port  de 
Paix,  La  Marie  took  718  rolls  of  tobacco  and  two  bales  of 
cotton  and  sailed  on  August  9  for  Bordeaux,  where  it 
arrived  on  November  13.^ 

The  principal  articles  of  export  from  Bordeaux  to  the 
West  Indies  were  wine,  brandy,  staves,  headings  and  hoops, 
flour  and  salt  beef.^  The  majority  of  vessels  went  to  the 
Windward  Islands,  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  St.  Christo- 
pher, and  a  few  to  St.  Domingo.  The  cargoes  from  the 
former  were  composed  almost  entirely  of  sugar,  with  small 
quantities  of  indigo,  ginger,  roucou,  and  cotton,  those 
from  the  latter,  of  tobacco,  with  small  quantities  of  cotton, 
indigo  and  hides.^ 

This  trade  proved  very  beneficial  to  Bordeaux.  Profit 
derived  from  it  laid  the  basis  for  the  fortunes  of  many 
successful  traders.     One,  Darriet  by  name,  equipped  no 

33  Arch.  D^pt.,  Gironde,  B,  159. 

34  The  details  of  cargoes  are  not  often  indicated  in  the  registers 
for  the  period.  Very  frequently  it  is  simply  noted  at  the  registration 
of  a  passport  that  the  cargo  of  the  vessels  was  composed  of  "wine 
and  other  merchandise,"  or  "wine  and  victuals."  The  cargo  of  Les 
deux  Maries,  which  sailed  from  Bordeaux  for  the  West  Indies  on 
September  16,  1698,  was  as  follows:  56  tuns  of  wine,  Q5  barrels  of 
beef,  88  quintals  of  salt  pork,  30  barrels  of  flour,  22  quintals  fish  oil, 
staves  and  hoops  and  headings  for  100  barrels.  La  Vierge,  160  tons, 
which  sailed  on  October  6  of  the  same  year,  had  a  cargo  composed  of 
64  tuns  wine,  100  gallons  brandy,  53  barrels  flour,  100  bundles  hoops, 
staves,  200  pounds  copper,  200  refining  forms  and  pots,  6  guns,  300 
tables,  10  dozen  pair  shoes,  2  dozen  hats,  100  dozen  drinking  glasses, 
400  yards  cloth,  150  pounds  olive  oil.  Arch.  D6pt.,  Gironde,  B,  197, 
fols.  72  verso  and  75  verso. 

35  Le  Charles,  60  tons,  coming  from  St.  Christopher  in  1671,  brought 
a  cargo  of  13  pipes,  95  hogsheads,  138  barrels  sugar,  2  barrels  indigo. 
Malvezin,  II,  369. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

less  than  five  vessels  for  the  West  Indies  in  1683,  seven  in 
1682,  and  received  five  in  1684.^  The  registers  of  1661 
and  1667  show  that  Bordeaux  had  been  receiving  its 
sugar  from  Portugal  and  La  Rochelle,^^  but  henceforward 
its  supply  was  obtained  directly  from  the  West  Indies. 
A  new  refinery  was  established  in  1670.^  Thanks  to  the 
high  tariff  against  foreign  refined  sugar,  established  in 
1665,^^  and  to  the  increase  of  trade  with  the  French  West 
Indies,  the  refining  industry  became  prosperous.  Trade 
with  the  West  Indies  became,  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
the  most  important  factor  in  the  economic  life  of  Bor- 
deaux. It  is  only  in  the  light  of  that  development  that 
one  can  fully  appreciate  the  importance  to  Bordeaux  of 
the  work  which  Colbert  accomplished  in  the  seventeenth 
century. 

It  is  particularly  unfortunate  that  the  admiralty  rec- 
ords, which  would  render  it  possible  to  state  accurately 
the  facts  concerning  the  development  of  trade  with  the 
West  Indies  at  La  Rochelle,  have  not  been  preserved,  for 
it  is  clear  that  La  Rochelle  was  the  most  important  port 
for  that  trade  throughout  the  ministry  of  Colbert.  The 
inquest  of  1664  showed  that  there  were  only  three  vessels 
in  this  port  engaged  in  trade  with  the  West  Indies.^''  In 
the  list  of  passports  granted  to  private  traders  in  1672 
in  all  France,  no  less  than  twenty-seven  out  of  a  total  of 
eighty-nine  were  demanded  by  its  traders.  In  1674,  the 
proportion  was  thirty-five  out  of  a  total  of  131.^^  In 
both  cases  La  Rochelle  heads  the  list  in  number  of  pass- 
ports demanded.     For  1682  we  have  found  scattered  rec- 

36  Arch.  D6pt.,  Gironde,  B,  187,  188,  159. 
sribid.,  153,  fol.  19;  154,  fols.  91,  94,  98,  etc. 

38  Malvezin,  II,  373. 

39  See  below,  the  discussion  of  legislation  regarding  sugar. 

40  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  500  Colbert,  199,  fols.  37  ff. 

41  Arch.  Nat.  Col,  B,  4,  fols.  107-114;  6,  fols.  54-60. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ords  of  thirty-four  vessels  sailing  for  the  West  Indies,*^ 
and  forty-nine  in  1685.*^ 

Colbert  seems  to  have  especially  favoured  the  Rochellais. 
Thus  he  wrote  on  January  23,  1671,  to  Brunet,  one  of  the 
directors  of  the  West  India  Company: 

"Let  me  know  exactly  how  many  private  traders  are  making 
preparations  at  La  Rochelle  to  go  to  the  islands  of  America. 
Inform  the  merchants  that  the  moment  I  see  that  the  number 
of  their  vessels  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  islands, 
the  king  will  exclude  those  of  Nantes  and  St.  Malo,  because 
I  notice  that  the  traders  of  those  ports  gain  their  profit  from 
sugar  which  they  sell  to  the  Dutch,  who  take  it  away  to  refine 
in  their  own  country.*'** 

The  average  tonnage  of  twenty-five  ships  sailing  from 
La  Rochelle  for  the  West  Indies  in  1674  was  144  tons, 
almost  three  times  greater  than  that  of  the  ships  from 
Bordeaux  in  1684,  recorded  above.*^  The  cargo  of  La 
Fortune,  150  tons,  which  sailed  in  1674,  may  be  taken  as 
typical.  It  was  composed  of  248  one-quarter  barrels  wine, 
122  ditto  brandy,  116  ditto  flour,  and  139  ditto  salt  pork.*^ 

Since  the  establishment  of  the  port  of  La  Pallice,  the 
picturesque  harbour  of  La  Rochelle  is  being  neglected. 
Mud  banks  and  sand-bars  keep  out  all  but  small  fisher 
boats  and  shallow-draft  steamers  which  glide  over  them  at 
high  tide.  But  no  one  can  roam  about  the  ancient  strong- 
hold of  the  Protestants  without  seeing  traces  and  hearing 
echoes  of  the  great  wealth  brought  by  the  sail  vessels  which, 
after  their  long  voyage   from  the  distant  West  Indies, 

42  Arch.  D6pt.,  Char.  Inf.,  B,  235,  Roles  d'^quip.,  1682-1696. 

« Ibid. 

4*Jourdan,  EphSmSrides  de  la  Rochelle,  II,  32-33. 

45  Arch.  D6pt.,  Char.  Inf.,  B  (unclassified).  Rap.  et  Proc.  Verbal, 
1674. 

46  Only  two  cases  have  been  noted  for  the  year  where  cargoes  con- 
tained any  salt  beef.  One  was  three  one-quarter  barrels  and  the  other 
sixty  barrels.    Ibid. 

240 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

glided  between  the  two  watch-towered  gateways  to  unload 
their  rich  cargoes  of  sugar.  Colbert  had  pointed  the  way 
and  the  enterprising  Rochellais  were  quick  to  follow  it. 

Results  were  also  very  encouraging  at  Nantes.  Accord- 
ing to  the  inquest  of  1664,  only  two  vessels  were  engaged 
in  trade  with  the  West  Indies.*^  But  after  the  admission 
of  private  traders  to  the  privileges  of  trading,  the  mer- 
chants at  Nantes  seized  the  opportunity  and  established 
a  regular  commerce  with  the  West  Indies.  Colbert  became 
convinced,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  that  some  merchants 
of  this  port  were  lending  their  names  to  Dutch  traders  and 
that  practically  all  of  the  raw  sugar,  imported  from  the 
French  colonies,  was  being  re-exported  to  Holland.  He, 
therefore,  in  1670,  refused  to  grant  any  more  passports 
to  the  traders  at  Nantes.  He  restored  the  privilege  by  an 
arret  of  the  conseil  d'etat  of  December  14,  1671,  on  con- 
dition that  the  merchants  of  Nantes  give  up  their  former 
practices.^  After  this  interruption,  trade  with  the  West 
Indies  increased  steadily  and  Nantes  became  a  close  rival 
to  La  Rochelle.  In  1672  traders  of  Nantes  demanded 
twenty-four  passports,*®  and  twenty-four  again  in  1683.^ 
During  the  year,  August  18,  1685,  to  August  18,  1686, 
no  less  than  fifty-eight  vessels,  5830  tons,  sailed  from 
Nantes  for  the  West  Indies.^ 

The  principal  exports  were  wine,  brandy,  salt  pork, 
Irish  and  domestic  salt  beef,  Irish  butter,  olive  oil,  fuel 

47  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  500  Colbert,  199,  fols.  225  ff.  See  also  L. 
Maitre,  Situation  de  la  Marine  du  comte  de  Nantes  d'apr^s  I'enquete 
de  1664  in  Ann.  de  Bretagne,  xviii,  326-343,  and  E.  Gabory,  La  Marine 
et  le  Commerce  de  Nantes  au  xviie  sifecle  et  au  commencement  du 
xviiie,  ibid.,  1-44. 

48  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1313. 

49  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  fols.  107-117. 

50  Arch.  D6pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  B,  6,  Reg.  de  sorties,  1679-1685,  The 
aggregate  tonnage  of  these  34  vessels  was  3410  tons,  the  aver- 
age being  a  fraction  over  100  tons. 

51  Ibid.,  B,  7,  Reg.  de  sorties. 

241 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

oil,  flour,  peas,  biscuits,  staves,  headings  and  hoops, 
cloths  and  clothes,  etc.,  etc.^^  Imports  were  raw  and  re- 
fined sugar,  cotton,  indigo,  ginger,   syrup,  etc.^ 

The  admiralty  records  for  the  ports  of  northern  France 
which  carried  on  trade  with  the  West  Indies  are  almost 
wholly  lacking  and  it  is  impossible  to  state  more  than 
superficial  facts  regarding  their  trade.  The  inquest  of 
1664  showed  that  there  were  no  vessels  at  Honfleur  en- 
gaged in  trade  with  the  islands,^  or  at  Rouen.^^  There 
were  at  Havre  one,  at  St.  Malo  three  and  at  Dieppe  six.* 
Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  English  war  in  1666,  the  West 
India  Company  carried  on  a  large  part  of  its  trade  with 
the  islands  from  these  ports.  In  November,  1665,  it  may 
be  recalled,  it  had  about  thirty  vessels  either  ready  or 
preparing  to  sail  from  them.  But  the  war  seriously  inter- 
fered with  commerce.  During  the  years  after  its  close, 
ships  again  sailed  for  the  West  Indies,  for  traders  of 
Dieppe  demanded  nine  passports  in  1672;  those  of  Hon- 
fleur, six;  those  of  St.  Malo,  three;  and  in  1674,  Dieppe 
demanded  ten;  Honfleur,  nine;  Havre,  seven;  St.  Malo, 
six.^'  De  Vanvre,  general  commissioner  at  Havre,  stated 
in  a  letter  of  February  5,  1675,  that  there  were  fifteen 
vessels  at  Havre,  Dieppe  and  Honfleur  ready  to  sail  for 

52  The  cargo  of  L'Africaine,  250  tons,  equipped  by  Ren6  Montau- 
douin,  which  sailed  on  January  18,  1675,  was  as  follows:  41  tuns 
wine  of  Nantes,  30  barrels  domestic  beef,  200  barrels  Irish  beef,  900 
sets  of  staves,  hoops  and  headings,  6  hogsheads  prunes,  5  casks  of 
brandy,  4  hogsheads  peas,  3  cases  shoes,  8  one-quarter  barrels  flour, 
8  cases  hats,  15  bales  cloth  Bilbao  style,  4  hogsheads  and  6  cases  cloth, 
10  barrels  glass.    Arch.  D6pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  B,  3. 

53  The  St.  Frangois  Xavier,  100  tons,  which  arrived  at  Nantes  on 
October  12,  1688,  brought  a  cargo  of  94  hogsheads  raw  sugar,  1  hogs- 
head refined  sugar,  20  bales  cotton,  22  small  barrels  syrup.  Ibid., 
B,  1,  Long  Cours,  Rapports,  1686-1689. 

54  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  500  Colbert,  199,  fols.  113-116. 

55  Ibid.,  fols.  47-66. 

66  Ibid.,  fols.  101-108,  237-260,  69-83. 

57  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  fols.  107-117;  6,  fols.  54-60. 

242 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  West  Indies,  and  on  March  3,  that  ten  had  actually 
sailed  from  Dieppe,  five  from  Honfleur  and  four  from 
Havre.^  The  northern  ports  suffered  both  from  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Dutch  war,  1672-1676,  and  from  the  superior 
advantages  of  the  southern  ports  for  trade  with  the  islands. 
A  memorialist  of  1698,  in  noting  the  decline  of  trade  of 
these  ports,  offered  the  following  explanation: 

"The  Norman  traders  and  those  of  La  Rochelle,  particu- 
larly, rendered  possible  the  first  establishment  of  the  French 
in  the  West  Indies.  Those  of  Brittany  also  had  relations 
with  the  islands  up  to  1664.  .  .  .  After  the  West  India  Com- 
pany granted  the  privilege  of  trade  to  private  traders,  Nor- 
mandy continued  her  commerce  principally  through  the  effort 
of  Sieur  Pierre  Formont,  who  sent  a  considerable  number  of 
ships  to  the  islands.  It  was  through  this  trade  that  the  refin- 
eries of  Rouen  were  able  to  obtain  a  supply  of  sugar  and 
supply  Paris  and  other  parts  of  the  kingdom.  But  this  com- 
merce diminished  and  the  Normans  were  in  the  habit  of 
sending  only  a  small  number  of  vessels  or  none  at  all  to  the 
West  Indies  even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  last  war  [war  of 
the  Austrian  Succession]  and  during  that  war.  This  change 
was  due  in  part  to  wars  during  which  danger  of  capture  in 
the  English  Channel  was  great,  and  also,  in  part,  to  the  growth 
of  trade  at  Nantes,  which  had  at  hand  a  supply  of  all  sorts 
of  food-stuffs,  products  and  merchandise  necessary  for  the 
West  India  trade,  whereas  Normandy  had  neither  wine  nor 
brandy  which  were  most  important  in  making  up  cargoes  for 
the  islands."^^ 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose,  however,  that  trade 
with  the  West  Indies  ceased  in  the  northern  ports,  for 
the  second  Company  of  Senegal  equipped  a  number  of  its 

58  Arch.  Nat.  Mar,,  Bg,  19,  fols.  183,  190.  It  seems  certain  that 
some  of  the  vessels  to  which  passports  were  granted  in  1674  were 
the  same  as  spoken  of  in  these  letters.  See  ibid.,  17,  fols.  215,  218,  for 
letters  from  the  same  person  in  regard  to  these  vessels. 

59  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  Cg,  2nd  series,  II,  Mem.  sur  le  commerce  et 
navigation  des  Isles  de  L'Am6rique. 

243 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

vessels  at  Dieppe  in  1682,^  and  in  1683  five  vessels  be- 
longing to  Protestants,  or  belonging  to  Protestant  cap- 
tains, sailed  from  Dieppe  to  trade  with  the  islands.^^ 

The  war  with  the  Dutch,  declared  in  April,  1672,  inter- 
fered seriously  with  the  West  India  trade  in  1672,  1674 
and  1676.     At  the  opening  of  the  war,  Bellinzani  stated 
in  a  memoir  that  inasmuch  as  the  "commerce  of  the  islands 
is  of  considerable  importance  to  France,  there  being  at 
present  in  the  islands  more  than  100  French  vessels,  which 
should  bring  back  very  large  quantities  of  merchandise," 
measures  should  be  taken  to  protect  it.^^     In  accordance 
with  this  advice,  vessels  were  forbidden  to  sail  from  the 
ports  of  France  for  the  islands  without  an  armed  escort, 
and  those  in  the  islands  were  expressly  prohibited  from  sail- 
ing for  France  "except  after  having  assembled  at  the  time 
and  place  indicated  by  the  lieutenant-general"  in  order  to 
be  escorted  by  the  king's  vessels  beyond  the  zone  of  dan- 
ger.^^    Escorts  were  furnished  in  some  cases,  for  mention  is 
made  in  one  letter  from  the  islands  of  the  arrival  "of  the 
king's   vessels    and   the   merchants    ships   which   they   es- 
corted."^   Royal  vessels  sometimes  carried  cargoes  back  to 
France.     Thus  du  Lion  noted  in  one  of  his  letters  the  sail- 
ing for  La  Rochelle  of  "one  of  the  king's  flutes  with  a  good 
cargo  of  sugar,  much  to  the  contentment  of  the  merchants 
and  planters  who  transacted  affairs  with  the  captain."^^ 
In  spite,  however,  of  these  precautions,  Dutch  corsairs 
at  times  wrought  havoc  with  trade.     Most  of  the  fifteen 
vessels  which  sailed  from  Bordeaux  for  the  islands  in  1672 

60  Arch.  Col.,  Ce,  Cie.  du  S6n6gal,  I,  Estat  des  vais.  ap.  aux  bour- 
geois marchands  de  Dieppe. 

61  Ibid. 

62  Arch.  Nat.  Col,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  M6m.  du  Sr.  Bellinzani  sur 
le  commerce  des  Isles,  March  12,  1673. 

63  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  262,  Ordon.  du  Roy,  March  14,  1672. 

64  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  letter  from  Jolinet,  September  11,  1676. 

65  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  March  22,  1672. 

244 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

were  captured  by  them  so  that  "the  chamber  of  insurance 
was  bankrupt  and  many  failures  followed."^^  Ogeron, 
governor  of  St.  Domingo,  wrote  to  Colbert  that  he  had 
neither  vessels  nor  troops  nor  ammunition  nor  any  means 
of  defending  the  colony  against  their  attacks  or  of  keep- 
ing foreigners  from  trading  there.®^ 

An  embargo  was  laid  in  all  the  ports  of  France  by  an 
ordinance  of  February  23,  1674,  but  special  permission 
was  given  to  sixteen  vessels  assembled  at  Belle  Isle,  three 
at  La  Rochelle,  four  at  Bayonne,  and  three  at  Nantes,  to 
sail  for  the  islands.^  The  attack  of  Reuyter  on  St.  Pierre 
(Martinique)  in  July,  1674,  although  unsuccessful  by 
reason  of  the  heroic  defense  maintained  by  the  French, 
seemed  to  scatter  terror  among  French  shippers,  for  not 
a  single  vessel  from  France  arrived  at  Martinique  from 
the  month  of  August  until  December  17.^^  The  price  of 
sugar,  consequently,  fell  so  low  in  1674,  that  some  plant- 
ers in  Martinique  began  to  cultivate  ginger  and  indigo, 
and  "to  raise  stock  and  poultry  which  they  sold  very  dear 
to  foreigners,  much  to  their  relief  and  satisfaction."^"  In 
the  following  year,  however,  French  traders  "came  in  such 
large  numbers  that  the  planters  lacked  nothing  and  all 
supplies  of  which  they  had  need  were  furnished  them  at 
very  reasonable  prices.  This  was  an  unexpected  joy  to 
them,  for  the  previous  year  had  been  very  hard  because 
only  a  small  number  of  vessels  came  from  France  and 
such  high  prices  were  demanded  by  merchants  that  they 
became  intolerable."^ 

66Malvezin,  op.  cit.,  II,  369. 

67  Charlevoix,  II,  97. 

68  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  6,  fols.  5,  6,  6  verso,  and  11. 

69  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 
On  Reuyter's  attack  see  ibid.,  2nd  series,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert 
August  28,  1674;  also  Dessalles,  Hist.  G4n.,  I,  chap.  21. 

70  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  8,  1674. 

71  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  May  4,  1675. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Another  Dutch  squadron  appeared  in  the  islands  in  1676 
and  interrupted  trade  again.  In  May  it  was  at  Marie 
Galante.  Jacob  Beinchk,  its  commander,  demanded  the 
surrender  of  the  island.  He  contented  himself,  however, 
with  sending  a  small  band  of  his  men  ashore  to  sack  a 
plantation.  In  July,  Beinchk  appeared  at  the  coast  of 
St.  Domingo,  and  on  the  7th  addressed  a  letter  to  the 
French  inhabitants,  offering  them  generous  treatment,  if 
they  would  declare  themselves  subjects  of  the  Prince  of 
Orange.'^^     On  the  15th  he  attacked  Petit  Goave,  where 

72  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B4,  7,  fol.  179;  Dessalles,  Hist.  Oin.,  I,  544; 
Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  F3,  164,  contains  a  copy  of  the  letter  addressed  by 
Beinchk  to  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Domingo.     It  is  as  follows: 

"His  Royal  Highness,  the  Prince  of  Orange,  has  been  informed 
several  times  of  the  strong  desire  which  the  French  of  the  coast  of 
St.  Domingo  have  to  trade  with  the  Dutch.  He  knows  also  that  His 
Majesty,  the  King  of  France,  out  of  regard  for  the  King  of  Spain, 
has  never  wished  to  recognize  them  as  his  subjects,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  those  who  dwell  at  Tortuga.  Besides,  His  Majesty  does  not 
permit  in  any  way  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Domingo  to  trade  with  any 
others  than  French  merchants.  He  refuses  to  them  the  same  freedom 
in  this  respect  which  he  grants  to  his  subjects  in  the  Antilles  to 
whom  negroes  are  brought  by  foreigners  and  w^ho  trade  freely  with 
all  Frenchmen.  His  Majesty,  for  special  reasons,  prevents  negroes 
to  be  brought  to  St.  Domingo.  It  is  needless  to  describe  the  suffering 
imposed  upon  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Domingo  by  such  narrow  restric- 
tions and  by  a  host  of  burdens  which  are  imposed  upon  them,  such 
as  excessive  taxes  and  duties  laid  by  His  Majesty.  It  is  useless  to 
describe  these  things,  because  the  inhabitants  themselves  have  been 
made  to  feel  the  burden  thereof.  His  Royal  Highness,  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  believing  that  these  hardships  are  unendurable  and  that  the 
French  of  St.  Domingo  will  take  advantage  of  the  existence  of  the 
war  to  throw  off  such  a  heavy  yoke  and  to  enter  under  the  protection 
of  our  lords,  the  estates  of  Holland  and  His  Royal  Highness,  and 
into  the  enjoyment  of  trade  with  all  nations  without  any  distinc- 
tions, and  into  that  of  other  privileges  which  we  will  not  specify  in 
this  letter,  but  which  will  undoubtedly  prove  advantageous  to  the 
said  inhabitants.  This  generous  offer  of  His  Royal  Highness  is  very 
favourable  to  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Domingo  and  of  great  conse- 
quence to  them.  Thus  every  one  would  be  freed  from  the  burden  of 
work  by  the  quantity  of  negroes  imported  into  the  island.  .  .  .  The 
majority  of  the  planters  would  become  in  time  very  prosperous.    We 

246 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

he  defeated  and  destroyed  the  few  French  vessels  there. 
Moreau  de  Saint-Mery  has  preserved  for  us  a  Hst  of  no 
less  than  thirteen  vessels  captured  by  the  Dutch  between 
June  10  and  July  17,  1676.^^  Beinchk  next  captured 
Cayenne. 

Trade  became  more  secure  in  the  following  year,  for 
Comte  d'Estrees  was  sent  to  the  islands  with  a  squadron 
of  twenty  vessels.  He  recaptured  Cayenne  on  December 
21,  1676,  and  took  Tobago  on  December  25,  1677.^*  He 
was  at  St.  Domingo  in  May,  1678.  In  the  summer  he 
attempted  an  expedition  against  Cura9ao,  but  his  squad- 
ron was  shipwrecked  on  August  5.  The  Dutch  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  catastrophe  and  captured  several  vessels 
with  cargoes  of  tobacco  at  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo.^^ 

are  sure  that  the  inhabitants  will  not  refuse  proposals  which  are 
so  vital  to  their  prosperity  and  well  being,  and  that  they  will  come 
aboard  our  vessels  to  confer  with  us  more  at  length.  We  hereby  give 
assurance  to  all  in  general,  and  to  each  in  particular,  that  those  who 
wish  to  come  aboard,  either  to  confer  with  us  or  for  other  things, 
will  be  freely  returned  ashore,  whenever  they  wish.  If  the  inhabi- 
tants, collectively,  desire  to  delegate  some  representative  who  will  go 
with  us  to  Cul  de  Sac,  empowered  to  act  conjointly  with  the  inhabi- 
tants of  that  quarter  in  treating  with  us,  we  shall  be  very  glad  to 
receive  such  representatives  and  will  guarantee  their  safe  return.  To 
accomplish  this  His  Royal  Highness  has  sent  this  squadron  of  ves- 
sels hither  and  has  commanded  us  to  treat  with  the  inhabitants  of 
St.  Domingo  in  the  most  friendly  spirit.  Awaiting  a  response,  we  are 
your  humble  servant, 

"Jacob  Beinchk. 
"Aboard  La  Defense,  July  7,  1676." 

73  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  F3,  164,  liste  des  Navires  qui  sont  pris  des 
Hollandais  a  la  Cote  de  St.  Domingue.  The  thirteen  vessels  had  an 
aggregate  tonnage  of  1900  tons  and  had  cargoes  of  18,900  rolls  of 
tobacco.  Of  the  thirteen  vessels  four  were  from  La  Rochelle,  three 
from  Honfleur,  two  from  Dieppe,  one  from  Havre  and  one  from 
Nantes. 

74  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B4,  7,  contains  much  material  on  d'Estrees' 
voyage. 

75  Charlevoix,  Hist,  de  L'Isle  Esp.,  II,  118-119. 

247 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Again  the  disturbance  in  trade  was  only  temporary,  for 
the  French  quickly  regained  control  of  the  West  India 
waters  by  the  appearance  at  Martinique  on  May  8  of 
d'Estrees  with  another  squadron,  and  they  remained  in 
control  until  the  close  of  the  warJ^  Treaties  of  peace 
were  signed  at  Nymwegen  on  August  10,  1678. 

With  the  exception  of  such  interruptions  occurring  dur- 
ing the  war,  private  traders  steadily  increased  in  numbers 
and  carried  on  a  constantly  growing  trade  with  the  W-est 
Indies.  An  experienced  merchant  of  La  Rochelle  remarked 
in  1679  that  "so  many  vessels  had  never  been  seen  at 
Nantes,  La  Rochelle  and  Bordeaux  in  preparation  for  the 
islands."^  By  1683,  the  number  of  French  ships  trading 
with  the  West  Indies  had  increased  to  205.^^ 

Freedom  of  trade  seems  to  have  worked  miracles,  but  in 
reality  it  was  the  indomitable  will  and  the  wisdom  of 
a  great  minister  which  had  called  the  dormant  forces  of 
the  nation  to  life,  and  endowed  them  with  new  prosperity. 

76  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B4,  8. 

77  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran?.,  11315,  fols.  19-22,  letter  from 
Anthoine  Allaire  to  Patoulet,  1679. 

78  Arch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  Memoir  marked  "Indes  Occidentales"  and 
endorsed  "M.  Morel." 


248 


CHAPTER  XI 

Colonial  Exports — Tobacco 

WE  have  had  occasion  in  the  preceding  chapters  to 
see  the  situation  which  confronted  Colbert  at  the 
beginning  of  his  ministry,  to  study  the  history  of  the  West 
India  Company  from  its  origin  in  1664  to  its  downfall  ten 
years  later,  to  follow  the  unrelenting  campaign  against 
the  Dutch,  and  finally  to  trace  the  rise  and  development  of 
the  private  trader.  An  important  task  still  remains,  for 
we  have  touched  only  superficially  upon  the  legislation 
which  Colbert  framed,  on  the  one  hand,  to  control  the 
production  of  colonial  commodities  and  to  regulate  their 
exportation  to  the  mother  country,  and,  on  the  other,  to 
stimulate  French  industry  to  furnish  the  articles  de- 
manded by  the  planters  and  to  open  the  way  for  their 
importation  into  the  islands.  The  royal  edicts,  ordinances, 
arrets  and  letters,  concerning  these  several  problems,  con- 
tain some  of  the  least  known  and,  at  the  same  time,  some 
of  the  most  interesting  phases  of  Colbert's  commercial 
policy.  But  their  number  is  so  great  that  it  would  prove 
quite  impracticable  to  present  them  in  detail.  We  shall 
limit  our  study,  therefore,  to  the  most  important.  There 
were  really  only  two  commodities  of  importance  produced 
in  the  French  West  Indies  during  the  entire  ministry  of 
Colbert,  namely,  tobacco  and  sugar.  Neither  cotton,  nor 
roucou,  nor  indigo,  nor  any  other  product,  except  the 
two  staples  mentioned,  ever  became  important  enough  to 
be  made  the  subject  of  special  legislation.  The  study  has 
been  limited  therefore  to  a  discussion  of  the  legislation 
relating  to  tobacco  and  sugar.  As  for  articles  imported 
into  the  islands,  slaves,  food-stufFs,  live  stock,  lumber  and 

249 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

manufactured  goods  were  the  most  important,  and  it  will 
be  only  with  them  that  we  shall  concern  ourselves. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  d'Esnambuc,  at  his  first  visit  to 
St.  Christopher,  was  enthusiastic  over  the  quality  of 
tobacco  which  grew  there  and  took  back  with  him  to 
France  a  cargo  of  "excellent  tobacco."  The  Dutch,  too, 
were  so  attracted  by  its  excellent  quality  that  they  estab- 
lished a  regular  trade  with  the  island.  It  became  the 
staple  product  at  Guadeloupe,  Martinique,  St.  Domingo, 
and  the  other  islands,  at  their  settlement  by  the  French. 
Jacques  Bouton  stated  in  1640  that  tobacco  was  the  only 
product  carried  to  Europe  from  the  French  West  Indies.^ 
Its  production  became  so  extensive  that  de  Poincy,  gov- 
ernor-general of  the  French  islands,  resident  at  St.  Chris- 
topher, made  an  agreement  with  the  governor  of  the  Eng- 
lish that  no  more  tobacco  would  be  planted  for  seventeen 
months  "in  order  to  restore  that  merchandise  to  its  former 
price."  In  accordance  with  that  agreement,  de  Poincy 
issued  an  ordinance  on  May  6,  1639,  ordering  "everyone 
to  pull  up  root  and  branch  the  tobacco  already  planted, 
without  saving  a  single  plant. "^ 

Tobacco  remained  the  staple  product  throughout  the 
period  of  the  first  two  companies  and  served,  as  in  Vir- 
ginia, as  currency  in  the  islands.  It  was  not  until  near 
the  middle  of  the  century  that  the  cultivation  of  sugar- 
cane became  important  enough  to  create  a  rival  for  it.^ 
By  the  beginning  of  Colbert's  ministry,  the  cultivation 
of  tobacco  had  become  secondary  and  during  the  course 
of  his  ministry  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  became  the 
all  absorbing  occupation  of  the  planters.  This  was  true 
only  so  far  as  the  Windward  and  small  Leeward  Islands 
were    concerned,    for    at    French    St.    Domingo    tobacco 

IJ.  Bouton,  Relation  de  I'Estab.  des  Frang.,  pp.  80-81. 

2  Du  Tertre,  I,  143,  prints  text. 

3  Pelleprat,  op.  cit.,  8-9. 

250 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

remained  practically  the  only  product  of  importance 
throughout  the  entire  period.* 

It  was  apparently  Ogeron  who  first  tamed  the  wild 
spirit  of  the  freebooters  of  St.  Domingo  and  led  some  of 
them  to  undertake  the  more  gentle  pursuit  of  cultivating 
the  soil.  He  was  so  successful  that  by  1669  the  produc- 
tion of  the  colony  reached  1,200,000  pounds  of  tobacco,^ 
and  by  1674,  3,000,000  pounds.^ 

Previous  to  the  ministry  of  Colbert,  French  colonial 
tobacco  seems  to  have  been  admitted  free  of  duty.  Thus 
a  royal  proclamation  of  November  17,  16^9,  laid  a  duty 
of  thirty  sous  the  pound  on  tobacco  imported  from  foreign 
countries,  but  specifically  exempted  that  brought  from 
the  islands  within  the  concession  of  the  Company  of  the 
Isles  of  America.^  By  the  tariff  of  1664,  framed  by  Col- 
bert, an  import  duty  of  thirteen  livres  the  hundredweight 
was  laid  on  foreign  tobacco  and  one  of  four  livres  the 
hundredweight  on  colonial  tobacco.^     The  latter  was  re- 

4  A  contemporary  description  of  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo  passes 
in  review  the  diflFerent  settlements  thereof.  On  the  section  of  the 
north  around  the  Cape  it  is  noted  that  "all  the  lands  are  planted  in 
tobacco,"  and  that  a  few  of  the  inhabitants  were  buccaneers;  on  that 
of  Port-de-Paix  that  the  inhabitants  were  occupied  with  the  produc- 
tion of  tobacco  and  food-stuffs;  on  that  of  the  west  coast  around 
Petit  Goave  it  is  remarked  that  "the  occupation  of  all  the  inhabitants 
of  this  gulf  is  the  cultivation  of  their  lands  in  tobacco  and  the  hunting 
of  the  wild  boar."  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  2nd  series,  I,  Memoire  en- 
voy^ par  Bellinzani  sur  les  Boucaniers  et  sur  l'6tat  des  establ.  faits 
k  St.  Dom.,  1677. 

5  Arch  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  I,  Ogeron  to  Colbert,  September  23,  1669. 

6  Arch.  Aff.  Etr.,  M6m.  et  Doc,  Esp.  79,  fols.  46  verso,  M6moire 
sur  le  commerce  des  isles  fran9.,  1692.  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  F3,  164, 
contains  a  list  of  vessels  captured  by  the  Dutch  at  the  coast  of  St. 
Domingo  between  June  10  and  July  17,  1676.  There  were  thirteen 
captured,  of  which  nine  were  laden  with  18,900  rolls  of  tobacco  (945,- 
000  pounds).  In  a  supplementary  list  are  given  the  names  of  nine 
vessels  which  had  sailed  from  St.  Domingo  for  France  with  13,900 
rolls  (695,000  pounds). 

7  Arch.   Nat.,  AD,xi,  48;   Sabatier,   La  ferme  du   tabac. 
SDessalles,  Hist.  Gin.,  II,  31. 

251 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

duced  to  two  livres  by  an  arret  of  December  10,  1670,  but 
restored  to  four  livres  on  May  24,  1675.^  In  addition, 
an  import  duty  of  three  per  cent  was  paid  by  private 
traders  to  the  West  India  Company  up  to  the  date  of  its 
dissolution  (1674),  and  then  to  the  Domaine  d'Occident 
throughout  the  remainder  of  the  period.  The  right  of 
re-exportation  with  drawback  of  import  duties  was  pro- 
vided by  law  throughout  the  period.^" 

Other  legislation  favoured  the  West  India  planter. 
Thus  the  cultivation  of  tobacco  was  forbidden  in  Canada 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  prove  less  profitable  to  the 
inhabitants  than  other  occupations  and  that  "the  culti- 
vation of  this  weed  in  Canada  would  be  injurious  to  the 
interests  of  the  islands  of  America. "^^  Its  cultivation  in 
France  w^as  restricted  to  the  generalites  of  Bordeaux  and 
of  Montauban  and  to  certain  districts  around  Montdragon, 
St.  Maixant,  Levy  and  Metz.^ 

But  the  most  important  act  concerning  tobacco  taken 
during  Colbert's  entire  ministry  came  in  1674.  In  that 
year  the  sale  of  all  tobacco  in  France  was  transformed  into 
a  monopoly,  controlled  by  the  state.  The  monopoly  was 
farmed  out  to  Jean-le-Breton,  whose  bail  bears  the  date 
of  November  30,  1674.  By  the  terms  of  the  bail  a  monop- 
oly was  granted  of  the  sale,  wholesale  and  retail,  of  all 
tobacco,  whether  grown  in  France  or  imported  from  the 
French  West  Indies,  from  Brazil  or  from  other  foreign 
colonies  or  countries ;  consequently,  all  those  who  grew 
tobacco  in  France  or  imported  it  into  the  realm  were 
forced  to  treat  with  the  farmer  or  his  agents ;  if,  however, 
no  agreement  could  be  reached  between  the  two  contract- 
ing parties,  the  liberty  of  exporting  or  of  re-exporting 

SMoreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  204,  292. 

10  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  I,  208-209. 

n  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  Colbert  to  Talon,  June  4,  1672. 

12  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48,  ArrH  du  conseil  d'4tat,  March  14,  1676. 

253 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

tobacco  to  foreign  countries  was  to  be  enjoyed  by  the 
seller,  on  condition  that,  in  case  of  delay,  his  tobacco  be 
placed  in  the  warehouses  of  the  farmer  at  the  owner's 
expense  until  the  time  of  shipment ;  the  wholesale  price 
of  tobacco,  grown  within  the  realm  and  in  the  French 
islands  of  America,  was  fixed  at  twenty  sous  per  pound, 
and  of  foreign  tobaccos  at  forty  sous  and  upwards;  the 
retail  price  at  twenty-five  sous  and  fifty  sous  and  upwards, 
respectively ;  and  it  was  forbidden  to  import  tobacco  into 
the  kingdom  by  land  and  by  any  other  ports  than  by 
those  of  Rouen,  Bordeaux,  La  Rochelle,  for  the  ocean,  and 
of  Marseilles  for  the  Mediterranean;  although  special 
permission  was  granted  to  import  tobacco  for  Normandy 
by  Dieppe  and  for  Brittany  by  Morlaix,  St.  Malo  and 
Nantes.^^  By  an  arret  of  January  25,  1676,  exportation 
of  tobacco  was  limited  to  the  ports  of  Bordeaux,  Sables 
d'Olonne,  La  Rochelle,  Nantes,  Morlaix,  St.  Malo,  Rouen, 
Dieppe,  St.  Valery,  Narbonne,  Cette,  Agde,  Marseilles 
and  Toulon.^* 

The  marketing  of  colonial  tobacco  in  France  was  thus 
made  highly  unprofitable  by  reason  of  the  relatively  high 
import  duty  laid  upon  it  and  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  its 
sale- was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  monopoly.  The  fact 
that  it  was  liberally  protected  against  foreign  competition 
was  offset  by  the  fact  that  in  actual  practice  the  privilege 
of  its  re-exportation  to  foreign  countries  was  rarely 
enjoyed.  Thus  a  well-known  merchant  of  Nantes  re- 
marked that  when  tobacco  arrived  from  St.  Domingo,  it 
was  necessary  to  place  it  under  the  lock  and  key  of  the 
farmer.  If  the  farmer  wished  to  buy  the  tobacco,  he 
sought  all  sorts  of  means  to  intimidate  the  trader.  He 
objected  to  the  quantity  or  to  the  quality,  and  offered 

13  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48,  contains  a  copy  of  the  bail  which  bears 
date  of  November  30,  1674. 

14  Ibid. 

253 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

low  prices.  He  tried  to  prevent  re-exportation  to  foreign 
markets,  for  which  provision  was  made  by  the  law,  by 
demanding  a  bond  of  twenty  sous  the  pound  as  a  guar- 
antee that  the  tobacco  would  be  carried  to  the  port  desig- 
nated." 

The  effect  of  this  policy  was  felt  at  once  in  the  colonies. 
Patoulet  stated  in  1680  that,  whereas  the  cultivation  of 
tobacco  used  to  occupy  in  the  Windward  Islands  4000  or 
6000  men,  none  was  being  cultivated  then  "by  reason  of 
its  depreciation."^^  De  Pouan9ay  wrote  about  the  same 
time  from  St.  Domingo  that  he  was  compelled  to  employ 
all  of  his  efforts  in  order  to  hold  the  planters  within  their 
allegiance,  because  "they  are  reduced  to  the  last  extremity 
on  account  of  the  great  losses  which  they  have  suffered 
since  the  time  that  tobacco  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
monopoly.  I  have  seen  them  in  despair,  and  ready  to  with- 
draw among  the  English  of  Jamaica  and  among  the  Dutch 
of  Cura9ao."  He  added  that  he  had  persuaded  them  from 
doing  so  only  by  communicating  to  them  a  letter  which  he 
had  received  from  Bellinzani  and  which  held  out  the  hope 
that  the  monopoly  would  be  suppressed  at  the  expiration 
of  the  bail,  that  is  to  say,  in  1680,  and  that  colonial 
tobacco  would  be  subjected  to  a  simple  import  duty  as 
in  former  times."  De  Pouan9ay  gave  warning  that  if 
conditions  continued  as  they  were,  he  would  not  remain 
responsible  for  what  might  happen  in  the  colony.^^  He 
wrote  again  at  the  beginning  of  the  following  year  that 
the  cultivation  of  tobacco  had  become  so  unprofitable  by 
reason  of  the  quantity  produced  and  of  the  low  price  of- 
fered by  the  monopoly  in  France  that  several  plantations 

iSBoislisle,  op.  cit.,  II,  appendix,  497,  M^moire  du  d6put6  de 
Nantes. 

16  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Memoir  by  Patoulet,  1680. 

17  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  I,  de  Pouan^ay  to  Colbert,  March  20,  1680. 

18  Charlevoix,  Hist,  de  VIsle  Esp.,  II,  131. 

254 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

had  been  abandoned.^^  In  still  another  letter,  a  few  months 
later,  he  remarked  that  the  planters  could  no  longer  gain 
a  living  by  cultivating  tobacco.^*^  Accompanying  this  last 
letter  was  a  memoir  addressed  to  Colbert  by  "the  officers 
and  principal  planters  of  St.  Domingo  who  had  assembled 
in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  M.  de  Blenac,  governor  and 
lieutenant-general  of  the  islands  and  terre  ferine  of 
America"  : 

"The  planters  of  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo  find  themselves 
reduced  to  the  last  extremity,  being  unable  to  derive  any  fruit 
from  their  labour,  because  the  monopoly  places  such  a  low 
price  upon  the  tobacco  which  they  send  to  France,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  the  same  tobacco  is  sold  at  a  very  high 
price  in  the  realm.  The  result  is  that  they  can  no  longer 
support  themselves  or  maintain  their  plantations  so  that  most 
of  them  have  been  forced  to  abandon  their  fields  and  become 
freebooters.  It  is  therefore  humbly  begged  of  Monseigneur 
that  he  take  some  measure,  agreeable  to  His  Highness,  which 
will  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  colony,  either  by  abolishing 
the  monopoly  or  by  prohibiting,  within  the  kingdom,  the  use 
of  foreign  tobacco  with  which  the  farmers  of  the  monopoly 
are  supplying  themselves  in  abundance.  .  .  .  Monseigneur  is 
also  humbly  begged  to  accord  the  privilege  of  re-exporting 
to  foreign  countries  the  tobacco  imported  from  St.  Domingo. 
The  said  officers  and  planters  agree  to  furnish  only  a  limited 
quantity  of  tobacco,  properly  weighed  and  of  good  quality, 
on  condition  that  the  monopoly  be  forced  to  purchase  it  at  a 
price  proportionate  to  the  cost  of  production. "^^ 

This  memoir  had  hardly  reached  France  before  the  monop- 
oly for  the  sale  of  tobacco  was  renewed  in  favour  of  Claude 
Boutet.^ 

19  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  I,  de  Pouan^ay  to  Colbert,  January  30, 
1681. 

20  Ibid.,  May,  1681. 

21  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  I,  Memoir  of  May  5,  1681. 

22  The  bail  was  renewed  on  July  22,  1681.  It  is  printed  in  full  by 
Chambon,  Le  Commerce  de  VAmSrique,  I,  483  ff.    A  printed  copy  is 

255 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

But  one  measure  was  taken  which  theoretically  freed 
the  planters  from  the  tyranny  of  the  monopoly.  This  was 
the  arret  of  April  8,  1681,  which  confirmed  the  right  of 
re-exportation  of  colonial  tobacco  to  foreign  countries. 
Consequently  all  French  subjects,  importing  tobacco  from 
the  "French  islands  of  America  and  the  coast  of  St. 
Domingo,"  were  to  enjoy  this  right  on  condition  that  a 
formal  declaration  be  made  of  their  intentions  to  do  so. 

The  farmers  of  the  monopoly  apparently  continued, 
however,  to  prevent  the  re-exportation  of  colonial  tobacco, 
for  a  merchant  guild  of  St.  Malo  made  protest  against 
their  conduct,  asserting  that  they  were  doing  everything 
to  control  absolutely  the  price  of  colonial  tobacco  and 
that  they  were  so  successful  that  there  was  no  longer  any 
profit  in  the  trade.^^  Complaints  came  also  from  the 
merchants  of  La  Rochelle  of  the  bad  faith  of  the  farmers 
in  using  every  means  to  prevent  the  re-exportation  of 
colonial  tobacco  and  to  force  traders  to  sell  them  tobacco 
at  prices  which  they  offered.^ 

Whatever  may  have  been  Colbert's  hope  in  the  passage 
of  the  arret  of  April  8,  1681,  or  to  whomever  must  be 
attributed  the  fault  that  the  privileges   accorded  by  it 

to  be  found  also  in  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48.  Dareste,  Histoire  de 
France,  V,  513,  asserts  that  Colbert  had  the  intention  to  abolish  this 
monopoly.  On  what  authority  he  makes  the  assertion,  he  fails  to 
state. 

23  Arch.  Nat.,  Gj,  1685,  Sindic  de  la  communaut6  des  March.  n6goc. 
de  St.  Malo,  November  28,  1685.  Villebague  Eon,  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal merchants  of  St.  Malo,  wrote  to  de  Lagny,  at  that  time  director- 
general  of  commerce,  asking  permission  to  ship  tobacco  directly  from 
St.  Domingo  to  Holland.  De  Lagny  replied  that  the  request  could 
not  be  granted,  but  that  orders  had  been  given  to  the  farmer  of  the 
monopoly  to  grant  without  delay  permission  to  re-export  colonial 
tobacco.  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B^,  58,  II,  fol.  98  verso,  de  Lagny  to 
Villebague  Eon,  September  23,  1686. 

24  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  358.  The  controller-general  wrote  to  Arnoul, 
the  intendant  at  La  Rochelle,  to  inquire  into  the  matter  and  report 
to  him.    Ibid. 

256 


r 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 


were  not  enjoyed,  one  thing  is  certain,  poverty  continued 
at  St.  Domingo.  Thus,  de  Pouan9ay  wrote  on  September 
25,  1682: 

"They  [the  planters]  live  very  well  so  far  as  food  is  con- 
cerned^ but  they  are  entirely  destitute  of  cloth  and  garments 
for  themselves^  for  their  servants  and  their  slaves,  and  are  in 
need  of  other  things  necessary  for  their  plantations.  This  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  merchants  are  unwilling  to  barter  merchan- 
dise for  tobacco  which  is  pure  loss  to  them."^^ 

De  Cussy  found  on  assuming  the  duties  of  governor  as 
successor  to  de  Pouan9ay  in  1684,  that  his  most  difficult 
task  was  "to  calm  the  planters  on  the  subject  of  the 
tobacco  monopoly  which  continued  to  ruin  them,  because 
the  existence  of  this  monopoly  had  so  cheapened  the  price 
of  tobacco,  which  had  so  long  been  the  staple  product  of 
the  colony  and  served  as  its  currency,  that  those  who  had 
no  other  means  of  support  than  its  cultivation  were  in 
danger  of  dying  of  starvation. "^^  A  priest  wrote  from 
St.  Domingo  somewhat  later: 

"I  believe  that  you  would  like  to  know  that  the  cause  of 
discontent  among  the  planters  of  the  island  is  none  other  than 
the  question  of  tobacco.  It  is  only  the  well-to-do  planters 
who  can  earn  their  living,  as  they  have  the  means  to  cultivate 
indigo;  the  small  planters  who  can  cultivate  nothing  but 
tobacco  are  objects  of  pity,  as  they  have  no  market  for  their 
tobacco.  They  are  in  extreme  poverty.  One  can  see  whole 
families  naked.  I  saw  a  poor  young  miss  who  was  obliged  to 
borrow  a  chemise  from  a  negress  to  put  on  while  she  washed 
her  own.  I  have  seen  women  about  to  be  delivered  come  and 
upon  bended  knee  implore  the  governor  to  give  them  a  small 
quantity  of  wool  wherein  to  wrap  their  babes. "^^ 

25  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  I,  de  Pouan^ay  to  Colbert,  September  25, 


26  Charlevoix,  op.  cit.,  II,  150. 

27  Arch.  AflP.  Etrang.,  Doc.  et  M6m.,  Am6rique,  V,  565,  Le  Pfere 
Plumier  to  de  Bonrepos,  October  6,  1690. 

257 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

If  a  contemporary  estimate  of  50,000  or  60,000  rolls 
(2,500,000  or  3,000,000  pounds)  of  tobacco  as  the  pro- 
duction of  the  colonies  in  1674  be  accurate,  the  decrease 
in  production  in  ten  years  was  nearly  fifty  per  cent,  for 
the  average  production  of  St.  Domingo  for  the  six  years, 
1683-1688,  was  only  30,674  rolls  (1,533,700  pounds)."^ 
A  few  years  later  the  planters  became  so  incensed  at  the 
low  price  of  tobacco  that  they  pulled  up  what  they  had 
planted  and  ceased  to  plant  it  altogether.^® 

This  policy  of  sacrificing  the  interests  of  the  planters 
to  those  of  the  monopoly  in  France  forced  the  adoption 
of  another  means  to  gain  a  livelihood.  De  Pouan9ay  tells 
us,  in  one  of  the  last  letters  which  he  wrote  before  his 
death,  that  "the  planters  are  devoting  themselves  to  the 
cultivation  of  indigo  and  cotton,  and  a  few  to  the  cultiva- 
tion of  sugar-cane,  some  others  to  that  of  cacao  and  to 
the  raising  of  cattle."^  This  was  true,  as  Pere  Plumier 
remarked,  only  of  the  larger  planters  who  had  the  capital 
necessary  to  begin  the  cultivation  of  new  products.     The 

28  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  IV,  Estat  des  quantit6s  de  roUes  de  tabac 
de  St.  Domingue  entrez  dans  le  Royaume  pendant  le  bail  de  Fau- 
conne,  de  celle  qui  en  a  est6  acheptez,  pour  la  ferme  et  le  prix  qu'ils 
ont  est^  payez  le  cent  pesant.    S^avoir: 


Annee 

Nombre 

des  Rolles 

entrees 

Ditto 

acheptees  poui 

la  ferme 

r               Prix  courant 
du  centpesant 

1683 

47,822 

8,913 

600  rolles  k  20  livres 
5,513  rolles  k  25  livres 
7,800  rolles  a  30  livres 

1684 

17,213 

11,211 

6,825  rolles  k  25  livres 
d'autres  rolles  k  21  to  36  livres 

1685 

25,153 

6,300 

de  20  k  45  livres 

1686 

35,590 

14,126 

Moyenne  a  30  livres 

1687 

45,500 

6,381 

Moyenne  k  32  livres 

1688 

12,763 

7,955 

Moyenne  k  22  livres 

The  "roll"  usually  contained  50  pounds. 

29  Boislisle,  II,  497,  M^moire  du  d6put6  de  Nantes,  1701. 

30  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C9,  I,  de  Pouan^ay  to  Colbert,  September  25, 


258 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

small  planter  was  idling  away  his  time  in  the  sunshine  with 
his  hungry,  naked  children  about  him.  Before  him  was 
his  small  tobacco  field.  As  he  gazed  upon  it,  he  doubt- 
lessly thought  of  the  days  when  the  large  green  leaf,  turn- 
ing to  a  rich  yellow  for  the  harvest  time,  brought  its 
reward  for  the  days  of  sweat  and  toil.  The  bitterness  of 
defeat  and  disappointment  and  rebellious  anger  must 
have  been  in  his  soul.  The  curse  was  writ  upon  his  brow. 
Colbert's  ministry  closed  leaving  poverty  broadcast 
among  the  tobacco  planters  of  St.  Domingo,  and  the 
policy  which  had  been  pursued  during  the  last  ten  years 
was  directly  responsible  therefor.  But  one  might  have 
seen  the  first  rays  of  a  new  dawn  which  was  to  transform 
the  struggling  colony  of  tobacco  planters  into  the  richest 
and  most  productive  sugar  colony  of  the  world. 


259 


CHAPTER  XII 

Colonial  Exports — Sugar 

PELLEPRAT,  who  was  in  the  islands  in  1650  and 
again  in  1654,  and  pubHshed  an  account  of  his  voy- 
age in  1655,  remarked  that  the  ordinary  money  of  the 
islands  was  tobacco  and  sugar  and  that  traders  were 
exporting  sugar.  "I  say  that  traders  take  away  sugar 
with  them,  because  of  late  sugar  of  excellent  quality  is 
being  produced  in  the  islands  and  particularly  at  St. 
Christopher."^  De  Rochefort,  in  1658,  in  describing  the 
plantation  of  de  Poincy,  the  governor  of  St.  Christo- 
pher, remarked  that  in  the  lot  adjoining  the  dwelling- 
house,  there  were  "three  machines  or  mills  suitable  for 
crushing  sugar-cane."  Besides  these,  the  same  governor 
maintained  three  similar  mills  on  another  plantation  in 
Cayonne.  Following  the  example  set  by  the  governor, 
the  chief  officers  and  planters  of  St.  Christopher  also  set 
up  sugar-mills.  De  Rochefort  gives  a  list  of  no  less  than 
fifteen  planters  who  had  done  so.^  Shortly  afterwards 
Biet  noted  that  the  sugar  industry  at  Guadeloupe  was 
flourishing,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  who  had 
been  driven  from  Brazil  had  settled  in  that  island: 

"After  one  of  the  principal  Dutchmen  had  examined  the  soil 
of  Guadeloupe,  he  found  it  so  excellent  that  he  assured  the 
governor  that  even  the  soil  of  Brazil  was  not  better  adapted 
to  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane.  Immediately  the  governor 
granted  him  a  plantation  in  Cabesterre  where  he  employed 
his  slaves  in  clearing  the  land,  preparing  the  soil  and  planting 
sugar-cane.  .  .  .  The  governor  and  all  the  planters  followed 
his  example  with  the  result  that  according  to  report  of  those 

iPelleprat,  pp.  8-9. 
2  De  Rochefort,  p.  312. 

260 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

who  come  from  the  island,  Guadeloupe  is  no  longer  what  it 
used  to  be.  .  .  .  There  are  planters  who  manufacture  10,000 
pounds  of  sugar  a  week.  .  .  .  All  the  planters  are  very  well 
established  and  are  little  lords,  whereas  in  former  times  they 
were  very  poor."^ 

In  a  memoir  written  in  1660,  it  was  stated  that  the  first 
trade  of  the  planters  of  Martinique  was  in  tobacco,  which 
was  still  produced,  and  that  indigo,  cotton,  ginger  and 
roucou  were  also  cultivated,  but  that  in  proportion  as  the 
planters  become  rich  they  began  to  plant  sugar-cane  and 
establish  sugar-mills,  of  which,  the  author  adds,  there 
were  many  then  in  the  islands.*  De  Tracy  wrote  to  Col- 
bert on  October  24,  1664,  that  there  was  a  scarcity  of 
food-stuffs,  not  only  for  the  soldiers,  but  also  for  the  plant- 
ers of  all  the  islands,  and  especially  of  Martinique,  because 
the  planting  of  cassava  had  been  abandoned  for  the  culti- 
vation of  sugar-cane.^  In  another  letter  the  same  year 
he  wrote  to  the  same  minister  that  it  was  useless  to  urge 
the  planters  to  cultivate  cotton  and  indigo,  because  much 
nlore  profit  was  to  be  gained  by  the  production  of  sugar.® 
It  is  clear  from  these  citations  that  by  1664  the  pro- 
duction of  sugar  had  become  the  chief  industry  of  the 
French  Antilles,  except  St.  Domingo,  where  tobacco  re- 
mained for  more  than  two  decades  longer  the  chief  produc- 

3  Biet,  pp.  314-315. 

4  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Relation  des  Isles  de  I'Am^r- 
ique. 

5Du  Tertre,  III,  98. 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Minute  of  a  letter  addressed  by 
Colbert  to  the  governor-general  of  the  Antilles.  In  the  margin  is 
written  in  the  hand  of  Colbert  the  following  comment:  "Quoyque  le 
peuple  trouvent  (sic)  plus  d'ad vantage  au  sucre  qu'au  coton  et  k 
I'indigo  comme  il  y  a  lieu  d'esperer  que  les  isles  en  se  peuplant  se 
defricheront  et  que  cette  augmentation  de  terre  en  culture  pourroit 
rendre  les  sucres  trop  communs,  il  faut  toujours  s'appliquer  et  main- 
teuir  la  culture  dudit  coton  et  de  I'indigo  parceque  la  diversity  des 
denrees  et  marchandises  causera  assurement  I'abondance  dans  les 
Isles." 

261 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

tion.  But  practically  all  of  the  sugar  produced  in  the 
French  islands  was  carried  either  directly  or  indirectly 
to  Holland  to  be  refined,  for  the  refining  industry  in 
France  was  as  yet  in  its  infancy/  Colbert,  therefore, 
had  two  problems:  (1)  the  creation  of  the  refining  indus- 
try in  France,  and  (2)  the  encouragement  of  production 
in  the  islands  by  legislation  which  would  facilitate  the  sale 
of  sugar  in  France. 

Colbert  formed  the  plan  as  early  as  1664  of  building 
up  the  refining  industry  in  the  realm,  for  he  made  provi- 
sion in  that  year  for  exportation  to  foreign  countries  of 
sugar  refined  in  France.^  Shortly  afterwards  he  encour- 
aged Guy  Terre,  a  merchant  at  Rouen,  in  the  establish- 
ment of  two  refineries  in  that  city.  He  even  furnished 
part  of  the  capital  himself,  "because  he  regarded  the 
enterprise  as  very  useful  to  the  state,  to  the  increase  of 
navigation  and  to  the  development  of  the  colonies  of 
America."^  On  September  15,  1674,  he  ordered  Gaspard 
Maurellet  to  establish  a  refinery  at  Marseilles  "with  the 
view  of  increasing  and  extending  the  commerce  of  the 
French  islands  of  America  to  the  ports  of  the  Mediterra- 

7  As  early  as  1613  permission  was  granted  to  Jeremie  Vualens  to 
establish  a  refinery  at  Rouen  and  in  1620  he  was  authorized  "to  con- 
tinue with  his  associates  the  refining  of  sugar."  Gosselin,  Doc.  authent. 
et  in4dits  pour  servir  d,  I'histoire  de  la  Marine  Normande  et  du  com- 
merce rouennais  pendant  les  16^  et  17^  sUcles,  Rouen,  1876,  p.  131. 
Trezel,  to  whom  was  granted  the  privilege  of  establishing  sugar  mills 
in  the  islands,  was  also  probably  interested  in  the  same  industry  at 
Rouen.  But  it  is  not  probable  that  these  refineries  were  of  much 
importance. 

8  Article  XVlII  of  the  letters-patent  of  the  West  India  Company 
of  May,  1664,  reads  as  follows :  "The  merchandise  which  will  have  been 
declared  to  be  consumed  in  the  kingdom  and  on  which  import  duty 
will  have  been  paid  and  which  the  company  decides  later  to  export  to 
foreign  countries  will  be  subject  to  no  export  duty,  nor  shall  the 
sugar,  refined  in  France  in  the  refineries  which  the  said  company 
will  have  established,  be  subjected  to  export  duties  with  the  condi- 
tion, however,  that  the  said  sugar  be  exported  in  French  bottoms." 

^Chambre  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  733. 

262 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

nean  and  those  of  Provence,  where  it  was  not  known,  and 
to  destroy  in  Provence  and  in  the  provinces,  trade  in 
Dutch  sugar  and  the  cassonades  of  Brazil."^^  Others 
were  urged  to  make  similar  estabHshments  at  Dunkerque, 
Dieppe,  Nantes,  Saumur,  Angers,  Tours,  Orleans,  La 
Rochelle,  Bordeaux  and  Toulouse.  By  1683  no  less  than 
twenty-nine  refineries  existed  in  France,  which  consumed 
annually  17,700,000  pounds  of  raw  sugar/^ 

Colbert  protected  refineries  in  France  by  putting,  in 
1664,  a  very  high  duty  on  foreign  refined  sugar  of  fifteen 
livres  the  hundredweight.  This  was  increased  by  an  arret 
of  September  15,  1665,  to  twenty-two  livres  ten  sous  the 
hundredweight.^^ 

The  amount  of  sugar  refined  in  the  realm  was  important 

10  O.  Teissier,  Inventaire  des  Archives  Historiques  de  la  Chambre 
de  Commerce  de  Marseille,  p.  144. 

11  The  document  from  which  this  information  has  been  taken  is  of 
enough  interest  to  be  reproduced  here :  Estats  des  rafineries  de  France, 
1683: 


Consommation  de 

Rafineries 

Sucre  brut 

Dimkerque 

2 

1,500,000  livres. 

Dieppe 

1 

500,000  livres. 

Rouen 

8 

4,500,000  livres. 

Nantes 

3 

2,000,000  livres. 

Saumur 

1 

800,000  livres. 

Angers 

1 

800,000  livres. 

Tours 

1 

500,000  livres. 

Orleans      . 

2 

800,000  livres. 

La  Rochelle 

4 

2,400,000  livres. 

Bordeaux 

3 

2,000,000  livres. 

Toulouse   . 

1 

400,000  livres. 

Marseille  . 

3 
.       29 

1,200,000  livres. 

Totals 

17,700,000  livres. 

Aux  Colonies    . 

34 

3,000,000  livres. 

20,700,000  Hvres. 

Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Fg,  142. 
12  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

enough  by  1670  to  raise  a  discussion  between  the  revenue 
farmers,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  West  India  Company 
and  private  traders  on  the  other,  to  make  it  necessary  for 
the  king  to  settle  the  dispute.  The  dispute  arose  in  the 
following  way.  By  a  royal  declaration  of  September, 
1664,  a  general  provision  was  made  whereby  both  French 
and  foreign  merchants  were  permitted  to  place  in  entrepot 
foreign  merchandise  which  they  wished  to  export  later 
into  foreign  countries.  No  export  duties  were  to  be  laid 
upon  such  goods  and  even  import  duties  paid  upon  mer- 
chandise which  was  at  first  declared  to  be  for  consumption 
in  France  were  to  be  returned  if  the  said  goods  were  re- 
exported to  foreign  ports.  This  was  confirmed  by  a  royal 
edict  of  February,  1670.^^  It  is  to  be  inferred  that  colonial 
products  brought  by  the  West  India  Company  and  pri- 
vate French  traders  could  thus  be  exported  to  Holland  and 
other  European  countries.  At  any  rate,  the  claim  was 
made  by  the  West  India  Company  and  private  traders  that 
raw  sugar,  brought  from  the  French  islands  and  refined 
in  the  kingdom  and  re-exported  into  foreign  countries,  fell 
within  the  law,  and  that  therefore,  duties  paid  on  the 
raw  sugar  when  imported,  should  be  restored  at  its  expor- 
tation after  it  had  been  refined.  As  it  took  two  and  one- 
half  pounds  of  raw  sugar  to  yield  one  pound  of  refined 
sugar,  the  duties  paid  on  the  two  and  one-half  pounds 
should  be  restored  for  every  pound  of  refined  exported. 
The  revenue  farmers  objected,  however:  (1)  that  the 
sugar  brought  from  the  islands  came  from  a  territory 
under  the  domination  of  His  Majesty  and  did  not  fall 
within  the  law,  which  had  to  do  only  with  merchandise 
imported  from  foreign  countries;  (2)  that,  besides,  sugar 
after  being  refined  changed  its  character;  and  (3)  that 
it  would  be  impossible  to  avoid  confusion  in  attempting 
to    restore   duties    collected   on   raw   sugar,   because    raw 

13  Chambre  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  730. 

264 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

sugar  imported  by  the  West  India  Company  paid  only 
two  livres  the  hundredweight,  and  that  imported  by  pri- 
vate ships  paid  four  livres,  and  that  it  would  be  obviously 
impossible  to  distinguish  between  the  two  after  refining. 
An  arret  of  September  29,  1670,  settled  this  dispute  by 
ordering  the  farmers  to  restore  duties  collected  on  raw 
sugar  imported  into  the  kingdom  from  the  French  islands 
at  the  rate  of  six  livres  the  hundredweight  on  its  exporta- 
tion in  the  form  of  refined  sugar.  No  distinction  was  to 
be  made  between  sugar  belonging  to  the  company  and 
private  merchants.  An  interesting  clause  was  added  to 
this  arret  which  said  that  no  restoration  of  duty  whatso- 
ever was  to  be  made  on  raw  sugar  re-exported  to  foreign 
countries.^* 

To  the  refiners  of  Rouen  was  granted,  on  every  hun- 
dredweight of  refined  sugar  exported,  a  special  drawback 
of  100  sous,  which  represented  a  partial  restitution  of  the 
special  import  duty  of  fifty  sous  per  hundredweight  laid 
at  Rouen  on  raw  sugar.^^ 

This  was  a  most  distinct  encouragement  to  the  refining 
of  sugar  within  the  realm,  both  by  the  relatively  high  tariff 
imposed  on  foreign  refined  sugar,  and  by  the  encourage- 
ment given  to  exportation  of  refined  sugar  by  granting  a 
drawback.  There  was  after  this  no  additional  legislation 
to  affect  the  refiners  in  France  before  1682,  "when  they 
complained  of  the  competition  of  the  refiners  in  the 
islands."  Before,  however,  considering  that  legislation, 
it  will  be  well  to  see  what  measures  were  taken  to  promote 
the  interests  of  the  planters  in  order  to  understand  how 
the  dispute  arose. 

WChambre  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  730. 

15  Chambre  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  730,  arrH  of  March  25,  1670. 
This  duty  had  been  imposed  originally  by  the  city  itself  in  1638  as  a 
temporary  source  of  revenue,  but  it  became  permanent  and  the  right 
to  collect  it  was  farmed  out.  The  West  India  Company  possessed  the 
farm  and  it  was  by  it  that  the  drawback  was  to  be  paid. 

265 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

By  the  tariff  of  1664,  all  refined  sugars  which  entered 
France  by  the  ports  of  the  Cinq  Grosses  Fermes  were  to 
pay  fifteen  livres  the  hundredweight,  all  other  sugars  four 
livres  the  hundredweight.  Included  in  the  last  named  was 
all  sugar  imported  from  St.  Christopher.  It  is  thus  seen 
that  French  colonial  sugar,  that  is  to  say,  raw  sugar,  for 
as  yet  there  were  no  refineries  in  the  islands,  received  no 
preferential  treatment.  Colbert,  however,  quickly  reme- 
died this  by  an  arret  of  September  15,  1665,  by  which  all 
refined  sugars  imported  from  foreign  countries  were  forced 
to  pay  twenty-two  livres  ten  sous  the  hundredweight ;  cas- 
sonades  and  muscovado  from  Brazil,  fifteen  livres  and 
seven  livres  ten  sous,  respectively ;  paneles  and  sugar  from 
St.  Thomas,  six  livres;  and  all  sugar  from  the  French 
colonies,  four  livres.^* 

This  schedule  remained  in  force  for  all  foreign  sugars 
throughout  the  entire  period  and  for  French  colonial  sugar 
until  an  arret  of  December  10,  1670,  by  which  the  import 
duty  was  reduced  fifty  per  cent,  that  is  to  say,  to  forty 
sous  the  hundredweight.  The  motive  for  this  reduction 
was  stated  in  the  preamble  to  be  the  fact  that  the  import 
duty  was  so  large  in  proportion  to  the  price  of  sugar  in 
France  that  the  planters  could  no  longer  gain  any  profit  in 
its  production.  Colbert  remarked  in  a  letter  to  Colbert  de 
Terron,  inclosing  a  copy  of  this  arret,  that  "there  is  justi- 
fication for  the  hope  that,  with  such  a  great  concession, 
the  French  will  carry  on  all  the  commerce  of  the  islands 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  foreigner."^^  This  new  schedule  on 
raw  sugar  from  the  islands  was  maintained,  however,  only 
until  May  24,  1675,  when  the  old  schedule  of  four  livres  the 
hundredweight  was  restored.  It  remained  thus  fixed  until 
the  close  of  Colbert's  ministry. 

These  duties  were  applicable  only  to  the  ports  within 

16  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  3. 

17  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B2,  14,  January  2,  1671. 

266 


I 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  Cinq  Grosses  Fermes,  that  is  to  say,  so  far  as  commerce 
with  the  islands  was  concerned,  in  the  ports  of  Normandy. 
They  were  later  extended  to  Bayonne  and  Bordeaux  but 
did  not  apply  to  the  Breton  ports  of  St.  Malo  and  Nantes. 
Sugar  imported  into  Rouen  was  subject  to  a  special  local 
import  duty  of  six  deniers  the  pound  or  fifty  sous  the 
hundredweight.  That  imported  into  other  ports  likewise 
was  subjected  to  local  duties,  but  they  were  of  small 
importance. 

The  increased  production  in  the  islands,  stimulated  no 
doubt  by  the  new  activity  of  French  traders  after  the 
English  war,  seems  to  have  been  accompanied  by  a  corre- 
sponding decrease  in  the  price  of  sugar.  De  Baas  repeat- 
edly expressed  the  opinion  in  his  letters  of  1670  that  the 
increasing  production  of  sugar  would  shortly  result  in 
such  low  prices  that  the  planter  would  no  longer  find  profit 
in  cultivating  the  soil.^^  Du  Lion  asserted  in  a  letter  of 
September  30,  1670,  that  the  price  of  sugar  in  France  was 
so  low  and  the  cost  of  freight  so  high  that  the  planters 
were  losing  hope  of  gaining  any  profit  from  its  sale.^^  The 
duty  of  four  livres  the  hundredweight  on  colonial  sugar 
was  reduced  to  two  livres  by  the  arret  of  December  10, 
1670,  as  we  have  just  seen,  because  its  low  price  made  it 
impossible  "for  the  planter  to  export  it  to  France  or 
to  continue  the  cultivation  of  his  plantation."^''  The  same 
conditions  continued  at  the  close  of  the  Dutch  war,  when 
the  price  of  sugar  in  the  islands  fell  to  two  livres  ten  sous 
and  three  livres  the  hundredweight.^ 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  135,  the  king  to  de  Baas,  December 
21,  1670. 

19  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  September  30,  1670. 
Du  Lion  stated  that  the  price  of  sugar  at  Dunkerque  was  fifteen 
francs  the  hundredweight  and  that  the  planters  were  forced  to  pay 
sixteen  deniers  a  pound  for  freight. 

20Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  204. 

21  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  M^moire  de  I'intendant  Patoulet  pour 
M.  Begon,  December  20,  1682. 

267 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Three  very  obvious  means  could  be  employed  to  bring 
relief  to  the  planter:  (1)  To  limit  the  production  of  sugar 
in  the  islands  so  that  the  supply  would  more  nearly  corre- 
spond to  the  demands  of  the  refineries  in  France;^  (2)  to 
permit  a  free  exportation  of  raw  sugar  to  foreign  ports, 
either  directly  from  the  islands  or  indirectly  by  way  of 
France;  and  (3)  to  permit  the  establishment  of  refineries 
in  the  islands. 

Colb£r±  .aeems  to  have  favoured  the  principle  of  limiting 
production.  To  the  remark  made  by  de  Tracy,  in  a  letter 
from  Martinique  in  1664,  that  the  planters  found  much 
more  profit  in  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  than  in  that 
of  cotton  or  of  indigo,  Colbert  made  the  following  reply: 
"Although  the  planters  find  more  profit  in  the  production 
of  sugar  than  in  that  of  cotton  or  indigo,  it  is  necessary  to 
maintain  the  cultivation  of  the  latter,  inasmuch  as  there 
is  reason  to  expect  that  the  islands,  in  proportion  as  their 
lands  are  cleared  and  put  in  cultivation,  will  produce  too 
large  a  quantity  of  sugar.  Variety  in  cultivation  is  more 
conducive  to  their  welfare."^^  But  to  the  letters  of  de 
Baas  expressing  fears  that  an  over-production  of  sugar 
was  imminent  and  might  prove  disastrous  to  the  islands, 
the  following  reply  was  made: 

"You  can  assuredly  relieve  your  mind  of  the  uneasiness 
which  is  expressed  in  all  of  your  letters  that  the  islands  will 
produce  so  much  sugar  that  it  will  be  difficult  to  find  a  market 
for  it  and  that  consequently  its   price  will  be  so  cheapened 

22  P.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  De  la  Colonisation  chez  les  peuples  modernes, 
5th  edition,  Paris,  1902,  I,  166,  states  that  the  production  of  sugar  in 
the  islands  was  27,000,000  pounds.  He  cites,  however,  no  authority 
for  this  statement.  Patoulet  estimated  the  production  at  18,000,000 
pounds.  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  Mem.  pour  M.  Begon,  December  20, 
1682,  and  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry  made  from  some  source  the  estimate 
that  the  seventeen  refineries  in  France  consumed  17,700,000  pounds 
of  raw  sugar.    Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  F3,  142. 

23  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Minutes  de  lettre  ad.  par  Col- 
bert au  gouv.  g6n.  des  Antilles. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

that  the  planters  will  suffer  a  loss  in  its  production  and  will 
no  longer  be  able  to  cultivate  their  plantations.  .  .  .  Trust  to 
me  that  I  shall  guarantee  to  my  subjects  who  are  engaged  in 
this  trade  every  means  and  facility  to  transport  sugar  to  for- 
eign markets."^ 

In  spite,  however,  of  this  very  clear  evidence  that  Col- 
bert did  not  wish  at  that  time  to  limit  the  production  of 
sugar,  because  he  believed  that  there  was  a  better  solu- 
tion to  the  problem,  we  find  him  writing  in  less  than  a 
year  to  Pelissier,  a  director  of  the  West  India  Company  in 
the  islands : 

"As  the  abundance  of  sugar  seems  to  be  exceedingly  great 
in  the  kingdom,  it  would  be  wise  for  you  to  take  into  considera- 
tion whether  or  not  you  could  influence  the  planters  to  decrease 
the  amount  of  land  devoted  to  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane, 
and  to  cultivate  some  cotton,  indigo,  and  ginger.  Try  some 
experiments  in  the  planting  of  spices  such  as  pepper,  nutmegs, 
etc."25 

But  no  measures  were  taken  to  enforce  such  a  plan  upon 
the  planters.  Colbert  regarded  it  as  unwise  because  he 
believed  that  "a  decrease  in  the  production  of  sugar  meant 
a  decrease  in  the  development  of  the  islands. "^^ 

The  expediency  of  permitting  the  exportation  of  raw 
sugar  directly  from  the  islands  was  never  seriously  con- 
sidered, because  "he  [Colbert]  knew  that  it  would  foster 
the  growth  of  the  Dutch  refineries,  which  he  wished  to 
destroy. "^^  The  question  arises  as  to  whether  the  raw 
sugar  of  the  islands  could  be  exported  from  France  to 
foreign    countries.      It    seems    that    according    to    clause 

24  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  135,  the  king  to  de  Baas,  December  21, 
1670. 

25  Clement,  III,  2,  pp.  526-527,  Colbert  to  Pelissier,  November  4, 
1671. 

26  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  M6moire  by  Patoulet,  December  20, 
1682. 

27  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  M6m.  by  Patoulet, 

269 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

XVIII  of  its  letters-patent,  the  West  India  Company 
had  the  right  to  re-export  any  sugar  imported  from  the 
islands.  The  act  of  September  10,  1668,  which  forbade 
the  company  to  grant  passports  to  foreigners,  said  explic- 
itly: 

"The  said  company  and  the  said  private  traders  shall  arm 
their  vessels,  and  make  their  returns  in  the  ports  of  France, 
where  they  shall  have  the  privilege  of  discharging  their  car- 
goes of  sugar,  tobacco,  and  other  merchandise  coming  from 
the  company's  colonies,  and  may  re-export  them  into  foreign 
countries  without  being  obliged  to  pay  duties  thereon,  on  con- 
dition, however,  of  making  a  declaration  of  the  fact  before  the 
proper  officers."^ 

Colbert  wrote  on  November  28,  1670,  to  Brunet,  one  of 
the  directors  of  the  West  India  Company:  "In  regard  to 
muscovado,  I  shall  not  change  my  policy  of  requiring 
duties  to  be  paid  upon  it  when  it  is  re-exported  from  the 
realm";  and  again  on  January  23,  that  "His  Majesty 
desires  that  all  sugar  imported  from  the  islands  of  Amer- 
ica be  refined  in  the  realm."^  It  was  also  about  this  time 
that  the  privilege  of  trading  in  the  islands  was  taken  from 
traders  at  Nantes  and  not  restored  until  a  formal  promise 
had  been  given  by  them  that  no  raw  sugar  would  be  re- 
exported to  foreign  countries,  under  penalty  of  confisca- 
tion of  vessel  and  cargo,  and  that  they  would  refine  their 
sugar.^ 

Scherer^  states  that  an  ordinance  of  1682  prohibited  the 
re-exportation  of  raw  sugar  imported  from  the  islands. 
Boizard  and  Tardieu^  refer  vaguely  to  a  law  of  1681  which 
forbade  the  same  thing.     The  latter  add  that  the  same 

28Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  175. 
29Depping,  Correspondance,  III,  524,  527. 

30  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1313;  AD,xi,  48,  arrH  du  conseil  d'4tat,  Decem- 
ber 14,  1671. 

^^Histoire  du  Commerce,  II,  493. 

32  Histoire  de  la  Legislation  des  Sucres,  1664-1891,  p.  3. 

270 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

law  imposed  a  duty  of  eight  francs  the  hundredweight  on 
refined  sugar  in  the  islands  and  imported  into  the  realm. 
But  this  last  action  was  taken  apparently  for  the  first 
time  by  the  enactment  of  the  arret  of  April  18,  1682,  which 
will  be  discussed  below,  and  it  seems  probable  that  it  is  to 
this  arret  that  reference  is  made.  It  contains,  however, 
no  prohibition  to  re-export  colonial  raw  sugar.  Although 
two  very  excellent  collections  of  acts  relating  to  sugar 
have  been  examined,  no  legislation  of  1681  or  1682  con- 
taining such  a  prohibition  has  been  found.^^  Apparently  it 
was  not  until  September  28,  1684,  that  the  re-exportation 
of  colonial  raw  sugar  to  foreign  countries  was  formally 
forbidden.^  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  this  date 
is  posterior  to  that  of  the  death  of  Colbert.  AU  that  can 
be  said,  so  far  as  the  records  which  we  have  consulted  are 
concerned,  is  that  Colbert  expressed  the  wish  that  all  raw 
sugar  be  refined  within  the  realm  before  re-exportation, 
but  that  he  never  formally  required  it  except  in  the  case 
of  traders  of  Nantes.  The  importance  of  this  consists  in 
the  fact  that  colonial  raw  sugar  was  never  placed  by  Col- 
bert entirely  in  the  control  of  the  French  refiner.  The  law 
permitted  its  sale  in  foreign  markets.  In  actual  practice, 
however,  the  refiner  in  France  enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  colo- 
nial raw  sugar,  for  it  was  found  to  be  so  unprofitable  to 
sell  it  in  foreign  markets,  after  import  duties  had  been 
paid  in  France  and  the  expense  of  unloading  and  reloading 
had  been  met,  that  it  was  not  done.  Thus  Patoulet  ex- 
plained the  excessively  low  price  of  sugar  in  the  islands  in 
1679,  which  was  two  livres  ten  sous  or  three  livres  per  hun- 
dredweight, by  saying  that  the  refiners  of  France  agreed 
among  themselves  to  fix  the  price  to  be  paid  for  raw 
sugar.^^ 

33  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48,  Chamb.  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C.  730. 

34  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  I,  402. 

35  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  Memoire,  December  20,  1682. 

271 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Obviously  the  only  means  left  to  save  the  planters  from 
the  tyranny  of  the  French  refiner  was  to  encourage  the 
establishment  of  refineries  in  the  islands.  The  refining  of 
sugar  had  already  been  begun  in  the  islands  in  fact.  Thus 
Claude  Gueston,  a  director  of  the  East  India  Company, 
and  residing  at  Caen,  established  in  1667,  at  great  expense 
to  himself,  a  refinery  in  the  island  of  Guadeloupe  in  order 
"to  do  something  agreeable  to  His  Majesty."^  We  learn 
from  a  letter  by  de  Baas  to  Colbert  of  March  4,  1670,  that 
the  superior-general  of  the  Jesuits,  R.  Pere  Brion,  had 
begun  the  refining  of  sugar  at  Martinique  and  that  he 
hoped  to  refine  10,000  pounds.  De  Baas  added  that  it 
would  be  wise  for  the  West  India  Company  to  encourage 
him  in  every  way  possible  in  order  to  stimulate  others  to 
follow  his  example  in  establishing  refineries,  for  it  was  a 
matter  of  great  importance  to  the  welfare  of  the  islands.^ 
At  the  beginning  of  1672,  de  Baas  wrote  that  the  planters 
were  convinced  of  the  advantage  of  refining  their  own 
sugar,  but  that  there  were  several  things  which  prevented 
them  from  doing  so.  In  the  first  place,  the  planters  were 
heavily  indebted  to  private  merchants  and  to  the  West 
India  Company  and  wished  to  pay  their  debts,  but  their 
creditors  wished  to  receive  refined  sugar  on  the  same  basis 
as  raw  sugar;  in  the  second  place,  a  considerable  capital 
was  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  refineries ;  and  in 
the  third  place,  there  were  not  enough  refiners  in  the 
islands  to  teach  the  process  of  refining  to  the  planters.  In 
regard  to  the  last  point,  de  Baas  suggested  that  the  West 

36Chamb.  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  730,  Extrait  des  Reg.,  July 
4,  1682.  The  purpose  of  the  act  was  to  grant  exemption  from  import 
duties  for  200,000  pounds  of  sugar  refined  at  this  refinery  and  im- 
ported into  France,  as  an  import  duty  of  eight  livres  per  hundredweight 
had  been  laid  by  an  arrSt  of  April  18,  1682,  on  sugar  refined  in  the 
islands. 

37  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  4, 
1670.  De  Baas  wrote  again  some  few  days  later  (March  22)  that 
Father  Brion  was  still  persisting  in  carrying  out  his  plans.    Ibid. 

272 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

India  Company  send  out  six  refiners,  two  for  each  of  the 
islands  of  Martinique,  Guadeloupe  and  St.  Christopher.^ 
Du  Lion  wrote  on  November  16,  1671,  that  he  was  plan- 
ning to  establish  a  refinery  at  Guadeloupe  and  that  he  was 
trying  to  induce  others  to  follow  his  example.^^ 

Colbert  pursued  the  policy  of  encouraging  such  estab- 
lishments.    He  wrote  to  de  Baas  on  November  29,  1672: 

"You  know  how  important  it  is  for  the  commerce  of  the 
islands  of  America  to  persuade  the  planters  to  refine  their  sugar 
themselves  and  thus  to  gain  a  more  ready  and  more  assured 
market  for  their  sugar.  The  West  India  Company  has  given 
orders  and  instructions  to  Sieur  de  Loover^  planter  of  Guade- 
loupe, and  supplied  him  with  all  implements  necessary  for  the 
instruction  of  planters  in  the  method  of  refining  sugar  and  of 
making  cassonades.  You  should  not  only  aid  him  in  every 
way  that  you  can,  but  acquaint  all  with  the  undertaking  and 
especially  convince  the  planters  of  the  advantage  to  be  gained 
in  refining  their  sugar."*^ 

He  wrote  similar  letters  to  du  Ruau  Pallu,  agent-general 
of  the  West  India  Company,  and  to  du  Lion,  governor 
of  Guadeloupe.*^  In  1674,  Colbert  wrote  again  to  de 
Baas  instructing  him  "to  urge  the  planters  to  purify  and 
refine  their  sugar."*^ 

Furthermore,  Colbert  protected  colonial  refiners  by  for- 
bidding the  revenue  farmers  to  collect  more  than  four 
livres  the  hundredweight  on  sugar  refined  in  the  islands 

38  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  28,  1672. 

39  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  II,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  November  16,  1671. 

40  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  November  29,  1672. 

41  Ibid.,  fols.  102,  102  verso. 

42  Ibid.,  6,  fol.  32,  May  15,  1674.  We  have  a  bit  of  evidence  in  the 
admiralty  records  of  La  Rochelle  which  rather  implies  that  a  refinery 
was  established  in  one  of  the  islands  a  few  months  later.  L'AngSlique, 
whose  passport  was  registered  on  December  22,  1674,  had  in  her  cargo 
"320  barriques  de  charbon,  1800  pots  et  formes  k  rafiner  sucres."  She 
was  bound  for  Guadeloupe.  Arch.  D6pt.  Charente  Inf.,  B,  unclassi- 
fied. Rap.  et  Proc.  Verb.,  1674. 

273 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

and  imported  into  the  realm.  He  thus  placed  the  same 
import  duty  on  it  as  that  levied  on  raw  sugar.*^ 

By  1679,  two  refineries  had  been  established  at  Martin- 
ique and  three  at  Guadeloupe,  but  they  seem  to  have  been 
small  and  rather  unimportant.**  Thus  Colbert's  efforts 
had  as  yet  borne  small  fruit.  This  was  possibly  due  in 
part  to  the  Dutch  war.  At  any  rate,  the  very  low  price 
of  sugar  in  1679  necessitated  renewed  activity. 

Patoulet's  arrival  in  the  islands  in  the  summer  of  1679, 
to  become  the  first  intendant-general,  marks  an  epoch  in 
the  growth  of  refineries.  A  memorialist  of  1692  re- 
ferred to  him  as  the  one  who  had  proposed  their  estab- 
lishment and  fostered  their  growth.*^  It  was  inaccurate 
to  affirm  that  Patoulet  had  originally  proposed  their  estab- 
lishment, as  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said  above,  but 
it  is  strong  proof  of  his  activity  during  his  intendancy  in 
contributing  to  its  success.  Shortly  after  his  arrival  he 
wrote  to  Colbert  that  plans  had  been  made  for  the  estab- 
lishment in  Martinique  of  two  large  refineries  which  would 
be  able  to  refine  annually  800,000  or  900,000  pounds  of 
raw  sugar.  These  two  refineries  were  to  be  ready  by  the 
beginning  of  1680.  Permission  had  been  asked  to  con- 
struct others.  Patoulet  wrote  to  Colbert  in  regard  to  the 
matter  as  follows: 

"As  I  do  not  know  exactly  what  are  your  intentions  toward 
such  enterprises  and  as  they  might  be  unfavourable,  I  have 
postponed  my  reply  to  the  very  pressing  demands  of  certain 
other  planters  who  wish  to  construct  two  new  refineries  and 
asked  my  permission  to  do  so.  This  delay  which  I  imposed, 
together  with  the  report  which  comes  from  the  refiners  at 
Bordeaux  to  the  effect  that  a  supplementary  import  duty  of 
four  livres  had  been  laid  on  sugar  refined  in  the  islands,  has 

43  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  294. 

44  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  II,  Patoulet  to  Colbert,  September  22,  1679. 

45  Arch.  Aif.  Etrang.,  M^m.  et  Doc,  Esp.,  79,  fol.  61,  M6moire  sur 
le  commerce  des  Antilles. 

274 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

so  alarmed  every  one  that  those  who  asked  permission  to  estab- 
lish the  two  refineries  no  longer  talk  of  carrying  out  their 
plan/'^ 

The  reply  which  Colbert  wrote  to  this  letter,  although 
brief,  can  leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  policy  which  he  intended 
to  pursue.  "You  should  work  to  increase  by  every  means 
the  number  of  refineries. "^^  Shortly  afterwards  he  wrote 
again:  "You  should  persuade  the  planters  to  establish 
refineries,  for  it  is  certain  that  it  can  contribute  much  to 
the  increase  of  commerce."^ 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions,  Patoulet  became 
very  active  in  promoting  the  refining  industry.  He  wrote 
in  1680  enthusiastically,  that  the  two  large  refineries  of 
which  he  had  written  in  a  previous  letter  had  brought  forty 
good  workmen  from  France  and  that  the  advantage  of 
such  establishments  was  already  evident,  for  the  price  of 
sugar  had  already  risen  thirty-three  and  one-third  per 
cent.  "I  shall  exert  all  my  efforts  to  persuade  others  to 
construct  new  refineries."  He  added  that  he  had  almost 
completed  a  company  which  would  erect  a  new  refinery 
and  that  he  had  written  to  the  Company  of  Senegal  to 
urge  it  to  establish  another.  If  these  plans  materialized 
he  was  sure  that  enough  sugar  could  be  refined  in  the 
islands  to  supply  the  entire  kingdom.*^  Patoulet  became 
personally  interested  in  one  refinery  for  a  three-eighths 
interest,^  and  he  seems  to  have  carried  on  a  regular  trade 
in  sugar  with  Anthoine  Allaire,  a  merchant  of  La  Ro- 
chelle.'^ 

46  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  II,  Patoulet  to  Colbert,  September  23,  1679. 
4r  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fol.  24,  June  2,  1680. 

48  Bib.    Nat.    MSS.,    fonds    fran?.,    11315,    fol.    133,    May   4,    1681. 

49  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  M6m.  de  Patoulet,  December 
20,  1680. 

50  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bg,  45,  fols.  31-33,  Patoulet  to  Seignelay,  March 
7,  1684. 

51  Bib.   Nat.  MSS.,  fonds   fran?.,  11315,  fol.  19  verso,  contains  a 

275 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

The  growth  of  these  refineries  produced  immediate  re- 
sults, for  the  price  of  raw  sugar  rose  in  1682  to  five  francs 
and  later  to  six  francs  ten  sous  per  hundredweight.^^  The 
refineries  of  the  realm  felt  the  competition  and  appealed 
to  the  government  against  this  new  force  which  had  arisen 
to  dispute  their  monopoly  and  to  threaten  their  destruc- 
tion. Colbert  had  been  responsible,  as  has  been  shown, 
for  the  growth  of  the  refining  industry  in  France  and 
those  interested  in  it  had  a  right  to  claim  his  protection. 
He  was  equally  responsible  for  its  growth  in  the  islands, 
as  has  just  been  seen.  There  is,  however,  a  difference  to 
be  observed  in  his  attitude  toward  the  two  ente^rprises. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  his  original  plan  was  for  the 
islands  to  produce  raw  sugar  and  to  have  it  refined  in  the 
realm.  When,  however,  the  establishment  of  refineries  in 
France  was  not  sufficiently  rapid  to  make  it  possible  for 
all  of  the  raw  sugar  of  the  islands  to  find  a  ready  market 
in  France  and  to  prevent  a  serious,  depreciation  thereof, 
he  was  forced  to  find  some  expedient  to  save  the  planter 
from  ruin.  He  refused  to  permit  the  exportation  of  raw 
sugar  direct  from  the  islands  to  foreign  markets  and  dis- 
tinctly discouraged  its  re-exportation  from  France,  and 
he  was  not  willing  to  limit  the  production  of  sugar  by 
forcing  the  planters  to  plant  a  certain  per  cent  of  their 
lands  with  other  crops.  He  was  thus  forced  in  a  sense  to 
encourage  the  establishment  of  refineries  in  the  islands. 
He  thus  seems  to  have  favoured  their  establishment  more 
as  a  temporary  expedient  than  as  a  permanent  policy. 

The  experiment  had  proved  highly  successful  and  ad- 
vantageous to  the  planters.  There  were  many  sound  rea- 
sons  why   the   policy   of   encouraging   colonial    refineries 

letter  of  October  29,  1679,  from  this  merchant  to  Patonlet,  contracting 
for  50,000  pounds  of  raw  sugar  at  four  livres  the  hundredweight. 

52  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  Cg,  III,  M^moire  pour  M.  B6gon  par  Patoulet, 
1682. 

276 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

should  be  continued.  Raw  sugar  lost  in  transportation 
from  the  islands  to  France  about  one-fourth,  whereas 
refined  sugar  lost  nothing.^^  By  refining  their  own  sugar 
in  the  islands  the  planters  would  gain,  according  to  an 
estimate  by  Patoulet,  600,000  francs  annually,  for,  he 
argued,  18,000,000  pounds  of  raw  sugar  at  an  average 
of  five  francs  the  hundredweight  would  yield  only  900,000 
francs,  whereas  the  same,  when  refined,  would  yield  1,500,- 
000  francs  (price  twenty-five  francs  the  hundredweight). 
This  incidentally  would  mean  a  net  gain  for  French  trad- 
ers, as  the  planters  would  have  this  additional  sum  with 
which  to  purchase  French  merchandise.  An  increase  in 
commerce  meant  an  increase  in  navigation,  hence  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  vessels  and  sailors,  which  would 
be  a  source  of  strength  to  the  kingdom.  Vessels  would  not 
be  obliged  to  wait  such  a  long  time  for  their  cargoes. 
"At  present,"  said  Patoulet,  "vessels  are  forced  to  wait 
a  whole  year  for  a  cargo  of  raw  sugar,  whereas  a  cargo  of 
refined  sugar  could  be  had  in  three  or  four  days."  It 
would  produce  another  advantage  for  traders.  A  vessel 
of  150  tons,  bringing  a  cargo  of  merchandise  valued  in 
France  at  15,000  francs  and  yielding  in  the  islands  2^,500 
francs,  could  receive  payment  in  90,000  pounds  of  refined 
sugar  which  could  be  obtained  from  a  refinery  in  three 
or  four  days.  If,  however,  the  cargo  were  bartered  for 
raw  sugar,  it  would  yield  450,000  pounds.  As  the  vessel 
could  not  carry  more  than  300,000  pounds,  one-third  of 
the  amount  would  have  to  be  left  in  the  islands.  Fur- 
thermore, the  establishment  of  refineries  created  a  Hveli- 
hood  for  the  petits  habitants.  Thus  Patoulet  stated  that 
the  three  refineries  at  Martinique  consumed  12,000  francs 
worth  of  eggs.  The  effect  of  this  was  already  seen  in  the 
fact  that  the  petits  habitants  who  had  lately  been  seeking 

53  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  IX,  Memoir  by  Robert,  intendant  of  the 
islands,  April  21,  1696. 

277 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

some  way  to  return  to  France  were  planning  to  remain. 
Patoulet  admitted  frankly  that  the  growth  of  the  refining 
industry  in  the  islands  meant  a  destruction  of  that  in 
France.  "But,"  said  he,  "I  am  of  the  opinion  that  that 
would  not  be  a  bad  thing  [tin  grand  maZ] .  It  is  true  that 
one  would  thus  destroy  the  profit  made  by  thirty  or  forty 
individuals  who  are  either  foreigners  or  protestants,  but 
the  benefit  thereof  would  be  enjoyed  by  a  large  number 
of  people."^ 

In  spite  of  such  sound  arguments  Colbert  sided  with  the 
refiners  of  France  by  imposing  a  special  import  duty  of 
eight  francs  the  hundredweight  on  sugar  refined  in  the 
islands.  This  was  done  by  an  arret  of  April  18,  1682. 
After  having  recalled  the  arret  of  May  31,  1675,  by  which 
the  import  duty  on  sugar  refined  in  the  islands  was  main- 
tained at  four  livres  the  hundredweight,  the  same  as  that 
on  raw  sugar,  the  preamble  says: 

"Whereas  His  Majesty  has  been  informed  that  when  the 
said  arret  was  rendered,  there  existed  only  a  very  small  num- 
ber of  refineries  in  the  islands  and  the  planters  were  accus- 
tomed to  send  their  sugar  to  France  to  be  refined,  but  that  at 
present  a  large  number  of  refineries  have  been  established  in 
the  islands  by  different  individuals;  that  this  fact  is  proving 
very  prejudicial  to  His  Majesty's  customs,  after  having  heard 
the  recommendation  of  Sieur  Colbert,  councilor  in  his  royal 
council,  controller-general  of  his  finances,  and  being  in  his 
council,  he  has  ordered  and  hereby  orders  that  sugar  refined  in 
the  French  islands  and  colonies  of  America  shall  pay,  com- 
mencing with  the  first  day  of  May  next,  the  sTum  of  eight  livres 
the  hundredweight."^^ 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  reason  given  for  laying  duty 
is  one  of  revenue.     It  is  very  clear,  however,  that  the  real 

54  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  Patoulet  to  Colbert,  December  20,  1682. 

55  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48 ;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  368-369.  White 
sugar  imported  from  Cayenne  was  exempted  from  this  by  an  arr^t  of 
September   19   following.     Chamb.  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  730. 

278 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

reason  was  one  of  favouritism  for  the  refiners  of  France, 
for  the  estabhshment  of  new  refineries  in  the  islands  was 
definitely  prohibited  by  an  arret  of  January  21,  1684.^® 
There  the  reason  given  for  the  action  is  stated  very 
frankly  and  clearly: 

"Whereas  the  king  has  been  informed  that  the  planters  of  the 
French  islands  and  colonies  of  America  .  .  .  having  devoted 
themselves  almost  entirely  to  the  plantation  and  cultivation  of 
sugar-cane^  have  established  a  large  number  of  refineries  in  the 
said  islands;  that  almost  all  of  the  sugar  produced  is  being 
refined  there;  and  that  consequently  the  refiners  established  in 
France  have  almost  ceased  work  and  that  men  and  refiners 
employed  in  them  who  have  no  other  means  of  gaining  a  live- 
lihood are  leaving  the  kingdom,  he,  being  in  his  council,  has 
forbidden  and  forbids  by  these  presents  all  of  his  subjects  of 
the  aforesaid  French  islands  and  colonies  of  America,  planters, 
as  well  as  merchants  and  traders,  to  establish  any  new  refin- 
eries in  the  said  islands  and  colonies  under  penalty  of  3000 
livres  fine." 

Patoulet,  who  in  the  meantime  had  been  made  intendant 
at  Dunkerque,  protested  energetically  against  this  meas- 
ure.^ But  his  protest  was  in  vain.  The  mind  of  the  gov- 
ernment was  clearly  made  up  to  sacrifice  the  general  inter- 
ests of  the  planters  to  the  special  interests  of  the  refiners 
in  France. 

Such  was  the  policy  which  Colbert  pursued  in  promoting 
the  production  of  sugar  in  the  islands  and  the  establish- 

The  duty  was  made  permanent  by  an  arrH  of  September  28,  1674. 
Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  402. 

56  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  395.  Curiously  enough  a  copy  of  this 
important  act  is  not  to  be  found  in  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,xi,  48.  A  copy  is 
found,  however,  in  Chambre  de  Commerce  of  Nantes,  C,  730. 

57  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bg,  45,  fol.  30.  Patoulet  to  Seignelay,  letter  and 
memoir  of  March  7,  1684.  Patoulet  there  related  the  history  of  the 
refining  industry  in  the  islands  and  of  the  encouragement  which  had 
been  given  by  Colbert  to  it.  He  demanded  at  least  exemption  from 
import  duty  for  sugar  refined  in  the  refinery  at  Martinique  in  which 
he  owned  a  three-eighths  interest. 

279 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ment  of  refineries  both  in  the  islands  and  in  France.  There 
were  three  very  important  results:  (1)  an  increase  in  the 
production  of  sugar,  (2)  the  growth  of  the  refining  indus- 
try, and  (3)  France  began  exporting  instead  of  importing 
refined  sugar. 

If  we  accept  the  estimate  made  by  a  memorialist  of 
1691,  that  the  amount  of  sugar  produced  in  the  islands  in 
1674  was  12,000,000  pounds,^  and  that  of  Patoulet  that 
it  was  18,000,000  pounds  in  1682,^^  an  increase  of  fifty  per 
cent  is  to  be  noted  for  the  last  eight  years  of  Colbert's 
ministry. 

The  rise  and  growth  of  the  sugar-refining  industry  was 
even  more  noticeable.  Colbert  stated  in  1664  in  his  mem- 
oir on  commerce  that  the  Dutch  were  furnishing  almost  all 
of  the  refined  sugar  consumed  in  the  realm.  By  1683,  no 
less  than  twenty-nine  refineries  existed  in  France  and  five 
in  the  islands,  making  a  total  of  thirty-four,  which  refined 
annually  20,700,000  pounds.^ 

At  the  beginning  of  Colbert's  ministry,  as  has  just  been 
stated,  refined  sugar  was  imported  into  France  from  Hol- 
land. But  in  1670,  Colbert  wrote  to  de  Baas:  "Foreign- 
ers no  longer  bring  us  sugar.  We  have  begun  in  the  last 
six  weeks  or  two  months  to  export  it  to  them."^^  No  mate- 
rial has  been  found  which  makes  it  possible  to  state  what 
amount  of  sugar  France  exported  to  foreign  countries  by 
the  end  of  Colbert's  ministry,  but  it  is  certain  that  the 
French  had  begun  by  that  time  to  march  forward  in  that 
road  which  led  in  the  eighteenth  century  to  their  suprem- 
acy over  the  English  as  furnishers  of  sugar  in  the  markets 
of  Europe. 

58  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  III,  M6moire  pour  M.  B6gon,  1682. 

59  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  II,  M6moire  touchant  le  com- 
merce des  Isles,  1691. 

60  See  above. 

61  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  115,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  October  10, 
1670. 

280 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Colonial  Imports — Indentured  Servants 
AND  Slaves 

T  N  the  early  history  of  the  French  West  Indies  the  inden- 
■■"  tured  servant  played  an  important  part.  Large  num- 
bers of  them  were  drafted  in  the  Norman  ports  and  sent 
out  to  the  islands.  During  the  years  of  1637,  1638  and 
the  first  six  months  of  1639,  more  than  500  were  sent  from 
the  single  port  of  Honfleur.^  Considerable  numbers  were 
also  sent  from  Havre  and  Dieppe.^ 

The  usual  form  of  contract  was  three  years  of  service 
on  the  part  of  the  servant  to  the  one  who  paid  his  passage 
and  fed,  clothed  and  housed  him  during  his  term  of  ser- 
vice.^ The  master  had  the  right  of  selling  to  another  any 
portion  of  the  unexpired  term  of  service.  It  was  not 
unusual  for  a  servant  to  have  seven  or  eight  masters  during 
the  three  years.* 

This  form  of  contract  proved  so  profitable  to  planters 
that  they  were  willing  to  pay  to  ship  captains  1000 
to  1200  pounds  of  tobacco  for  servants.  Even  higher 
prices  were  paid  for  artisans.^  Captains  of  La  Ro- 
chelle,  St.  Malo,  Dieppe  and  Havre  engaged  regularly  in 
the  trade.  In  order  to  obtain  servants  "they  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  naivete  of  many  people  whom  they  persuade 
that  life  in  the  islands  is  a  bed  of  roses,  that  the  land  flows 
with  milk  and  honey  and  that  one  works  httle  and  gains 

1 C.  Br6ard,  Les  documents  relatifs  d,  la  marine  normande,  p.  187. 

2  Du  Motey,  OuUlaume  d'Orange  et  rorigine  des  Antilles  fran- 
qaises,  chap.  XIII. 

3  Both  Br6ard  and  du  Motey  publish  the  texts  of  several  con- 
tracts made  at  Honfleur  and  Havre. 

4Du  Tertre,  II,  454. 
5  Ibid.,  p.  464. 

281 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

much.  They  not  only  deceive  the  ignorant,  .  .  .  but  also 
debauch  young  children  in  order  to  kidnap  them.  Some 
have  been  mean  and  knavish  enough  to  entice  children 
aboard  their  vessels  under  various  pretexts  and  force  them 
to  go  to  the  islands  where  they  were  sold  to  masters  who  fed 
them  poorly  and  made  them  work  so  excessively  and  treated 
them  so  inhumanely  that  many  of  them  died  in  a  short 
time."*  Abuses  of  this  nature  grew  so  flagrant  that  de 
Poincy  complained  to  the  home  government  of  one  case 
where  200  young  Frenchmen,  some  of  whom  were  of  good 
family,  had  been  kidnapped,  concealed  at  St.  Servan  for 
three  months  and  then  taken  to  be  sold  at  Barbadoes.^ 

But  after  the  establishment  of  the  sugar  industry  and 
of  the  regular  trade  in  slaves,  the  trade  in  indentured 
servants  decreased.  Colbert  was  forced  to  take  measures 
to  encourage  and  to  compel  the  importation  of  servants 
into  the  islands.  He  first  attempted  to  encourage  it  by 
making  the  terms  of  the  contract  more  attractive  to  the 
servant.  Thus  by  an  arret  of  February  28,  1670,  the  term 
of  service  was  reduced  from  three  years  to  eighteen 
months.^  This  arret  was  re-enacted  on  October  31,  1672.® 
Colbert  made  efforts  to  force  their  importation  by  an  arret 
of  January  22,  1671,  which  required  all  vessels  of  100  tons 
or  more,  going  to  the  West  Indies,  to  carry  two  cows  or 
two  mares,  and  those  of  less  than  100  tons  to  carry  two 
indentured  servants  in  place  of  each  cow  or  mare.^^  To 
prevent  too  large  a  growth  of  slave  population  in  propor- 
tion to  the  white,  a  regulation  was  made  which  required 
all  planters  of  St.  Domingo  to  have  a  number  of  servants 

6Pelleprat,  p.  21. 
7Du  Tertre,  II,  465. 

8  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  190;  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  54,  letter 
to  conseils  souverains  of  Martinique  and  St.  Christopher  to  register 
the  said  arrit. 

9  Ibid.,  p.  264. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  207. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

equal  to  that  of  their  slaves.^^  After  the  close  of  Col- 
bert's ministry,  regulations  required  that  vessels  of  sixty 
tons  or  less  should  take  three  servants,  those  of  sixty  to  100 
tons  four,  and  those  of  more  than  100  tons  six.^ 

There  were  two  facts,  however,  which  militated  against 
the  success  of  any  plan  to  supply  labour  in  the  islands  by 
the  importation  of  indentured  servants  from  France.  The 
one  was  that  the  supply  was  not  large  enough  to  keep 
pace  with  the  demand  for  labour  after  the  introduction 
of  the  cultivation  of  sugar.^^  The  other  was  that  slave 
labour  was  more  reliable  and  much  cheaper.^*  The  slave 
became  the  planter's  property  and  his  labour  was  avail- 
able throughout  his  lifetime,  whereas  the  indentured  ser- 
vant offered  only  a  temporary  service  and  became  his  own 
master  at  the  end  of  three  years.  This  explains  why  the 
slave  trade  developed  in  the  French  West  Indies,  and  it 
seems  idle  to  argue,  as  does  M.  Peytraud,^^  that  these 
islands  might  have  been  cultivated  entirely  by  white  labour. 

There  seems  to  be  some  evidence  that  d'Esnambuc  found 
some  slaves  in  the  small  French  colony  at  St.  Christopher 
in  1625/^  Du  Tertre  informs  us  that  in  1635  a  Dutch 
trader,  Pitre  Cotte,  brought  to  St.  Christopher  a  "quan- 
tity of  slaves"  which  he  had  captured  from  the  Spaniards.^^ 
In   1643  the  Company  of  the  Isles  of  America  made  a 

11  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Ord.  du  Roy,  September  30,  1686 ;  Moreau 
de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  434.  The  proportion  was  later  changed  to  one 
servant  to  twenty  slaves.  Peytraud,  L'esclavage  aux  Antilles  fran- 
qaises,  p.  15. 

12  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  581,  Ordre  du  Roy,  February  19,  1698. 

13  This  assertion  seems  warranted  by  the  practices  to  which  the 
traders  were  forced  to  resort  in  order  to  have  a  number  of  servants. 
See  passages  cited  above  from  Pelleprat  and  Du  Tertre. 

14  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Memoir  by  de  Pouan^ay,  governor  of  St. 
Domingo,  1681,  speaks  of  indentured  servants  as  "costing  much  more 
than  slaves." 

^^  L'Esclavage  aux  Antilles  franqaises. 

16  Peytraud,  p.  5. 

17  Du  Tertre,  I,  59. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

contract  with  a  Captain  Drouault  to  deliver  sixty  slaves 
at  Guadeloupe  for  12,000  livres.^^ 

The  supply  of  slaves  did  not  as  yet  become  very  abun- 
dant, however,  for  Maurile  de  St.  Michel  remarked  that 
slaves  were  being  imported  to  the  islands  in  1646,  but  that 
they  were  very  dear,  the  price  at  St.  Christopher  being 
4000  pounds  of  tobacco  for  a  male  and  3000  pounds  for 
a  female.  But  the  next  ten  years  saw  a  considerable 
^.^  increase  in  the  trade.  In  1655,  Pelleprat  remarked  that 
the  planters  "employed  in  tilling  their  land  neither  oxen 
nor  horses,  but  only  slaves  which  were  brought  from 
Africa  or  the  coasts  of  America,"  and  that  well-to-do 
planters  possessed  twenty-five  or  thirty  slaves.  ^^  De 
Poincy,  the  governor-general,  had  between  six  and  seven 
hundred  on  his  several  plantations.^"  Pelleprat  said  that 
several  ships  came  yearly  to  the  islands  with  cargoes  of 
slaves  and  that  in  1654,  between  six  and  seven  hundred 
had  been  brought  to  Martinique  alone,  the  price  having 
dropped  to  2000  pounds  of  tobacco  or  100  ecus.  By 
1655  the  slave  population  of  the  islands  had  reached  12,- 
000  or  13,000.^ 

The  French  trader  had  apparently  played  a  very  small 
part  in  supplying  these  slaves.  Du  Tertre  records  that 
during  the  sojourn  of  de  Tracy  in  the  West  Indies,  from 
June  1,  1664,  to  April,  1665,  the  Dutch  imported  into 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  no  less  than  twelve  or  thir- 
teen hundred  negroes.^    De  Tracy  wrote  to  Colbert  from 

18  The  contract  was  carried  out  by  Drouault.  We  find  him  in 
October  of  the  same  year  demanding  payment  for  the  sixty  slaves 
and  for  two  others  which  he  had  delivered  to  the  company's  agent  at 
St.  Christopher.  Arch.  Col.,  Fg,  19,  fols.  444,  462,  Records  of  the 
meetings  of  the  directors  for  February  4,  and  October  7,  1643. 

19  Pelleprat,  p.  54. 

20  Ibid. 

21  Ibid. 

22  Du  Tertre,  III,  201.  The  same  historian  records  the  arrival  at 
Martinique  in  October,  1664,  of  a  Dutch  vessel  bringing  a  cargo  of 

284 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  islands  in  1664  that  the  slave  trade  would  prove  profit- 
able to  the  French,  as  it  yielded  a  profit  of  ^66  per  cent.^^ 
It  will  be  recalled  that  the  West  India  Company  had 
all  the  west  coast  of  Africa  included  in  its  grant  and  that 
it  attempted  to  make  provision  for  a  supply  of  slaves  to 
the  planters  by  ceding  to  Carolof,  in  1665,  the  right  of 
trading  on  the  coast  of  Guinea  and  importing  slaves  into 
the  islands.^*  In  1667  a  treaty  was  made  by  Villaut  de 
Bellefond  in  behalf  of  the  West  India  Company,  with  cer- 
tain tribes  on  the  coast  of  Guinea  for  trading  privileges, 
which  implies  that  the  company  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
results  attained  by  Carolof  and  that  it  was  taking  other 
measures  to  supply  slaves  to  its  West  India  colonies. ^^ 
Material  is  lacking  to  show  what  the  company  did  to  take 
advantage  of  this  treaty,  but  it  is  very  probable  that  it  did 
nothing  and  that  the  Dutch  still  supplied  slaves  to  the 
planters,  for  de  Baas  was  instructed  by  the  directors  at 
the  beginning  of  1668,  to  admit  Dutch  ships  which  brought 
slaves  from  Cura9ao,^^  and  on  November  7,  1668,  permis- 
sion was  accorded  by  the  company  to  a  Dutch  trader  to 
import  slaves  into  the  islands.^^  In  1669,  Cartier,  the 
general  agent  of  the  company,  was  freely  admitting  into 

300  slaves.  He  states  that  the  price  demanded  was  3000  pounds  of 
sugar  per  slave,  which  was  reduced  by  de  Tracy  to  2000  pounds. 
Ibid.,  p.  101. 

23  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Abr6g6  de  la  corresp.  de  M.  de  Tracy. 
Letter  de  juillet,  1664. 

24  See  Chapter  IV. 

25  Arch.  Col.,  Cq,  I,  Trait6  fait  avec  le  Roy  de  Comendo  en  la 
coste  de  Guin^e.  The  treaty  was  made  on  March  15,  1667,  aboard 
L'Europe,  a  vessel  belonging  to  a  Dutchman,  Van  Teitz  by  name. 

26  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  26,  1669. 

27  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  22,  1670;  Cjq, 
I.a  Grenade,  1654-1729,  contains  a  copy  of  the  passport.  The  trader, 
Drik  Jansen  by  name,  agreed  to  pay  to  the  company  five  per  cent  on 
all  slaves  and  horses  imported  into  the  islands  and  ten  per  cent  on 
commodities  exported  therefrom.  Jansen  was  captured  by  one  of  de 
Cabaret's  ships.    See  a  discussion  of  the  case  in  Chapter  IX. 

285 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  Dutch  vessels  which  brought 
slaves.  For  the  slaves  he  was  demanding  as  high  as  4000 
pounds  of  sugar  per  head.^  Slaves  were  being  imported 
also  into  Marie  Galante  from  Cura9ao  in  this  same  year.^ 

It  will  be  noticed  that  we  have  reached  the  date  when 
Colbert  began  his  determined  fight  to  exclude  all  foreign 
traders  from  the  islands  and  attempted  to  supply  abso- 
lutely all  the  needs  of  the  planters  by  French  commerce. 
He  assigned  to  the  West  India  Company,  as  one  of  its  spe- 
cial duties,  the  task  of  furnishing  a  supply  of  slaves  to 
the  planters.  It  was  most  probably  in  accordance  with 
Colbert's  instructions  that  the  company  equipped  and  sent 
out,  at  the  close  of  1669,  two  vessels  to  the  coast  of 
Guinea.^  Carolof,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  company's 
interests,  succeeded  in  establishing  trade  relations  with 
the  king  of  Ardres  and  the  two  vessels  sailed  for  the  West 
Indies  with  997  slaves  on  board.  Of  this  number  there 
was  landed  at  Martinique  a  total  of  753,  the  remainder 
having  died  during  the  voyage.  The  results  seemed  so 
auspicious  that  Colbert  at  once  had  large  visions  of  the 
company  being  able  not  only  to  furnish  2000  slaves 
annually  to  the  French,  but  also  to  send  2000  more  to  the 
Spanish  colonies.^ 

In  order  to  encourage  private  traders,  the  special  tax 
of  five  per  cent  levied  by  the  company  on  slaves  imported 
by  them  was  removed  in  1670.^^  In  the  following  year 
(1671)  all  duties  were  removed  from  goods  exported  from 
France  to  the  coast  of  Guinea,^  and  in  1672  a  bounty  of 

28  Ibid.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  December  1,  1669. 

29  Ibid.,  T6m6ricourt  to  Colbert,  December  14,  1669. 

30  A  full  account  of  this  expedition  will  be  found  above  in  Chap- 
ter VII. 

31  C16ment,  III,  2,  p.  485,  Colbert  to  P61issier,  June  21,  1670. 

32  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  3;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  97,  arrH  of 
August  26,  1670. 

33  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  3;  Le  Commerce  de  I'AmMque  par  Mar- 
seille, II,  303,  arrH  of  September  18,  1671. 

286 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

thirteen  livres  per  head  was  granted  on  all  slaves  imported 
into  the  islands.^ 

From  the  beginning  de  Baas  expressed  doubts  as  to  the 
ability  of  the  French  traders  to  furnish  the  number  of 
slaves  necessary  to  the  development  of  the  islands  and 
added  the  warning  that  "if  enough  were  not  furnished  to 
take  the  place  of  those  that  died,  the  planters  would  suffer 
seriously. "^^  Colbert,  however,  remained  deaf  to  de  Baas' 
doubts  and  warnings,  and  ordered  a  strict  enforcement  of 
the  regulations  against  the  foreign  trader.  The  slave 
trade  was  thus  left  in  the  hands  of  the  West  India  Com- 
pany and  of  private  French  traders. 

The  activity  of  neither  seems  to  have  been  great.  We 
find  mention  of  the  arrival  in  1672  at  Guadeloupe  of  two 
vessels  belonging  to  the  company  with  about  550  slaves, 
and  another  of  its  ships,  coming  from  Guinea,  was  ex- 
pected to  arrive  in  December.^  But  the  company's  com- 
merce practically  ceased  after  1672.  Its  dissolution  in 
1674  formally  removed  it  from  the  field.  Private  traders 
seem  to  have  shown  but  small  interest  in  the  slave  trade  and 
it  is  very  probable  that  their  activity  was  even  less  than 
that  of  the  company.  The  result  was  that  the  supply  of 
slaves  was  very  inadequate.  Du  Lion  stated  in  1672  that 
the  clearing  of  new  lands  was  being  retarded  for  this  rea- 
son.^^  Du  Clerc,  secretary  to  de  Baas,  informed  Colbert 
in  a  letter  of  January  20,  1675,  that  it  was  impossible  to 

34  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  259-260,  arrH  of  January  13,  1672.  Of 
this  sum,  ten  livres  were  to  be  paid  by  His  Majesty  to  the  armateurs 
and  three  livres  by  the  West  India  Company  to  the  captains  com- 
manding the  vessels.  After  the  dissolution  of  the  company,  the  three 
livres  were  paid  by  the  Domaine  d'Occident. 

35  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  26,  1669. 

36  Arch.  Nat.  Col,,  Cj,  II,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  December  5,  1672. 
Du  Lion  states  in  a  letter,  eod.  loco,  of  November  16, 1671,  that  he  had 
become  associated  vnih.  Carolof  in  an  enterprise  to  clear  land  at 
Guadeloupe  for  which  Carolof  was  to  furnish  slaves. 

37  Ibid.,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  March  15,  1672. 

287 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

replace  the  slaves  who  were  dying,  because  "no  one  is 
bringing  slaves  to  the  islands."^ 

Colbert,  doubtless  disappointed  at  the  failure  of  the 
private  trader  to  respond  to  his  liberal  policy,  shortly 
afterwards  committed  the  slave  trade  into  the  hands  of  a 
monopoly  and  continued  to  do  so  until  his  death. 

By  a  contract  of  November  8,  1673,  the  West  India 
Company  ceded  to  a  private  company,  composed  of  Mau- 
rice Egrot,  Fran9ois  Fran9ois  and  Fran9ois  Raguenet,  all 
the  western  coast  of  Africa,  lying  between  the  rivers  Sene- 
gal and  Gambia,  with  all  the  privileges  of  trade  which  had 
been  granted  to  it  in  its  letters-patent  and  with  all  furnish- 
ings, utensils,  arms,  munitions  and  everything  belonging  to 
it  at  the  said  coast  except  the  slaves  in  its  possession,  which 
were  sold  to  Thouret,  a  merchant  of  La  Rochelle.^^  This 
contract  was  approved  by  an  arret  of  November  11,  by 
which  was  granted  to  the  new  company  a  monopoly  of 
trade  for  thirty  years,  the  unexpired  term  of  the  Wfest 
India  Company,  and  all  others  were  forbidden  to  encroach 
upon  its  monopoly  under  penalty  of  confiscation  of  vessels 
and  cargoes  and  of  a  fine  of  3000  livres. 

Only  a  small  part  of  this  coast  had  ever  been  actually  in 
control  of  the  West  India  Company.  The  Dutch  were  in 
possession  of  a  good  strategic  base  in  the  island  of  Goree,*" 
and  would  have  to  be  reckoned  with  before  the  Company 
of  Senegal  could  enter  with  advantage  into  the  exploita- 
tion of  its  grant.  The  war  with  Holland  furnished  the 
occasion  to  dispute  with  them  the  control  of  Senegal.  In 
1677,  Jean  d'Estrees  attacked  the  Dutch  at  Goree,  de- 
stroyed their  forts,  and  took  possession  of  the  island,  thus 
preparing  the  way  for  the  conquest  of  the  coast  south  of 

38  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  90,  1675. 

39  Arch.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  contrat  de  vente  du  S6n6gal  et  dependences  aux 
Sieurs  Egrot,  Francois  et  Raguenet,  November  8,  1673. 

40D'Elb6e,  Journal,  p.  351,  states  that  the  Dutch  used  the  island 
as  an  entrepot  for  trade  with  the  tribes  of  the  mainland. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Cape  Verde.^^  Du  Casse,  who  was  later  to  win  fame  as 
governor  of  St.  Domingo,  and  still  later  as  admiral  of 
France,  had  recently  been  appointed  governor  of  the  coast 
by  the  Company  of  Senegal.  He  at  once  took  advantage 
of  d'Estrees'  victory.  In  command  of  UEntendu,  a  royal 
vessel  mounted  by  forty  guns  and  with  a  crew  of  250  men, 
he  occupied  Goree  and  placed  some  agents  in  command  for 
the  company.  He  then  made  treaties  with  the  princes  of 
Rufisque,  Portudal  and  Joal.  In  the  following  year,  1678, 
he  continued  the  work  of  conquest.  The  Dutch,  driven 
from  Goree,  had  concentrated  their  forces  at  Arguin,  a 
well-fortified  island  off  the  coast  near  Cape  Blanco.  Du 
Casse  first  captured,  without  difficulty,  their  trading  posts 
on  the  mainland  opposite  the  island.  The  defense  of  the 
island  itself  proved  so  stubborn,  however,  that  he  was 
forced  to  return  to  Saint  Louis  for  more  ammunition  and 
reinforcements.  After  sustaining  seven  days  of  bombard- 
ment, the  Dutch  were  finally  forced  to  surrender  and 
evacuate  the  island.  The  French  entered  into  possession  on 
September  2,  1678.*^  Shortly  after  this  a  Dutch  vessel 
appeared  and  succeeded  in  stirring  up  a  rebellion  among 
the  natives  on  the  coast  between  Cape  Verde  and  Gambia, 
so  that  du  Casse  was  forced  to  land  troops  and  march 
against  them.  He  met  with  small  resistance  and  forced 
the  natives  to  sign  treaties,  by  which  full  trade  privileges 
were  accorded  to  the  French. 

These  conquests  made  by  d'Estrees  and  du  Casse  were 
sanctioned  by  the  treaty  of  Nymwegen.*^     The  Company 

41  P.  Chemin-Dupont^s,  Les  Compagnies  de  colonisation  en  Afrique 
occidentale  sous  Colbert,  pp.  93  ff.;  P.  Cultru,  Histoire  du  SSn4gal  du 
XFe  siecle  a  1870,  Paris,  1910,  pp.  58-59. 

42  Robert  du  Casse,  L' A  miral  du  Casse,  Paris,  1876,  pp.  9  fP. 

43  The  conquest  of  Arguin  was  in  reality  posterior  to  the  signing 
of  the  treaty,  but  it  remained  effective  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the 
treaty  provided  that  all  conquests,  made  south  of  Cape  St.  Vincent 
within  ten  weeks  after  date,  would  be  recognized. 

289 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

of  Senegal  was  thus  placed  in  actual  possession  of  the 
coast  from  Cape  Blanco  to  the  Gambia.  It  established 
several  trading  posts**  which  apparently  became  prosper- 
ous.*^ But  no  record  has  been  found  that  the  company 
even  attempted  to  carry  slaves  to  the  West  Indies.  It 
is  to  be  remarked  that  the  company's  concessions  extended 
only  to  the  Gambia  and  did  not  include  the  coast  of  Guinea, 
which  furnished  the  supply  of  choice  slaves  and  where  the 
West  India  Company  had  carried  on  some  trade. 

No  immediate  disposition  was  made  of  the  coast  of 
Guinea,  and  the  planters  had  to  depend  for  a  while  longer 
upon  private  traders  to  supply  them  with  slaves.  The 
report  came  from  the  islands  in  1675,  that  none  were 
being  brought.*^  It  was  perhaps  for  this  reason  that  an 
attempt  was  made  in  this  same  year  to  make  definite  pro- 
vision for  a  supply. 

On  October  16,  1675,  the  liquidators  of  the  West  India 
Company  signed  a  contract  with  Jean  Oudiette,  the 
farmer-general  of  the  Domaine  d'Occident,  whereby  the 
latter  agreed  to  import  into  the  French  West  Indies  800 
slaves  a  year  for  four  consecutive  years.  Oudiette  was 
probably  granted  a  monopoly  of  trade.*^  He  was  certainly 
to  enjoy  the  bounty  of  thirteen  livres  per  head  on  all 
slaves  imported  into  the  islands.*^    De  Baas  was  informed 

44  Cultru,  op.  cit.,  QO. 

45  Arch.  Col.,  Cq,  I,  Traits  fait  entre  les  Sieurs  directeurs  g6n6raux 
du  Dom.  Roy.  d'Occid.  et  la  Comp.  du  S6n6gal,  March  21,  1679. 

46  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 

47  No  copy  of  the  contract  has  been  found.  The  fact  of  the  con- 
tract and  a  part  of  its  provisions  are  to  be  found  in  the  avant-propos 
of  the  letters-patent  creating  the  Company  of  Senegal  of  1679.  Moreau 
de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  314. 

48  This  had  been  originally  provided,  it  will  be  recalled,  by  an  arrH 
of  January  13,  1672.  This  meant  probably  only  ten  livres  to  Oudiette, 
because  three  livres  were  to  be  paid  by  the  Dom.  d'Occident,  of  which 
he  was  the  farmer. 

290 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

of  the  contract  and  instructed  to  aid  Oudiette  in  every  way 
possible.     The  king  wrote  him  in  part  as  follows: 

"As  there  is  nothing  which  can  contribute  so  much  to  the 
increase  of  my  islands  of  America  as  the  importation  of  a 
quantity  of  negroes,  I  am  very  glad  to  inform  you  that  a  con- 
tract has  been  made  with  the  Sieur  Oudiette,  farmer  of  my 
Domaine  d'Occident,  to  carry  on  this  trade.  As  it  is  impor- 
tant for  him  to  enjoy  freely  the  privilege  which  I  have  granted 
him  by  the  arret  of  which  I  am  enclosing  a  copy,  do  not  fail 
to  aid  him  in  every  way  you  can."*^ 

Oudiette  for  some  reason  did  not  carry  out  the  contract 
and  it  was  annulled  on  March  25,  1679.^  Four  days 
previously,  on  March  21,  Bellinzani  and  Mesnager,  in 
quality  of  liquidators  of  the  defunct  West  India  Company, 
had  made  another  more  important  contract  with  the  Com- 
pany of  Senegal. 

The  preamble  of  this  contract  stated  that  the  Company 
of  Senegal,  "which  had  established  large  trading  posts  on 
the  coast  of  Africa,  was  on  the  point  of  making  contracts 
to  furnish  slaves  to  the  Dutch  and  Spanish,"  and  had 
offered  to  transport  to  the  French  West  Indies  2000 
slaves  annually  for  the  space  of  eight  years.^  It  was 
apparently  in  excellent  shape  to  make  a  contract  to  do  so. 
Of  its  three  original  directors,  Fran9ois,  Raguenet  and 
Egrot,  the  first  alone  remained.  Raguenet  was  dead.  His 
widow  and  Egrot  had  ceded  their  interests  to  Bains  and 

49  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  7,  fol.  30,  the  king  to  de  Baas,  May  27,  1676, 
cited  by  Dessalles,  Hist.  gen.  des  Antilles,  I,  546,  and  Peytraud,  op. 
cit.,  p.  42. 

50  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  3;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  314. 

51  The  company  had  apparently  already  begun  to  send  some  slaves 
to  the  islands,  for  in  a  letter  written  from  Martinique  on  August  16, 
1677,  the  arrival  "of  a  vessel  belonging  to  the  Company  of  Senegal 
with  eighty  slaves"  is  noted.  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cgj  II,  Jolinet  to  Col- 
bert, August  16,  1677. 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

le  Brun.^^  Under  the  new  directors  the  company  had  made 
considerable  progress  in  its  commerce  and  in  1679  was  in 
a  prosperous  condition.^^  Within  six  years,  thanks  to  the 
conquest  of  d'Estrees  and  du  Casse  and  the  wise  direc- 
tion of  the  latter,  it  had  occupied  a  large  territory  and 
established  a  rich  trade.^ 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  company's  pros- 
perity had  been  gained  most  largely  by  trade  in  rubber, 
ivory,  wax,  and  other  articles  from  Senegal,  and  very 
little  in  the  slave  trade.  Success  in  trade  north  of  Gambia 
did  not  necessarily  augur  success  in  the  slave  trade  on  the 
coast  which  stretched  to  the  southward.  However,  the 
offer  of  the  company  was  accepted  and  a  contract  was 
signed  on  March  21.^ 

The  number  of  directors  was  straightway  increased  by 
the  addition  of  six  new  associates,  namely,  Duvivier  of  Paris, 
Thouret  and  Duport  of  La  Rochelle,  Petit  Saint-Louis  of 
Bordeaux,  Sieur  de  Richemond,  who  had  aided  du  Casse 
in  his  conquests,  and  Ballade  at  St.  Domingo.^  Chemin- 
Dupontes'  remark  that  the  company  was  thus  composed 
of  the  "principaux  armateurs  frangais  de  Vepoqiiey'*  is 
perhaps  a  conjecture,  but  one  is  impressed  with  the  dis- 
tinctly national  character  of  the  company  and  with  the 
fact  that  most  of  them  were  probably  merchants.  The 
new  company  was  capitalized  at  approximately  1,000,000 
francs,  about  one-fourth  of  what  it  really  needed  to  carry 
out  the  plans  which  it  had  undertaken.^ 

The  contract  was   officially   approved  by  an  arret   of 

52  Arch.  Col.,  Cq,  II,  M^moire  concernant  le  commerce  du  Senegal, 
1695. 

53  Ibid. 

54  Chemin-Dupont^s,  p.  99. 

55  A  copy  of  the  contract  is  to  be  found  in  Arch.  Col.,  Cg,  I. 

56  Chemin-Dupont^s,  p.  104. 

57  Chemin-Dupont^s,  p.  105,  makes  this  estimate,  based  on  an  inter- 
esting calculation. 

292 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

March  25,  1679,  and  letters-patent  were  issued  in  June, 
whereby  the  company  was  granted  a  monopoly  of  trade 
for  twenty-five  years  (the  unexpired  time  of  the  West 
India  Company's  grant)  on  the  whole  coast  of  Africa 
from  Cape  Verde  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  was  also 
given  a  full  monopoly  of  the  slave  trade  in  the  West  India 
colonies  for  the  same  period.  All  other  French  subjects 
were  excluded  from  both  these  branches  of  commerce,  under 
penalty  of  confiscation  of  vessel  and  cargo  to  the  profit  of 
the  company,  and  of  a  fine  of  3000  livres,  to  be  divided 
between  the  company  and  His  Majesty.  Full  freedom  was 
accorded  to  sell  slaves  at  any  price  agreed  upon  between 
the  company's  agents  and  the  planters.  The  bounty  of 
thirteen  livres  was  granted  on  all  slaves  imported  by  the 
company  into  the  islands.  Exemption  from  all  duties  on 
goods  exported  to  the  coast  of  Guinea  or  to  the  islands, 
and  from  half  the  duties  on  goods  imported  into  France 
from  Africa  or  from  the  West  Indies  was  to  be  enjoyed. 
The  company  assumed  the  obligation  to  import  into  the 
French  Wfest  Indies  2000  slaves  annually  for  eight  years 
and  in  addition  to  furnish  to  "His  Majesty  at  Marseilles 
such  a  number  as  he  shall  need  for  his  galleys,"  on  terms  to 
be  agreed  upon  later .^ 

Efforts  seem  to  have  been  made  at  once  to  carry  out 
the  contract,  for  by  May  20,  1679,  the  company  had  upon 
the  sea,  twenty-one  vessels  of  an  aggregate  tonnage  of 
5580  tons.  Of  these,  sixteen  were  occupied  in  the  slave 
trade,  four  of  which  were  to  carry  cargoes  of  slaves  to 
Marseilles  for  His  Majesty's  galleys;  four,  cargoes  to 
Spain  to  trade  at  the  arrival  of  the  galleons  from  Amer- 
ica, and  eight  to  carry  slaves  to  the  West  Indies.  Of  the 
remaining  five,  three  were  to  bring  cargoes  of  hides,  rub- 

58  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fol.  I,  contains  the  arrH  of  March  25, 
1679;  Arch.  CoL,  Cg,  I,  contains  the  letters-patent.  They  have  both 
been  printed  by  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  314-317,  and  335-326. 

293 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ber  and  ivory  to  France  from  Senegal,  and  two  were  to 
bring  cargoes  of  sugar  and  tobacco  from  the  islands.^® 

But  misfortunes  were  encountered  from  the  beginning. 
During  the  course  of  the  first  year  no  less  than  four  of 
the  company's  vessels  suffered  shipwreck.^"  By  April, 
1680,  the  company  had  lost  no  less  than  2000  slaves  who 
died  on  board  its  ships  during  the  voyage  from  Guinea  to 
the  West  Indies.®^  Its  total  losses  were  estimated  at  400,- 
000  livres.  Furthermore,  the  company  experienced  the 
same  difficulty  which  the  West  India  Company  had  met 
with,  in  being  unable  to  receive  from  the  planters  prompt 
payment  for  its  slaves.  It  was  thus  unable  to  meet  the 
heavy  obligations  which  it  had  assumed  in  order  to  equip 
its  vessels  and  carry  out  its  contract.  Even  before  the 
first  fiscal  year  had  closed,  the  debt  of  the  company 
amounted  to  no  less  than  1,200,000  livres. ^^  Large  sums 
had  to  be  borrowed,  but  they  only  added  to  the  burden 
without  creating  any  additional  income. 

A  crisis  came  in  the  spring  of  1680,  with  the  failure  of 
de  Kervert  and  Simonnet,  bankers.  In  the  credits  of  the 
bankers,  which  amounted  to  2,000,000  livres,  the  Company 
of  Senegal  figured  for  an  indebtedness  of  1,500,000  livres. 
Immediate  bankruptcy  of  the  company  seemed  inevitable. 
An  appeal  was  made  to  the  king  by  its  directors  "to  grant 

59  Arch.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Estat  des  Navires  appart.  k  la  Cie.  du  S6n6gal, 
May  20,  1679.  Seventeen  of  these  vessels  belonged  to  the  company, 
the  other  four  were  chartered.  All  were  equipped  with  from  six  to 
forty  guns.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  company  was  sending  as 
many  vessels  to  Marseilles  and  Spain  with  slaves  as  to  the  West 
Indies. 

60  The  St.  Francois,  400  tons,  was  wrecked  on  the  coast  of  Brittany 
and  its  cargo  of  tobacco  and  sugar  from  the  islands  lost.  La  Paix, 
400  tons,  was  wrecked  in  the  West  Indies  with  a  cargo  of  tobacco. 
La  Fortune  was  lost  in  the  Canaries,  and  Le  Soleil  on  the  coast  of 
England  with  a  cargo  from  the  coast  of  Senegal. 

61  Arch.  Col.,  Ce,  I,  arrU  of  April  9,  1680,  preamble. 

62  Chemin-Dupont^s,  p.  107. 

294 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

them  his  protection  in  order  that  they  might  be  able  to 
continue  their  commerce,  for  which  they  have  more  than 
twenty  vessels  upon  the  sea."  They  promised  that  in  a 
short  while  they  would  be  able  to  pay  all  of  their  debts. 
After  the  approval  of  Colbert,  a  favourable  reply  was 
made  to  the  petition.  An  arret  of  April  9  forbade  the 
creditors  to  make  any  seizures  against  the  company  under 
penalty  of  invalidation  of  their  claims  and  3000  livres 
fine.^^  The  persistence  of  the  creditors  was  so  great,  how- 
ever, that  the  arret  had  to  be  re-enacted  on  April  16. 
Finally,  on  May  14,  an  agreement  was  reached  by  which 
the  creditors  accepted  the  following  settlement.  De  Ker- 
vert  and  Simonnet  were  to  pay  one-fourth  of  their  debts 
within  the  space  of  three  months.  The  remaining  three- 
fourths  were  to  be  paid  by  the  Company  of  Senegal,  one- 
twelfth  in  eleven  months,  one-fourth  in  one  year,  one- 
twelfth  in  sixteen  months,  one-twelfth  in  two  years,  and  for 
the  remaining  one-fourth,  shares  in  the  company  were  to 
be  issued.  This  agreement  was  sanctioned  by  the  king  on 
May  26."* 

But  misfortunes  continued  to  pursue  the  company. 
Shortly  afterwards  two  vessels  were  lost  by  shipwreck  and 
one  was  captured  by  pirates.^^  Storms  in  the  West  Indies 
destroyed  much  of  the  sugar  and  tobacco  harvests  and 
delayed  payments  upon  which  the  company  had  counted. 
It  was  consequently  unable  to  make  the  settlements  which 
it  had  agreed  to  make  with  its  creditors.  By  June  30, 
1681,  its  liabilities  exceeded  its  assets  by  1,184,569  liv. 
13s.  7d.^^  The  Company  of  Senegal  was  bankrupt.  It 
formally  came  to  an  end  on  July  2,  1681. 

63  Arch.  Col.,  Cq,  I,  arrH  of  April  9,  1680,  cited  by  Chemin-Du- 
pont^s,  p.  109. 

64  Chemin-Dupontfes,  p.  110. 

65  Ibid.,  p.  114. 

66  Arch.  Col.,  Ce,  I,  Estat  g6n6ral  des  efFets  de  la  Compagnie  du 
Senegal,  June  30,  1681.    Among  its  chief  assets  were  eight  vessels  in 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 


The  question  naturally  arises  as  to  what  success  the 
company  had  met  with  in  furnishing  slaves  to  the  West 
India  colonies.  We  seem  to  have  some  evidence  in  the 
accounts  of  the  Domaine  d*Occident.  Under  the  sixth 
title  of  the  credit  sheet  of  its  accounts  for  1680,  1681, 
1682,  1683,  the  entry  is  made  of  thirteen  payments  made 
to  "Fran9ois  for  the  thirteen  livres  per  head  of  slaves 
imported  into  the  islands  of  America."  The  total  of  these 
payments  amounts  to  49,424  liv.  lOs.^^ 

"This  sum  at  thirteen  livres  per  head,  represents,"  says 
Chemin-Dupontes,  "the  bounty  for  3810  slaves  imported 
by  the  Company  of  Senegal  from  March  25,  1679,  to  July 
1,  1682,  in  reality  during  the  space  of  two  years,  .  .  . 
showing  that  the  Company  of  Senegal,  bankrupt  as  it 
was,  was  the  company  which  did  the  most  for  the  develop- 

France  valued  at  73,000  livres  and  eleven  upon  the  sea  valued  with 
their  cargoes  at  375,345  liv.  lis.  7d.  and  sums  due  in  the  West  Indies 
amounting  to  174,164  liv.  18s.  6d. 

67  Arch.  Nat.,  G7,  1312,  Extrait  de  la  R6cepte  et  d6pense  du  compte 
du  Sr.  La  Live  cy-devant  caissier  du  dom.  d'occident  par  luy  faitte 
pendant  les  ann6es  1680-1683.    The  portion  in  question  is  as  follows: 

Dates  Sixiesme  Chap,  de  depense 

14  sept.  1680.  A  Francois  pour  les  13  livres  par 
teste  de  n^gres  port6s  aux  Isles  de 
I'Am.  ord.  du  11  Uv.  1680 

14  dec.    1680  k  luy  ord.  du    3  dud.  mois 

15  avril  1681  h  luy  ord.  du  12  dud.  mois 
15  juin    1681  k  luy  ord.  du  31  mai 
27  Uy.     1682  k  luy  ord.  du  26  dud.  mois 
21  nov.    1682  k  luy  ord.  du  29  juin  1682 
31  nov.    1682  k  luy  ord.  du  21  dudit 
Signature  en  blanc: 
Servant  de  quitt  luy  ord.  du  29  desdit,  mois  et  an 

3  f^v.     1683  k  luy  ord.  du    3  Jan.  1683 

5  avril  1683  k  luy  ord.  du     . 
14  dec.    1680  k  luy  ord.  du    2  d6c.  1680 
13  juin    1681  k  luy  ord.  du    2  dudit      . 

7  oct.     1682  k  luy  ord.  du  dudit  jour    . 


7,059  liv. 

2,907  liv. 

963  liv. 

4,515  liv. 

1,212  liv. 

3,051  liv. 

5,981  liv. 

10  s. 

t  an 

864  liv. 

1,971  liv. 

2,268  Uv. 

5,733  liv. 
10,000  liv. 
30,000  Uv. 

49,524  Uv. 

10  s. 

298 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

ment  of  the  slave  trade  with  the  West  Indies."^  This 
would  be  most  interesting,  if  our  data  could  be  interpreted 
in  such  a  way.  Unfortunately  a  close  analysis  of  the  docu- 
ment, together  with  other  evidence  which  apparently  es- 
caped the  notice  of  M.  Chemin-Dupontes,  will  not  permit 
it.  In  the  first  place,  the  list  of  payments  shows  that  of 
the  thirteen  payments  made,  only  six,  representing  an 
aggregate  of  31,177  livres,  were  made  between  June,  1679, 
the  date  when  the  privilege  of  the  slave  trade  was  accorded 
to  the  Company  of  Senegal,  and  July  2,  1681,  when  it 
was  replaced  by  a  reorganized  company.  Fran9ois,  to 
whom  all  payments  were  said  to  be  made,  was  also  a 
director  of  the  reorganized  company.^'  Now,  payments 
after  the  date  of  July  S,  1681,  would  certainly  represent 
bounties  paid  to  the  second  company.  Even  upon  M. 
Chemin-Dupontes's  supposition  that  the  sums  represent 
bounties  paid  on  slaves,  we  should  be  compelled  to  reduce 
the  number  of  slaves  imported  by  the  Company  of  Senegal 
during  the  two  years  of  its  existence  from  3810  to  2398. 
This  would  still  represent  a  respectable  activity  by  the 
company,  as  the  average  would  be  1199  slaves  a  year. 
Our  suspicion  is  aroused,  however,  by  the  fact  that  onl}'^ 
two  of  the  thirteen  sums  paid  are  divisible  by  thirteen. 
The  total  is  also  indivisible  by  that  number.  A  possible 
explanation  might  be  offered  by  saying  that  the  thirteen 
livres  ''par  tete*'  really  meant  thirteen  livres  ''par  piece 
d'lnde.''^^    This  would  immediately  introduce  an  element  in 

68  Chemin-Dupont^s,  p.  111. 

69  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran?.,  11315,  fol.  152,  letter  of  the  direct- 
ors to  Patoulet,  October  22,  1683.  Francois'  name  occurs  among  the 
seven  signatures  of  the  directors. 

70  This  suggestion  has  been  made  to  me  by  Prof.  P.  Cultru  of  the 
University  of  Paris.  The  practice  grew  up  of  making  contracts  for 
the  delivery  of  so  many  "pieces  d'Inde,"  which  served  as  a  standard 
by  which  to  measure  the  value  of  a  slave.  In  the  Spanish  trade  the 
"piece  d'Inde"  was  a  slave  seven  "quartas"  high  (about  182 
centimeters),  between  thirty  and  thirty-five  years  old  and  without  any 

297 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

the  reckoning  which  we  could  not  control  from  the  data 
given  in  the  document.  It  would  obviously,  however, 
increase  the  actual  number  of  slaves  sent  to  the  islands, 
which  would  mean  that  the  Company  of  Senegal  sent  more 
than  2398  slaves  to  the  islands  during  the  two  years  of  its 
existence.  It  is  not  necessary  to  search  farther  for  some 
key  to  unlock  the  mystery,  for  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  the  sums  do  not  represent  at  all  bona  fide  bounties 
paid  on  slaves  imported  into  the  islands.  Just  at  the 
close  of  the  document  is  to  be  found  a  most  interesting  note 
which  reads,  ^'Nota,  le  Sieur  Bellinzani  a  profite  de  la 
moitie  des  susdites  sommes,'*  and  this  is  corroborated  in 
another  document,  contained  in  the  same  carton,  which 
states  that  Bellinzani  himself  had  confessed  the  fact.^^ 

With  the  name  of  Bellinzani  enters  upon  the  scene  a 
person  of  more  than  passing  interest.  Taken  into  service 
by  Colbert  in  1654,  he  was  named  in  1669  to  the  important 
post  of  general  inspector  of  manufactures.  On  February 
19,  1670,  he  was  made  one  of  the  directors  of  the  West 

physical  defect.  "On  measurait  les  adultes  qui  n'avaient  point  cette 
hauteur,  les  enfants  et  I'on  obtenait  ainsi,  en  divisant  le  total  obtenu 
un  certain  nombre  de  pieces  d'Inde  dans  une  cargaison."  G.  Scelle,  La 
traite  n4gribre  aux  Indes  de  Castille,  Paris,  1906,  2  vols.,  I,  506.  In 
a  contract  made  at  Nantes  by  the  French  Assiento  Company  in  1702, 
for  the  delivery  of  4000  slaves,  the  following  definition  was  given: 

"La  piece  d'Inde  sera  homme  et  femme  depuis  quatorze  jusqu'a 
quarante  ans  au  plus,  ainsy  qu'il  paraistra  par  la  veue,  r6glee  par  gens 
indiflferens,  choisis  de  part  et  d'autre,  fiUes  et  gar9ons  seront  r^gl^s  k 
prorata  de  leur  grandeur  huit  pour  sept,  six  pour  cinq  et  enfin  quatre 
pour  trois.  On  ne  pourra  rebuter  ancun  n^gre  que  ceux  qui  passeront 
quarante  ans  qui  n'auront  qu'un  oeil  ou  qui  seront  rompus  a  leurs  parties 
ou  qui  seront  malades.  On  sera  oblig^  de  recevoir  ceux  a  qu'il  man- 
quera  un  ou  deux  doigts  h,  la  main  ou  au  pied,  ou  ceux  qui  seront 
maigres,  pourveu  qu'ils  se  portent  bien,  car  maigre  n'est  pas  un  d6- 
faut."    Chamb.  de  Commerce,  Nantes,  C,  739. 

71  Arch.  Nat.,  Gy,  1312,  Extrait  de  la  depence  du  compte  du  Sr.  de 
La  Live  des  150,000  livres  qu'il  a  receu  par  chacun  an  de  M.  Jean 
Oudiette,  fermier  du  Dom.  d'Occident,  etc. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

India  Company  at  Colbert's  recommendation/^  It  was  in 
this  way  that  he  became  actively  associated  with  West 
India  affairs.  He  became  personally  interested  in  the 
commerce  of  the  West  Indies.  In  1671  we  find  a  record  of 
a  cargo  of  slaves  being  sold  at  Guadeloupe  "for  the 
account  of  M.  Bellinzani."^^  He  wrote  to  de  Baas  in  1675 
instructing  him  to  permit  four  English  vessels  to  trade  in 
the  islands,  stating  that  permission  had  been  granted  by 
His  Majesty.^*  Yet  the  letter  which  Colbert  wrote  to  de 
Baas  on  receiving  the  news  that  these  vessels  had  traded 
in  the  islands  implies  that  no  such  permission  had  been 
granted.'^^  At  the  dissolution  of  the  W'est  India  Com- 
pany, Bellinzani  was  named  by  Colbert  as  one  of  the  three 
charged  with  the  liquidation  of  its  affairs .^^  A  very  long 
and  detailed  indictment  was  made  against  Bellinzani,  by 
no  less  a  personage  than  Jacques  Savary,  in  which  he  was 
accused  of  dishonesty  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties  in  the 
direction  and  liquidation  of  the  West  India  Company, 
specific  cases  being  given  where  he  had  embezzled  funds.^^ 
After  Colbert's  death  he  was  thrown  into  the  Bastille  on 
charges  of  embezzlement  and  died  there. 

It  is  very  possible  that  the  sums  entered  in  the  accounts 
of  the  Domaine  d'Occident  as  payments  to  the  Company 
of  Senegal  for  bounties  on  slaves  imported  into  the  islands 
represent,  in  part  at  least,  sums  embezzled  by  Bellinzani. 
In  that  case  they  give  no  clue  to  the  number  of  slaves 
imported  into  the  West  Indies.  Besides,  we  have  some 
very  positive  evidence  to  show  that  the  number  of  slaves, 

72  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  5. 

73  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  II,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  November  16,  1671. 

74  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 

75  Ibid.,  B,  6,  fols.  34-39,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  May  17,  1675. 

76  Moreau  de  Saint-M^ry,  I,  290,  arrH  of  December  4,  1674. 

77  Arch.  Nat.,  Gj,  1312.  The  exact  title  of  the  document  has  not 
been  recorded  in  my  notes,  but  it  is  easily  found  by  its  size,  being  the 
longest  document  in  the  carton. 

299 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

corresponding  to  the  bounties  represented  as  having  been 
paid,  is  much  too  large  for  the  number  actually  imported. 
Thus  de  Blenac,  the  governor-general  of  the  islands,  wrote 
on  July  13,  1680,  that  within  the  last  sixteen  months  no 
more  than  600  or  700  slaves  had  been  imported  into  all  the 
islands,  including  St.  Domingo.^^  The  "sixteen  months" 
covered  exactly  the  period  of  the  obligation  of  the  Com- 
pany of  Senegal  to  carry  slaves  to  the  islands.  The  com- 
pany was  probably  less  active  during  the  last  year  of  its 
existence,  which  followed  these  sixteen  months,  for  de 
Pouan9ay  stated  in  a  memoir  of  1681  that  the  company 
was  not  bringing  a  large  number  of  slaves  to  St.  Do- 
mingo,^^  and  Patoulet  wrote  that  an  adequate  supply  was 
not  being  sent  to  Martinique.^"  A  letter  was  written  to  the 
latter  in  May,  1681,  explaining  that  the  small  number  of 
slaves  being  sent  was  due  to  the  embarrassments  of  the 
company,  and  that  better  results  were  expected  from  the 
new  company  soon  to  be  organized.^^  So  that  on  the  basis 
of  de  Blenac's  statement  it  is  not  probable  that  a  large 
number  of  slaves  were  ever  imported  into  the  islands  by  the 
Company  of  Senegal. 

All  of  this  evidence  points  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
number  of  slaves  imported  into  the  West  Indies  by  the 
Company  of  Senegal  was  much  smaller  than  that  for 
which  bounties  were  purported  to  have  been  paid.  The 
inference  is  natural  that  some  fraudulent  measures  had 
been  resorted  to  in  order  to  collect  bounties  which  were  in 
reality  not  due.  The  point  is  of  some  importance  because 
the  conclusion  here  adopted  shows  that  the  success  which 

78  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  II,  de  Blenac  to  Colbert,  July  13,  1680: 
"Depuis  seize  mois  il  n'est  venu  dans  toutes  les  Isles  ny  k  St.  Dom- 
ingue  que  600  a  700  n^gres." 

79  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  C9,  I,  M6moire  par  de  Pouan^ay,  1681. 

80  Ibid.,  Cg,  II,  Patoulet  to  Colbert,  August  14,  1680. 

81  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran^ais,  11315,  fol.  133,  the  king  to 
Patoulet,  May  4,  1681. 

300 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

M.  Chemin-Dupontes  attributes  to  the  first  Company  of 
Senegal  is  fictitious.  It  means  further  that  the  efforts 
which  Colbert  made  to  supply  slaves  to  the  islands  by  the 
employment  of  a  commercial  company,  endowed  with  a 
monopoly,  were  not  highly  successful.  This  failure  im- 
posed upon  Colbert  anew  the  burden  of  providing  some 
means  to  supply  slaves  to  the  West  India  planters. 

A  tentative  company  offered  to  enter  into  a  contract, 
provided  it  be  entirely  exempt  from  the  liabilities  of  the 
former  company.  This  proviso  was  rejected  by  Colbert, 
who  insisted  that  all  the  debts,  contracted  by  the  old  com- 
pany since  the  arret  of  supersedeas  of  April  9,  1680,  and 
in  part  those  contracted  before  that  date,  be  paid  by  the 
new  company.^  This  retarded  affairs  for  some  months. 
But  Colbert  began  to  employ  the  same  means  which  he  had 
employed  in  the  organization  of  the  East  and  West  India 
Companies,  by  informing  certain  parties  that  to  partici- 
pate in  the  enterprise  "would  be  a  thing  very  agreeable 
to  His  Majesty,"  and  promised  "to  unite  the  Domaine 
d^Occident  to  the  new  company."^  The  result  was  that  a 
company  was  formed  composed  for  the  most  part  of  offi- 
cials of  various  ranks,^  "who  entered  it  only  for  the  sake 

82  Arch.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  Memoir  marked  "La  Compagnie  du  S6n6gal,'* 
and  endorsed  "Envoye  k  M.  Morel,  le  20  aoust  1685." 

83  Ibid. 

84  Arch.  Col.,  Cq,  I,  Contrat  de  vente  du  privilege,  habitations,  effets 
de  la  Cie.  du  S6n6gal  et  cote  de  Guin6e,  July  2,  1681.  The  original 
members  are  given  as  follows: 

"Claude  d'Appougny,  conseiller,  S6c.  du  Roy,  Maison  de  couronne 
de  France  et  de  ses  finances  et  Guillaume  de  Kessel,  .  .  .  Conseiller 
du  Roy,  maitre  ordinaire  en  sa  chambre  des  comptes. 

"Guillaume  M6nager,  conseiller  du  Roy,  directeur  general  du  Dom. 
Roy.  d'Occid. 

"Ren6  de  Larr6  .  .  .  Conseiller,  s6cretaire  du  Roy,  receveur  g6n6- 
ral  de  finances  k  Caen. 

"Paul  Acer6,  6cuyer,  Sieur  des  Forges.  .   .   . 

"Jean  Massoit,  le  jeune,  Marchand  k  la  Rochelle  demeurant  k 
present  a  Paris. 

801 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

of  pleasing  the  king  and  Monseigneur  Colbert."^  The 
name  of  only  one  merchant  appeared  in  the  list  of  stock- 
holders. The  point  is  worthy  of  notice,  because  it  shows 
that  the  merchant  class  had  not  been  attracted  by  the 
enterprise  and  that  Colbert  was  forced  to  browbeat  enough 
officials  in  order  to  form  a  company  to  which  he  wished 
to  commit  the  performance  of  an  important  task  in  his 
plan  of  building  up  the  commerce  of  the  West  Indies. 

By  a  contract  of  July  2,  1681,  the  new  company  agreed 
to  assume  1,010,015  livres  of  the  debts  of  the  old  com- 
pany and  in  return  it  received  all  the  latter's  effects  and 
privileges.^  Letters-patent  were  issued  in  the  form  of  an 
edict  in  this  same  month  of  July,  1681.^^  A  complete 
monopoly  of  trade  was  accorded  on  the  same  terms  as  to 
the  former  company. 

A  capital  of  only  600,000  livres  was  subscribed  by  the 
new  stockholders,  because  it  was  hoped  that  this  sum, 
together  with  the  cargoes  of  returning  vessels,  which  were 
upon  the  sea,  would  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  pressing  obliga- 
tions and  to  meet  the  expenses  of  carrying  on  trade.^ 

The  directors  chose  J.  Massoit,  the  younger,  a  stock- 
holder, to  manage  the  company's  affairs  at  La  Rochelle; 
a  new  director,  Dancourt,  was  sent  to  Goree;^^  du  Casse 

"Jean  Faure,  6cuyer,  Prieur  de  Valfrey  et  de  Notre  Dame,  depuis 
Serviant. 

"Jean  du  Casse. 
"Claude  Cdberet." 

85  Ibid.,  Estat  des  affaires  de  la  Cie.  du  S6n6gal  et  costes  d'Af rique 
en  Oct.,  1687.  "La  plupart  de  ceux  qui  la  composent  n'y  6tant  entrez 
que  pour  plaire  au  Roy  et  k  feu  Monseigneur,  votre  pfere."  The  mem- 
oir was  addressed  to  Seignelay,  the  son  and  successor  of  Colbert. 

86  Arch.  Col.,  Ce,  I. 

87  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  356-359. 

88  Arch.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  "La  Cie.  du  S6n6gal,"  1685. 

89  An  account  of  Dancourt's  voyage  is  to  be  found  in  Les  Voyages 
du  8r.  le  Maire  aux  iles  canaries,  Cap  Verd,  Senegal  et  Gambia, 
Paris,  1695.  Bib.  Nat.,  G,  33098.  No  record  has  been  found  of  an 
agent  having  been  sent  to  the  coast  of  Guinea. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

was  placed  in  charge  of  affairs  at  Martinique,  du  Clerc  at 
Guadeloupe  and  Pinel  at  St.  Christopher.^*^  A  special 
appeal  was  made  to  the  intendant  Patoulet  to  take  meas- 
ures to  improve  the  quality  of  sugar,  complaint  being 
made  that  sugar  lately  arrived  from  Martinique  was 
saturated  with  syrup  and  sold  for  three  livres  per  hun- 
dredweight less  than  the  sugar  from  the  other  islands.^^ 
The  company  promised  to  furnish  an  abundance  of  slaves, 
if  he  would  do  so. 

No  material  has  been  found  which  enables  us  to  trace 
the  company's  activity  during  the  first  years  of  its  exist- 
ence, but  the  company  appealed  to  the  king  in  1683  to 
protect  it  against  a  contraband  trade  in  slaves  being 
carried  on  in  the  islands,  and  an  ordinance  was  issued  on 
September  23,  1683,  which  read  in  part  as  follows: 

"His  Majesty  being  informed  of  the  damage  which  the 
Company  of  Senegal  is  suffering  from  the  fact  that  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  islands  of  America  and  St.  Domingo  trade  with 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Main  and  with  the  Caribs  for  slaves, 
captured  from  the  English  and  Dutch,  and  wishing  to  main- 
tain the  company  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  privileges  which  he 
has  granted  to  it  alone  of  importing  slaves  into  the  islands,  has 
forbidden  and  forbids  by  these  presents  all  of  his  subjects  to 
buy  negroes  from  the  said  natives  or  to  import  them  into  the 
French  islands  of  America  and  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo,  under 
penalty  of  confiscation  of  negroes  and  of  vessels  and  of  a  fine 
of  1000  livres."^ 

It  is  very  probable  that  this  ordinance  attempted  to  stop 
the  contraband  trade  in  slaves  of  which  the  directors  had 
complained  to  Patoulet  in  the  previous  year.^^ 

90  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran9ais,  11315,  fol.  152-153,  the  directors 
to  Patoulet,  October  22,  1682. 

91  Ibid. 

92  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  386. 

93  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran^ais,  11315,  fol.  152. 

303 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

In  a  memoir  dated  August  14,  1684,  it  was  asserted 
that  the  company  had  at  that  time  nine  vessels  en  voyage 
and  four  others  which  would  be  ready  to  sail  some  time 
before  the  month  of  October.  Of  these  thirteen  vessels, 
four  were  to  carry  negroes  to  the  West  Indies,  three  to 
bring  cargoes  from  Senegal  to  France,  and  six  to  fetch 
cargoes  of  sugar  from  the  islands.  Besides  these  vessels, 
one  had  already  carried  a  cargo  of  290  slaves  to  St. 
Domingo  and  still  another  would  carry  100  negroes  to 
Cayenne.  "If  all  of  these  vessels,"  added  the  memoir, 
"arrive  happily  at  their  destination,  a  sufficient  number  of 
slaves  will  be  furnished  to  the  planters."^ 

It  seems  reasonably  certain,  however,  that  the  company 
did  not  import  2000  slaves  annually  to  the  islands,  as  it 
had  contracted  to  do,  for  a  memoir  was  written  in  1684  to 
explain  why  it  had  not  done  so.  The  memoir  is  anonymous 
and  undated,  but  it  was  very  probably  written  by  d'Ap- 
pougny  or  one  of  the  other  directors,  and  it  is  easy  to 
fix  the  date  of  1684  from  internal  evidence. 

"Two  reproaches  are  made  against  the  company,"  it  said, 
"one  that  it  is  weak  and  cannot  develop  its  trade  as  it  should, 
the  other  that  it  does  not  furnish  to  the  islands  of  America  the 
number  of  slaves  necessary  to  satisfy  the  terms  of  its  con- 
tract. ...  In  regard  to  the  latter  it  seems  that  the  reproach 
against  the  company  is  well  founded,  because  the  new  company 
in  succeeding  the  old  assumed  the  obligation  of  importing 
2000  negroes  annually.  The  following  considerations  should  be 
taken  into  account:  (1)  The  promise  was  originally  made  on 
the  supposition  that  this  number  of  slaves  could  be  sold  in 
the  islands  and  that  a  failure  to  carry  out  the  promise  imposed 
no  penalty;  (2)  it  is  very  easy  to  show  that  the  present  com- 
pany has  imported  into  the  islands  many  more  negroes  during 
the  past  three  years  than  was  done  during  the  six  preceding; 

9*  Arch.  Col.,  Cq,  I,  M6moire  de  la  Cie.  du  S6n6gal,  August  14, 
1684. 

304 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

(3)  it  is  a  fact  well  known  by  all  those  who  are  well  acquainted 
with  the  affairs  of  the  islands  that  not  more  than  1200  negroes 
should  be  imported^  if  prompt  payment  is  desired,  for  if  this 
number  be  surpassed,  a  risk  of  a  total  loss  or  of  not  being  paid 
for  a  long  time  must  be  taken.  ...  [In  support  of  this,  the 
intendant,  Patoulet,  was  quoted  to  the  effect  that  if  2000  slaves 
were  imported  into  the  islands,  more  than  one-half  and  almost 
two-thirds  of  the  sugar  produced  would  be  required  to  pay 
for  them]  ;  (4<)  the  company  has  found  by  actual  experience 
that  the  reasoning  of  M.  Patoulet  is  sound,  not  only  as  to 
importing  2000  slaves,  but  also  a  smaller  number,  for,  having 
imported  about  1200  slaves  annually,  it  finds  that  the  sums 
due  it  have  accumulated  so  rapidly  that  at  the  commencement  of 
the  present  year,  1684,  they  amounted  to  6,000,000  pounds  of 
sugar,  and  that  the  year  preceding  even  three  of  its  vessels 
were  unable  to  obtain  enough  sugar  for  cargoes,  one  being 
forced  to  return  empty.  "^ 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  in  neither  of  these  memoirs  is  the 
claim  even  made  that  the  company  had  ever  tried  to 
import  2000  slaves  a  year  into  the  colonies,  that,  in  fact,  it 
is  distinctly  stated  that  only  about  1200  had  been  sent 
there  annually.  One  is  therefore  somewhat  surprised  to  find 
the  assertion  made  by  Labat  that  "the  company  had  not 
failed  to  meet  its  obligations,  for  it  had  sent  to  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  4561  negroes  in  less  than  two  years  and  a 
half." 

Labat  states  that  the  directors  of  the  company  made 
this  assertion  in  a  protest  against  the  arret  of  September 
14,  1684,  which  took  away  from  them  a  large  part  of  their 
grant  to  confer  it  upon  the  new  company  of  Guinea  about 
to  be  organized.^  No  record  has  been  found  among  the 
papers  of  the  company  of  Senegal  of  any  such  assertion. 

95  Arch.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  M6moire  de  la  Compagnie  du  S6n6gal  et  coste 
d'Afrique  sur  le  droit  qu'elle  a  de  faire  seule  le  commerce,  etc. 

96  Labat  (Le  P^re  J.  B.),  Nouvelle  Relation  de  I'Afrique  occident- 
ale,  edition  of  1722,  I,  27-28. 

305 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

A  recent  writer^  has  shown  that  Labat  was  not  only  guilty 
of  plagiarism  in  writing  the  Nouvelle  Relation,  but  also  of 
careless  handling  of  his  material.  It  is  possible,  and  even 
probable,  that  we  have  here  but  another  case  of  inaccuracy 
on  Labat's  part.  The  fact  that  we  have  two  memoirs,  both 
of  1684,  in  agreement  as  to  the  company's  activity,  is 
rather  conclusive  against  the  accuracy  of  Labat's  state- 
ment. 

The  company  had  certainly  made  progress  over  its 
predecessor  by  importing  a  larger  number  of  slaves  into 
the  islands,  but  it  had  not  kept  pace  with  the  needs  of 
the  planters.  Patoulet  stated  in  August,  1680,  that  Mar- 
tinique alone  had  need  of  1000  slaves  per  year  for  the  next 
two  years,  and  1200  or  1300  for  the  third  year.  Now, 
Martinique  was  the  most  productive  colony  of  all  at  the 
time  and  doubtless  needed  the  greatest  number  of  slaves, 
but  both  Guadeloupe  and  St.  Christopher  were  well  culti- 
vated and  must  have  needed  many.  The  demand  for  slaves 
at  St.  Domingo  was  increasing.  The  amounts  owed  the 
first  Company  of  Senegal  by  the  planters  of  the  several 
islands  on  June  30,  1681,  gives  a  clue,  perhaps,  to  the 
distribution  of  its  trade  and  consequently  some  idea  of  the 
relative  numbers  of  slaves  which  they  demanded.  The 
statement  of  debts  owed  the  company  at  that  time  shows 
67,018  hv.  Is.  owed  by  planters  of  Martinique,  47,466  liv. 
8s.  by  those  of  St.  Christopher,  30,214  liv.  17s.  6d  by 
those  of  Guadeloupe  and  30,065  liv.  12s.  by  those  of  St. 
Domingo.^  By  making  use  of  these  figures  to  establish 
a  proportion,  it  would  not,  perhaps,  be  far  wrong  to  say 
that  if  Martinique  needed  1000  to  1200  slaves  annually, 
the  others  combined  needed  at  least  1500  to  1800,  making 
a  total  of  2500  to  3000  slaves  for  them  all. 

^  P.  Cultru,  Histoire  du  SSnSgal  du  XFe  Sihcle  h  1870. 
98  Arch.  Col.,  Ce,  I,  Estat  g^n.  des  effets  de  la  Cie.  du  Sen6gal, 
June  30,  1681. 

806 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

From  these  estimates  it  seems  very  probable  that  the 
second  Company  of  Senegal  was  importing  only  about 
enough  slaves  to  satisfy  the  demand  of  Martinique  alone 
and  hence  was  not  satisfying  the  total  demand  in  the 
islands.  A  letter  written  by  Patoulet  from  Dunkerque  on 
October  18,  1684,  seems  to  point  clearly  to  this  same 
conclusion.  "I  have  urged,"  he  wrote,  "some  merchants 
of  Dunkerque  and  of  Lille  to  undertake  to  import  from 
Guinea  into  the  islands  1000  slaves  annually  on  terms  much 
more  advantageous  to  the  king  than  those  which  are  being 
proposed  at  Paris."  Patoulet  added  that  full  liberty  to 
all  Frenchmen  to  import  slaves  would  be  beneficial  to  the 
islands.^  No  such  suggestions  would  have  been  made,  if 
the  Company  of  Senegal  had  been  furnishing  an  adequate 
supply  of  slaves.  A  still  stronger  piece  of  evidence  is  to 
be  found  in  the  arret  of  September  12,  1684,  which  revoked 
the  monopoly  of  trade  for  that  part  of  the  company's  con- 
cessions lying  between  the  Gambia  and  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope.  The  act  is  explicit  in  giving  the  reason  for  such  a 
step: 

"Whereas  His  Majesty  has  been  informed  that  the  company 
has  not  only  not  satisfied  the  contract  of  importing  2000 
slaves  annually  into  the  islands^  but  has  imported  even  so  few 
that  most  of  the  planters  are  planning  to  abandon  the  Wind- 
ward Islands  for  the  coast  of  St.  Domingo  and  other  places, 
a  thing  which  would  destroy  both  the  colonies  and  the  trade 
thereof;  besides  that  as  the  concession  made  to  the  company 
in  the  letters-patent  of  June,  1679^  which  gave  it  the  monop- 
oly of  trade  for  the  whole  coast  of  Africa  from  Cape  Verde 
to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  is  too  vast,  it  has  not  been  able  to 
equip  enough  vessels  or  furnish  enough  funds  to  carry  on  the 
trade  of  both  Senegal  and  the  coast  of  Guinea  .  .  .  the  king, 
being  in  his  council,  has  revoked  and  revokes  by  these  presents 

99  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B3,  45,  fol.  115,  Patoulet  to  Ambleteuze,  Octo- 
ber 18,  1684. 

807 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

the  privilege  accorded  to  the  Company  of  Senegal  by  the 
contract  of  March  21,  1679."^"" 

The  monopoly  of  the  company  was  henceforth  limited  to 
trade  on  the  coast  from  Cape  Verde  to  Gambia,  trade  on 
the  coast  between  the  Gambia  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
being  left  open  to  all  Frenchmen.  The  period  of  leaving 
this  latter  trade  open  to  all  was  of  short  duration,  for 
letters-patent  were  issued  in  the  month  of  January  (1685) 
to  the  Company  of  Guinea,  which  granted  it  a  monopoly 
of  trade  on  the  coast  from  Sierra  Leone  to  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  and  conjointly  with  the  Company  of  Senegal, 
a  monopoly  of  slave  trade  in  the  French  West  Indies.^"^ 

Thus  the  history  of  the  slave  trade  during  the  ministry 
of  Colbert  falls  into  three  distinct  periods:  (1)  1661-1668, 
during  which  slaves  were  supplied  to  the  planters  by  the 
Dutch;  (2)  1669-1675,  during  which  Colbert  attempted 
to  direct  the  energy  of  the  West  India  Company  to  the 
trade  and  to  stimulate  both  the  company  and  private 
traders,  by  removing  export  duties  on  all  aLticles  used  in 
the  trade,  and  by  providing  a  liberal  bounty  of  thirteen 
livres  per  head  on  all  slaves  imported  into  the  islands ;  and 
(3)  1675-1685,  during  which  the  slave  trade  was  placed 
under  a  monopoly,  granted  successively  to  Oudiette 
(1675),  first  Company  of  Senegal  (1679),  the  second 
Company  of  Senegal  (1681),  and  finally  conjointly  to  the 
last  named  company  and  the  Company  of  Guinea  (1685). 

In  no  one  of  these  periods  had  French  enterprise  shown 
itself  equal  to  the  task  of  satisfying  the  needs  of  the 
planters.  The  development  of  the  islands  was  probably 
somewhat  retarded  as  a  consequence,  but  the  policy  pur- 
sued by  Colbert  had  brought  a  distinct  increase  to  French 
commerce.    Many  new  trading  posts  had  been  founded  on 

100  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  400-401. 

101  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  409-414.  An  account  of  the  formation 
and  history  of  this  company  will  be  found  in  a  later  volume. 

308 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  coast  of  Africa,  trade  relations  had  been  definitely 
established  and  the  ways  of  the  slave  trade  known.  The 
basis  had  been  laid  for  the  building  up  of  a  prosperous 
trade. 


309 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Colonial  Imports — Food- Stuffs 

ONE  of  the  most  pressing  problems  in  the  maintenance 
of  prosperous  colonies  in  the  West  Indies  was  to 
furnish  an  adequate  supply  of  food-stufFs  for  both  master 
and  slave.  This  became  more  and  more  true  as  the  large 
sugar  plantations  supplanted  the  small  tobacco  farms  and 
as  the  larger  planter  with  many  slaves  replaced  the  small 
farmer  with  his  small  number  of  indentured  servants. 

In  their  early  history  the  planters  of  the  French  West 
Indies  produced  a  large  share  of  their  own  food  supply. 
Maurile  de  St.  Michel,  in  describing  the  life  of  the  colonies 
in  1646,  remarked: 

"Here,  instead  of  bread  made  from  wheat,  we  eat  bread 
made  from  the  cassava  plant  which  is  very  common  and 
abundant.  Instead  of  beef  we  eat  lamantin,  which  is  a  sort 
of  sea  cow  caught  along  the  shore.  Instead  of  chicken,  we  eat 
lizards,  from  which  a  very  good  soup  is  made  and  the  meat  of 
which  is  very  delicate.  I  have  often  eaten  them.  .  .  .  One 
of  the  principal  articles  of  food  is  peas  which  grow  here  in 
abundance.  I  have  seen  many  kinds,  Roman  peas,  haricots 
brought  from  Virginia  by  the  English,  peas  from  Angola  in 
Africa,  which  resemble  our  lentils.  I  have  also  seen  large 
beans.  The  ordinary  dinner  of  the  average  man  consists  of 
pea  soup,  cassava  bread  seasoned  with  red  pepper,  lemon  juice 
and  a  small  piece  of  bacon."^ 

With  the  exception  of  bacon,  all  the  articles  of  this  menu 
were  produced  in  the  islands  and  the  planter  was  almost 
independent  of  foreign  food  supplies. 

As  trade  increased,  however,  the  planter  found  it 
much  more  advantageous  to  expend  the  labour  of  his  slaves 

1  Maurile  de  St.  Michel,  op.  cit.,  31,  64. 

310 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

upon  the  production  of  sugar  and  tobacco  and  to  barter 
these  commodities  to  traders  for  food  supplies.  Pelleprat 
remarked  in  1655  that  "the  grapevine  was  exceedingly 
productive  in  the  islands,  bearing  fruit  almost  uninter- 
ruptedly," and  that,  if  cultivated,  three  harvests  could  be 
gathered  yearly  and  excellent  wine  made.  "But,"  he 
added,  "the  planters  of  America  find  more  profit  in  the 
production  of  tobacco  and  of  sugar  than  in  that  of  grapes. 
It  is  true  that  the  traders  of  Europe  supply  them,  so  that 
there  is  an  abundance  of  wine  and  flour  in  the  islands."^ 
Du  Tertre  stated  that  observing  days  of  abstinence  was 
exceedingly  difficult  in  the  islands  and  was  not  practiced 
by  many  families.  "This  is  not  because  the  seas  are  not 
full  of  fish,  but  because  every  one  is  so  occupied  with  his 
plantation  that  it  is  only  the  well-to-do  who  have  a  savage 
or  a  negro  to  send  a-fishing."^ 

It  was  then  not  so  much  a  question  of  what  the  planters 
might  and  could  produce  to  supply  themselves  with  food, 
as  of  what  they  found  it  to  their  interest  to  do.  The  law 
of  larger  returns  for  amount  of  labour  expended  guided 
very  naturally  the  course  of  production  on  the  plantations. 

The  ordinary  bread,  both  for  master  and  slave,  was 
made  from  the  cassava  plant,  which  flourished  in  the 
islands.  The  root  of  the  plant  was  pressed  so  as  to  remove 
the  poisonous  juice  and  then  made  into  a  small  loaf  and 
cooked.*  Only  the  richest  planters  ate  bread  made  from 
flour  imported  from  Holland  and  France  and  some  of  them 
preferred  cassava  bread.^  The  demand  for  European 
flour  was  great  only  when  the  crop  of  cassava  was  ruined 
by   storms   or   drouth,   as   in   1670.^      It    seems   to   have 

2  Pelleprat,  op.  cit.,  5-8. 

3  Du  Tertre,  II,  458-459. 

4  Pelleprat,  p.  5. 
5Du  Tertre,  II,  457. 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  March  29,  1670,  and 
ibid.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  March  22,  1670. 

311 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

increased  somewhat  during  the  second  half  of  Colbert's 
ministry,  due  no  doubt  to  the  increasing  number  of  rich 
planters/  But  no  evidence  has  been  found  to  show  that 
the  importation  of  wheat  flour  ever  became  permanently 
important  or  was  made  the  subject  of  legislation  by  Col- 
bert. With  the  exception  of  salt  beef  and  bacon,  this  is 
true  also  of  all  other  articles  of  food  which  were  exported 
to  the  islands  in  only  very  small  quantities.^ 

But  the  importation  of  salt  beef  became  a  matter  of 
immense  importance.  De  Baas  stated  that  salt  beef  was 
more  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the  islands  than  any  other 
commodity  "because  it  is  the  meat  fed  to  the  slaves  and  the 
consumption  of  which  is  so  great  that  30,000  barrels 
(6,000,000  pounds)  are  not  sufficient."^  The  same  governor 
stated  in  1672  during  a  period  of  scarcity  of  salt  beef  that 
the  slaves  would  starve,  unless  some  measures  were  taken 
to  guarantee  a  supply.^"  Du  Tertre  tells  us  that  it  was  the 
custom  for  the  planter  to  obtain  from  the  ships  which  came 
to  trade  in  the  islands  a  supply  of  salt  beef,  of  which  he 
retained  a  part  for  his  own  table  and  the  remainder  he 
distributed  to  his  slaves  at  the  rate  of  about  one-half 
pound  a  day  for  each,^^  whereas  de  Baas  stated  that  it  was 
the  custom  to  feed  the  slaves  on  "three  kinds  of  roots, 
potatoes,  yams  and  cassava,"  to  which  was  added  two 
pounds  of  salt  beef  per  week  for  each  working  slave.^^ 
Only  the  rich  had  fresh  meat  for  their  own  table.^^  Salt 
beef  was  thus  the  common  meat  food  of  slave  and  master. 

7  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  June  26,  1675. 

8  The  cargoes  sent  out  from  Nantes  in  1673  and  1675  contained 
only  small  quantities  of  flour,  biscuits,  prunes,  olive  oil,  stockfish 
and  codfish.  Arch.  D6pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  B,  1,  4,  "Declarations  de  Sorties," 
passim. 

9  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  28,  1672. 

10  Ibid.,  November  20,  1672. 

11  Du  Tertre,  II,  457. 

12  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  November  20,  1672. 

13  Ibid. 

312 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  demand  for  it  increased  in  proportion  as  the  number 
of  planters  and  slaves  grew.  It  was,  therefore,  impera- 
tive to  provide  an  adequate  supply. 

Previous  to  the  ministry  of  Colbert  and  during  its  open- 
ing years,  this  supply  had  always  been  obtained  in  Ire- 
land and  imported  by  Dutch  and  French  traders.  These 
traders  not  only  went  to  the  Irish  coast  for  cargoes  of 
beef,  butter  and  horses,  but  bought  "under  the  name  of 
Irishmen,  a  certain  number  of  acres  to  serve  as  a  pasture 
for  cattle,  some  of  which  they  killed,  salted  and  carried 
to  the  West  Indies."^* 

After  the  Dutch  had  been  excluded  from  the  trade  of 
the  islands,  Nantes  and  La  Rochelle,  especially  the  former, 
became  the  principal  entrepots  for  Irish  beef.  Paul  Par- 
fouru,  late  archivist  of  the  archives  of  He  and  Vilaine,  has 
called  attention  in  a  very  interesting  article^^  to  the  large 
number  of  Irish  at  Nantes  and  to  the  close  relations  be- 
tween Ireland  and  that  port  during  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. Unfortunately  his  article  has  very  little  to  say 
about  commercial  relations.  We  have  enough  evidence, 
however,  to  state  that  commercial  relations  between  Ire- 
land and  Brittany  became  important  even  during  the 
ministry  of  Colbert.^^  Trade  with  Ireland,  besides  furnish- 
ing a  valuable  article  of  export  for  the  West  Indies,  proved 
very  profitable.  A  memoir  written  by  some  merchants  at 
Nantes  stated  that  the  trade  yielded  a  profit  of  forty-three 
per  cent.^^ 

14  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  M6moire  contenant  les  avis  et 
sentiment  de  difp.  capit.,  etc.,  1661. 

^^  Annales  de  Bretagne,  IX,  524-533,  Les  Irlandais  en  Bretagne 
aux  XVIIe  et  XVIIIe  Si^cles. 

16  The  cargoes  of  vessels  sailing  to  the  islands  contained  large  quan- 
tities of  Irish  salt  beef.  Thus  La  Marie,  a  vessel  of  thirty-five  tons, 
sailing  from  Nantes  on  May  7,  1673,  carried  fifty-seven  barrels  of 
Irish  beef  in  her  cargo  and  the  8te.  Anne,  ninety  tons,  sailing  on  July 
3,  took  323  barrels.     Arch.  D^pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  B,  1,  "Decl.  de  Sorties." 

17  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  B7,  496,  fols.  118-119,  M6moire  des  march,  de 

313 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

But  it  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  mercantiHst  idea 
to  permit  the  importation  of  such  an  important  commodity 
from  foreign  markets.  The  ideal  solution  would  have 
been  to  obtain  a  food  supply  for  the  West  Indies  from  a 
temperate  zone  colony  within  the  empire.     The  compara- 


Nantes  sur  le  commerce  d'Irlande,  1690.  Included  in  the  memoir  is 
an  estimate  of  the  profit  to  be  gained  on  the  cargo  of  a  vessel  of  100 
tons.    The  outgoing  cargo  was  to  be  composed  as  follows: 

67  tons  of  salt 540  livres. 


860  livres. 

400  livres. 
1,300  livres. 
1,900  livres. 


10  tons  of  wine  of  Anjou 
10  tons  of  wine  of  Nantes 
10  tons  of  brandy  of  Nantes     . 
3  tons  of  cloth,  paper,  hats,  etc. 

100  5,001  livres. 

Insurance  on  cargo  at  sixteen  per  cent     .         .  800  livres. 

Interest  on  capital  eight  months  at  four  per  cent  200  livres. 


The  cargo  would  sell  in  Ireland 

for 

Deduct  for  cost  of  freight 
Deduct  for  commission 


6,000  livres. 

16,500  livres. 
4,000  livres. 
800  livres.      4,800  Uvres. 


With  this  sum  could  be  bought  for  return  cargo: 
30  tons  of  salt  beef  in  240  barrels  at  9  livres  per 

barrel,  F.  O.  B 

3  tons  of  tallow       ...... 

5  tons  of  butter  at  15  livres  the  hundredweight 

2  tons  of  beef  hides 

35  tons  of  wool  ...... 

Conmiission  and  other  expenses 


11,700  livres. 


2,160  livres. 

936  livres. 

1,500  livres. 

480  livres. 

6,000  livres. 

624  livres. 


11,700  livres. 
15,400  livres. 


This  cargo  would  yield  at  Nantes  . 
Deduct: 

Capital 6,000  livres. 

Freight  from  Ireland  .         .  4,000  livres. 

Insurance  on  cargo    .         .         .  1,872  livres. 
Expense  of  unloading         .         .  928  livres.     12,800  livres 


Which  represents  profit  of  forty-three  per  cent 

314 


2,600  livres. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

tively  early  and  rapid  development  of  the  New  England 
and  middle  colonies  made  possible  such  a  happy  solution 
for  the  British  West  Indies.  Colbert  attempted  to  find  in 
French  Canada  the  equivalent  of  the  British  continental 
colonies  for  the  French  West  Indies.  As  early  as  Septem- 
ber 27,  1664,  he  wrote  to  de  Tracy  who  was  at  Guade- 
loupe : 

"Order  being  established  in  the  islands,  as  it  is  now,  it  will 
prove  a  great  advantage,  if,  in  the  course  of  a  year  as  you 
hope,  trade  can  be  established  between  them  and  Canada  by 
sending  to  the  islands  fifteen  or  sixteen  vessels  with  cargoes 
of  staves,  hoops  and  headings  for  hogsheads  which  will  find 
a  ready  market  there  and  by  sending,  after  the  land  has  been 
cleared,  cargoes  of  wheat  flour,  dry-salted  eels,  codfish  and 
other  fish."!^ 

The  establishment  of  trade  between  Canada  and  the 
West  Indies  seems  to  have  been  one  of  the  cherished  plans 
of  Talon,  who  became  intendant  of  Canada  in  1665.  In 
a  letter  of  October  27,  1667,  he  informed  Colbert  that  he 
had  associated  himself  with  a  merchant  in  a  plan  to  send 
a  ship  belonging  to  the  West  India  Company  with  a  cargo 
of  salted  fish,  peas,  lumber  and  other  articles  to  the 
French  West  Indies  "in  order  to  make  an  experiment  and 
open  the  road  to  a  trade  which  the  inhabitants  of  Canada 
have  as  yet  not  attempted. "^^  In  a  memoir  of  November 
10,  1670,  he  stated  that  Canada  was  producing  a  surplus 
of  wheat,  vegetables  and  fish,  and  that  he  had  "laden  this 
surplus  on  three  vessels,  constructed  in  Canada,  to  be 
carried  to  the  West  Indies,  with  the  hope  that  this  north- 
ern part  of  America  will  be  able  to  furnish  great  aid  to  the 
southern  part." 

18  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  Colbert  to  de  Tracy,  September 
27,  1664. 

19  Thomas  Chapais,  Jean  Talon,  Intendant  de  la  Nouvelle  France, 
p.  283. 

315 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

"I  hope,"  he  said,  "that  the  trade  which  I  am  opening  up 
will  prove  of  mutual  benefit  to  the  inhabitants  of  Canada  and 
to  the  planters  of  the  islands.  My  plan  is  for  vessels  to  take 
a  cargo  [of  food-stufFs]  hence  to  the  islands,  thence  a  cargo 
of  sugar  to  France  and  then  to  bring  back  here  a  cargo  of 
merchandise  suited  to  our  needs.  The  realization  of  this  plan 
will  prove  very  advantageous  to  His  Majesty's  empire,  for, 
in  case  of  war,  the  Antilles  can  be  supplied  from  Canada  with 
food-stuffs  and  manufactures  and  they  will  thus  not  be  made 
to  suffer  from  having  their  supply  cut  off  from  Europe.  In- 
asmuch as  this  consideration  appears  to  me  to  be  of  some 
importance,  my  own  feeling  is  that  in  order  to  encourage  the 
inhabitants  of  Canada  to  construct  vessels  and  employ  them 
in  this  trade,  it  would  be  wise  for  His  Majesty  to  offer  a 
larger  bounty  than  that  which  he  offers  to  his  other  subjects 
for  buying  or  constructing  vessels,  and  in  addition  to  reduce  in 
their  favour  import  duties  on  sugar  which  they  bring  from  the 
islands."20 

Colbert  replied  to  this  letter  by  saying  that  the  king 
was  delighted  to  learn  that  Canada  was  not  only  in  con- 
dition to  support  herself,  but  even  to  send  food  supplies 
to  the  French  West  Indies. 

"Inasmuch  as  His  Majesty  has  furnished  such  large  sums 
of  recent  years  with  a  view  of  building  up  commerce  between 
these  two  parts  of  his  empire,  there  is  nothing  to  which  you 
should  pay  greater  attention  than  to  strengthen  and  to  encour- 
age the  efforts  which  have  been  made  this  year  in  Canada  to 
establish  trade  with  the  islands  and  to  persuade  the  inhabitants 
to  construct  or  buy  vessels  for  the  establishment  of  this  trade. 
It  is  certain  that  there  is  no  better  means  to  make  them  pros- 
perous and  increase  their  numbers.  I  have  not  failed  to  render 
an  account  to  His  Majesty  of  the  three  vessels  constructed  in 
Canada  and  sent  last  year  with  cargoes  to  the  West  Indies. 

20  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cji  (Canada),  III,  fol.  94,  Memoire  sur  le 
Canada  joint  a  la  lettre  de  M.  Talon,  November  10,  1670. 

316 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

The  commencement  of  this  commerce  has  proved  very  agree- 
able to  His  Majesty."^^ 

As  to  Talon's  demand  that  a  special  bounty  be  granted 
for  the  construction  of  vessels  in  Canada,  Colbert  re- 
plied :  "I  am  very  glad  that  the  inhabitants  of  Canada  are 
beginning  to  apply  themselves  to  shipbuilding.  Although 
those  which  you  note  are  rather  small  .  .  .  yet  you  may 
grant  the  bounty  provided  for  in  the  arret,  of  which  I 
am  inclosing  you  a  copy."^  As  to  the  reduction  on  sugar 
imported  into  France  from  the  West  Indies  by  Canadian 
vessels,  Colbert  extended  to  them  the  benefits  of  the  reduc- 
tion, made  by  the  arret  of  December  10,  1670,  on  colonial 
sugar,  from  four  livres  to  forty  sous  the  hundredweight.^ 
Instructions  were  given  to  de  Baas  in  1668  to  do  every- 
thing to  encourage  trade  with  Canada.^  Likewise,  Pelis- 
sier  was  instructed  to  study  the  problem  of  establishing 
this  trade.  The  latter  submitted  a  memoir  to  Colbert, 
under  date  of  December  10,  1670,  suggesting  that  ships 
should  plan  to  sail  from  Quebec  by  November  1,  or  No- 
vember 11  at  the  latest,  for  the  islands  and  pass  thence 
to  Bordeaux,  La  Rochelle,  Nantes  or  to  one  of  the  chan- 
nel ports,  where  a  return  cargo  would  be  taken  to  Can- 
ada.^   Blenac,  governor-general  of  the  islands,  and  Begon, 

21  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  22,  Colbert  to  Talon,  1671  (exact  date 
not  given — Clement,  III,  2,  p.  511,  gives  date  of  February  11). 

22 1  have  not  been  able  to  determine  whether  or  not  Colbert  pro- 
vided a  special  bounty  by  an  arr^t  of  which  I  have  found  no  record. 
It  is  more  than  probable,  however,  that  the  bounties  here  accorded 
were  none  other  than  those  granted  to  ship  builders  in  France,  for  in 
the  margin  of  the  memoir  in  which  Talon  demanded  the  special 
bounty  is  written  in  Colbert's  hand:  "Les  graces  que  S.  M.  accorde 
sent  si  grandes  qu'elles  ne  peuvent  etre  augmentees.  II  faut  faire 
pour  ces  batimens  reduction  de  quarante  sols  sur  le  sucre."  Arch.  Nat. 
Col.,  Cii,  in,  fol.  94. 

23  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fol.  124  verso. 

24  Arch.  AfF.  Etrang.,  Doc.  et  Mem.,  Am6rique,  V,  237.  Instruc- 
tions to  Sieur  de  Baas,  September  15,  1668. 

25  Arch.   Nat.   Col.,  Cn,   III,  M6moire  touchant  le  commerce   du 

317 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

intendant,  in  a  joint  memoir  to  Colbert  under  date  of  Feb- 
ruary 13,  1683,  stated  that  they  were  trying  to  encourage 
the  planters  to  carry  on  trade  with  Canada,  because  they 
"could  obtain  there  salted  meats  of  better  quality  and 
cheaper  than  those  of  Ireland,  as  well  as  flour,  peas,  salted 
fish  and  lumber."^ 

A  short  time  after  Colbert's  death,  all  duties  were 
removed  from  sugar-cane  brandy,  sugar,  tobacco,  cotton, 
indigo,  and  other  products  imported  into  Canada  from 
the  French  islands  and  from  salted  meats,  peas,  flour, 
fish,  lumber,  and  other  articles  imported  into  the  islands 
from  Canada.^^  The  encouragement  of  trade  between  the 
two  groups  of  colonies  continued  to  be  a  policy  of  the 
government  throughout  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.^ 

These  efforts  yielded  very  meagre  results.  Talon  lost 
two  of  the  vessels  sent  to  the  islands  in  1670,  of  which 
the  estimated  value  with  cargoes  was  36,000  livres.^  An 
intendant  of  the  islands  stated  in  1691  that  others  who 
had  made  attempts  to  carry  on  this  trade  had  made  no 
profit.^ 

There  were  several  obstacles  to  the  success  of  the  trade. 
Canada  did  not  produce  a  sufficient  quantity  of  food- 
stuffs or  lumber  to  make  the  trade  of  large  importance, 
nor  was  there  a  sufficient  demand  in  Canada  for  West 
India  products  to  make  an  independent  trade  between  the 

Canada  aux  Isles  Antilles  fran^aises  de  I'Am^rique,  December  15, 
1670. 

26  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  Cg,  III. 

27  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  11,  fol.  70,  Extrait  des  Reg.  du  con.  d'Etat, 
April,  1685. 

28  The  history  of  this  policy  will  be  told  in  a  succeeding  volume. 
See  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  IV,  Dumaitz  de  Goimpy  to  Seignelay,  Decem- 
ber 18,  1686;  ibid.,  V,  de  Blenac  and  de  Goimpy  to  the  king,  May  8, 
1688;  ibid.,  B,  24,  Instructions  to  Desnos,  February  9,  1701;  ibid.,  B, 
31,  letter  to  d'Aguesseau,  December  5,  1708,  etc.,  etc. 

29  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  C^,  III,  fols.  274-279,  M^moire  du  Sieur  Patou- 
let,  January  25,  1672. 

30  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  VI,  letter  from  Dumaitz,  February  16,  1691. 

818 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

two  groups  of  colonies  possible.^  It  was  necessary  to 
establish  a  three-cornered  trade  between  Canada,  the  West 
Indies  and  the  mother  country .^^  This  meant  a  long  and 
difficult  voyage  at  great  risks.  A  trader  undertaking  it 
had  to  wait  a  year  for  any  returns  from  his  capital.^ 
Besides  the  British  North  American  continental  colonies 
furnished  a  much  more  accessible  and  much  cheaper  sup- 
ply of  food-stuffs.  The  petition  of  the  sugar  refiners  of 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  in  1681,  quoted  above,^  for 
permission  to  establish  a  trade  with  these  colonies  is  most 
significant. 

Thus  both  Colbert  and  his  successors  failed  in  their 
efforts  to  obtain  an  adequate  supply  of  food-stuffs  for  the 
West  India  planters  by  establishing  trade  with  Canada. 
But  Colbert  was  not  willing  to  remain  idle  in  presence  of 
the  fact  that  such  a  large  part  of  that  food  supply  came 
from  Ireland,  a  foreign  country.  In  1670,  he  began  to 
exclude  Irish  beef  from  importation  into  the  islands  and 
to  substitute  French  beef.  On  October  27,  he  wrote  to 
Brunet,  one  of  the  directors  of  the  West  India  Company, 
who  was  at  that  time  at  La  Rochelle,  as  follows : 

"I  note  from  your  letter  the  efforts  which  you  have  made  to 
carry  out  the  instructions  which  I  gave  you,  and  particularly 
those  concerning  the  purchase  of  beef  in  France  to  export  to 
the  islands  instead  of  that  of  Ireland.  As  you  know  how  very 
much  at  heart  I  hold  this  matter,  you  will  understand  why  I 
am  so  happy  to  learn  that  you  are  hopeful  of  succeeding.  .  .  . 
Bend  your  energies  to  the  task  and  rest  assured  that  you  can 
do  nothing  which  would  bring  me  more  pleasure  than  the  suc- 
cess of  the  enterprise."^ 

31  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C^,  V,  Memoir  by  de  Bl^nac  and  Dumaitz,  May 
8,  1686. 

32  Ibid. 

33  Ibid.,  IV,  Dumaitz  de  Goimpy  to  Seignelay,  December  18,  1686. 

34  Chapter  IX. 

35  Depping,  Correspondance,  III,  522. 

319 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

In  order  to  induce  the  West  India  Company  to  devote 
special  attention  to  the  importation  of  French  beef  into 
the  islands,  he  offered  the  directors  a  bounty  of  12,000 
livres  for  the  importation  of  4000  barrels  during  the  year 
1671.'' 

To  the  objection  that  French  beef  was  too  dear,  Col- 
bert replied  that  it  was  necessary  to  convince  traders  that 
it  was  of  superior  quahty  and  he  added: 

"In  order  to  force  merchants  who  trade  in  the  islands  to 
buy  French  beef,  you  may  forbid  them  to  use  He  de  Re  as  an 
entrepot  for  Irish  beef.  In  that  case  you  have  need  of  an  arret 
of  the  conseil  d'etat  to  do  so,  let  me  know  and  I  shall  send  one 
to  you  promptly."^ 

Such  an  arret  was  published  on  August  17,  1671,  which 
formally  annulled  the  right  of  entrepot  in  France  for 
"beef  and  other  meats  brought  from  Ireland."^  This  was 
followed  by  a  royal  ordinance  which  forbade  the  importa- 
tion into  the  islands  of  all  foreign  beef  and  bacon  under 
penalty  of  confiscation  thereof  and  500  livres  fine  for  the 
first  oflPense  and  of  bodily  punishment  in  case  of  repeti- 
tion.^ A  supplementary  arret  of  December  21,  1671, 
granted  the  liberty  of  exporting  to  the  islands  all  Irish 
beef  actually  on  hand,  if  it  were  done  before  January  13, 
1672.*°  Finally  a  bounty  of  four  livres  per  barrel  was 
granted  on  all  beef  salted  within  the  kingdom  and  ex- 
ported to  the  West  Indies.*^ 

36  Ibid.,  p.  523,  same  to  same,  November  13,  1670. 

37  Ibid.,  p.  527,  Colbert  to  Brunet,  February  26,  1671. 

38  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  230. 

39  Arch.  Nat.,  Gj,  1313,  arrU  of  November  4,  1671;  Moreau  de 
Saint-M6ry,  I,  253. 

40  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  fols.  1-2;  Arch.  Aff.  Etrang.,  M6m.  et 
Doc,  France,  2007,  fol.  12  verso. 

41  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  4,  fols.  4-5;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  259. 
Ordinance  of  January  13,  1672.  In  order  to  claim  this  bounty  the 
captains  were  obliged  to  deposit  a  certificate,  properly  signed  in  the 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

There  is  but  very  little  evidence  to  show  that  French 
traders  made  many  efforts  to  take  advantage  of  the 
bounty  offered  for  salting  beef  in  France  and  shipping 
it  to  the  islands.  The  West  India  Company  made  some,  but 
it  has  been  shown  above  that  it  was  too  near  bankruptcy 
to  accomplish  any  important  results.  The  cargoes  of  only 
a  few  vessels  sailing  from  Nantes  contained  French  beef 
and  then  the  quantities  were  small.*^  In  1675,  two  years 
after  the  restoration  of  the  privilege  to  export  Irish  beef 
to  the  islands,  the  quantities  of  French  beef  sent  to  the 
islands  were  still  small.*^ 

De  Baas  showed  opposition  to  the  policy  from  the  first. 

islands,  certifying  that  the  beef  had  been  landed  there.    Ibid.,  fol.  22 
verso. 

42  Thus  Le  David,  240  tons,  captain,  Chapelain,  whose  passport  was 
registered  on  August  3,  1673,  had  in  her  cargo  23  one-quarter  barrels, 
and  La  Notre  Dame  de  Mont  Carmel,  150  tons,  captain,  Castellier, 
July  3,  had  64  barrels.  Likewise,  the  cargo  of  La  Montague,  300 
tons,  captain,  Hotman,  had  179  barrels.  The  rest  of  the  vessels  for 
the  year  carried  either  Irish  beef  or  none  at  all.  Arch.  D6pt.,  Loire 
Inf.,  D6cl.  de  Sorties,  B,  1,  and  2.  There  is  one  case.  La  Marguerite, 
50  tons,  captain,  Leroy,  where  the  cargo  contained  a  small  quantity  of 
beef  from  Hamburg. 

43  Of  the  ten  vessels  sailing  for  the  islands  from  the  port  of 
Nantes  in  that  year,  the  following  is  the  record  so  far  as  beef  con- 
tained in  their  cargoes  is  concerned: 

Beef 
French  Irish 

Jan.  10,  L'Esp4rance,  200  tons,  Capt.  Mezard,  70    bbls.  llbbls. 

Jan.  10,  St.  Franqois,  120  tons,  Capt.  Gabillard,  3914 bbls.  5  bbls. 

Jan.  18,  L'Africaine,  250  tons,  Capt.  Bernard,  30    bbls.  200  bbls. 

Jan.  22,  La  Montague,  300  tons,  Capt.  Allard,  274    bbls.  142  bbls. 

Oct.  12,  St.  Bernard,       80  tons, Capt. D'Arquistad,  20    bbls.  75  bbls. 

Jan.  23,  La  Louise,           40  tons,  Capt.  Lelois,  —    bbls.  70  bbls. 

Feb.  16,  St.  Pierre,  200  tons,  Capt.  Marston,  —    bbls.  112  bbls. 

Mar.  14,  La  Tartaune,      30  tons,  Capt.  Joubert,  —    bbls.  18  bbls. 

Oct.     2,  St.  Nicolas,         60  tons,  Capt.  Coillot,  —    bbls.  64  bbls. 

Dec.  23,  Le  Charles,  130  tons,  Capt.  Dubois,  %bbls.  — bbls. 


Total,  434  bbls.  697  bbls. 

Arch.  D6pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  D6cl.  de  Sorties,  B,  3  and  4. 

321 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

On  receiving  notification  of  the  arret  excluding  Irish  beef, 
he  wrote  to  Colbert: 

"I  shall  obey  orders,  Monseigneur,  but  permit  me  to  say 
that  a  supply  of  beef  is  more  necessary  to  the  islands  than  that 
of  any  other  commodity,  for  it  is  the  meat  which  is  fed  to  the 
slaves.  The  consumption  of  it  is  so  great  that  30,000  barrels 
are  not  enough  to  satisfy  the  annual  demand.  I  am  not  sure 
that  France  can  furnish  such  a  large  quantity,  and  even  if  it 
could,  the  beef  would  have  to  be  sold  at  double  the  price  of 
Irish  beef."^ 

After  nearly  a  year  of  trial  of  the  new  regulation,  the 
same  governor  wrote  again: 

"If  the  supply  of  salt  beef  fails,  the  planters  will  be  without 
the  services  of  their  slaves.  The  stronger  slaves  will  become 
robbers  and  runaways,  and  the  weaker,  the  women  and  chil- 
dren, will  grow  faint  and  die,  as  they  are  already  beginning 
to  do.  .  .  .1  must  say  to  you,  with  your  permission,  Monseig- 
neur,  that  as  beef  is  the  meat  given  to  slaves,  a  supply  of  it  is 
absolutely  necessary,  if  they  are  to  be  kept  at  work.  It  is 
impossible  for  French  traders  to  bring  a  sufficient  quantity 
from  France,  as  the  supply  there  is  small  and  costs  so  much 
that  beef,  which  has  been  selling  here  for  300  pounds  of  sugar 
per  barrel,  will  cost  800.  .  .  .  None  of  the  traders  is  im- 
porting any  into  the  islands  and  there  is  none  to  be  had  here. 
The  planters  are  murmuring  because  they  see  no  means  of 
feeding  their  slaves,  who  detest  fat  pork  and  eat  it  only  by 
compulsion.  .  .  .  The  slaves  are  forced  to  work  twenty  out  of 
every  twenty-four  hours.  If,  then,  these  miserable  wretches  do 
not  have  beef  to  eat,  how  is  it  possible  for  them  to  endure  so 
much  work  by  eating  only  potatoes,  yams  and  cassava  bread.'' 
If  Irish  beef  is  not  imported,  it  is  certain  that  they  will  rot 
be  fed  on  French  beef.  ...  I  confess,  Monseigneur,  that  I 
have  a  great  deal  of  weakness  in  the  matter  of  carrying  out 
your  orders,  for  slaves  are  human  beings  and  human  beings 

44  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  February  23,  1673. 

322 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

should  not  be  reduced  to  a  state  which  is  worse  than  that  of 
cattle."*^ 

De  Baas  added  a  postscript  to  say  that  he  had  been  forced 
to  interrupt  the  work  of  fortifying  the  harbour  of  Port 
Royal  on  account  of  not  having  a  supply  of  beef  and  that 
he  would  have  to  discontinue  the  work,  until  some  was 
brought  from  France,  or  until  he  could  send  to  Barbadoes. 
A  month  later  he  wrote  that  beef  and  other  provisions  had 
become  so  scarce  at  St.  Croix  that  the  governor  was  sick 
and  some  of  the  chief  planters  had  died.*^  One  official 
reported  that  he  had  seen  planters  at  Guadeloupe  "swear- 
ing upon  bended  knee  and  with  tears  in  their  eyes  to  the 
governor  that  it  had  been  more  than  a  year  since  they 
or  their  families  had  had  a  morsel  of  meat  to  eat."*^ 

De  Baas  seems  to  have  taken  the  law  into  his  own  hands 
and,  in  spite  of  strict  orders  and  instructions,  permitted 
trade  with  the  foreigner  to  relieve  suffering  caused  by 
the  scarcity  of  beef.  Thus  he  permitted  the  planters  at 
St.  Croix  to  trade  with  the  Danes  during  six  months.*^ 
He  permitted  two  Jew  merchants  of  Martinique  to  fetch 
a  cargo  of  food  suppHes  from  Barbadoes,*^  and  likewise 
four  English  vessels  to  trade  at  Guadeloupe  and  Martin- 
ique. Among  the  latter  was  "a  ketch  coming  from  the 
city  of  Boston."^"  Colbert  rebuked  de  Baas  for  his  con- 
duct,^^  but  he  withdrew,  nevertheless,  the  prohibition  to 
import  Irish  beef. 

A  royal  ordinance  was  proclaimed  on  May  10,  1673, 
which  stated  that  as  the  existence  of  a  war  had  rendered 
commerce  by  sea  difficult,  and  traders  had  ceased  to  salt 

45  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  November  20,  1672. 

46  Ibid.,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  28,  1672. 

47  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 

48  Arch.  Nat,  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  28,  1672. 

49  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas,  February  6,  1674. 

50  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  du  Clerc  to  Colbert,  January  20,  1675. 

51  Ibid.,  B,  6,  fol.  32,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  May  IS,  1674. 

323 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

beef  and  to  export  it  to  the  islands,  and  as  the  planters  of 
the  said  islands  might  suffer  as  a  consequence,  "His  Maj- 
esty has  permitted  and  permits  to  all  French  traders  to  ex- 
port and  sell  in  the  said  islands  beef  purchased  in  foreign 
countries  in  the  same  manner  as  was  the  custom  to  do 
before  the  ordinance  of  November  4,  1671."^^  The  ordi- 
nance seems  to  have  produced  a  good  effect,  for  de  Baas 
wrote  shortly  afterwards :  "I  believe  that  I  should  tell  you 
that  the  abundance  of  meat  is  so  great  in  the  islands  that 
this  year  a  barrel  of  beef  sells  for  350  pounds  of  sugar  and 
a  barrel  of  bacon  for  450  pounds,  whereas  the  price  of  the 
former  was  formerly  800  pounds  and  of  the  latter  was 
1200  pounds."^ 

Even  after  the  close  of  the  war,  Colbert  did  not  return 
to  the  fight.  The  intendant,  Patoulet,  suggested  in  1680 
that  the  planters  be  forced  to  raise  cattle  and  that  "His 
Majesty  should  announce  that  after  a  period  of  three 
years  the  importation  of  Irish  beef  would  not  be  per- 
mitted."^ The  reply  made  to  this  suggestion  is  instruc- 
tive in  showing  that  Colbert  had  learned  by  experience 
that  some  things,  which  he  thought  desirable  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  interests  of  the  state,  were,  nevertheless, 
impossible  of  realization.  "His  Majesty  does  not  think 
it  wise,"  he  wrote,  "to  prohibit  the  importation  of  Irish 
beef  and  Madeira  wine  into  the  islands.  The  suggestion 
which  you  make  to  compel  the  planters  to  devote  them- 
selves to  the  raising  of  cattle,  by  declaring  that  the  impor- 
tation of  Irish  beef  will  not  be  permitted  after  a  period 
of  three  years,  does  not  seem  practicable,  for  the  lands 
which  have  been  cleared  are  along  the  seashore  and  pro- 
duce only  cane.    Thus  there  would  be  no  land  suitable  for 

52Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  270. 

53  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  June  26,  1675. 

54  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  M6moire  par  Patoulet,  Decem- 
ber 20,  1680. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

the  pasturage  of  cattle."^  Instructions  were  sent  to  de 
Blenac  under  the  same  date  to  admit  Irish  beef  as  had 
been  the  custom  since  1673.^ 

Patoulet  himself  placed  an  order  with  Allaire,  a  mer- 
chant of  La  Rochelle,  for  500  barrels  of  Irish  beef  at 
twelve  livres  the  barrel.^^ 

Irish  beef  continued  to  maintain  its  place  of  importance 
in  the  trade  of  the  islands,  for  Gastines,  the  commissioner 
of  the  marine  at  Nantes,  stated  that  the  basis  of  all  car- 
goes sent  to  the  islands  from  that  port  was  Irish  beef.^ 
When  an  import  duty  of  five  livres  per  hundredweight 
was  laid  in  France  on  Irish  beef  by  an  arret  of  June  29, 
1688,  some  merchants  at  Nantes,  interested  in  the  com- 
merce of  the  islands,  met  and  drew  up  a  memoir  of  protest, 
asserting  that  the  duty  was  excessive,  as  it  represented 
a  duty  of  100  per  cent  ad  valorem  and  that,  if  maintained, 
the  traders  of  Nantes  and  the  West  India  planters  would 
suffer.'' 

It  is  certain,  therefore,  that  Irish  beef  continued, 
throughout  the  ministry  of  Colbert,  to  be  a  most  impor- 
tant article  of  food  for  the  slaves  of  the  French  West 
Indies.  The  attempt  of  Colbert  to  prevent  its  importa- 
tion between  November  4,  1671,  and  May,  1673,  proved 
futile. 

55  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran^ais,  11315,  Colbert  to  de  Baas,  May 
4,  1681,  and  also  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fols.  12-23,  April  30,  1681. 

56  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  9,  fols.  1-12. 

57  Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  fonds  fran9ais,  11315,  fols.  19-22,  Anthoine  Al- 
laire to  Patoulet,  October  29,  1679. 

58  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bg,  55,  fol.  492,  Gastines  to  Seignelay,  July  20, 
1688. 

59  Arch.  Nat.  Mar.,  Bj,  495,  fol.  198,  Memoire  sur  le  boeuf  sal6 
d'Irlande,  June  29,  1688. 


325 


CHAPTER  XV 

Colonial  Imports — Live  Stock,  Lumber, 
Manufactured  Goods 

THE  introduction  of  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  in 
the  French  Wfest  Indies  brought  with  it  an  increased 
demand  for  live  stock.  De  Poincy,  the  governor  of  St. 
Christopher,  stated  in  1640,  that  the  lack  of  water  power 
would  have  to  be  supplied  by  the  employment  of  horses 
or  oxen  to  turn  the  sugar-cane  mills. ^  This  was  actually 
done,  for  de  Rochefort  asserted  in  1658,  that  five  of  the 
six  sugar-cane  mills  operated  by  that  governor  were 
turned  by  oxen  or  horses  brought  from  Cura9ao.^  Later, 
Dutch  and  French  traders  maintained  pastures  in  Ire- 
land for  raising  cattle,  some  of  which  were  shipped  to  the 
West  Indies  as  Hve  stock  to  turn  the  sugar-mills.^  Nac- 
quart,  in  his  plan  of  1663  to  establish  a  company  to  carry 
on  trade  with  the  West  Indies,  proposed  to  include  in  the 
cargoes  of  each  vessel,  "twenty-five  or  thirty  horses  of 
the  kind  that  are  ordinarily  sent  from  Amsterdam  to  the 
islands  and  that  cost  from  sixty  to  eighty  florins  and  sell 
for  S500  to  3500  pounds  of  sugar,  according  to  quality."* 
He  also  proposed  that  "while  the  company's  ships  were 
waiting  in  the  islands  for  return  cargoes,  one  or  two  of 
them  be  sent  to  Cura9ao  and  Bonayre  for  cargoes  of 
asses  and  horses."^ 

lArch.  Col.,  F2,  15,  Letter,  November  15,  1640. 

2  Du  Tertre,  II,  289-290. 

3  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  2nd  series,  I,  M^moire  contenant  les  avis  et 
sentiment  de  diflF.  capit.,  1661. 

*Arch.    Nat.   Col.,  Cg,  2nd   series,   I,   Proposition  au   Roy   d'une 
Nouvelle  Compagnie  k  establir,  etc.,  1663. 
5  Ibid. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

Cura9ao  remained  the  principal  source  of  supply  even 
after  the  beginning  of  Colbert's  ministry,  for  de  Baas  was 
instructed  by  the  West  India  Company  in  1668  to  admit 
Dutch  ships  from  Cura9ao,  bringing  slaves  and  horses, 
and  he  admitted  them  freely  until  the  close  of  1669.^ 
Furthermore,  du  Lion,  the  governor  of  Guadeloupe,  com- 
plained in  1669  that  Cartier,  the  general  agent  of  the 
West  India  Company,  was  monopolizing  the  supply  of 
horses  "imported  by  the  Dutch  from  Cura9ao,"  in  order 
to  sell  them  at  the  exorbitant  price  of  2500  to  3000  pounds 
of  sugar  for  horses  and  from  3000  to  4000  pounds  for 
maresJ  Finally,  Temericourt,  governor  of  Marie  Ga- 
lante,  informed  Colbert  that  he  had  sent  a  small  vessel  to 
Cura9ao  for  a  cargo  of  slaves  and  horses.^ 

But  news  reached  Guadeloupe  in  1670  that  the  Dutch 
West  India  Company  had  forbidden,  for  two  years,  the 
exportation  of  horses  from  Cura9ao.^  Du  Lion  then  asked 
that  permission  be  granted  for  Jean  Vaulit,  a  Dutch 
inhabitant  of  Guadeloupe,  to  bring  from  Flushing  a 
cargo  of  "good  Norman  horses,  lumber  and  other  things 
of  which  the  colonies  are  in  need."  "It  would  be,"  he 
said,  "an  advantage  for  the  colony,  if  he  brought  a  cargo 
of  Norman  horses,  because  they  are  much  stronger  than 
those  which  we  have  been  receiving  from  Cura9ao."^"  We 
learn  from  the  same  governor  in  a  letter  of  July  25  that 
the  agent  of  M.  Formont  at  Guadeloupe  was  expecting  a 
cargo  of  mares  from  Ireland  and  Norway.^^ 

Thus  the  French  islands  were  dependent  upon  foreign 
markets  for  their  supply  of  live  stock.  But  Colbert  re- 
garded this  fact  as  an  evil  and  made  efforts  to  remedy  it. 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  de  Baas  to  Colbert,  December  22,  1669. 

7  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  December  1,  1669. 

8  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  December  14,  1669. 

9  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  C7,  I,  du  Lion  to  Colbert,  May  5,  1670. 

10  Ibid. 

11  Ibid. 

327 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

He  instructed  de  Baas  on  March  25,  1670,  not  to  admit 
under  any  circumstances  slaves  or  horses  brought  by  for- 
eigners or  imported  from  foreign  countries.^^  At  the  same 
time  he  instructed  the  West  India  Company  to  devote  spe- 
cial attention  to  the  importation  of  live  stock  into  the 
islands.^^  He  attempted  to  force  the  West  India  trader  to 
find  a  supply  in  France.  A  royal  ordinance  was  proclaimed 
on  December  20,  1670,  which  required  every  vessel  going 
to  the  islands  to  take  two  mares  or  two  cows  or  two  she- 
asses.  A  promise  to  do  so  was  made  the  condition  of 
obtaining  a  passport.^* 

What  definite  results  these  regulations  attained,  the 
writer  is  unable  to  say,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  du  Lion 
complained  in  1672  of  the  exorbitant  price  demanded  by 
the  West  India  Company  for  horses  of  Poitou.  This 
would  seem  to  imply  that  the  company  imported  some 
horses  from  France.  France,  however,  did  not  have  a 
supply  of  good  horses,  for  Vauban  noted  the  fact  near  the 
close  of  the  century .^^  It  would  seem  to  imply  that  horses 
offered  for  sale  were  exceedingly  scarce.  At  any  rate,  we 
know  that  by  1680  the  French  planters  were  again  receiv- 
ing live  stock  from  the  foreigner.  Patoulet  stated  in  one 
of  his  letters  to  Colbert  that  he  had  succeeded  in  estab- 
lishing trade  in  horses  and  mules  with  the  Spaniards  of 
Porto  Rico,^^  and  de  Pouan9ay  stated  in  the  following  year 

12  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  f ol.  19  verso. 

13  An  account  of  this  will  be  found  in  Chapter  VII. 

14  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  145.  A  slight  modification  in  the 
regulation  was  made  on  January  22,  following,  by  which  vessels  of 
100  tons  or  less  were  allowed  to  substitute  two  servants  for  each  mare, 
cow  or  she-ass.    Ibid.,  3,  fol.  8  verso;  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  207. 

15  Vauban,  Oisiv4Us,  I,  92.  "II  y  a  encore  une  raison  en  France 
qui  emp^che  qu'il  ne  s'y  trouve  que  tres  peu  de  bons  chevaux,  c'est  que 
les  paysans  sont  trop  pauvres  pour  les  pouvoir  nourrir  et  attendre 
quatre  on  cinq  ans  pour  s'en  d^faire;  il  les  vendent  ordinairement  k 
dix  huit  mois  ou  deux  ans  ou  les  font  tirer  ou  porter  presqu'aussitdt, 
ce  qui  les  empeche  de  croitre  et  les  mine  de  forte  bonne  heure." 

i«  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cs,  III,  Patoulet  to  Colbert,  December  96,  1680. 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

that  live  stock  was  being  imported  into  St.  Domingo  from 
the  Spanish  colonies/^ 

It  seems  probable  that  the  efforts  of  Colbert  to  find 
within  the  empire  a  supply  of  live  stock  for  the  W-est 
India  planters  proved  futile,  as  they  had  in  the  case  of 
salt  beef. 

A  supply  of  lumber  was  necessary  in  the  West  Indies 
for  building  purposes,  for  repairing  ships  and  in  form  of 
staves,  hoops  and  headings  for  making  sugar  barrels.  Du 
Tertre  remarked  during  his  sojourn  at  St.  Christopher 
that  a  supply  of  lumber  was  obtained  from  the  Dutch  at 
Saba.^^  He  notes  also  the  presence  in  the  islands  of  wood- 
choppers  and  dressers  of  lumber,  and  adds  the  comment 
that  they  demanded  exorbitant  prices  for  their  lumber.^^ 
But  the  return  for  labour  was  greater  on  the  plantation 
than  in  the  forest  and  the  islands  relied  upon  the  foreigner 
for  a  supply  of  lumber  which  they  needed. 

But  Colbert  was  unwilling  to  let  this  continue.  Thus, 
in  his  instructions  to  de  Baas  of  September  15,  1668,  is 
to  be  found  the  following  passage:  "The  thing  which  is 
lacking  most  in  the  islands  and  of  which  there  is  a  very 
great  and  pressing  need,  is  lumber  for  the  construction  of 
vessels  and  the  making  of  sugar-barrels.  As  Canada  is 
well  supplied  with  timber  .  .  .  Sieur  de  Baas  will  exert 
his  efforts  to  persuade  the  inhabitants  to  undertake  to 
obtain  a  supply  by  trade  with  Canada."^"  He  had  pre- 
viously instructed  Talon,  the  intendant  of  Canada,  to 
encourage  the  same  trade.  The  story  has  been  told  else- 
where of  how  these  efforts  proved  unfruitful.^ 

17  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  M^moire  du  Sieur  de  Pouan^ay  concernant 
la  coste  de  St.  Domingue  envoy6  k  M.  Colbert,  January  30,  1681. 

18  Du  Tertre,  II,  453. 

19  Ibid.,  p.  454. 

20  Arch.  Aff.  Etrang.,  M6m.  et  Doc,  Am6rique,  V,  237,  September 
15,  1668. 

21  See  Chapter  XIV. 

329 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

After  1669  the  supply  of  staves,  hoops  and  headings 
for  barrels,  in  part  at  least,  seems  to  have  come  from  the 
ports  of  France.  The  few  cases  found  in  the  admiralty 
records  of  the  several  ports,  where  the  cargoes  of  out- 
going vessels  are  given  in  detail,  show  that  nearly  all  of 
them  took  these  articles  to  the  islands.^  But  France  was 
not  able  to  satisfy  for  a  long  time  the  growing  demand  of 
her  West  India  islands  for  these  articles,  for  she  was 
compelled  in  the  eighteenth  century  to  admit  their  impor- 
tation from  the  British  North  American  colonies. 

The  principal  articles  of  manufacture  imported  into 
the  islands  were  cloth,  of  qualities  varying  from  a  coarse 
grade,  used  for  making  shirts,  breeches  and  short  skirts 
for  the  slaves,^  to  the  finest  grades,  used  by  the  more  pros- 
perous planters,  clothing,  hats,  shoes,  utensils  for  the 
farm  and  household,  caldrons  and  copper  vessels  of  vari- 
ous sizes,  and  implements  used  in  the  sugar-mills. 

After  Colbert  had  excluded  the  Dutch  who  had  been 
accustomed  to  furnish  these  articles,  he  removed  one  by 
one  the  restraints  which  had  long  discouraged  the  French 
traders  from  exporting  them  to  the  islands.  In  the  first 
place,  he  granted  to  the  West  India  Company,  by  an  arret 
of  May  30,  1664,  exemption  from  half  the  duties  ordina- 
rily levied  on  exports  from  France.^  He  removed  all  such 
duties  both  for  the  company  and  for  private  traders  by  an 
arret    of   June   4,    1671.^     Exemption   from   all   export 

22  Arch.  D^pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  B,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  passim.  La  Tartane,  30 
tons,  sailing  from  Nantes  on  March  14,  1674,  took  staves  for  120 
barrels,  28  bundles  of  hoops,  2  barrels  nails,  etc.  L'Africaine,  250  tons, 
sailing  on  January  18,  took  staves  and  headings  for  900  barrels,  and 
36  bundles  hoops.  L'Esp4rance,  200  tons,  sailing  January  10,  took 
dressed  lumber  and  staves,  hoops  and  headings. 

23  Peytraud,  op.  cit.,  226.  The  master  was  required  by  the  twenty- 
fifth  article  of  the  Code  noir  of  1685  to  furnish  yearly  to  each  slave 
*^deux  habits  de  toile  ou  quatre  aunes  de  toile." 

24  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  114-115. 

25  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,   fols.   127-128.     This  was   re-enacted  on 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

duties  on  goods  sent  to  the  coast  of  Guinea  to  be  used  in 
the  slave  trade  was  granted  on  September  18  of  the  same 
year.^^  Finally,  by  a  royal  ordinance  of  June  9,  1670, 
duties  levied  in  the  islands  on  goods  imported  from  France 
were  abolished.^^  As  an  explanation  of  this  last  action, 
Colbert  wrote  to  de  Baas  as  follows : 

"The  custom  which  has  been  followed  up  to  the  present  of 
levying  duties  on  incoming  and  outgoing  cargoes  was  a  very 
good  practice  for  the  time  when  foreigners  and  only  a  few 
Frenchmen  carried  on  this  trade,  but  at  present,  when  the 
foreigners  have  been  entirely  eliminated  and  only  French 
traders  remain,  the  custom  must  be  abolished."^ 

Colbert  thus  removed  all  the  barriers  which  had  im- 
peded for  two  generations  the  trade  between  the  mother 
country  and  her  colonies.  Henceforward  the  way  was 
perfectly  free.  Cargoes  of  manufactured  goods  could  be 
exported  to  the  islands  free  from  all  duties.  The  French 
traders  took  advantage  of  this  fact  and  built  up  a  profit- 
able trade  with  the  West  Indies.^^ 

November  25.  Arch.  Nat.,  AD,vii,  3,  and  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I, 
255-256. 

26  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  3,  fols.  129-130,  and  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry, 
I,  242. 

27  Moreau  de  Saint-M6ry,  I,  194. 

28  C16ment,  III,  2,  p.  478,  April  9,  1670. 

29  The  following  will  illustrate  the  relative  amount  of  manufac- 
tured articles  in  cargoes  taken  from  Nantes:  Le  Charles,  130  tons, 
Dubois,  captain,  took  "1th.  vin  Nantais,  1  boite  verres  ouvrag^s,  1 
bal.  couverture  at  toile,  1  balle  papier,  20  caisses  couteaux  et  oustils, 
1  ballot  selles  k  cheval,  5  paq.  marchandises,  1  caisse  chapeaux,  3  bal. 
toile  fa9on  Bilbao,  1  quart  toile,  3  ballots  droguets,  1 1-4  barrique 
mercerie  et  soies,  1  caisse  d'esp^es  et  toile,  300  barrils  en  botte,  5 
quarts  lard,  1  caisse  savon,  57  quarts  farine,  2  bar.  pigalles,  1  caisse 
fayence,  6  quarts  biscuits,  3  quarts  boeuf  du  pays,  6  bar.  huile  d'olive, 
4  quarts  huile  de  poisson,  150  feuillards  de  cercles,  3  bar.  1  quart  1 
ballot  souliers  et  estoffe."  Arch.  D6pt.,  Loire  Inf.,  B  (Registre  de 
Sorties),  4,  December  23,  1675. 


331 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Conclusion 

THERE  are  some  obvious,  but  at  the  same  time  funda- 
mental principles  which  underlay  the  whole  of  Col- 
bert's colonial  commercial  policy.  First  of  all,  he  consid- 
ered the  chief  end  of  establishing  colonies  to  build  up 
trade.  He  instituted  the  practice  of  subsidizing  colo- 
nial enterprises  with  no  other  purpose  than  that  of  creat- 
ing an  over-sea  commerce.  Colonies  should  contribute  to 
this  end  by  becoming  markets  for  the  manufactures  of  the 
mother  country  and  for  other  articles  brought  by  her 
traders,  and  by  furnishing  raw  products  which  might  be 
used  either  as  a  supply  to  her  manufacturing  industries 
or  as  articles  of  trade  with  other  nations.  /^In  the  second 
place,  he  considered  colonies  as  the  exclusive  property  of 
the  mother  country.  Foreigners  should  not  be  allowed  to 
profit  from  them,  either  by  being  allowed  to  import  even 
the  articles  which  the  m"5ther  country  did  not  produce  or 
which  her  traders  could  not  or  did  not  supply,  or  by  being 
permitted  to  take  away  even  the  surplus  products  for 
which  there  was  no  market  in  the  realm.  As  a  corollary 
to  this  was  the  principle  that  the  growth  and  expansion 
of  a  colony  were  only  desirable  when  they  had  been  made 
possible  by  a  strict  exclusion  of  foreigners  from  all  profit 
therein.  Finally,  the  interests  of  the  colonies  should  be 
subjected  to  those  of  the  mother  country.  Wherever  they 
came  into  conflict,  the  former  should  always  be  sacrificed 
to  the  latter. 

In  the  application  of  these  principles,  as  we  have  had 
occasion  to  see  in  the  preceding  chapters,  Colbert  formu- 
lated many  regulations.  Those  which  he  made  to  keep  out 
the  foreign  trader,  together  with  the  measures  which  he 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

took  to  insure  their  enforcement,  caused  much  suffering 
to  the  planters  and  checked,  at  least  temporarily,  the 
development  of  the  islands.  The  wisdom  of  forcing  such  a 
sudden  change  from  a  regime  of  Dutch  to  that  of  French 
trading  may  be  seriously  questioned.  The  suggestion 
made  by  Formont,  in  his  memoir  of  1662,  to  effect  this 
change  gradually,  by  permitting,  for  a  few  years,  trade 
with  foreigners  under  a  regime  of  preferential  treatment 
to  French  ships,  would  undoubtedly  have  proved  less  rev- 
olutionary and  less  burdensome  to  the  colonies.  It  might 
have  saved  them  from  the  long  state  of  unrest  and  rebellion 
which  prevailed  from  1665  to  1670,  for  French  traders 
proved  unable  to  satisfy  all  the  needs  of  the  islands  and 
the  Dutch  might  have  been  utilized  advantageously,  for  a 
time  at  least,  in  aiding  them.  This  was  especially  true  of 
a  supply  of  slaves  and  live  stock.  The  directors  of  the 
West  India  Company  clearly  recognized  the  wisdom  of  this 
and  freely  admitted  into  the  islands  Dutch  ships  bringing 
such  a  supply.  As  late  as  1668,  it  will  be  recalled,  they 
instructed  de  Baas  to  admit  them.  Colbert,  however,  was 
not  willing  to  tolerate  such  an  exception  to  the  strict 
principle  of  excluding  all  foreigners.  The  result  was,  as 
we  have  seen,  that  the  planters  were  forced  not  only  to 
discontinue  the  clearance  of  new  lands,  but  also  were  unable 
to  replace  slaves  that  died,  and  hence  were  unable  to  main- 
tain the  former  level  of  production. 

The  desire  to  exclude  all  foreigners  from  profit  in  the 
island  trade  led  Colbert  to  go  to  extremes.  A  case  in 
point  is  to  be  found  in  his  efforts  to  exclude  Irish  beef 
from  the  islands.  Irish  beef  not  only  offered  an  article 
for  profitable  trade  between  Nantes  and  Ireland,  but  also, 
s  an  article  of  export  to  the  islands,  yielded  a  good  mid- 
leman's  profit  to  French  traders.  It  was,  to  say  the 
least,  somewhat  an  exaggeration  of  mercantilist  principles 
to  attempt  to  force  its  production  in  France,  where  the 

333 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

cost  was  much  greater,  and  to  disregard  the  suffering  of 
the  hungry  planters  and  of  their  starving  slaves.  It  must 
be  added,  however,  that  the  short  experiment  which  was 
made  convinced  Colbert  of  the  error  of  his  way  and  that 
he  never  tried  afterwards  to  carry  out  this  policy.  An- 
other example  of  extremes  to  which  he  went  was  his  refusal 
to  permit  the  exchange  of  rum  and  molasses — two  waste 
products  of  the  sugar  industry  which  could  not  be  mar- 
keted in  France — for  New  England  food-stufFs  and  lumber, 
of  which  the  mother  country  could  not  furnish  a  sufficient 
supply.  Events  proved  that  this  exchange  was  so  profit- 
able that  the  French  government  was  forced  to  make  defi- 
nite^rovisions  to  permit  and  encourage  it. 

[Colbert's  plan  to  make  the  islands  absolutely  independ- 
ent of  all  foreign  aid  and  to  reserve  the  profit  of  their 
development  entirely  to  the  French  could  have  proved 
permanently  successful  only  by  building  up  what  might 
be  termed  an  ideal  colonial  empire.  Such  an  empire  would 
have  required  four  essential  parts  to  make  it  complete, 
namely,  the  mother  country,  temperate  zone  colonies.  West 
India  colonies,  and  trading-posts  on  the  coasts  of  Africa. 
In  general,  the  mother  country  should  furnish  a  supply 
of  manufactured  articles  of  all  descriptions,  and  a  suffi- 
ciently large  market  for  the  products  of  the  West  India 
colonies,  as  well  as  an  abundance  of  vessels  and  of  capital 
necessary  for  the  development  of  shipping  and  commerce; 
the  West  India  colonies  should  produce  such  articles  as 
sugar,  tobacco,  indigo,  cotton,  ginger,  dye-woods,  and 
other  articles  for  which  there  was  always  a  profitable 
market  in  Europe ;  the  temperate  zone  colonies  should 
yield  a  supply  of  food-stuffs,  live  stock  and  lumber,  suffi- 
cient to  satisfy  all  the  needs  of  the  West  India  colonies 
and  be  a  good  market  for  the  manufactures  of  the  mother 
country;  and  finally,  the  trading-posts  of  the  coast  of 
Africa  should  be  able  to   supply   a   sufficient  number  of 

834 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

slaves  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  planters  in  the  West 
Indies. 

It  was  generally  true  of  all  West  India  colonies  that 
their  exports  to  Europe  far  outweighed  their  imports. 
This  was  so,  because  the  consumption  of  European  manu- 
factures was  relatively  small  and  because  in  most  cases 
European  countries  did  not  produce  a  surplus  of  lumber, 
live  stock  or  food-stuffs  sufficiently  large  to  satisfy  the 
needs  of  the  planters.  The  balance  of  trade  with  the 
mother  country  was  therefore  always  in  their  favour.  It 
was  by  this  balance  that  they  gained  a  means  of  buying 
in  other  markets  a  supply  of  the  articles  most  essential  to 
their  welfare  and  progress. 

Exactly  the  opposite  was  true  of  the  temperate  zone 
colonies.  They  imported  much  from  and  exported  little 
to  Europe.  They  produced,  in  general,  articles  which 
were  produced  in  the  mother  country  and  for  which  it 
offered  them  no  market.  They  were  consequently  forced 
to  find  a  middle  market  where  their  commodities  could  be 
exchanged,  either  for  letters  of  credit,  or  for  commodities 
which  could  be  marketed  in  the  mother  country.  It  was 
only  in  this  way  that  they  could  meet  the  balance  of  trade 
against  them.  They  found  this  middle  market  in  the  West 
India  colonies,  which  needed  an  abundance  of  the  very 
articles  they  offered,  and  could  give  them  in  exchange  the 
letters  of  credit  against  the  mother  country  or  commodi- 
ties which  they  could  use  to  settle  their  bills  in  Europe/y 

The  same  thing  was  true  of  the  trader  at  the  coast  of 
Africa.  His  cargo  of  slaves  could  be  readily  exchanged 
in  the  same  way  with  the  West  India  planter. 

An  ideal  empire,  so  to  speak,  would  have  been  one  in 
which  all  of  these  four  parts  were  sufficiently  productive 
to  supply  the  needs  of  the  others  and  sufficiently  pros- 
perous to  furnish  a  market  for  their  commodities  and  in 
which  a  balance  was  maintained  between  the  several  parts. 

335 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

No  such  empire  ever  existed.  The  British  had  very  pro- 
ductive West  India  and  southern  colonies,  as  well  as  pros- 
perous northern  temperate  zone  colonies.  But  the  devel- 
opment of  the  latter  was  too  rapid  for  the  former  and  the 
balance  was  destroyed.  The  northern  colonies  were  forced 
to  seek,  outside  of  the  empire,  larger  and  more  profitable 
markets.  The  French  empire  had  productive  West  India 
colonies,  but  was  very  weak  in  its  temperate  zone  colonies 
and  in  trading-posts  on  the  coast  of  Africa.  Colbert's 
efforts  to  stimulate  the  development  of  trade  between 
Canada  and  the  West  Indies,  and  to  build  up  the  slave 
trade  at  the  coast  of  Africa  indicate  that  he  was  awake  to 
the  importance  of  this  fact. 

We  have  had  occasion  to  see  that  his  efforts  to  build 
up  the  slave  trade  bore  some  fruit,  but  that  they  were  not 
sufficiently  successful  to  prevent  a  serious  check  to  the 
normal  development  of  the  islands.  We  have  seen  also 
that  the  development  of  Canada  was  so  slow  and  its  mar- 
kets so  distant  and  inaccessible,  that  trade  with  it  proved 
both  unimportant  and  unprofitable  to  the  West  India 
planter.  But  in  spite  of  these  two  very  important  facts, 
Colbert  persisted  in  enforcing  his  policy  of  excluding  all 
foreigners.  The  only  statistics  which  have  been  found  for 
1669-1683,  the  period  in  which  the  foreigners  were  ex- 
cluded so  rigourously,  rather  indicate  that  as  a  conse- 
quence the  development  of  the  islands  was  retarded.  Thus 
the  total  population  of  the  French  colony  of  St.  Chris- 
topher in  1671  was  8120,  of  which  4468  were  slaves,  in 
1682  it  was  7278,  of  which  4301  were  slaves,  showing  a 
decrease  in  both  white  and  slave  population.'  In  Guade- 
loupe the  total  population  in  1671  was  7477,  of  which 
4167  were  slaves,  and  in  1684  it  was  8161,  of  which  4954 
were  slaves.^     The  increase  for  thirteen  years  was  thus 

1  Arch.  Col.,  Gi,  471,  Recensement  de  St.  Christophe,  1671,  1682. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  468,  469,  Recensement  de  la  Guadeloupe. 

336 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

very  slight.  In  St.  Domingo  alone  does  the  development 
seem  to  have  been  rapid.  Its  population  was  1500  in 
1669,^  6648  (2102  slaves)  in  1681.*  But  it  was  exactly 
at  St.  Domingo  that  Colbert's  efforts  to  exclude  the  for- 
\  eigner  were  not  successful.  We  have  had  occasion  to  see 
'  that  they  were  trading  freely  with  the  Dutch  in  1670  and 
again  in  1676.  The  inference  is  natural  that  the  other 
islands  suffered  from  the  enforcement  of  his  policy. 

Colbert  would  have  replied  to  this  by  saying  that  it  was 
better  for  the  development  of  a  colony  to  be  less  rapid  and 
to  retain  the  profit  thereof  for  the  mother  country,  than 
for  it  to  be  more  rapid  and  to  let  the  foreigner  share  in 
the  profit.  He  remarked,  in  fact,  in  a  letter  to  a  colonial 
administrator  that  he  should  not  be  surprised,  if  the  en- 
forcement of  the  regulations  against  the  foreigner  resulted 
in  "quelqiies  inconvenient s^'  to  the  planters.^  "I  know  very 
well,"  he  wrote  to  another,  "that  these  innovations  [the 
regulations  against  foreign  traders]  will  prove  at  first 
somewhat  irksome,  and  that  people  who  do  not  see  beyond 
the  present  good  or  ill  prove  rather  difficult  to  control, 
when  they  are  forced  to  make  some  real  sacrifice,  but  it  is 
precisely  at  such  times  that  reason,  justice  and,  if  neces- 
sary, force,  should  be  employed  to  make  them  submit."® 

There  are,  perhaps,  many  other  features  of  Colbert's 
policy  which  modern  economists  would  be  inclined  to  criti- 
cise severely,  such  as  his  tendency  to  pay  little  heed  to 
the  larger  economic  interests  of  the  colonies  by  placing 
the  sale  of  their  tobacco  in  the  hands  of  a  monopoly,  which 
destroyed  the  industry  in  the  Windward  Islands  and  seri- 

3  Charlevoix,  II,  82,  M6moire  par  Ogeron,  1669. 

4  Arch.  Nat.  CoL,  C9,  I,  Denombrement  gen,  de  I'isle  de  la  Tortue 
et  Coste  de  St.  Dom.  mai,  1681;  Arch.  CoL,  Gj,  Recensement  de  St. 
Domingue. 

5  Clement,  III,  2,  p.  484,  letter  to  P^lissier,  June  21,  1670. 

6  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  B,  2,  fol.  135,  letter  to  de  Baas,  December  21, 
1670. 

337 


THE  COMMERCIAL  POLICY  OF  COLBERT 

ously  hurt  it  at  St.  Domingo,  or  by  subjecting  colonial 
sugar  to  the  mercy  of  French  refiners  which  brought  a 
period  of  distress  from  1670  to  1679,  and  finally  by  pro- 
viding no  means  to  prevent  French  traders  from  demand- 
ing  exorbitant  prices  for  their  wares  during  the  period 
^  of  transition,  before  there  were  enough  of  them  for  com- 
petition to  insure  fair  prices. 

But  one  redeeming  feature  of  Colbert's  whole  commer- 
I  cial  policy,  which  makes  one  pardon  many  a  fault,  was  the 
N  fact  that  it  was  eminently  patriotic.  Colbert  worked  inde- 
fatigably  for  the  interests  of  France  and  of  her  people. 
Personal  interests,  the  interests  of  commercial  companies 
and  of  the  colonies  were  all  subjected  to  sacrifices  which 
would  insure  the  realization  of  his  larger  plan  to  increase 
the  wealth  of  the  nation  and  to  lift  France  to  a  position  of 
real  and  abiding  power. 

It  had   another,   as  M.   Pigeonneau  has   pointed   out: 
/         r*Good  or  bad  in  theory,  in  conformity  or  not  with  the 
\y  jprinciples  of  economy,  Colbert's  policy  had  one  merit  which 

/  ^s  ^re  valuable  than  many :  it  jvas__successf uL/  Col- 
^be^rm  found  tETTi-ench  m  lbbl,"at  TETb^ning  of 
his  mmistry,  in  possession  of  some  rich  West  India  colo- 
nies, but  he  saw  their  whole  profit  going  to  enrich  the 
enterpnsmg  traders  of  Holland.  Only  a  few  straggling 
French  vessels,  three  or  four  in  1662,  out  of  a  total  of 
150,  he  said,  were  finding  their  way  to  these  colonies.  At 
his  death  in  1683,  he  had  driven  the  Dutch  from  the  field 
and  more  than  WO  French  vessels  were  trading  annually 
at  Martmique,  Guadeloupe  and  St.  Domingo.  He  had 
awakened  the  ports  of  La  Rochelle,  Bordeaux  and  Nantes, 
especially  to  new  life,  and  the  West  India  trade  became 
henceforth  a  source  of  much  profit  to  their  merchants  and 


TOWARD  THE  FRENCH  WEST  INDIES 

traders  and  served  as  a  base  of  their  whole  commercial 
development  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

It  is  curious  to  note  that  in  1664  Colbert  viewed  with 
much  scepticism  the  enthusiasm  of  de  Tracy  as  to  the  pos- 
sibilities to  be  realized  in  the  development  of  the  West 
India  colonies.  He  wrote  in  the  margin  of  his  letter, 
dated  July  2  of  that  year:  "He  (de  Tracy)  exaggerates 
the  great  advantages  which  the  nation  may  derive  from 
these  colonies."^  In  reality  their  development  proved  to 
be  the  most  valuable  colonial  asset  which  France  pos- 
sessed and  contributed  more  to  her  commercial  prosperity 
than  any  other  single  branch  of  trade.  And  it  was  in  this  ) 
trade,  established  after  a  long  and  determined  fight,  that 
Colbert  made  his  most  permanent  contribution  to  the  com- 
merce of  France. 

8  Arch.  Nat.  Col.,  Cg,  I,  D^p^che  de  M.  de  Tracy  de  I'isle  de  la 
Martinique,  July  2,  1664.  In  the  margin  in  Colbert's  hand,  "II 
exag^re  les  grands  avantages  que  I'estat  peut  retirer  de  ces  establis." 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  manuscript  material  for  the  history  of  the  French 
West  Indies  prior  to  the  ministry  of  Colbert,  treated  in 
Chapter  I  of  the  present  work,  is  very  meagre.  This  is 
to  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  these  islands  were  in  the 
hands  either  of  private  commercial  companies  or  of  pro- 
prietors throughout  the  period.  The  ministries  of  Riche- 
lieu and  of  Mazarin  were  only  indirectly  connected  with 
their  administration.  The  few  documents  which  remain 
from  the  official  relations  of  the  government  are  to  be 
found  principally  in  Paris,  at  the  Foreign  Office  in  vols. 
IV  and  V  of  the  section  of  its  archives,  Memoires  et  Docn^ 
merits,  Amerique.  Their  preservation  at  the  Foreign  Office 
is  to  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  during  this  period  the 
administration  of  the  colonies  fell  within  the  duties  of  the 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Little  has  remained  to  us 
from  the  private  papers  of  the  Company  of  St.  Christo- 
pher (1626-1635)  and  the  Company  of  the  Isles  of  Amer- 
ica (1635-1648).  From  those  of  the  latter  company  there 
does  remain  a  register  of  the  minutes  of  the  meetings  of 
its  directors.  It  is  noted  below  under  series  F2  of  the 
Archives  Coloniales.  The  private  papers  of  the  several 
proprietors  who  held  the  islands  from  1648  to  1664  seem 
to  have  completely  disappeared.  This  loss  is  all  the  more 
deplorable  because  the  "Fouquet  papers,"  which  undoubt- 
edly contained  most  valuable  material,  have  also  been  lost. 
Attention  has  been  called  in  Chapters  I  and  II  to  the 
important  role  which  Nicolas  Fouquet  played  in  colonial 
affairs,  and  Du  Tertre  notes  the  existence  of  his  papers. 
(See  Du  Tertre,  I,  passim,  and  Dampierre,  pp.  210-212.) 
The  chances  of  finding  the  "Fouquet  papers"  seem  slight 
and  the  great  gaps  in  the  manuscript  material  for  the 

341 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


period  will  probably  remain  unclosed.  Fortunately,  we 
have  some  excellent  contemporary  chronicles,  travels  and 
histories  which  cover  the  period.  A  list  of  them  is  given 
below  and  a  critical  estimate  of  their  authors  and  of  their 
value  will  be  found  in  Dampierre.  (See  below.)  The  most 
important  of  them  all  is  the  general  work  of  Du  Tertre, 
which  records  the  history  from  the  beginning  to  the  year 
1667.  The  more  deeply  and  carefully  one  studies  the 
period  and  attempts  to  analyze  Du  Tertre's  work,  the 
greater  grows  his  admiration  for  that  historian.  His 
history  is  based  upon  a  careful  and  impartial  study  of 
the  best  contemporary  material,  contains  an  abundance  of 
documents,  cited  textually,  and  has  an  enhanced  value 
from  the  fact  that  its  author  knew  the  West  Indies  from 
travel  and  residence  in  them. 

For  the  period  from  the  ascension  of  Colbert  to  power, 
in  1661,  to  the  formation  of  the  West  India  Company  in 
1664,  which  we  have  preferred  to  call  the  period  of  prep- 
aration, our  manuscript  sources  are  confined  to  a  few 
documents  at  the  Foreign  Office  (noted  below  under  Mem. 
et  Doc,  AmSrique,  V)  and  at  the  Colonial  Office  (noted 
below  under  series  Ci4,  Cayenne),  relating  to  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Company  of  Cayenne,  and  to  a  few  memorials 
addressed  to  Colbert  during  the  years  1660-1663,  and 
preserved  in  the  second  series  of  the  correspondence  of 
Martinique  of  which  a  list  is  given  below. 

For  the  period  of  the  rule  of  the  West  India  Company 
(1664-1674),  there  is  a  wide  gap  in  our  source  material 
occasioned  by  the  disappearance  of  the  company's  regis- 
ters and  private  papers.  Prolonged  research  has  failed 
to  find  a  trace  of  them.  Their  loss  is  irreparable.  For  the 
years  1664-1669,  we  are  forced  to  rely  upon  Du  Tertre 
(to  the  year  1667),  upon  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery  {Loix 
etConsUtutions.  see  below)  and  upon  a  few  memorials  and 
letters  addressed  by  the  directors  of  the  company  to  Col- 

342 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

bert.  A  list  of  the  more  important  of  the  last  named  will 
be  found  below  under  the  series  F2  of  the  Archives  Colo- 
niales.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  list  includes  also  documents 
for  the  period  1669-1674.  To  the  knowledge  of  the  writer 
these  papers  have  never  been  made  use  of  before.  The  loss 
of  the  company's  papers  is  less  serious  for  the  years  1669- 
1674,  because  in  the  former  year  Colbert  came  officially 
in  charge  of  colonial  affairs  and  began  at  once  to  direct 
both  the  policy  of  the  company  and  the  trend  of  affairs  in 
the  West  Indies.  He  placed  all  students  of  the  West 
Indies  under  lasting  obligations  to  him  by  commanding  the 
preservation  both  of  his  own  correspondence  and  of  that  of 
the  colonial  governors,  intendants  and  other  officials. 

The  material  thus  preserved  by  Colbert  constitutes  our 
richest  collection  of  source  material  for  the  period  1669- 
1683.  It  is  to  be  found  today  at  the  Archives  Nationales, 
having  been  deposited  there  by  the  Minister  of  the  Colo- 
nies in  the  spring  of  1910.  Research  is  long  and  difficult 
from  the  fact  that  neither  a  catalogue  nor  a  calendar  has 
ever  been  made.  A  very  summary  inventory  in  manu- 
script is  the  only  aid  to  guide  one  to  the  various  series  and 
dates  of  volumes.  Pains  have  been  taken,  therefore,  to 
give  elsewhere  in  this  bibliography  enough  data  about  the 
material  to  make  it  easy  for  a  student  to  find  it  readily. 

To  supplement  this  valuable  collection  we  have  yet 
another  in  the  Archives  Coloniales,  namely,  the  Collection 
Moreau  de  Saint-Meryy  consisting  of  287  volumes.  (A 
short  sketch  of  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery  will  be  found  in 
Dampierre,  pp.  192-194,  and  in  a  paper  read  by  the 
author  of  the  present  work  before  the  American  Philo- 
sophical Society  of  Philadelphia  and  to  be  found  in  the 
proceedings  of  that  society  for  April,  1912.)  The  char- 
acter of  the  collection  is  shown  by  the  data  given  below 
and  is  such  that  it  offers  to  the  student  of  French  West 
India  history  a  mine  of  information. 

343 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Colbert  apparently  retained  among  his  own  private 
papers  many  official  documents  which  are  most  important 
for  a  study  dealing  with  any  phase  of  his  ministry.  In 
the  Salle  de  MSS  of  the  BibHotheque  Nationale  are  to 
be  found  two  large  collections  of  Colbert's  papers,  the 
one  known  as  the  Cinq  Cents  de  Colbert,  and  the  other,  as 
the  Melanges  de  Colbert.  Research  in  either  of  these 
collections  is  difficult,  but  is  indispensable. 

The  intimate  relations  existing  between  the  history  of 
the  marine  and  of  the  colonies  render  it  obligatory  for  the 
investigator  to  consult  the  large  and  rich  collection  of 
documents  deposited  some  years  ago  at  the  Archives  Na- 
tionals by  the  Minister  of  the  Marine.  This  is  espe- 
cially true,  because  the  administration  of  the  colonies 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Department  of  the  Marine 
until  1892. 

Our  researches  in  the  ports  of  France  which  carried  on 
trade  with  the  West  Indies  have  been  on  the  whole  dis- 
appointing. In  many  cases  the  admiralty  records  have 
completely  disappeared.  This  is  especially  true  for  Rouen, 
Havre  and  Dieppe.  Only  unsatisfactory  fragments  have 
remained  at  La  Rochelle,  while  at  Bordeaux  there  are 
many  wide  gaps  in  the  material.  At  Nantes  alone  was  the 
reward  great  for  many  days  of  patient  work.  In  the  case 
of  the  last  three  ports,  the  material  found  has  been  tabu- 
lated below  and  the  results  utilized  in  Chapter  X  above. 

This  study  has  been  based  in  large  measure  upon  the 
manuscript  material  thus  briefly  described.  Collections  of 
printed  documents,  such  as  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  Loix 
et  Constitutions  des  colonies  fran^aises  de  VAmeriqiie  sous 
le  Vent  and  of  printed  official  correspondence  such  as  the 
pubHcations  of  Clement,  Depping  and  Boislisle  (see  below) 
have  been  found  convenient  for  a  more  careful  study  of 
many  documents  found  in  manuscript.  Qessalleg,  Histoire 
generale   des   Antilles,   the   only   general   history    of   the 

844 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

French  West  Indies  which  we  have,  may  be  used  as  a  his- 
torical guide.  Dessalles'  work  is  based  upon  the  study  of 
some  of  the  material  in  the  Archives  Coloniales  referred  to 
above,  but  it  was  evidently  hastily  written  and  its  value 
is  much  decreased  by  the  failure  of  the  author  to  cite  his 
sources.  Moreover,  it  treats  economic  and  commercial 
questions  only  very  superficially,  a  fact  which  has  con- 
siderably reduced  its  utility  for  this  work.  The  same 
criticism  holds  good  for  Sidney  Daney's  Histoire  de  la 
Martinique  and  Jules  Ballet's  La  Guadeloupe.  Of  the 
general  works  on  Colbert,  those  of  Clement  and  Joubleau 
are  the  most  valuable.  Neither  of  them  treats,  however, 
the  question  of  Colbert's  colonial  policy  except  in  its 
broadest  outlines.  Benoit  du  Rey  has  attempted  a  special 
study  on  Colbert's  colonial  policy,  but  it  is  very  superficial 
and  inadequate.  The  author  gives  no  evidence  of  having 
ever  darkened  the  door  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Colonies  to 
find  material.  Peytraud's  UEsclavage  aux  Antilles  fran^- 
aises  avant  1789,  is  the  most  serious  monograph  which  has 
been  written  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  history  of 
the  French  Antilles.  It  is  to  be  regretted,  however,  that 
M.  Peytraud  attempted  to  prove  a  thesis  and  was  not  con- 
tent to  use  his  valuable  data  to  write  a  real  history  of 
slavery  in  these  islands.  M.  Chemin-Dupontes  in  his  Les 
compagnies  de  colonisation  en  Afrique  occidentale  sous 
Colbert,  has  presented  a  short,  but  valuable  study  of  the 
West  India  Company  and  of  the  two  companies  of  Senegal. 
In  regard  to  the  former  company,  M.  Chemin-Dupontes 
apparently  overlooked  the  very  important  documents  at 
the  Colonial  Office  and  we  have  been  compelled  to  disagree 
with  him  in  some  of  his  conclusions  as  to  the  two  last  named 
companies.  Malvezin's  Histoire  du  commerce  de  Bordeaux 
is  the  only  work  treating  the  history  of  any  of  the  several 
ports  engaged  in  the  West  India  trade  that  is  of  much 
value.     It  is  a  work  of  sound  scholarship. 

345 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Of  the  remaining  works  included  in  the  bibliography 
below,  there  are  none  of  immediate  value  for  our  subject, 
but  they  have  been  referred  to  for  their  indirect  value, 
which  will  be  readily  understood  from  their  titles. 

BiBLIOGEAPHIES 

There  is  only  one  bibliography,  properly  speaking,  for 
any  part  of  the  period  covered  by  this  study,  namely, 
Jacques  de  Dampierre,  Essai  sur  les  sources  de  Vhistoire 
des  Antilles  Fran^aises  (1492-1664),  Paris,  1904,  being 
vol.  VI  of  Memoires  et  Docv/ments  publies  par  la  societe  de 
VEcole  des  Chart es. 

Manuscript  Sources 

archives  coloniales 

(Deposited  at  the  Archives  Nationales.     Referred  to  in  notes 
as  Arch.  Nat.  Col.) 

S6rie  A.  Actes  du  pouvoir  souverain.  Edits  et  arrets,  vol.  24? 
(1669-1715).  A  register  of  regulations  of  the  conseil  d'etat, 
of  the  conseil  souverain  of  Martinique,  incomplete  and 
lacking  order  in  the  arrangement  of  documents. 

S^rie  B.  Correspondance  generate,  Lettres  envoyees.  Regis- 
ters of  letters  written  by  the  Minister  of  the  Marine  to  gov- 

-  ernors,  intendants,  naval  officers,  etc.,  in  regard  to  colonial 
affairs. 

Vol.  1  (1663-1669),  vol.  2  (1670),  vol.  3  (1671),  vol.  4 
(1672),  vol.  5  (1673),  vol.  6  (1674-1675),  vol.  7  (1676- 
1678),  vol.  9  (1679-1682),  vol.  10  (1683). 

Serie  C.  Correspondance  generate,  Lettres  regues.  Bound 
volumes  of  the  original  letters  and  memorials  received  from 
colonial  governors,  intendants,  and  other  officials.  The 
documents  are  arranged  according  to  their  date  and  locality 
from  which  they  came. 

346 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

C7  (Guadeloupe),  vol.  1  (1649-1670),  contains  only  three 
documents  of  importance  for  this  study  prior  to  1669, 
namely,  two  letters  from  du  Lion,  the  governor  of  Guade- 
loupe, of  April  8  and  May  11,  1665,  and  one  of  February 
17,  1666.  The  remainder  of  the  volume  contains  du  Lion's 
correspondence  for  1669  and  1670. 

Vol.  2  (1671-1673)  and  vol.  3  (1674-1691)  contain  du 
Lion's  correspondence  and  that  of  his  successor,  Hinselin, 
as  well  as  that  of  de  Temericourt,  governor  of  Marie  Ga- 
lante. 

Cg  (Martinique),  vol.  1  (1663-1676),  is  of  capital  im- 
portance as  it  contains  the  interesting  letters  of  de  Baas, 
governor-general  of  the  islands  from  I668  to  1676.  The 
date  of  the  first  letter  preserved  is  December  26,  1669-  After 
that  date  his  correspondence  seems  to  have  been  preserved 
with  but  few  gaps.  The  volume  contains  also  two  interest- 
ing memoirs,  one  by  Gabaret,  commander  of  the  three  ves- 
sels sent  in  1670  to  drive  Dutch  traders  from  the  islands, 
the  other,  by  Pelissier,  whose  mission  to  the  islands  in  1670 
is  treated  in  Chapter  VI.  For  the  years  anterior  to  Decem- 
ber 26,  1669,  the  volume  contains  an  important  memoir  of 
1663  addressed  by  d'Estrades  to  Colbert,  an  abrege  of  the 
letters  written  by  de  Tracj^  from  Martinique  in  1664,  and 
some  extracts  of  letters  written  by  de  Baas  in  May,  1669, 
to  the  West  India  Company.  Vol.  2  (1677-1680)  and  vol. 
3  (1681-1684)  are  chiefly  important  for  the  correspond- 
ence of  de  Blenac,  de  Baas's  successor,  and  of  Patoulet,  the 
active  and  intelligent  intendant-general  of  the  islands. 

Cg  (Martinique),  2°"®  Serie.  A  collection  of  miscellaneous, 
unbound  documents  in  cartons,  classified  chronologically  and 
relating  to  the  history  of  Martinique.  Carton  1  (1635-1689) 
contains  a  number  of  documents  referred  to  in  Chapters  I 
and  II  of  the  present  work.  Among  them  the  following  are 
the  most  important:  Reglement  de  M.  de  Tracy  pour  le 
gouvernement,  police  et  commerce  de  la  Martinique,  17  mars 
1665;  Relation  des  Isles  de  I'Amerique  Antilles  en  I'Estat 
qu'elles  estoient  I'annee  I66O;  Memoire  contenant  les  avis  et 
sentiments  de  diiFerents  capitaines  de  navires  voyageurs  et 

347 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

autres  sur  les  moyens  de  former  des  etablissements  a  I'Amer- 
ique  meridionale,  I66I ;  Memoire  du  Sieur  Formont  pour 
montrer  I'utilite  du  commerce  des  Isles  et  les  moyens  de  le 
bien  etablir,  1662;  Proposition  au  Roy  d'une  nouvelle  com- 
pagnie  a  establir  pour  les  Isles  fran9aises  de  I'Amerique  par 
le  Sieur  Nacquart,  1663;  Relation  de  ce  qui  s'est  passe  aux 
Isles  de  I'Amerique,  4  avril  1667;  Memoire  du  Sieur  Bellin- 
zani  sur  le  Commerce  des  Isles,  12  mars  1672;  Memoire  pour 
M.  Begon  par  M.  Patoulet;  and  four  letters  from  de  Baas 
bearing  dates  of  March  4,  September  21,  1670,  January  14, 
1671,  and  August  28,  1674. 

C9  (St.  Domingue),  vol.  1  (1664-1688),  contains  many 
interesting  letters  and  memoirs  from  the  hand  of  Ogeron 
and  of  Pouan9ay,  the  governors  of  St.  Domingo  from  1664 
to  1683. 

C9  (St  Domingue),  2°^"  Serie.  Carton  1  (1666-1710) 
contains  a  number  of  memoirs  and  miscellaneous  letters  re- 
lating to  St.  Domingo. 

Cjo  (lies  diverses).  A  series  of  twenty- four  cartons  con- 
taining miscellaneous  documents,  classified  chronologically 
and  relating  for  the  most  part  to  the  small  Windward 
Islands. 

Cio  (St.  Christophe).  Carton  1  (1627-1689)  contains 
many  documents  concerning  the  relations  of  the  English 
and  French  at  St.  Kitts.  Of  special  interest  are  two  mem- 
oirs of  1679  entitled:  Memoire  particulier  presante  a  M.  le 
Chevalier  de  St.  Laurent,  gouverneur  pour  le  roy  de  St. 

Christophe  et  Isles  adjacentes,  par  Cloche directeur  du 

Dom.  Royal  d'Occident  dans  les  Isles  de  I'Amerique  pour 
I'interruption  du  negoce  etranger,  etc.,  and  Estat  ou  est  Flsle 
de  St.  Christophe  au  sujet  de  I'interruption  du  commerce  des 
Etrangers. 

Cio  (La  Grenade).  Carton  1  (1654-1724)  contains  the 
passport  of  the  Dutch  trader,  Drik  Jansen,  whose  case  is 
discussed  in  Chapter  IX. 

C„  (Canada).  Vols.  4  and  5  contain  some  letters  and 
memoirs  from  the  hand  of  Talon,  the  intendant  of  Canada, 

348 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

which  concern  the  efforts  made  to  establish  trade  between 
Canada  and  the  West  Indies. 
Serie  F.     Services  divers  (464  registers,  41  cartons). 

F3  (Collection  Moreau  de  Saint-Mery,  287  vols.). 

Vols.  18-20  (1635-1790).  Historique  de  la  Guadeloupe. 
A  carefully  chosen  and  arranged  set  of  documents  bearing 
on  all  phases  of  Guadeloupe's  history.  Vol.  18  covers  the 
period  1635-1758. 

Vols.  26-38  (1635-1801).  Historique  de  la  Martinique, 
Vol.  26  covers  the  period  1635-1722. 

Vol.  39.     Description  de  la  Martinique. 

Vols.  52-53  (1627-1784).  Historique  de  St.  Christophe. 
Vol.  52  deals  with  our  period. 

Vol.  63.    Description  de  Tahago. 

Vols.  64-65.    Historique  de  Tahago  (1645-1788). 

Vols.  67-72.  Instructions  aux  Administrateurs  (l665- 
1788).     Vol.  67  deals  with  period  1665-1701. 

Vols.  96-101.  Description  de  la  partie  frangaise  de  St. 
Domingue. 

Vols.  102-105.  Description  de  la  partie  espagnole  de  St. 
Dofningue. 

Vols.  132-155.  Notes  historiques  sur  St.  Domingue  par 
Moreau  de  Saint-Mery. 

Vol.  157.     Administration  des  Isles  sous  le  Vent. 

Vols.  I6I-I63.     Culture,  manufactures  des  Colonies. 

Vols.  164-202.  Historique  de  St.  Domingue  (1492-1806). 
Vol.  164  (1492-1685). 

Vols.  221-235.  Code  de  la  Guadeloupe  (1635-1806). 
Vol.  221   (1635-1699). 

Vol.  236.  Recueil  des  Lois  particulieres  a  la  Guadeloupe 
(1671-1777). 

Vol.  237.  Description  historique  de  la  Guadeloupe  (1687- 
1812). 

Vols.  247-263.  Code  de  la  Martinique  (1629-1784).  Vol. 
247  (1629-1672)  and  vol.  248  (1673-1685). 

Vols.  269-281.  Code  de  St.  Domingue  (1492-1789).  Vol. 
269  (1492-1720). 

349 


/ 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

(At  the  Ministere  des  Colonies,  rue  Oudinot,  Paris.     Referred 
to  in  notes  as  Arch.  Col.) 

S^rie  Cq.  Compagnie  du  Senegal.  A  series  of  unbound  mem- 
oirs, letters,  accounts,  etc.,  of  the  first  two  Companies  of 
Senegal.     Carton  1  (1588-1690). 

S6rie  C14.  Correspondance  generate,  Lettres  regues,  Cayenne. 
Vol.  1  contains  much  interesting  material  concerning  the 
organization  and  history  of  the  Company  of  Cayenne  which 
has  been  utilized  in  Chapter  II. 

Serie  F2.  Compagnies  de  Commerce  avant  1716.  A  series 
consisting  of  nineteen  cartons  and  containing  some  precious 
fragments  which  remain  from  the  papers  of  various  com- 
mercial companies  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  cen- 
turies. The  following  are  of  importance  for  our  study. 
Carton  15.  Compagnies  des  Isles  de  VAmerique  et  Com- 
pagnies des  Indes  Occidentales.  This  carton,  together  with 
F2,  1 7,  contains  the  most  important  documents  which  remain 
to  us  of  the  West  India  Company's  papers.  The  most  impor- 
tant found  in  this  carton  are  the  following:  Memoire  des 
Directeurs  de  la  Cie.  des  Indes  Occidentales  pour  rendre 
raison  a  Mgr.  Colbert  de  leur  conduite  et  luy  faire  con- 
noistre  I'estat  ou  se  trouve  ladite  Compagnie  (1665)  ;  Mem- 
oire sur  I'estat  veritable  ou  se  trouve  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Occid. 
(1666);  Memoire  Important  pour  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Occid. 
pour  faire  connoistre  le  besoin  quelle  a  d'estre  soutenue 
(1667)  ;  Memoire  sur  I'estat  des  affaires  de  la  Cie.  des  Ind. 
Occid.  (November,  1667) ;  Estat  des  vaisseaux  qui  restent  a 
la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Occid.  (November,  1667)  ;  Memoire  de  ce  qui 
a  este  fait  pour  I'etablissement  et  conduite  de  ladite  Com- 
pagnie et  de  ce  qu'il  reste  a  faire  presentement  (by  Becha- 
meil,  January  15,  I668) ;  Extrait  du  Memoire  sur  I'estat  de 
la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Occid.  Cie.  d'Occident  a  este  fort  avant- 
ageuse  au  Roy  et  a  I'estat,  etc.;  Proces  Verbaux  de  1673  et 
de  1674. 

Carton  17.  Compagnies  des  Indes  Occidentales,  Edits, 
ordres  du  Roy,  Memoires,  166^-1716,  1722.  This  carton 
contains  about  sixty  documents  relating  to  the  history  of 

350 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

the  West  India  Company  up  to  its  dissolution  in  1674  and 
many  more  for  the  period  of  its  liquidation.  Besides  manu- 
script copies  of  many  edicts^  arrets  and  ordinances,  the  most 
important  of  which  were  published  by  Moreau  de  Saint- 
Mery  in  his  Constitutions  et  Loix  des  Colonies  frangaises  de 
VAmerique  sous  le  Vent,  vol.  I,  the  most  important  docu- 
ments for  our  study  are  the  following:  Contract  d' acquisi- 
tion de  la  Martinique  vendue  par  le  Sieur  Dyel  d'Enneval 
a  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  (August  14,  1665);  Memoire  de  la 
Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  sur  I'etat  ou  elle  se  trouve  et  les  secours 
qu'elle  attend  du  Roy  (1665)  ;  Memoire  des  Directeurs  de  la 
Cie.  des  Ind.  Occid.  a  Colbert  (1665)  ;  Memoire  pour  les  Isles 
(1665);  Memoire  de  ce  qui  doibt  estre  paye  par  les  soub- 
straittans  des  taxes  faicts  pour  la  descharge  des  recherches 
de  la  Chambre  de  Justice  dans  les  generallitez  de  ce  Roy- 
aume  a  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  (May,  1666);  Ordre  ou  juge- 
ment  du  conseil  prive  du  Roy  d'Angleterre  sur  la  requeste 
de  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  de  France  touchant  les  navires  pris 
avant  la  declaration  de  la  guerre;  Estat  present  des  affaires 
de  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Occid.  de  France  (May,  1666)  ;  Memoire 
sur  les  besoins  des  Isles  et  Terreferme  de  I'Amerique  et  la 
necessite  de  pourvoir  a  la  seurete  des  vais.  de  ladite  Com- 
pagnie,  etc.  (1665)  ;  Memoire  de  I'estat  present  des  Isles  et 
de  ce  que  la  Cie.  pent  faire  pour  leur  conservation  (par  M. 
Bechameil,  27  janv.  1667)  ;  Memoire  des  pieces  touchant  les 
navires  pris  par  les  Anglais  avant  la  declaration  de  Guerre 
sur  la  Cie.  des  Ind.  Oc.  de  France  (1667);  Sommaire  des 
Matieres  contenues  en  ce  Memoire  sur  lesquelles  Mgr.  doit 
prononcer  (1667). 

Vol.  18.  Histoire  ahregee  des  Compagnies  de  Commerce 
qui  ont  este  etahlies  en  France  depuis  I'annee  1626  avec  la 
collection  generale  de  tous  les  privileges  qui  ont  este 
accordes  depuis  166 ^  tant  a  ces  differ entes  Compagnies  qu'a 
la  Compagnie  perpetuelle  des  Indes,  etc.,  par  le  Sieur 
Dernis  employe  dans  les  Bureaux  de  ladite  Compagnie, 
1742,  pp.  515.     (A  bound  volume  in  manuscript.) 

Vol.  19.  Ordres  du  Roy  et  autres  Expeditions  de  la  Cie. 
des  Isles   de   VAmerique,   de   1635  a   16Jf7   avec   les   Actes 

851 


^ 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

d'assemhlees  tenues  par  cette  compagnie  pour  ce  qui  con- 
cerne  ses  affaires  particulieres  depuis  1635  jusqu'en  I64.8. 
For  full  description  see  Dampierre,  p.  219-  It  is  a  bound 
volume  in  manuscript  of  5l6  pages  and  has  been  used  in 
the  preparation  of  Chapter  I  above. 
Serie  F.  Commerce  des  Colonies.  Carton  1  (1663-17^7)  con- 
tains one  memoir  of  interest:  Memoire  des  moyens  qu'il  fau- 
droit  tenir  pour  empescher  aux  estrangers  le  negoce  des  Isles 
de  I'Amerique  et  de  I'utilite  qui  en  reviendroit  a  la  France 
(1663). 

ARCHIVES  DE   LA  MARINE 

(Deposited  at  the  Archives  Nationales  and  referred  to  in  notes 
Arch.  Nat.  Mar.) 

Didier-Neuville,  Etat  Sommaire  des  Archives  de  la  Marine 
anterieures  a  la  Revolution,  Paris,  1898. 

Inventaire  des  Archives  de  la  Marine,  Serie  B,  Service  gene- 
ral, Paris,  1885-1904.     The  first  six  volumes  have  appeared. 

Serie  A3.  Vol.  1  (1182-1671),  vol.  2  (1672-1784).  A  chron- 
ological list  of  edicts,  declarations,  arrets,  ordinances,  etc., 
concerning  the  marine,  commerce  and  the  colonies. 

Serie  B2.  Correspondance  generate:  Lettres  envoy ees,  ordres 
et  depeches.  Vols.  7,  9,  14,  23,  26,  29-31,  34,  36,  38,  40  and 
51.  This  collection  is  of  importance  for  our  subject  be- 
cause it  contains  many  letters  addressed  to  intendants  and 
commissioners  of  the  marine  resident  in  the  ports  of  Havre, 
Dieppe,  St,  Malo,  Nantes,  La  Rochelle  and  Bordeaux  and  to 
other  officials  in  regard  to  colonial  affairs. 

Serie  B3.  Correspondance  generate.  Lettres  regues  (1628- 
1789).  Vols.  7-10,  13,  15-17,  19,  27,  28,  31,  33,  S5,  39,  42. 
It  has  been  noted  elsewhere  in  this  bibliography  that  the 
departmental  archives  are  exceedingly  meagre  in  material 
throwing  light  upon  the  commercial  relations  of  the  several 
ports  with  the  West  Indies.  This  fact  renders  the  letters 
written  by  the  intendants  and  admiralty  officials  of  those 
ports  all  the  more  valuable.  It  is  these  letters  which  may  be 
consulted  in  this  series. 

352 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serie  B4.  Campagnes  1572  a  1789.  Vols.  5-9  contain  mate- 
rial relating  to  campaigns  in  the  West  Indies.  Vol.  5  con- 
tains some  interesting  material  on  the  war  with  Holland 
(1672-1676). 

Serie  B7.  Pays  Strangers,  Commerce  et  Consulats  (1261  a 
1789).  The  series  contains  many  interesting  letters  and 
memoirs  to  and  from  consuls  and  merchants  in  regard  to 
matters  of  trade.  It  is  especially  rich  for  the  latter  half 
of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV  for  memoirs  on  the  Spanish- 
American  trade.  These  memoirs  almost  invariably  contain 
material  of  interest  on  the  West  Indies.  Vol.  207,  209, 
485-488  have  been  consulted  with  profit  for  the  period  of 
Colbert's  ministry.  Vol.  209  contains  a  memoir  of  espe- 
cial interest  entitled,  Memoire  sur  le  commerce  d'Espagne 
aux  Indes  et  voyages  des  Flottes,  by  de  Bellinzani  (Jan- 
uary 19,  1679).  It  was  written  at  the  command  of  Colbert 
for  the  instruction  of  de  Seignelay,  his  son  and  successor. 

ARCHIVES   NATIONALES 

Serie  AD.  This  series  contains  some  material  of  prime  impor- 
tance to  our  subject.  Divisions  vii  and  xi  contain  the  most 
complete  collections  of  legislation  concerning  the  colonies 
which  we  have  found. 

Carton  AD,vii,  2 A.  Colonies  en  general  (1667-1789). 
Contains  many  edits,  ordonnances,  arrets,  etc.,  concerning 
commerce. 

Carton  AD,vii,  2 A,  3.  Canada,  St.  Domingue,  traite  des 
negres,  troupes  coloniales  (1667-1789). 

Carton  AD,vii,  3.  Edits,  arrets,  lettres-patentes,  police  et 
traite  des  noirs  (1670-1785). 

Carton  AD,vii,  5.     Galeres  et  gardes-cotes  (151^7-1786). 
Carton   AD,ix,   384-386.      Compagnies   des   Indes   et   du 
Senegal  (166^-1787). 

Carton  AD,xi,  9-     Commerce  en  general  (1617-1688)  ; 
37-40,  Grains  et  farines  (1569-1789)  ; 
48,  Sucres   (1660-1786)  ; 
48-51,  Tabac  (1629-1789). 

353 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serie  G7,  1312-1328.  Domaine  d' Occident  {1673-17 H).  The 
Domaine  d'Occident  was  a  revenue  farm  created  at  the  disso- 
lution of  the  West  India  Company  with  the  right  to  collect 
taxes  and  duties  in  the  islands.  Its  papers  contain  the  his- 
tory of  the  liquidation  of  the  West  India  Company  and 
contain  material  which  throws  light  upon  the  operation  of 
the  laws  of  trade.  Cartons  1312-1316  cover  the  period  of 
our  study. 

ARCHIVES  DU  MINI8TERE  DES  AFFAIRES  ETRANGERES 

Inventaire  sommaire  des  Archives  du  Department  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres,  Memoires  et  Documents,  2  vols.,  Paris, 
1892-1893. 

Memoires  et  Documents,  Amerique,  vols.  IV  (1592-1660)  and 
V  (1661-1690)  contain  many  documents  relating  to  the  his- 
tory of  the  West  Indies  during  the  seventeenth  century. 
The  guide,  whose  title  is  given  above,  is  easily  accessible  in 
all  large  libraries  and  makes  it  unnecessary  to  give  a  list 
of  these  documents.  Attention  must  be  called  to  the  fact, 
however,  that  vol.  V  contains  the  letters-patent  and  the  list 
of  stockholders  of  the  Company  of  Cayenne,  which  have  been 
utilized  in  Chapter  II,  as  also  the  instructions  of  de  Tracy  of 
November  19,  1663,  and  the  extremely  interesting  letter  and 
memoir  of  Pere  Plumier  on  conditions  at  St.  Domingo  in 
1690. 

Memoires  et  Documents,  France,  vols.  1991,  1992,  1993,  2018, 
all  contain  memoirs  of  interest  on  West  India  trade.  Vol. 
2017  contains  a  table  of  edicts,  arrets  and  ordinances  con- 
cerning trade  (1619-1759). 

BIBLIOTHEQUE    NATIONALE,    SALLE    DE    MSS 

Charles  de  la  Ronciere,  Catalogue  de  la  collection  des  Cinq 

Cents  de  Colbert,  Paris,  I9O8. 
Collection  des  Cinq  Cents  de  Colbert. 

Vol.    126.      Registre   contenant   diverses    expeditions    et 

depesches  dont  les  minutes  sont  de  la  main  de  Monseigneur, 

354 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1666-1667.  This  register  apparently  belongs  to  the  series 
of  registers  described  above  under  Archives  Coloniales,  B, 
and  Archives  de  la  Marine,  B2.  Why  it  was  retained  in  this 
private  collection,  we  have  not  been  able  to  find  out. 

Vol.  199.  Inventaire  general  et  description  de  tons  les 
vaisseaux  appartenans  aux  sujets  du  Roy  en  I'annee  166Jf,,  en 
consequence  d'un  arrest  du  Conseil  royal  des  finances  donne 
au  rapport  de  M.  Colbert.  The  title  is  self-explanatory. 
The  volume  is  of  capital  importance  in  revealing  the  con- 
dition of  the  merchant  marine  at  the  beginning  of  Colbert's 
ministry.  Only  a  relatively  small  part  of  the  material  has 
ever  been  utilized. 

Vol.  201.  Remarques  f aides  par  le  Sieur  Arnoul  sur  la 
marine  d'Hollande  et  d'Angleterre  dans  le  voyage  qu'il  en 
fit  en  Vannee  1670  par  ordre  de  M.  Colbert. 

Vol.  203.  Recueil  de  pieces  et  memoires  sur  la  marine,  le 
commerce  maritime  et  les  manufactures,  1515-166^. 

Vol.  204.  Registre  de  depeches  et  correspondance  de 
Colbert  concernant  le  commerce  exterieur  et  interieur  (1669) 
contains,  especially,  letters  to  Colbert  de  Croissy,  French 
ambassador  at  London,  in  regard  to  the  surrender  of  St. 
Christopher. 

Vol.  207.  Recueil  d'arrets  du  Conseil  d'Etat,  du  Conseil 
de  Commerce  et  de  privileges  concernant  les  manufactures, 
1661-1669. 
Melanges  de  Colbert.  A  valuable  collection  of  papers  and 
letters  addressed  to  Colbert.  The  catalogue  (in  manuscript) 
for  the  collection  is  entirely  too  summary  and  is  of  small  aid 
to  research.  Another  is  in  preparation  and  will  be  pub- 
lished shortly.  Letters  addressed  to  Colbert  by  different 
directors  of  the  Company  of  Cayenne  and  of  the  West  India 
Company,  such  as  Bechameil,  Matharel  and  Bibaud,  and 
by  colonial  administrative  officers,  such  as  de  Chambre  and 
dii  Lion,  and  by  officials  in  France,  such  as  Bellinzani  and 
Colbert  de  Terron,  are  to  be  found  in  vols.  103-114,  II6  bis, 
118  bis,  121,  122-124. 
Collection  Margry  relative  a  Vhistoire  des  colonies  et  de  la  Ma- 
rine frangaise.    (Nouvelles  acquisitions,  9256-9510.)    A  large 

855 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

collection  of  miscellaneous  documents,  some  originals,  some 
copies,  relating  to  the  history  of  the  French  colonies.  For 
a  short  notice  and  criticism  of  Margry  and  of  his  plans  see 
Jacques  de  Dampierre,  Essai  sur  les  sources  de  Vhistoire  des 
Antilles  frangaises,  U92-1664,  pp.  178  ff.  Vols.  9318- 
9336  relate  to  the  Antilles  and  to  the  coast  of  South  Amer- 
ica. For  the  most  part  we  have  found  only  copies  of  docu- 
ments of  which  the  originals  had  already  been  studied  in 
various  other  depositories  of  Paris.  Vol.  9325  is  an  excep- 
tion, as  it  contains  some  biographical  data  concerning 
Ogeron,  governor  of  St.  Domingo.  Vol.  9326  is  a  copy  of 
Histoire  de  St.  Domingue  par  de  Beauval  Segur,  a  history  in 
manuscript  which  was  probably  written  shortly  after  1750. 
Fonds  frangais,  vols.  8990-8992.  Memoires  pour  Vhistoire  de 
I'isle  de  St.  Domingue  par  le  Pere  J.  B.  Le  Pers,  Jesuite.  A 
most  interesting  discussion  as  to  the  relations  and  relative 
merits  of  this  work  and  of  Charlevoix,  L'histoire  de  VIsle 
espagnole  is  to  be  found  in  H.  Lorin,  De  prcedonihus  Insulam 
S.  Dominici  celebrantibus  and  in  J.  de  Dampierre,  op.  cit., 
pp.  158  ff. 

Vols.  11315-11318.  Correspondance  de  Patoulet  (1679- 
1685).  Special  attention  has  been  called  in  Chapter  XII  to 
the  important  work  which  Patoulet  did  in  the  islands  as 
intendant  from  1679  to  1681.  Letters  addressed  to  him 
during  his  sojourn  in  the  islands  are  of  both  interest  and 
importance.  These  volumes  contain  among  others  original 
letters  from  Seignelay,  de  Blenac,  governor-general  of  the 
French  West  Indies,  and  Anthoine  Allaire,  a  merchant  of  La 
Rochelle.  The  letters  from  the  last  named  are  of  unusual 
interest  in  throwing  light  on  some  of  the  practical  problems 
of  trade,  as  Patoulet  seems  to  have  carried  on  regular  trade 
in  colonial  products  with  Allaire. 

ARCHIVES   DEPARTEMENTALES 

Archives  depart ement ales  de  la  Gironde  (at  Bordeaux).  Of 
the  admiralty  records  for  the  port  of  Bordeaux,  the  following 
volumes  have  been  examined: 

356 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serie  B.  Registres  d' entrees,  vols.  150  (1640-1643),  151 
(1643-1645),  153  (1661),  154  (1667),  155  (1669),  156 
(1670),  157  (1672),  158  (1682),  159  (1684). 

Registres  de  sorties,  vols.  181  (1649),  182  (1651-1653), 
183  (1663),  184  (1671),  185  (l672),  186  (1673),  187 
(1682),  188  (1683). 

Serie  C.  Chambre  de  Commerce  de  Guienne,  vol.  940.  Some 
correspondence  concerning  armaments  for  the  American 
colonies. 

Carton  1649-  Correspondence  of  the  intendants  of 
Guienne  ...  in  regard  to  the  duty  of  three  per  cent  on 
sugar  (1649-1772). 

Archives  departementales  de  la  Charente  Inferieure  (at  La 
Rochelle).  Unfortunately  the  Admiralty  registers  for  the 
port  of  La  Rochelle  seem  to  have  been  lost.  Only  a  frag- 
ment of  a  register  bearing  the  date  1682-1696,  classified  as 
B,  235,  has  been  found.  A  large  number  of  unclassified 
papers  consisting  of  passports,  lists  of  crews,  certificates  of 
inspection  of  vessels,  still  remain  and  contain  valuable  data, 
but  they  are  in  such  wild  disorder  and  were  so  damaged  by 
dampness  before  being  deposited  in  their  present  locality 
that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  conduct  any  satisfactory 
methodical  researches.  The  task  proved  too  gigantic  to 
search  at  haphazard  through  all  the  mass  of  unclassified 
papers.  Some  of  them  were  examined  and  the  results  are 
stated  in  Chapter  X  above.  Unfortunately  the  archives  of 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  La  Rochelle  do  not  bear  dates 
anterior  to  1719. 

Archives  departementales  de  la  Loire  Inferieure  (at  Nantes). 
Leon  Maitre,  Inventaire  sommaire  des  Archives  departe- 
mentales anterieures  a  1790,  Loire  Inferieure,  Series  C  et  D, 
Nantes,  1898. 

The  Admiralty  records  for  the  port  of  Nantes  offer  a 
rich  unexplored  field.  They  are  very  complete  for  the  sec- 
ond half  of  Louis  XIV's  reign.  It  was  apparently  planned 
to  keep  four  sets  of  registers:  one  for  vessels  coming  (1) 
from  other  ports  of  Brittany  ("province"),  (2)  from  ports 
of  France  outside  of  Brittany  ("hors  province"),  (3)  from 

857 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

foreign  ports  ("etranger"),  and  (4)  from  colonial  markets 
("long  cours").  Records  of  sailings  were  to  be  kept  after 
the  same  classification.  Registers  were  also  kept  of  declara- 
tions made  by  captains  or  proprietors  of  vessels  for  the  pur- 
pose of  obtaining  passports.  In  actual  practice  this  classi- 
fication was  not  followed  for  it  is  not  very  unusual  to  find  the 
sailing  or  arrival  of  a  vessel  engaged  in  colonial  commerce 
("long  cours")  entered  in  a  register  bearing  the  title  "hors 
province"  or  "etranger." 

Unfortunately  for  the  present  study  the  registers  of  sail- 
ings have  not  been  preserved  for  the  period  anterior  to  1673, 
nor  the  registers  of  arrivals  anterior  to  1 694!. 
Serie  B,  1.     Registre  d*enregistrement  des  passe-ports  pour 
province,  hors  province  et  etranger  (January-May,   1673). 
Ibid.,  2.    Idem  (May  10,  1673—5  March,  1674). 
Ibid.,  3.     Declaration  de  Sorties,  etranger  (1674.-1675), 
including  registration  of  passports  for  ports  of  France,  for- 
eign European  ports  and  colonial  ports. 

Ibid.,  4    (1675-1677),  5    (1677-1679),  6    (1679-1685). 
Idem. 


ARCHIVES  DE  LA  CHAMBRE   DE   COMMERCE  DE  NANTES 

(Leon  Maitre's  Inventaire  sommaire  referred  to  in  the  preced- 
ing section  includes  under  series  C  an  admirable  catalogue 
of  these  archives.) 

Serie  C,  722,  1652-1791.     Cies.  des  Indes  Occidentals  et  de 
St.  Domingue. 

Ibid.,  724,  1671-1789.  Edits,  ordonnances  .  .  .  portant 
reglements  pour  Ventrie  et  la  sortie  des  Marchandises  venant 
de.  Isles  fran^aises  de  I'AmSrique  et  du  Canada  .  .  .  listes 
d  arrets  concerrmnt  les  isles  d'Amerique  de  1665  a  17U  etc 
Ibid.,  730,  1670-1789.  Industne  et  commerce  des  snores 
raffmes. 

Ibid.,  733  and  734,  1671-1790.     Contain  many  documents 
concerning  the  production,  refining  and  commerce  of  sugar. 
Ibid.,  735,  1670-1789.    Commerce  eMrieur  avec  les  isles. 
858 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Printed  Sources 

collections  of  laws,  letters,  memoirs  and  other  con- 
temporary documents 

Petit  de  Vievigne  (Jacques)^  Code  de  la  Martinique ,  St.  Pierre 

(Martinique),  1767. 
Moreau   de   Saint-Mery,   Loix   et    Constitutions   des    Colonies 

Frangaises  de  VAmerique  sous  le  Vent,  Paris,  1784-1790,  6 

vols.     Vol.  I. 
CleDient   (Pierre),  Lettres,  Instructions  et  Memoires  de  Col- 
bert, Paris,  1861-1882,  10  vols.     Vol.  Ill,  part  2. 
Depping  (G.  B.),  Correspondance  Administrative  sous  le  regne 

de  Louis  XIV,  Paris,  1850-1851,  4  vols. 
Boislisle  (A.  M.  de),  Correspondance  des  controleurs  generaux 

des  finances  avec  les  intendants  des  provinces,  Paris,  1874- 

1897,  3  vols. 
Breard    (Charles   et   Paul),  Documents   relatifs   a   la   marine 

Normande  et  a  ses  Armements  aux  XVP  et  XVIP  siecles 

pour  le  Canada,  VAfrique,  les  Antilles,  le  Bresil  et  les  Indes, 

Rouen,  1899. 

CONTEMPORARY  CHRONICLES,  HISTORIES,  ETC. 

Bouton  (Le  Pere  Jacques),  Relation  de  I'etahlissement  des 
Frangais  depuis  Van  1635  en  I'lsle  de  la  Martinique  I'une 
des  Antilles  de  VAmerique,  Paris,  1640. 

Coppier  (Guillaume),  Histoire  et  Voyage  des  Indes  Occident- 
ales,  Lyon,  1645. 

Pacifique  de  Provins  (Le  Pere),  Relation  du  Voyage  des  Isles 
de  VAmerique,  Paris,  1646. 

Du  Tertre  (Le  R.  P.  Jean-Baptiste),  Histoire  generale  des 
,  isles  de  St.  Christophe,  de  la  Guadeloupe,  de  la  Martinique 
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Idem.,  Histoire  generale  des  Antilles  habitees  par  les  Fran- 
cois, Paris,  1667-1671,  4  vols,  in  three.  It  is  to  this  edition 
that  all  references  are  made  in  the  notes. 

859 


y^- 


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Ducoeurjoly  (S.  J.),  Manuel  des  Habitants  de  St.  Domingue, 
Paris,  2  vols. 

Renouard  (Felix),  Statistique  de  la  Martinique,  Paris,  1822, 
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Placide  (Justin),  Histoire  politique  et  statistique  de  Vile 
d'Haiti,  Paris,  1806. 

Boyer-Peyreleau  (E.  E.),  Les  Antilles  Frangaises  particuliere- 
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Daney  (Sidney),  Histoire  de  la  Martinique  depuis  la  colonisa- 
tion jusqu'en  1815,  Fort  Royal  (Martinique),  1846,  6  vols. 

Dessalles  (Adrien),  Histoire  Generale  des  Antilles,  Paris, 
1847,  5  vols. 

Margry  (Pierre),  Belain  d'Esnambuc  et  les  Normands  aux 
Antilles,  Paris,  1863. 

Idem.,  Origines  Frangaises  des  Pays  d'outre-mer,  Les  Seig- 
neurs de  la  Martinique,  three  articles  in  Revue  Maritime  et 
Coloniale,  vol.  58,  pp.  28-50,  276-305,  540-547. 

Ballet  (Jules),  La  Guadeloupe,  Renseignements  sur  Vhistoire, 
la  flore,  la  faune,  la  geologic,  la  mineralogie,  Vagriculture,  le 
commerce,  Vindustrie,  etc.,  Basse  Terre  (Guadeloupe),  1890- 
1902.  Five  volumes  have  appeared.  It  is  to  be  complete  in 
twelve. 

Guet  (Isidore),  Le  colonel  Frangois  de  Collart  et  la  Mar- 
tinique de  son  Temps,  Vannes,  1893. 

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articles  which  appeared  in  the  Revue  Historique  de  I'Ouest, 

1897-1899. 
Lorin  (Henri),  De  Prcedonibus  insulam  Sancti  Dominici  cele- 

brantibus  sceculo  septimo  decimo,  Paris,  1895. 
Peytraud    (L.),   UEsclavage   aux  Antilles   Frangaises   avant 

1789,  Paris,  1897. 
Saint- Yves   (G.),  Les  Campagnes  de  Jean  d'Estrees  dans  la 

mer  des  Antilles,  1676-1678,  Paris,  1900.      (Reprint  from 

the  Bulletin  de  geographie  historique  et  descriptive,  no.  2, 

1899.) 
Idem.,  Les  Antilles  Frangaises  et  la  Correspondance  de  Vln- 

tendant  Patoulet,  Paris,  1902.    A  short  pamphlet  (Bib.  Nat. 

Lk.  12,  1516),  giving  an  account  of  the  correspondence  in 

Bib.  Nat.  MSS.,  Fonds  fran9ais,  11315,  referred  to  above. 
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ciete  et  la  vie  Creoles  sous  I'Ancien  Regime,  Paris,  1909. 

SPECIAL   WORKS   ON   THE   SEVERAL   PORTS   ENGAGED   IN   THE   WEST 
INDIA  TRADE 

Malvezin    (Theophile),  Histoire  du   Commerce   de  Bordeaux 

depuis  les  Origines  jusqu'a  nos  jours,  Bordeaux,   1892,  4? 

vols.    Vol.  II. 
Garnault  (Emile),  Le  Commerce  Rochelais  au  XVIIP  Siecle, 

La  Rochelle,  1887-1891,  3  vols.    Vol.  II. 
Le  Beuf  (E.  B.),  Du  Commerce  de  Nantes,  Son  Passe,  Son 

Avenir,  Nantes,  1857. 
Parfouru   (Paul),  Les  Irlandais  en  Bretagne  aux  XVIP  et 

XVIIP  Siecles,  article  in  Annates  de  Bretagne,  vol.    IX, 

524-533. 
Maitre  (Leon),  Situation  de  la  Marine  marchande  du  Comte 

de  Nantes  d'apres  I'enquete  de  1664,  in  Annates  de  Bretagne, 

vol.  XVII,  326-343. 
Gabory   (Emile),  La  Marine  et  le  Commerce  de  Nantes  au 

XVIP  Siecle  et  au  Commencement  du  XVIIP,  1661-1715. 

(Reprint  from  Annates  de  Bretagne,  XVII,  1-44,  235-290, 

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Augeard  (Eugene),  Etude  sur  la  Traite  des  Noirs  avant  1790 
au  point  de  vue  du  Commerce  Nantais,  Nantes,  1901. 

Borely  (A.  E.),  Histoire  de  la  Ville  du  Havre,  Havre,  1880- 
1881,  3  vols. 

SPECIAL  WORKS  ON  ARTICLES  OF  COMMERCE 

Boizard  (E.)  et  Tardieu  (H.),  Histoire  de  la  Legislation  des 
Sucres,  1664-1891,  Paris,  1891. 

Sabatier  (Antoine),  La  Ferme  du  Tahac,  Lille,  1905.  (Re- 
print from  the  Bulletin  de  la  Societe  archeologique,  histo- 
rique  et  artistique,  November,  1905.) 

GENERAL  WORKS 

Savary  (Jacques),  Dictionnaire  Universel  de  Commerce,  Paris, 

1732,  4  vols. 
Veron  de  Forbonnais  (F.),  Recherches  et  Considerations  sur  les 

Finances   de   France   depuis   VAnnee   1595   jusqua   I'annee 

1721,  Basle,  1758,  2  vols. 
Gouraud   (Charles),  Histoire  de  la  Politique  commerciale  de 

la  France  et  de  son  Influence  sur  le  Progres  de  la  Richesse 

puhlique   depuis  le   Moyen  Age  jusqu'a   nos  Jours,   Paris, 

1854,  2  vols. 
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France,  Paris,  1864. 
Segur-Dupeyron   (P.  de),  Histoire  des  Negotiations  commer- 

ciales   et  Maritimes  aux  XVIP  et  XVIIP  Siecles,   Paris, 

1872-1873,3  vols. 
Berlioux  (Etienne-Felix),  Andre  Brile  ou  I'Origine  de  la  Col- 
onic Frangaise  du  Senegal,  Paris,  1874. 
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VAmerique.     (Reprint  from  the  Revue  de  Geographic,  1885.) 
Norman  (C.  B.),  Colonial  France,  London,  1886. 
Pigeonneau  (H.),  Histoire  du  Commerce  de  la  France,  Paris, 

1887-1889,  2  vols. 
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France,  Paris,  1891. 
Vignon  (Louis),  L'Expansion  de  la  France,  Paris,  1891. 

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Leroy-Beaulieu  (Paul),  De  la  Colonisation  chez  les  peuples 
modernes,  Paris,  fifth  edition,  1902.  (A  sixth  edition  ap- 
peared in  19O8.) 

Bonnassieux  (Pierre),  Les  grandes  Compagnies  de  Commerce, 
Paris,  1892. 

Chailley-Bert  (J-),  Les  Compagnies  de  Commerce  sous  VAncien 
Regime,  Paris,  1898. 

Martin  (Germain),  La  grande  Industrie  sous  le  Regne  de 
Louis  XIV,  Paris,  1899. 

Gaffarel  (Paul),  Les  Colonies  Frangaises,  Paris,  1899- 


364 


INDEX 


Acadia,  sugar  refiners   of  Guadeloupe   and  Martinique  propose 

establishment  of  trade  with 320 

Africa,  Dutch  on  western  coast  of,  288;  French  West  India  Com- 
pany's possessions  on,  288;  ceded  to  private  company,  288; 
du  Casse  appointed  governor  at  western  coast  of,  289; 
monopoly  of  Company  of  Senegal  in,  293.  See  also  Company 
of  Senegal,  Company  of  Guinea,  Slaves,  Slave  trade,  etc. 

Alou,  Sieur  de  1',  sent  to  St.  Christopher  in  command  of  troops, 
136. 

Andre,  Jean,  Baron  de   Woltrogue,  associated  with   Carolof  in 

Slave   trade 118 

Antigua,  attacked  by  French,  139;  capture  of,  139;  trade  of  Sieur 
Cartier  with,  157;  trade  with  Dutch,  207. 

Ardres,  W.  I.  Co.  sends  vessels  to  trade  with  king  of,  167;  king 
grants  privileges  of  slave  trade,  167. 

Arguin,  captured  by  du  Casse   289 

Baas,  de,  succeeds  de  Clodore  at  Martinique,  152 ;  governor-general 
of  the  French  West  Indies,  155;  accused  of  favouring  trade 
with  Dutch,  158;  complains  of  W.  I.  Co.'s  price  of  slaves,  162; 
letter  to  Colbert  regarding  supply  of  salt  beef,  175;  receives, 
instructions  from  W.  I.  Co.  concerning  trade  with  foreigners 
(1668Xi  184,  188-189;  commanded  by  Colbert  to  enforce 
strictly  regulations  against  foreign  traders,  186;  receives 
letters  from  Colbert  concerning  same,  187,  187-188,  190,  191; 
warns  Colbert  exclusion  of  foreigners  will  bring  suffering  to 
planters,  189;  writes  Colbert  of  case  of  trade  with  foreigners, 
190-191 ;  complains  of  de  Gabaret's  severity  toward  Dutch 
traders,  197,  198;  writes  sarcastic  letter  to  Colbert  concerning 
same,  198-199;  promises  to  be  severe  with  Dutch,  199;  com- 
ments upon  effect  of  de  Gabaret's  sojourn  in  W.  I.,  200; 
appealed  to  by  Ogeron  for  aid  at  St.  Domingo,  202;  receives 
letter  of  encouragement  from  Colbert,  207;  instructed  to 
maintain  patrol  against  foreign  traders,  208;  permits  provi- 
sions to  be  brought  from  Martinique  and  rebuked  by  Colbert, 
210;  correspondence  concerning  trade  with  foreigners  dis- 
cussed, 210-215;  trades  with  Dutch  at  Curasao,  211-212; 
accusation   against   discussed,   212-215;    character,   215;    dis- 

365 


INDEX 

likes  private  traders  and  favours  W.  I.  Co.'s  monopoly,  237; 
receives  letters  from  Colbert  concerning  same,  228-239;  com- 
plains of  high  prices  demanded  by  French  traders,  228; 
receives  instructions  regarding  freedom  of  trade,  232;  com- 
plains of  varying  policy,  232;  writes  of  overproduction  and 
depreciation  of  sugar,  267;  writes  concerning  establishment 
of  refineries,  272;  receives  instructions  regarding  same,  273; 
writes  in  regard  to  slave  trade,  287;  comments  upon  impor- 
tance of  salt  beef,  312;  instructed  to  encourage  trade  with 
Canada,  317;  opposes  Colbert's  policy  of  excluding  Irish 
beef,  321-323;  permits  trade  with  English,  323. 

Barbadoes,  trade  of  French  with,  191;  provisions  imported  into 
Martinique  from,  209 ;  indentured  servants  at,  282 ;  trade  with 
permitted  by  de  Baas,  323. 

Bayonne,  duties  imposed  upon  sugar  at 267 

B6chameil,  a  stockholder  of  Company  of  Cayenne  and  of  W.  I. 
Co.,  80;  becomes  director  of  latter  and  specially  charged  by 
Colbert  with  management,  83;  reports  plans  of  company,  83- 
84;  receives  news  concerning  Dutch  and  West  India  trade, 
84;  suggests  plan  to  send  supplies  to  West  Indies,  85;  writes 
of  urgency  in  sending  vessels,  102 ;  plans  to  send  200  soldiers 
to  Martinique,  109;  appeals  to  Colbert  for  aid.  111;  asks  for 
convoys,  113;  suggests  closing  subscriptions,  152;  favours 
private  traders,  153-154;  explains  company's  failures  and 
advocates  reforms,  156. 

B6gon,  intendant,  writes  joint  memoir  with  St.  Laurent  concern- 
ing trade  with  foreigners    223 

Beinchk,  Jacob,  in  command  of  Dutch  squadron,  attacks  Marie 
Galante,  246;  attempts  to  win  over  colony  at  St.  Domingo, 
246  and  note  72;  destroys  French  vessels  at  Petit  Goave,  246. 

Bellefond,  Villant  de,  makes  treaty  for  W.  I.  Co.  on  coast  of 
Guinea     285 

Bellinzani,  writes  memoir  concerning  W.  I.  trade,  244;  letter  con- 
cerning monopoly  of  tobacco,  254;  sketch  of  ofl&cial  career, 
connection  with  W.  I.  Co.  and  trade,  dishonesty,  indictment 
of  Jacques  Savary  against,  death  in  Bastille,  etc.,  298-299. 

Berruyer,  a  director  of  Company  of  the  Isles  of  America 23 

Berthelot,  a  director  of  Company  of  Cayenne  and  of  W.  I.  Co., 
68,  75,  80,  83. 

B16nac,  de,  governor-general,  receives  instructions  regarding 
trade  with  foreigners  at  St.  Christopher,  192,  218;  arrives  at 
Martinique,  218;  proposes  treaty  with  English  at  St.  Christo- 
pher regarding  trade,  218;  ordered  to  exclude  foreign  trad- 
ers, 219;  issues  ordinance  in  regard  to  same,  219-220;  writes 
Colbert  concerning,  223;  at  St.  Domingo,  255;  estimates  num- 


INDEX 

ber  of  slaves  imported,  300;  encourages  trade  with  Canada, 
317-318;  instructed  to  admit  Irish  salt  beef,  325. 
Bibaud,  a  director  in  Company  of  Cayenne  and  W.  I.  Co.,  66,  77, 
83 ;  writes  Colbert  in  regard  to  state  of  latter  company,  77-78. 

Boisseret,  de,  instructed  by  Houel  to  purchase  Guadeloupe   42 

Bonaire,  proposal  to  establish  trade  in  live  stock  with  56 

Bouchardeau,  Sir,  assists  in  organization  of  Company  of  Cayenne.. 64 
Bordeaux,  development  of  trade  with  West  Indies,  1650-1683,  236- 
238;  exports  to  West  Indies,  imports  from,  238;  admiralty 
records  of,  236-237  and  bibliography;  tonnage  and  log  of 
vessels  engaging  in  W.  I.  trade,  237-238;  sugar  refineries  at, 
239;  trade  with  West  Indies  interrupted  by  Dutch  war,  244- 
245;  duties  imposed  upon  sugar  at,  267;  importance  of  W.  I. 
trade  in  eighteenth  century,  238-239. 
Boston,  a  ketch  from  trades  at  Martinique,  210;  trade  with  pro- 
posed by  colonial  refiners,  221;  character  of  settlers  accord- 
ing to  French,  222. 

Bouchet,  a  director  of  W.  I.  Co 83 

Boutet,  Claude,  granted  monopoly  of  tobacco  in  France  225 

Bounties,  offered  on  French  salt  beef,  209,  320;  on  slaves,  286. 

Bourg,  du,  sent  to  coast  of  Guinea  by  W.  I.  Co 165-168 

Brandy,  article  of  export  from  Bordeaux,  238;  from  La  Rochelle, 
240;  Nantes,  241;  made  from  sugar-cane  and  exported  from 
West  Indies  to  Canada,  318. 
Brazil,  cassonades  imported  into  Provence  from,  263;  duties  on, 
266. 

Breda,  treaty  of  142 

Brunet,  a  director  of  W.  I.  Co.,  correspondence  with  Colbert,  173, 
174,  175;  buys  salt  beef  and  live  stock  for  W.  I.  trade,  175, 
319-320. 

Buc,  du,  clerk  of  W.  I.  Co.,  encounters  rebellion  at  Martinique 92 

Buccaneers,  on  northern  coast  of  St.  Domingo 202 

Butter,  Irish,  article  of  export  from  Nantes  241 

Cacao,  cultivation  of  at  St.  Domingo  instead  of  tobacco  258 

Cadiz,  vessel  from  Nantes  calls  at  on  way  to  Martinique 219 

Cuhuzac,  in  command  of  a  fleet  to  protect  French  at  St.  Christo- 
pher, 18;  forces  English  to  respect  treaty,  but  leaves  colony 
at  mercy  of  Spaniards,  19. 

Calle,  de  la,  chief  agent  of  W.  I.  Co.  at  Martinique 133, 157 

Canada,  occupied  by  W.  I.  Co.,  118;  trade  of  company  with,  112, 
116;  assets  of  company  in,  146;  efforts  to  establish  trade 
between  West  Indies  and,  220,  221;  cultivation  of  tobacco 
forbidden  in,  252;  Colbert  attempts  to  find  supply  of  lumber 
in,  329 ;  explanation  of  failure  of  trade,  318,  319. 

367 


INDEX 

Canonville,  district  of  Martinique,  scene  of  rebellion  106 

Cape  Verde  Islands,  trade  of  W.  I.  Co.  with  . . .  .86,  116,  131,  146,  148 

Caribs,  Colbert  urges  incitement  of  against  the  Dutch,  198;  slave 
trade  with,  303. 

Carolof,  makes  contract  with  W.  I.  Co.  for  slave  trade,  117,  285; 
terms  of  contract  and  privileges,  118;  sent  to  Guinea  by  W.  I. 
Co.,  165;  establishes  trade  relations  with  king  of  Ardres,  16T; 
arrives  at  Guadeloupe  with  cargo  of  slaves,  172. 

Cartier,  Sieur,  general  agent  of  W.  I.  Co.  in  islands,  156;  proves 
corrupt,  157;  accepts  bribes  from  Dutch  traders,  157,  212, 
285,  327. 

Casepilote,  district  of  Martinique,  scene  of  rebellion  104 

Cassonades,  see  Sugar. 

Cassava,  planted  at  Cayenne,  65;  cultivation  of  abandoned  at 
Martinique,  261;  bread  made  from  as  food,  310,  311,  312. 

Casse,  du,  appointed  governor  of  Senegal,  captures  Arguin  from 
Dutch,  occupies  Gor^e,  quells  rebellion  on  coast,  289 ;  services 
to  Company  of  Senegal,  292;  in  charge  of  company's  affairs 
at  Martinique,  303. 

Cayenne,  French  settlement  at,  2;  population  of  in  1660  and  1664, 
65,  67;  first  expedition  of  Company  of  Cayenne  to,  77;  trade 
of  W.  I.  Co.  with,  86,  112,  131,  147,  148,  177;  captured  by 
English,  142;  governor  ordered  to  enforce  regulations  against 
foreign  traders,  185;  trade  with  Bordeaux,  237;  recaptured 
by  French,  247;  slave  trade  at,  304. 

C^rillac,  de,  proprietor  of  Grenada,  44;  cedes  it  to  W.  I.  Co.,  73, 
74,  note  8. 

Champigny,  cedes  possessions  to  W.  I.  Co 73 

Chambrd,  de,  general  agent  of  W.  I.  Co.,  writes  of  first  fleet, 
85-86;  sails  for  West  Indies,  86;  at  Martinique,  89;  Guade- 
loupe, 90;  St.  Christopher,  91;  writes  of  scarcity  of  provisions 
at  Guadeloupe,  99;  opinion  regarding  rebellions  at  Martin- 
ique, 107;  superintends  removal  of  English  from  St.  Christo- 
pher, 127;  assists  in  regulating  trade  at  Martinique,  138; 
recalled,  156. 

Chemin-Dupontfes,  statements  regarding  W.  I.  Co.  refuted,  75, 
119;  quoted,  292;  estimates  number  of  slaves  imported  by 
Company  of  Senegal,  296;  same  discussed,  297-298. 

Clodor6,  de,  governor  of  Martinique,  sails  for  West  Indies,  86; 
inauguration,  87;  puts  down  rebellion,  92-93;  character,  93; 
commended  by  Colbert  and  company,  94;  pacifies  spirit  of 
rebellion,  101-102;  grows  alarmed,  102;  crushes  rebellion  at 
Martinique,  104-106;  prepares  for  war  with  English,  124; 
quells  another  rebellion  in  Martinique,  132-135;  aids  in  regu- 
lating trade,  138;  fights   at  Antigua,   139;   dispute  with   de 


INDEX 

La  Barre,  140;  commands  at  St.  Pierre,  141;  returns  to 
France,  152. 
Colbert,  on  condition  of  French  commerce,  2;  plans  inquest  of 
1664,  3;  estimates  number  of  vessels  in  merchant  marine  of 
France  and  other  countries,  2-3;  official  career  and  activity 
sketched,  7-8;  decides  to  organize  East  and  West  India  Com- 
panies, 9;  attitude  toward  same,  10;  authorizes  many  com- 
mercial companies,  12;  attitude  toward,  12-13;  problem  in 
West  Indies,  50-51;  alarmed  over  affairs  at  Martinique,  58; 
sends  de  Tracy  to  reclaim  West  Indies  for  crown,  58-59; 
commends  de  Tracy  for  conduct,  61 ;  approves  plan  to  organ- 
ize Company  of  Cayenne,  62,  66;  plans  W.  I.  Co.,  68;  letter 
to  German  princes  concerning  company,  71,  note  5;  appealed 
to  by  W.  I.  Co.,  78;  forces  subscriptions  to  both  companies, 
79  J  appeals  to  king  to  support  both,  79;  subscribes  personally 
to  W.  I.  Co.,  81;  task  assigned  company,  83;  frames  legisla- 
tion to  exclude  Dutch  traders,  83;  provides  small  source  for 
company,  98;  authorizes  company  to  borrow,  98;  opens  royal 
treasury,  102-103;  partially  successful  in  excluding  Dutch, 
108;  subscribes  liberally  to  W.  I.  Co.,  109-110;  receives  mem- 
oir concerning  company,  116-117;  plan  of  uniting  East  and 
West  India  Companies,  122;  neglects  W.  I.  Co.  during  war, 
144-145;  makes  partial  provision  of  funds,  145;  subscribes 
funds,  147;  opposes  continuance  of  Dutch  trade  in  islands, 
150;  also  restoration  of  proprietary  rule,  150;  attitude  to- 
ward W.  I.  Co.  at  close  of  English  war  defined  and  discussed, 
151-154;  has  company  declare  first  dividend,  156;  instructions 
to  de  Baas,  156;  correspondence  with  Pelissier,  159;  instruc- 
tions to  same  defining  duty  of  W.  I.  Co.,  159-161;  policy  of 
complete  freedom  of  trade  to  all  French  traders,  160;  advises 
encouragement  of  early  marriages,  160;  urges  reduction  of 
amount  of  sugar  produced  in  islands,  161;  instructs  Pelissier 
to  favour  private  traders,  and  exclude  foreign  traders,  161; 
correspondence  with  Pelissier,  161;  urges  colonies  to  engage 
in  commerce,  162;  orders  census  made,  protects  private  trad- 
ers, considers  means  of  perfecting  manufacture  of  tobacco 
and  sugar,  orders  price  of  slaves  lowered,  162;  appreciates 
private  traders,  restricts  W.  I.  Co.'s  commerce,  reasons  for 
same,  163;  decides  to  abandon  company,  16^  175,  176;  plans 
slave  trade  with  Spaniards,  171;  attempts  to  exclude  Irish 
salt  beef  from  W.  I.  trade  and  correspondence  with  Brunet, 
173-175;  orders  de  Tracy  to  exclude  Dutch  traders,  182; 
refuses  to  compromise,  184;  forbids  W.  I.  Co.  to  grant  pass- 
ports to  foreigners,  183;  reserves  right  of  granting  passports, 
184;  commands  all  governors  to  enforce  regulations  against 


INDEX 

foreign  traders,  185-186;  correspondence  with  de  Baas  on 
same,  186,  188,  189,  191-192,  197-198,  214-215;  commands  W. 
I.  Ck).  to  supply  slaves  and  live  stock,  190;  plans  trade  with 
Spanish  Main  at  Grenada,  192;  exceptions  regarding  foreign 
trade,  192-193;  meaning  of  system  of  excluding  foreigners, 
193;  explains  why  trade  with  Spaniards  should  be  prohibited, 
193;  decides  to  maintain  patrol  in  islands,  195;  urges  drastic 
measures  against  Dutch  and  explains,  198;  replies  to  objec- 
tions of  English,  199-200;  protests  against  conduct  of  Dutch 
traders  at  St.  Domingo,  203;  orders  de  Gabaret  to  quell 
rebellion  and  destroy  Dutch  vessels  at  St.  Domingo,  203; 
commends  Ogeron,  205 ;  successful  in  fight  against  Dutch,  206- 
207;  refuses  special  privileges  to  colonial  ships,  208;  fails  in 
attempts  to  exclude  Irish  beef  from  islands,  208-210;  rebukes 
de  Baas  for  trade  with  English,  210;  rebukes  du  Lion  for 
insubordination  and  conduct,  213-214;  censures  de  Baas,  214; 
unable  to  prevent  trade  with  English  at  St.  Christopher,  218; 
refuses  to  honour  claims  of  Dutch  and  rebukes  Patoulet  for 
failure  to  enforce  regulations,  219;  rejects  proposal  of  trade 
with  New  England,  222;  results  of  fight  against  foreign  trad- 
ers, 223-224;  policy  regarding  freedom  of  trade  defined  and 
discussed,  225-236 ;  forces  reduction  of  taxes  levied  on  private 
traders,  225-226;  grants  passports  to  private  traders,  226; 
protects  their  freedom  and  removes  restrictions  of  trade,  228; 
writes  de  Baas  concerning  same,  228-229;  attitude  toward 
monopolies  defined  and  discussed,  229  ff. ;  key  to  understand- 
ing colonial  policy,  233-236;  rise  of  private  trader,  236;  re- 
sults of  work  at  Bordeaux,  La  Rochelle  and  Nantes,  239  ff. ; 
tariflF  of  1664,  251;  legislation  regarding  tobacco,  results, 
251  «.;  builds  up  sugar  refining  industry  in  France,  262-263; 
aids  enterprise  personally,  262 ;  high  duties  on  foreign  refined 
sugar,  263-266;  writes  concerning  same,  266;  offers  drawback 
on  French  refined  sugar,  262;  wishes  destruction  of  Dutch 
refiners,  269;  attitude  toward  limiting  production  of  sugar 
defined,  268-269;  toward  re-exportation  of  raw  sugar,  269- 
271 ;  policy  toward  colonial  refiners,  273  ff. ;  results  of,  279- 
280;  encourages  importation  of  indentured  servants,  282; 
plans  for  slave  trade,  286;  creates  monopoly  for  same,  288; 
protects  Compaijy  of  Senegal,  295 ;  attitude  toward  reorgani- 
zation of  company,  recruits  stockholders,  301;  results  of 
policy  regarding  slave-trade,  308-309;  efforts  to  build  up 
trade  between  Canada  and  West  Indies,  315-317;  failure 
explained,  319;  fight  against  Irish  salt  beef,  319-320;  failure 
and  refusal  to  renew  fight,  323-325;  efforts  to  supply  live 
stock  and  lumber  from  Canada  futile,  329;  removes  restraints 

870 


INDEX 

on  trade,  330;  principles  underlying  colonial  policy,  332; 
criticism  of,  332-339;  general  results,  338-339. 

Colbert  de  Terron,  intendant  at  Brouage,  and  Company  of  the 
North,  12;  becomes  stockholder  in  Company  of  Cayenne  and 
W.  I.  Co.,  80;  warns  Colbert  of  de  La  Barre's  character, 
129;  receives  letter  from  Colbert,  226. 

Commerce,  state  of  in  France,  1-6;  Colbert's  policy  regarding, 
7  if. ;  attempts  to  establish  with  West  Indies,  36-40 ;  state  of, 
46-50;  further  plans  to  establish  with  West  Indies,  53,  55; 
state  of,  110-111,  113,  142,  148,  156,  157;  W.  I.  Co.  attempts 
to  establish  with  Guinea,  165-173;  regulations  governing,  185; 
with  West  Indies  traced  statistically,  236  ff. ;  state  of,  244- 
247;  between  Canada  and  West  Indies  encouraged,  318. 

Companies,  Commercial,  Colbert's  attitude  toward,  12  ff.,  233.  See 
also  Company  of  Cayenne,  Company  of  the  Isles  of  America, 
Company  of  the  Levant,  Company  of  the  North,  Company  of 
the  Pyrenees,  Company  of  Senegal,  West  India  Company. 

Company  of  Cayenne,  plan  of  organization  approved  by  Colbert, 
62;  chief  object,  63;  stockholders,  66;  letters-patent  and  first 
expedition  to  Cayenne,  66;  makes  treaty  with  Dutch,  67; 
serves  as  basis  for  W.  I.  Co.,  75-77,  83. 

Company  of  Guinea,  organization  and  privileges  308 

Company  of  the  Isles  of  America,  organization,  letters-patent 
and  work,  23-24;  promotes  cultivation  of  sugar-cane,  31-35; 
attempts  to  build  up  trade  and  results,  36-40;  failure  and 
causes,  40-43;  sells  islands  to  proprietors,  42. 

Company  of  the  Levant,  organization   12-13 

Company  of  the  North,  established  by  Colbert,  12;  authorized  to 
charter  vessels  from  W.  I.  Co.,  176. 

Company  of  the  Pyrenees,  organized  by  Colbert   12-13 

Company  of  St.  Christopher,  organized,  15;  letters-patent,  16; 
sends  vessels  to  St.  Christopher,  16-17;  appeals  to  Richelieu 
for  protection  against  Dutch  traders,  22;  failure,  23. 

Company  of  Senegal,  buys  W.  I.  Co.'s  possessions  in  Senegal, 
178;  equips  vessels  at  Dieppe,  243-244;  urged  to  establish 
sugar  refinery  at  Martinique,  275;  history,  288-298;  trade 
in  Africa,  289;  appoints  du  Casse  governor,  289;  makes  con- 
quests, 290;  contracts  to  furnish  slaves  to  West  Indies,  291; 
character,  personnel  and  capital,  292;  enlarged,  292;  terms 
of  contract,  293;  activity,  293-294;  losses  and  misfortunes, 
294-295;  unsuccessful  efforts  to  prevent  bankruptcy,  295; 
supposed  bounties  paid  to,  296;  number  of  slaves  carried  to 
West  Indies,  296-301;  reorganization,  301;  capital  and  privi- 
leges, 302;  establishes  agents,  303;  number  of  slaves  imported 
into  West  Indies,  304-308;   failure  to  satisfy  contract   and 

371 


INDEX 

reasons,  304-305,  307;  debts  owed  to,  305;  monopoly  partly 
revoked,  308-309. 

Contraband  trade,  see  Foreign  trade. 

Cotton,  cultivation  ordered  in  islands,  30;  cultivated  at  Cayenne, 
65;  imported  at  Bordeaux  from  West  Indies,  also  at  Nantes, 
238,  242;  cultivated  instead  of  tobacco,  258;  proves  less  prof- 
itable than  sugar-cane,  261;  cultivation  encouraged  by  Col- 
bert, 269. 

Curasao,  proposal  to  establish  trade  in  live  stock  with,  56;  sends 
oxen  and  horses  to  West  Indies,  189,  326,  327;  slave  trade 
with  Spanish  Main,  192-193;  with  French,  285-286;  exporta- 
tion of  live  stock  forbidden,  327. 

Currency,  tobacco  serves  as   250 

Cussy,  de,  succeeds  de  Pouan9ay,  as  governor  of  St.  Domingo  . .  .257 

Dalibert,  a  director  in  W.  I.  Co 83 

Darriet,  a  merchant  of  Bordeaux,  engaged  in  W.  I.  trade 238-239 

Dartiagne,  convicted  of  illicit  trade 190 

Delb6e,  Sieur,  records  expedition  to  Guinea  and  facts  concerning 

slave  trade   165, 169 

Desirade,  becomes  a  proprietary,  43;  ceded  to  W.  I.  Co.,  73. 
Dieppe,  trade  with  West  Indies,  236,  242-243;  Company  of  Sene- 
gal equips  vessels  at,  243-244;  trade  in  indentured  servants, 
281. 
Domaine  d'Occident,  revenue  farm,  178;  attempts  to  exclude  for- 
eign traders,  215-216;  plan  to  unite  with  Company  of  Senegal, 
301. 

Drawbacks,  on  sugar  refined  in  France   264-265 

Dunkerque,  trade  with  West  Indies 157 

Dupas,  Sieur,  judge  at  St.   Christopher,  orders  confiscation   of 

foreign  merchandise    216 

Dutch,  as  carriers  and  traders  in  France,  3;  success  in  trade  with 
East  Indies,  Baltic,  West  Indies,  etc.,  9;  begin  trade  at  St. 
Christopher,  20-22;  service  as  traders,  21;  trade  with  French 
colonies  becomes  regular,  22-23,  29;  importance,  39-40;  settle 
St.  Martin  conjointly  with  French,  43;  control  trade  with 
French  islands,  45-50;  explanation  of  superiority  as  traders, 
48-50;  yield  Cayenne  to  French,  67;  barred  from  French 
islands  by  Colbert,  83;  attempt  to  embarrass  W.  I.  Co.,  84- 
85;  furnish  capital  for  sugar  mills  at  Guadeloupe,  91-92;  sell 
vessels  to  W.  I.  Co.,  94;  cry  of  Vive  les  Hollandais!  raised 
at  Martinique,  101;  suspend  trade  with  French  colonies,  108; 
trade  with  W.  I.  Co.,  113;  aid  Guadeloupe,  125;  permitted  to 
trade  in  West  Indies,  138,  150;  aid  French  in  war,  140; 
opposed  by  Colbert,  150,  153;  bribe  oflBcials  in  order  to  trade, 

372 


INDEX 

157;  sell  slaves  to  French,  162,  172;  trade  in  Guinea,  166- 
168;  attempt  to  prevent  W.  I.  Co.  from  trading  with  king  of 
Ardres,  168;  slave  trade  with  Spaniards,  171;  Colbert  renews 
fight  against,  182  if. ;  carry  on  illicit  trade,  184 ;  St.  Eustatius 
specially  watched  by  Colbert,  186-187;  continue  to  import 
slaves  and  live  stock,  188;  prohibited  from  doing  so,  189- 
190;  contraband  trade  at  St.  Eustatius,  191;  trade  with  Span- 
ish Main,  192-193;  Colbert's  long  fight  against,  195-224; 
instructions  to  de  Gabaret,  196;  captured  by  French  patrol, 
196-197;  Colbert  plans  to  drive  from  West  Indies,  198,  199- 
200;  stir  up  rebellion  at  St.  Domingo,- 201  ff. ;  affected  by  de 
Gabaret's  sojourn  in  West  Indies,  206-207;  de  Baas  trades 
with  Curasao,  211-212;  trade  with  French  islands,  212-215, 
217,  218-219;  driven  out,  223;  obtain  raw  sugar  at  St.  Malo 
and  Nantes,  240;  prey  upon  French  commerce,  244;  war, 
244-248,  288;  attack  French  West  Indies,  246-247;  emigrate 
from  Brazil  to  Guadeloupe  and  cultivate  sugar-cane,  260; 
import  slaves  into  French  islands,  283-286;  surrender  Gor6e 
and  Arguin  to  French,  288-289. 
East  India  Company,  organized,  8;  importance,  9-11;  subscrip- 
tions, 79;  enjoys  monopoly,  231. 

Embargo,  laid  in  ports  of  France    245 

English,  manufacturers  of  woollens,  1;  driven  from  Tortuga  by 
French,  29;  trade  with  French  at  St.  Christopher,  91;  capture 
vessels  of  W.  I.  Co.,  108,  110-111;  war  declared,  124;  defeated 
at  St.  Christopher,  126-127;  blockade  St.  Christopher,  139; 
fleet  arrives  in  West  Indies,  139;  attacked  by  French  at 
Antigua,  139;  attacked  by  de  La  Barre's  fleet,  140;  attack 
St.  Pierre,  140-142;  obtain  control  of  sea  and  capture  Cay- 
enne, 142;  contraband  trade,  157;  on  coast,  of  Guinea,  166, 
168;  smuggling  at  Nevis,  191;  protest  against  French  regu- 
lations, 199;  permitted  to  sell  cargoes  at  Guadeloupe  and 
Martinique,  209;  trade  with,  215,  217,  218;  reject  treaty 
offered  by  French  at  St.  Christopher,  218. 

Eon,  Jean,  quoted 1,  3,  5-7 

Esnambuc,  Pierre  d',  sets  sail  for  West  Indies,  14;  decides  to 
found  colony  at  St.  Christopher,  15;  returns  to  France  and 
obtains  permission,  16;  founds  colony,  17;  seeks  aid  in 
France,  18;  fights  valiantly  against  Spaniards,  19-20;  flees, 
but  returns,  20;  decides  to  abandon  colony,  but  aided  by 
Dutch  and  remains,  21 ;  makes  settlement  at  Martinique,  27 ; 
death,  40. 

Estrades,  Count  d',  writes  Colbert  of  state  of  Martinique 56-57 

Estrees,  Count  d',  vice-admiral  in  command  of  squadron  in  West 
Indies,  195,  220,  247;  recaptures  Cayenne  and  takes  Tobago, 

373 


INDEX 

247 ;  plans  to  attack  Curasao,  but  shipwrecked,  247 ;  captures 
Gor^e,  288,  292. 

Fermiers  giniraux  des  aides,  subscribe  to  W.  I.  Co.,  81;  make 
loan  to  same,  99,  145. 

Filibusters,  on  northern  coast  of  St.  Domingo 202 

Flour,  article  of  export  from  French  ports  to  West  Indies,  238, 
240,  242,  311-312. 

Food-stuflFs,  scarcity  in  West  Indies,  45 ;  eflforts  to  provide  supply, 
116;  increasing  demands  for,  224;  scarcity  at  Martinique, 
261;  food  of  planters,  310;  supply  at  first  obtained  in  islands, 
310;  legislation  concerning,  310-325;  cargo  sent  from  Canada, 
315;  efforts  to  obtain  regular  supply  in  Canada,  318-319. 

Foreign  Commerce,  prohibited  at  St.  Christopher  without  pass- 
port, 22-23;  forbidden  by  Company  of  Isles  of  America,  37; 
prevalent  in  French  West  Indies,  38-40;  under  proprietary 
rule,  46;  at  St.  Christopher,  91;  ordered  stopped  by  Colbert, 
162;  regulations,  182-194;  arrH  of  June  12,  1669,  184-185; 
instructions  to  governors,  185-186;  royal  ordinance,  June  10, 
1670,  187-189;  Colbert  insists  on  enforcement,  188-190;  de 
Baas  protests,  189;  case  at  Martinique,  190;  permitted  in  two 
cases,  192-193;  with  Porto  Rico  forbidden,  193;  patrol  main- 
tained in  French  islands,  195;  Dutch  vessels  seized,  196-197; 
English  protest  against  regulations  and  receive  explanations 
from  Colbert,  199-200;  de  Gabaret's  mission  and  results,  195- 
200,  206;  rebellion  at  St.  Domingo,  205-206;  not  eliminated, 
207;  patrol  maintained,  208;  ordinance  of  July,  1671,  govern- 
ing colonial  ships,  208;  with  English,  209-210;  in  poultry  and 
live  stock,  211;  de  Baas'  correspondence,  210-215;  cases, 
211-214;  French  traders  complain  of  competition,  214;  cor- 
ruption of  officials,  212-215;  regulations  of  1677,  215-216; 
difficulties  of  enforcement  at  St.  Christopher,  216-218;  Col- 
bert's instructions,  219;  ordinance  of  October  11,  1680, 
against,  219-220;  squadron  on  patrol  duty,  220;  Colbert 
refuses  to  permit  trade  with  New  England,  221-222;  results, 
223-224;  Dutch  furnish  slaves  to  French,  283-286;  Colbert 
interferes,  286-287;  cases,  323,  326. 

Formont,  de,  discusses  W.  I.  trade,  83;  and  W.  I.  Co.,  176;  trades 
in  West  Indies,  243. 

Fouquet,  Nicolas,  and  colonial  affairs 23,  52 

Francois,  Fran9ois,  director  Company  of  Senegal  ..288,  291,  296,  297 
Freedom  of  trade,  Colbert's  policy,  225-236;  defined,  229;  results 

attained,  248;  Colbert's  definition,  277. 
French,  and  manufacture  of  woollens,  1;  and  shipping,  2;  fail 
to  meet  Dutch  competition,  49;  fight  English  at  Martinique, 

374 


INDEX 

140-142;  and  slave  trade,  168;  relations  with  English  at  St. 
Christopher,  217-218,  284. 

Gabaret,  de,  in  command  of  three  vessels  on  patrol  in  West 
Indies,  195;  importance  of  mission,  196;  Colbert's  instruc- 
tions, 196;  captures  Dutch  vessels,  196-198,  200;  effect  of 
work,  200;  sent  to  quell  rebellion  at  St.  Domingo,  202-205; 
explains  causes  of  rebellion,  205-206;  results  attained,  206. 

Gazette,  as  source  of  information 95,  note  28 

Ginger,  cultivated  in  West  Indies,  211;  imported  at  Bordeaux  and 
Nantes,  238,  242;  cultivated  at  Martinique,  261;  Colbert  en- 
courages cultivation,  269. 

Gor^e,  captured  from  Dutch  by  French,  288;  occupied  by  du 
Casse,  289. 

Grenada,  possession  of  du  Parquet,  43;  sold  to  de  Cerillac,  44; 
ceded  to  W.  I.  Co.,  74,  90;  Colbert  plans  contraband  trade 
with  Spanish  Main,  192;  trade  with  Dutch,  196,  197. 

Guadeloupe,  settled  by  French,  25;  early  history,  25-27;  cultiva- 
tion of  sugar-cane,  34-35;  revenue  from,  42;  estimated  value 
of  production,  42;  becomes  proprietary,  43;  partially  ceded 
to  W.  I.  Co.,  73;  W.  I.  Co.  inaugurated,  90;  state  of  in  1665, 
99;  arrival  of  cargo  of  slaves,  172;  trade  with  foreigners,  190, 
209;  scarcity  of  meat,  209,  323;  trade,  237-238;  tobacco 
staple  product,  250;  establishment  of  sugar  refineries,  272- 
274;  slaves  imported  by  Dutch,  284,  286;  W.  I.  Co.  sends 
cargo  of  slaves,  287;  debts  owed  Company  of  Senegal,  306; 
supply  of  live  stock,  327;  population,  336. 

Guinea,  trade  with,  112,  116,  117-118,  148,  164,  231,  285;  W.  I.  Co. 
attempts  to  organize  slave  trade,  286;  description  of  trade, 
286  ff.;  trade  freed  from  restraints,  293. 

Harman,  Sir  John,  commands  English  fleet  in  attack  upon  Mar- 
tinique     140-141 

Havre,  trade  with  West  Indies,  236,  242-243;  trade  in  indentured 
servants,  281. 

Hides,  imported  at  Bordeaux  from  St.  Domingo 238 

Holland,  see  Dutch,  Foreign  trade,  etc. 

Honfleur,  trade  in  indentured  servants,  29;  trade  with  West 
Indies,  242-243. 

Houel,  Charles,  takes  charge  of  plans  to  cultivate  sugar-cane  at 
Guadeloupe,  33-34;  governor  of  Guadeloupe,  34;  raises  sugar- 
cane, 36;  selfish  administration,  42;  becomes  joint  proprietor 
of  Guadeloupe,  43;  sent  to  France  to  answer  for  conduct,  62; 
refuses  to  cede  possessions  to  W.  I.  Co.,  73-74. 

375 


INDEX 

He  de  R^,  entrepot  for  trade  in  Irish  beef 174,  320 

Indentured  servants,  numbers  sent  from  Normandy  and  Brittany, 
29,  281;  early  importance,  45-46;  form  of  contract,  281; 
prices,  281;  devices  to  seduce,  281;  Colbert  attempts  to  arrest 
decrease,  282-283;  reasons  for  failure,  283. 

Indigo,  cultivation  encouraged,  31;  cultivated  at  Cayenne,  65; 
rate  of  transportation,  103-104;  cultivation  forced  by  low 
price  of  sugar,  211;  imported  at  Bordeaux  and  Nantes,  238, 
242;  sli^t  importance  as  colonial  commodity,  249;  culti- 
vated instead  of  tobacco  at  St.  Domingo,  258;  Colbert 
encourages  production,  261. 

Ireland,  supplies  salt  beef  to  French  West  Indies,  173,  208,  241, 
313;  supplies  live  stock,  189;  Colbert  attempts  to  interrupt 
trade  with,  209-210,  319-320;  French  and  Dutch  traders 
maintain  pastures  in,  313;  trade  with  Nantes  and  La  Ro- 
chelle,  313-314,  325 ;  suffering  in  West  Indies  from  interruption 
of  trade  with,  322;  Colbert  restores  trade  with,  323;  Colbert 
refuses  Patoulet's  suggestion  to  prohibit  trade  with,  324. 

Jacquier,  director  of  W.  I.  Co 83 

Jamaica,  smuggling  trade  with   206 

Janon,  consul  at  Middleburg,  employed  by  W.  I.  Co 94,  113 

Jansen,  Drik,  arrested  at  Grenada  for  illicit  trade,  196;  released, 

197. 
Jews,  at  Cayenne  65 

Knights  of  Malta,  proprietors  at  St.  Christopher  43 

La  Barre,  de,  see  Le  Febure. 

Labot,  quoted  and  refuted  305-306 

Lagny,  de,  relation  to  Company  of  North  12 

La  Rochelle,  trade  with  West  Indies,  38,  236,  239-241;  Colbert 
favours  traders  of,  240;  tonnage  of  vessels  engaged  in  West 
India  trade,  240;  merchants  complain  of  tobacco  monopoly, 
256;  trade  in  indentured  servants,  281;  entrepot  for  Irish 
beef,  313. 
La  Sabli^re,  de,  stockholder  in  Company  of  Cayenne  and  W.  I. 

Co 80 

Laubi^re,  de,  lieutenant-governor  of  Martinique   93,  105,  136 

Le  Febure  de  La  Barre,  and  colony  at  Cayenne,  60-64 ;  plans  com- 
mercial conquest  of  French  West  Indies,  64;  statement  re- 
garding capital  of  Company  of  Cayenne,  76-77;  explains 
employment  of  inexperienced  clerks,  87-88;  advises  de  Clo- 
dor^  concerning  rebellions,  107;  urges  W.  I.  Co.  to  send 
strong  fleet  to  islands,  129;  put  in  command,  129;  character 

376 


INDEX 

and  conduct,  129-130;  arrives  at  Martinique,  137;  aids  in 
regulating  commerce,  138;  attacks  Antigua,  139;  captures 
Montserrat,  139;  withdraws  to  St.  Christopher,  140;  accuses 
de  Clodor6  of  disobedience,  140;  accused  of  cowardice,  140; 
returns  to  Martinique  and  fights  with  English,  140. 

L6ogane,  rebellion   at    202 

Levasseur,  leads  colony  to  settle  Tortuga  and  becomes  governor, 
29;  character  of  administration,  41. 

Lion,  du,  placed  in  command  of  Guadeloupe,  62;  made  governor 
by  W.  I.  Co.,  90;  complains  of  scarcity  of  supplies  and  ves- 
sels, 99-100;  fights  English  at  Antigua,  139;  charges  corrup- 
tion in  trade,  157;  complains  of  high  prices  charged  by  P61is- 
sier,  162;  accuses  de  Baas  of  corruption,  212-213;  character, 
213-214;  plans  establishment  of  sugar  refinery  at  Guade- 
loupe, 273;  asks  permission  for  cargo  of  live  stock  to  be 
brought  from  Holland  to  Guadeloupe,  327. 

Live  stock,  furnished  by  Dutch,  157;  price  at  Martinique,  162; 
trade  of  W.  I.  Co.,  164,  175;  supplied  by  foreign  traders,  184, 
188;  ordinance  of  December  20,  1670,  190-328;  raised  in 
French  islands,  211;  Colbert  rejects  proposal  to  obtain  sup- 
ply at  Boston,  221-222;  increasing  demand,  224,  326;  raised  at 
St.  Domingo,  258;  regulations,  326-329;  imported  from 
Cura9ao,  326,  327;  price,  326;  exportation  forbidden  at 
Curasao,  327;  imported  from  Porto  Rico,  328;  inadequate 
supply  in  France,  328;  price,  328. 

Lumber,  need  of  supply  in  West  Indies,  329;  partially  obtained 
in  France,  330. 

Madeira  Islands,  trade  with 130,  146 

Manufactures,  principal  articles  of,  imported  into  West  Indies, 

330;  regulations  governing  exportation  to  islands,  330-331. 
Marie  Galante,  becomes  proprietary,  43-44;  ceded  to  W.  I.  Co., 
73,    90;    attacked    by    Dutch,    246;    slaves    imported    from 
Curasao,  286,  327. 

Marseilles,  establishment  of  sugar  refinery  at  262 

Martinique,  settled  by  French,  27;  early  history,  27-28;  planters 
ordered  to  raise  cotton,  30;  cultivation  of  sugar-cane,  31-33, 
35;  becomes  a  proprietary  colony,  43;  importation  of  slaves, 
45;  corrupt  administration,  57;  arrival  of  W.  I.  Co.'s  fleet,  86- 
87;  discontent  with  the  company,  88;  official  inauguration  of 
W.  I.  Co.,  89-90;  rebellion,  99-106;  causes  and  significance, 
105-108;  another  rebellion,  132-135;  supplies  arrive,  135,  136; 
petition  of  planters  regarding  trade,  137-138;  attacked  by 
English,  140-141;  de  Baas  becomes  governor,  152;  price  of 
slaves,   162;   arrival  of  cargoes  of  slaves,   170-171;  cases  of 

377 


INDEX 

smuggling,  190;  de  Gabaret  maintains  patrol,  196;  provisions 
imported  from  English,  209,  210;  scarcity  of  salt  beef,  210; 
trade  with  Bordeaux,  237-238;  attacked  by  Reuyter,  245; 
low  price  of  sugar,  245;  tobacco  first  staple  product,  250; 
cultivation  of  sugar-cane  becomes  chief  industry,  260;  sugar 
refineries  established,  272-275;  number  of  slaves  imported, 
1654,  284;  Dutch  import  slaves,  286;  lack  of  slaves,  300,  306; 
scarcity  of  salt  beef,  322-323. 

Matharel,  stockholder  in  Company  of  Cayenne  and  W.  I.  Co., 
80,  83,  85. 

Menjot,  stockholder  in  Company  of  Cayenne  and  W.  I.  Co.,  .  .80,  176 

Molasses,  exportation  to  France  unprofitable,  220;  estimated 
value,  220;  price,  221;  proposal  to  market  in  New  England, 
222. 

Monopoly,  granted  to  W.  I.  Co.,  70;  Colbert's  attitude  toward 
principal  of  monopoly,  229  ff. ;  of  sale  of  tobacco  farmed 
out,  252,  255 ;  granted  to  Company  of  Senegal,  288,  293 ;  prob- 
ably granted  to  Oudiette,  290;  granted  for  slave  trade,  302; 
of  slave  trade  granted  conjointly  to  Company  of  Senegal 
and  Company  of  Guinea,  308. 

Montserrat,  captured  by  La  Barre,  139;  Dutch  trade  with,  207. 

Muscovado,  see  Sugar. 

Nacquart,   Sir,   proposes   to   establish   i  »mpany   for   trade   with 

West    Indies 55 

Nantes,  trade  with  West  Indies,  38,  219,  236,  241-242;  exports  to 
West  Indies,  241;  imports  from  Wes'  Indies,  241;  develop- 
ment of  trade,  243;  export  colonial  raw  sugar  to  Holland, 
which  angers  Colbert,  240-241 ;  privileges  of  trade  withdrawn 
and  restored,  241;  import  duties  upon  colonial  sugar,  313; 
trade  with  Ireland,  313;  ships  salt  beef  to  West  Indies,  321 
and  notes  42  and  43,  325. 

Nevis,  fight  with  French,  139-140;  smuggling  trade  with  French, 
191;  trade  with  Dutch,  207;  trade  with  St.  Christopher,  217. 

New  England,  trade  with,  191,  210;  proposal  to  trade  with,  224. 

Nymwegen,  treaty  of 219,  248,  289 

Ogeron,  governor  of  St.  Domingo,  vainly  tries  to  assert  W.  I. 
Co.'s  authority,  91 ;  encounters  revolt,  201-205 ;  explains  causes 
of  rebellion  and  suggests  remedies,  205-206;  appeals  to  Col- 
bert for  aid,  245 ;  proposes  establishment  of  colony  in  Florida, 
203;  leads  freebooters  to  cultivate  soil,  251. 

Olive,  de  1',  makes  settlement  at  Guadeloupe  25-27 

OUve  oil,  exported  from  Nantes  to  West  Indies  241 

378 


INDEX 

Orange,  Guillaume  d',  sent  to  explore  Guadeloupe,  Martinique 

and  Dominica    25 

Otterinck,  governor  of  Curasao,  corresponds  with  de  Baas   212 

Oudiette,  Jean,  farmer  of  Domaine  d'Occident  290,  291 

Parquet,  du,  shows  courage  in  fighting  Spaniards,  19;  in  com- 
mand at  Martinique,  27 ;  character  and  administration,  28,  41 ; 
becomes  proprietor  of  Martinique,  St.  Lucia  and  Grenada, 
43. 

Passports,  W.  I.  Co.  forbidden  to  issue  to  foreign  traders,  arret 
September  10,  1668,  183;  king  reserves  right  to  issue,  184- 
185;  regulations  concerning,  185,  226,  228,  328. 

Patoulet,  intendant,  receives  special  instructions  to  prohibit  for- 
eign trade,  219;  rebuked  by  Colbert  for  violating  instruc- 
tions, 219;  approves  plan  to  establish  trade  with  New  Eng- 
land, 221-222;  writes  concerning  tobacco  industry,  254;  ex- 
plains low  price  of  sugar,  272;  plays  important  rdle  in  build- 
ing up  sugar  refineries,  274;  personally  interested  in  refinery, 
275;  trades  with  merchant  of  La  Rochelle,  275,  325;  states 
advantages  of  refining  industry  in  West  Indies,  277;  protests 
against  favouritism  for  home  refiners,  279;  estimates  number 
of  slaves  needed  at  Martinique,  306;  suggests  raising  of  live 
stock  in  islands,  324. 

Pelissier,  director  of  W.  I.  C<o.  sent  to  West  Indies,  152;  charged 
with  duties  of  intendaiit,  158-159;  receives  full  instructions, 
159-161;  spends  two  years  in  islands,  161;  correspondence 
with  Colbert,  161-162  ;i  writes  memoir  concerning  West  India 
trade,  163;  arouses  complaints,  172,  175;  receives  further 
instructions  from  Colbert,  189-190,  192;  plan  for  trade  with 
Canada,  317. 

Plessis,  du,  settles  Guadeloupe  con j  ointly  with  de  I'Olive 25-26 

PUce  d'Inde,  defined,  297  and  note  70. 

Poincy,  de,  governor-general  sends  expedition  to  take  Tortuga, 
28-29;  makes  agreement  with  English  to  limit  production  of 
tobacco  and  issues  ordinance,  30,  250;  cultivates  sugar-cane, 
36,  260;  trades  with  Dutch  and  attempts  to  monopolize  trade, 
39;  character,  40;  refuses  to  obey  company  and  heads  rebel- 
lion, 41 ;  victorious,  41 ;  sends  colony  to  St.  Martin,  43 ;  orders 
attack  on  Spaniards  and  occupation  of  St.  Croix,  43-44;  large 
slave  owner,  45,  284. 

Population,  see  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  St.  Christopher,  etc.,  etc. 

Porto  Rico,  trade  with   193,  328 

Pouangay,  de,  governor  of  St.  Domingo,  writes  regarding  tobacco 
industry,  254,  257,  258;  complains  of  lack  of  slaves,  300; 
succeeded  by  de  Cussy,  357. 

379 


INDEX 

Private  traders,  permitted  to  trade  by  Company  of  Isles  of 
America  with  conditions,  39-40;  number  in  West  Indies  in 
1668,  153;  Colbert's  attitude  toward,  153;  passports  granted 
freely  to,  154;  attitude  of  W.  I.  Co.  toward,  154;  Colbert 
issues  instructions  for  protection  of,  160-163;  share  monopoly 
of  slave  trade,  172,  287;  increase,  175,  176,  180;  favoured  by 
Colbert,  225-226;  entire  W.  I.  trade  entrusted  to,  225;  insolent 
according  to  de  Baas,  226-227;  defended  by  Colbert,  227; 
regulations  favouring,  228-229;  Colbert  defines  policy  toward, 
229;  rapid  rise  of,  236;  distribution  in  several  ports  of 
France,  236  flF.;  little  interest  in  slave  trade,  287,  288;  ex- 
cluded from  trade  with  Africa,  293. 

Rambouillet,  de,  stockholder  in  Company  of  Cayenne  and  W.  I. 

Co 75 

Refineries,  sugar,  number  increases  in  France,  207;  established  at 
Bordeaux,  239;  at  Rouen,  243;  Colbert  urges  increase  of,  262- 
263;  Colbert  furnishes  part  of  capital,  262;  number  in  France 
in  1683,  263,  note  11;  proportion  of  raw  sugar  required,  264; 
enjoy  monopoly  of  colonial  sugar,  271;  Colbert  encourages 
establishment  in  West  Indies,  272-275;  first  established,  272; 
role  played  by  Patoulet,  274-275;  results,  276;  advantages  of 
refining  sugar  in  West  Indies  shown,  278 ;  in  West  Indies  sub- 
jected  to  increased  import  duty,  278;  new  establishments  for- 
bidden in  West  Indies,  278-279;  in  France  favoured,  279;  ex- 
port refined  sugar,  280. 

Reuyter,  attacks  Martinique    245 

Richelieu,  aids  organization  of  Company  of  St.  Christopher,  15; 
sends  protection  to  colony,  18;  subscribes  to  Company  of 
Isles  of  America,  23. 

Roissey,  Urbain  de,  sets  forth  with  d'Esnambuc  to  found  colony, 
14-16;  joint  command  at  St.  Christopher,  17;  joins  de  Razilly 
for  expedition  in  Irish  Sea,  18;  cowardice  and  imprisonment 
in  Bastille,  19. 

Roucou,  cultivation  encouraged,  30;  at  Cayenne,  65;  cultivated  at 
Martinique  before  1660,  2^1;  imported  at  Bordeaux,  238; 
never  important,  249. 

Rouen,  trade  with  West  Indies,  236,  242-243;  two  refineries,  262; 
special  tax  on  sugar,  265,  267;  special  drawback  on  refined 
sugar,  265. 

Rum,  no  market  in  France,  220;  proposals  to  market  in  New 
England,  221-222. 

St.  Bartholomew,  settled  by  French,  43;  becomes  possession  of 
W.  I.  Co.,  90. 

380 


INDEX 

St.  Christopher,  settled  by  French,  14;  early  history,  lS-22; 
cultivation  of  tobacco,  30;  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  begun, 
35-36;  becomes  possession  of  Knights  of  Malta,  43;  slaves, 
45;  trade  with  Dutch,  48;  ceded  to  W.  I.  Co.,  90;  opposition 
to  company,  91 ;  French  defeat  English  and  gain  whole  island, 
126-13T;  state,  132;  blockaded  by  English,  139;  harvest  dam- 
aged by  storm,  143;  illicit  trade,  185,  196;  trade  with  English 
permitted  under  conditions,  192;  Dutch  vessels  captured,  197; 
attempts  to  prevent  enforcement  of  regulations,  215-216;  regu- 
lations, 217-218;  trade  with  Bordeaux,  237-238;  quality  of 
tobacco,  250;  excellent  sugar,  260;  slaves  imported  by  Dutch, 
283;  price  of  slaves,  284;  debts  owed  Company  of  Senegal, 
306;  population,  1671,  1682,  336. 
St.  Croix,  Spaniards  driven  from  and  occupied  by  French,  44; 

ceded  to  W.  I.  Co.,  90;  scarcity  of  food-stuffs,  323. 
St.  Domingo,  early  French  settlement,  29;  granted  to  W.  I.  Co., 
90;  opposition  of  colony,  91;  trade  with  foreigners,  185;  re- 
volt against  W.  I.  Co.,  201-205;  causes,  205-206;  de  Cabaret 
attempts  to  quell  rebellion,  203-205;  trade  with  Bordeaux, 
237-238;  Dutch  attempt  to  win  colony,  247;  tobacco  staple 
product,  250-251;  memorial  of  planters  regarding  monopoly 
of  tobacco,  255;  conditions  at,  257;  average  production  of 
tobacco,  1683-1688,  258;  regulations  concerning  indentured 
servants,  282 ;  slave  trade,  300,  304,  306 ;  trade  with  Spaniards, 
329;  population,  337. 

St.  EuStatius,  trade  with  French 186-187,  191,  196,  207,  217 

St.  Laurent,  fights  against  English  at  St.  Christopher,  126-127; 
chosen  to  succeed  de  Sales  as  governor,  128;  prevents  revolt, 
132;  tries  to  prevent  foreign  trade,  217;  writes  memoir  on 
foreign  trade,  223.  , 
St.  Lucia,  settled  by  French  and  becomes  possession  of  du  Par- 
quet      43-44 

St.  Malo,  trade  with  West  Indies,  236,  240,  242-243;  import  duties 

on  sugar,  267;  trade  in  indentured  servants,  281. 
St.  Marthe,  governor  of  Martinique,  convicted  of  illicit  trade  . . .  .215 
St.  Martin,  settled  conjointly  with  Dutch,  43;  ceded  to  W.  I.  Co.,.  .90 

St.  Thomas,  import  duties  laid  on  sugar  from 266 

Saints,  the,  settled  by  colony  from  Guadeloupe 43-44 

Sales,  de,  governor  of  St.  Christopher 123,  126 

Salt  beef,  lack  of  supply  in  French  West  Indies  (1665),  99;  at- 
tempt to  provide,  116;  trade  of  W.  I.  Co.,  173-175;  supply 
ordinarily  obtained  in  Ireland,  173,  313;  Colbert  decides  to 
exclude  Irish,  174,  208,  319;  arret  of  August  17,  1671  and 
royal  ordinance  of  November  4,  1671,  320;  price  of  French 
beef,  174;  bounties  offered  by  Colbert,  320;  results,  175,  209- 

381 


INDEX 

210,  321;  suffering  in  islands,  210;  price,  217,  322-324,  325; 
importance  as  food,  312-313;  proposal  to  obtain  supply  at 
Boston,  221-222;  trade  between  Ireland  and  Nantes,  313; 
attempt  to  obtain  supply  in  Canada,  318;  Colbert  restores 
privilege  of  exporting  Irish,  323;  results,  324;  protests 
against  import  duty  of  1688,  325. 

Salt  pork,  forbidden  to  be  imported  from  foreign  countries,  219- 
220;  exported  from  La  Rochelle,  240;  from  Nantes,  241;  as 
food,  310;  price,  324. 

Senegal,  W.  I.  Co.'s  trade  with,  112,  116,  117,  146.  See  also  Com- 
pany of  Senegal. 

Shipping,  state  of  in  France,  49-50.    See  also  Commerce. 

Slaves,  at  St.  Christopher  in  1625,  283;  imported  by  Dutch  in 
1635,  283;  imported  into  Guadeloupe  for  cultivation  of  sugar- 
cane, 33-34,  284;  cheaper  than  indentured  servants,  283;  price 
in  1643,  1646,  1654,  284;  number  in  French  West  Indies  in 
1655,  44,  284;  growth  of  trade,  45;  profit  in  trade  estimated 
by  de  Tracy,  284;  number  in  Dutch  settlement  at  Cayenne, 
65;  W.  I.  Co.  makes  contract  for  supply,  117-118;  price  in 
sugar,  162;  Dutch  supply  Spaniards,  171;  supplied  to  French 
by  Dutch,  184,  188,  196,  285-286;  increasing  demand,  224; 
W.  I.  Co.  ordered  to  supply,  164;  company's  efforts,  165-173, 
285  ff. ;  expedition  to  Guinea  and  description  of  trade,  165  ff. ; 
contract  with  king  of  Ardres,  169;  W.  I.  Co.  sends  two  car- 
goes to  West  Indies,  169-170,  171,  286,  287;  trade  encouraged 
by  Colbert,  172;  trade  opened  to  private  traders,  226;  private 
traders  show  little  interest,  287;  import  duty  removed,  286; 
bounties  offered,  286;  log  of  a  vessel  engaged  in  slave  trade, 
171;  loss  in  transportation,  171;  Colbert  plans  to  supply 
Spaniards,  286;  price,  172,  286;  arrival  of  cargoes  at  Guade- 
loupe, 172;  numbers  regulated  at  St.  Domingo,  282;  fed  on 
salt  beef,  208;  history  of  trade,  283-309;  scarcity  in  1675, 
287,  290;  monopoly  created,  231,  288;  Oudiette's  contract, 
290;  Company  of  Senegal  makes  contract,  291-293;  bounties 
and  price,  293;  number  imported  by  company,  296-301;  sup- 
posed bounties  paid,  296;  sold  at  Guadeloupe  for  Bellinzani, 
299;  pidce  d'Inde  defined,  297,  note  70 ;  numbers  imported,  300 ; 
imported  from  foreigners,  303;  second  Company  of  Senegal 
makes  contract,  304-308;  numbers  imported  by  company,  304- 
305;  munbers  required,  306;  failure  of  company  to  satisfy 
contract,  307;  monopoly  shared  by  Company  of  Guinea  and 
Company  of  Senegal,  308;  results  of  Colbert's  efforts,  308- 
309;  condition  of  slave  labour  at  Martinique,  322-323;  popu- 
lation, 1671,  1684,  336. 
Smuggling,  see  Foreign  commerce. 


INDEX 

Spaniards,  attempt  to  destroy  French  colony  at  St,  Christopher, 
18-19;  driven  from  St.  Croix,  44;  trade  with  Dutch,  171; 
Colbert  plans  to  sell  slaves  to,  171;  trade  with  Spanish  Main 
planned,  192-193;  trade  with  Porto  Rico  forbidden,  193;  fur- 
nish live  stock  to  French,  328,  329. 

Sugar,  history  of  production  in  French  West  Indies  and  legisla- 
tion concerning,  260-280 ;  plans  to  cultivate  sugar-cane  in  1640, 
31-32;  successful,  33-36;  causes  for  slow  progress,  36;  be- 
comes chief  product  in  Windward  Islands,  250,  258;  influence 
upon  planters,  44;  Colbert  estimates  quantity  produced,  45; 
of  French  West  Indies  refined  in  Holland,  54;  import  duty 
in  France,  54;  drawback  on  refined,  70;  rate  of  transporta- 
tion to  France,  103-104;  as  currency,  162,  172,  175,  250;  ex- 
ported from  several  islands,  260,  261;  profit,  261;  imported 
from  Holland  and  Brazil  into  Provence,  263;  import  duty  on 
foreign  refined,  239,  263;  drawback,  265;  special  duties  and 
drawbacks  at  Rouen,  265;  duties,  266;  price  in  1665,  118; 
trade  with  Dutch,  157;  overproduction  and  depreciation, 
267;  Colbert's  instructions  to  Pelissier  concerning  same,  161, 
268;  price  in  France  (1670),  267;  perfecting  manufacture, 
269;  exported  from  France,  207;  price  at  Martinique,  211, 
245;  freed  from  export  duty  in  West  Indies  (ordinance  of 
June  9,  1670),  228;  imported  at  Bordeaux,  237-239;  exported 
from  Nantes  and  St.  Malo  to  Holland,  240,  242;  imported 
at  Rouen,  243;  Colbert's  attitude  toward  re-exportation  of 
raw  sugar,  269-271;  re-exportation  forbidden  by  arrH  of 
1684,  271;  low  price  in  France  (1679)  and  causes,  271;  refined 
at  Guadeloupe,  272;  growth  of  colonial  refineries,  272-275; 
duties  on  refined  in  colonies,  273-274;  rise  in  price  (1679), 
276;  benefits  of  refining,  276-278;  arret  of  April  18,  1682, 
278;  results,  279-280;  increase  of  production,  280;  freed  from 
import  duty  in  Canada,  318.    See  also  Refineries. 

Talon,  intendant  in  Canada,  tries  to  build  up  trade  with  West 
Indies,  315-317;  sustains  losses,  318. 

T6m6ricourt,  governor  of  Marie  Galante   327 

Thoisy,    de,    appointed    governor-general,    but    defeated    by    de 

Poincy    41 

Tobacco,  history  of  cultivation  and  trade,  249-259;  early  produc- 
tion at  St.  Christopher,  30;  excellent  quality,  250;  staple,  36, 
250;  depreciation  and  agreement  with  English  to  limit  pro- 
duction, 30,  250;  as  currency,  250;  exported  to  Holland,  54; 
import  duties  in  France,  54,  251,  252;  cultivation  at  Cay- 
enne, 65;  rate  of  transportation  to  France,  103-104;  cargo 
arrives  at  Dunkerque,  109;  imported  into  France,  157,  162, 

383 


INDEX 

171,  183,  238;  cultivation  becomes  secondary  in  Windward 
Islands,  250;  remains  staple  in  St.  Domingo,  251;  cultivation 
in  France  restricted,  252;  forbidden  in  Canada,  252;  monop- 
oly of  sale  in  France,  252-253;  results,  253-255;  monopoly 
renewed,  255;  re-exportation  permitted,  256;  estimated  pro- 
duction (1674),  258;  results  at  St.  Domingo,  258;  freed  from 
import  duties  in  Canada,  318. 

Tortuga,  English  expelled  and  French  settlement  made,  28-29; 
rebels  against  W.  I.  Co.,  91;  trade  with,  146,  177;  Dutch  trade 
with,  201. 

Tobago,  captured  by  French 247 

Tracy,  Alexander  Prouville  de,  mission  to  America,  59;  character 
and  duties,  59;  administration,  60;  commended  by  Colbert, 
61;  restores  order,  62;  inaugurates  W.  I.  Co.,  88-90;  corre- 
spondence, 261;  estimates  profit  of  slave  trade,  285. 

Trade,  see  Commerce,  Foreign  commerce. 

Treillebois,  Sieur  de  La  Rabesni^res,  de,  commands  squadron  in 

West    Indies    151,    195 

Trezel,  makes  contract  to  cultivate  sugar-cane  in  West  Indies, 
31-33,  35,  39. 

Warner,  Sir  Thomas,  governor  of  English  at  St.  Christopher  . . .  17-18 
West  India  Company,  preparation  for  organization,  68;  establish- 
ment, 68  ff. ;  letters-patent  analyzed,  70 ;  administration,  71 ; 
resources  according  to  Colbert,  71-72  and  note;  opposition 
by  proprietors,  73-74;  contracts  with  proprietors,  74  and  note 
8 ;  analysis  of  subscriptions,  75  ff. ;  stockholders  and  directors, 
75  ff. ;  relation  to  Company  of  Cayenne,  75-77 ;  real  character, 
82;  history,  1664-1665,  83-122;  preparation  for  trade,  83; 
delay,  84;  description  of  first  fleet,  85-86  and  note  9;  inexpe- 
rience of  clerks  and  explanation,  87-88;  inauguration  in  West 
Indies,  89-90;  agents  and  correspondents  in  France  and  Hol- 
land, 94;  builds  and  buys  vessels,  94;  sends  vessels  to  West 
Indies,  95,  99;  discontent  among  planters,  90-92;  revolt  at 
Martinique,  98-99;  state  of  finances,  1665,  96;  borrows,  98- 
99;  fails  to  supply  needs,  99-100;  complaints  against,  101; 
receives  aid  from  king,  102-103;  sends  vessels,  103;  revolt  at 
Martinique,  103-106;  suits  against  at  Dieppe  and  Rouen,  104; 
authority  sustained  by  de  Clodore,  106;  de  La  Barre  admits 
lack  of  success,  107;  failure  to  meet  conditions  in  West 
Indies,  108;  sends  out  vessels,  108;  receives  cargoes,  109; 
financial  condition  November,  1665,  109;  receives  aid  from 
king,  109-110;  commerce  embarrassed,  110;  authorized  to 
seize  English  goods,  110;  awarded  claims  by  British,  111; 
distribution  of  trade,  111-112;  contracts  for  ships,  116;  makes 

384 


INDEX 

contract  for  slave  trade,  117;  sends  vessels  to  Canada,  118; 
state  of  trade,  May,  1666,  114-115;  summary  of  activity,  1664- 
1665,  115-121;  directors  suggest  union  with  East  India  Com- 
pany, 121;  history,  1666-1667,  123-149;  financial  condition  at 
outbreak  of  war  with  England,  128 ;  in  control  of  St.  Christo- 
pher, 128;  sends  fleet,  128-131,  135;  sends  more  vessels,  136; 
permits  Dutch  to  trade,  139;  vessels  in  attack  upon  Antigua, 
139;  losses  from  English  attack  at  Martinique,  140-142;  dis- 
astrous effects  of  war,  142-144;  financial  embarrassment,  144; 
statement  November,  1667,  145-147;  distribution  of  assets 
and  value,  147;  receives  aid,  147;  number  of  vessels,  147-148; 
prepares  vessels  for  Cayenne,  Cape  Verde  and  Guinea,  148; 
history,  1668-1670,  150-164;  attitude  of  Colbert  after  war, 
150-154,  235;  shares  trade  with  private  traders,  153,  227;  for- 
bidden to  grant  passports  to  Dutch,  153,  189-190;  reforms  in 
administration,  155;  confined  to  wholesale  trade,  156;  first 
dividend,  156;  commerce  declines,  156-157;  sends  new  agent 
to  West  Indies,  158 ;  Colbert's  instructions,  159  ff. ;  commerce 
limited  to  certain  articles,  163,  190;  declines,  164;  history, 
1670-1674,  165-181;  sends  vessels  to  Guinea  and  opens  slave 
trade,  165-1*73;  treaty  with  king  of  Ardres,  169,  285;  trade  in 
salt  beef,  173-175;  trade  in  live  stock,  175,  189;  dissolved  by 
Colbert,  175,  176,  179;  liquidation,  176-178;  financial  condi- 
tion, 177-178;  reasons  for  failure,  179;  service  rendered,  179- 
181;  revolt  at  St.  Domingo,  201-205;  sends  refiners  to  West 
Indies,  273. 

West  Indies,  establishment  of  French,  14flF.;  population,  1642, 
30;  become  proprietaries,  43;  population  in  1665,  44;  condi- 
tion in  1664,  50-51;  absorb  attention  of  W.  I.  Co.,  112;  gov- 
ernor-general placed  in  command,  155;  Colbert  encourages 
increase  in  population,  160;  trade  with  France,  236  flF.;  de- 
crease of  trade  with  Normandy  and  Brittany,  243-244;  culti- 
vation of  tobacco,  250;  storms,  295;  trade  by  Company  of 
Senegal,  296-301;  trade  with  Canada,  315-316;  causes  for 
failure,  318-319;  nature  of  trade,  335.  See  also  Martinique, 
Guadeloupe,  St.  Domingo,  etc.,  etc. 

Wine,   article  of  export  to  West  Indies   at  Bordeaux,   La  Ro- 

chelle,  Nantes 238,  240,  241 


385 


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